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Bombay High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 99 (BOM)

Laukik Tukaram Khedkar v. Rahul Education Society

2009-01-21

S.A.BOBDE

body2009
Order: 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Mr.Topkar for the respondent nos.1 & 2 and Mrs.Bhende, the learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader for the respondent no.3, waive service. Heard by consent. 2. The petitioner has challenged the dismissal of his appeal against termination by the School Tribunal. The learned Tribunal has dismissed the appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to grant only the relief of back wages. According to the Tribunal, the petitioner’s appeal is not tenable since the petitioner gave up the prayer for reinstatement and restricted his prayer only for back wages. On merits, the Tribunal seems to have taken the view that because the Education Department withdrew the approval granted to the petitioner’s appointment on the ground that there was fall in the number of students and, therefore, no work-load, the petitioner did not complete his period of probation satisfactorily. 3. Mr.Bandiwadekar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Tribunal should have seen that the petitioner gave up only the relief of reinstatement because he was employed elsewhere, but nonetheless prayed for back wages. According to the learned counsel, at no point of time, the petitioner gave up the challenge to the termination order and, therefore, the Tribunal was in error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal and that such an appellant was bound to approach some other forum. 4. Having considered the submission of both the sides, I am of view that the contention on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be upheld. Section 9(1) of the MEPS Act reads as follows:- "9. 4. Having considered the submission of both the sides, I am of view that the contention on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be upheld. Section 9(1) of the MEPS Act reads as follows:- "9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of private schools: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school,- (a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the Management; or (b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion, and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8: Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court, on the appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before the 1st July, 1976." The section confers a right of appeal on an employee aggrieved by dismissal, removal, etc., or superseded to prefer an appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8. Thus, the section provides a forum to an aggrieved employee of a school to challenge any order by which he is dismissed, removed or terminated or reduced in rank or, the action of the management in superseding him while making an appointment to any post by promotion. The section has provided a remedy against the aforesaid acts by which an employee of a school may be aggrieved. A party approaching a Tribunal or Court under any such provision is thus entitled to challenge the act by which he is aggrieved and to seek appropriate relief therefor. An employee may claim relief depending on his circumstances. The Tribunal may grant relief depending on what it considers appropriate. In all such matters, the relief follows the decision on the challenge to the act. Thus, it is perfectly open for a party to pray for addition or deletion of reliefs, in accordance with law, provided the party does not give up the challenge to the act by which he is aggrieved. In all such matters, the relief follows the decision on the challenge to the act. Thus, it is perfectly open for a party to pray for addition or deletion of reliefs, in accordance with law, provided the party does not give up the challenge to the act by which he is aggrieved. There was no basis for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that because the petitioner gave up the relief of reinstatement, he was not entitled to maintain the appeal only on the ground of back wages since the Tribunal had no corresponding jurisdiction to decide only the question of back wages. In taking this view, the Tribunal completely lost sight of the fact that it has been conferred with the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against dismissal, removal or termination or reduction in rank of an employee of a school by the management. That jurisdiction to decide whether an employee’s appeal should be allowed is not lost if the employee alters i.e. gives up any of the reliefs as long as the employee does not give up the challenge to the action of the management by which he is aggrieved. 5. Apart from the above infirmity in the order, there is no justification for the Tribunal for taking the view that the petitioner cannot be said to have completed his period of probation because the approval of his appointment was withdrawn on the ground of fall in students and want of work-load. It is difficult to see how it could be said that if there is a fall in work-load and such a fall leads to termination of a teacher, the teacher must be taken not to have completed his probationary period satisfactorily. The finding suffers from gross non-application of mind and perversity. 6. In the result, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the School Tribunal for a fresh decision, in accordance with law. The Tribunal shall decide the appeal, as expeditiously as possible. 7. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.