COMMON JUDGMENT:- (per C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J.,) I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Alienation of lands situated within the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits to various Societies comprising as their members, persons, who are members of both the Houses of A.P. State Legislature, members of both the Houses of Parliament from A.P., Officers of All India Services i.e., IAS, IPS and IRS, who are the non-natives and working in the State of A.P. and those belonging to other States cadre with A.P. nativity working/worked on deputation in the State of A.P., Journalists and the High Court Judges of A.P., is the subject matter of this batch of writ petitions. 2. When the State Government attempted to alienate the lands in favour of the persons belonging to the above categories, individually, the same was questioned by Dr. Rao V.B.J. Chelikani, petitioner No.1 in WP.No.7956 of 2008 along with two others by filing WP.No.13730 of 2006. A Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice G.S.Singhvi as he then was and one of us (CVNR,J) allowed the said writ petition and quashed G.O.Ms.No.522, Revenue (ASN.V) Department, dated 04.05.2006, whereby alienation of land was made in respect of the abovementioned categories, insofar as the said G.O. providing for allotment of land to the individuals, who are not members of the societies/groups and who may have received the benefit of concessional allotments from the Government earlier or as member of any society or group to which concessional allotment was made, was concerned. The Division Bench, while finding that there can be no rationale or justification for allotting land to the individuals irrespective of the fact that they may be possessing properties either in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children or they may have already been benefited by allotment of land at concessional rate either directly or through society, felt that the Government will do well to incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment of land to those who own a house or house site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children, and make the same applicable to all future allotments, which may be made in accordance with the policy enshrined in G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 dated 28.02.2005. The Division Bench left it open to the identified categories of persons to form new societies and get the same registered or make applications as groups for the purpose of allotment of land in terms of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243 dated 28.02.2005. 3. Purporting to follow the Division Bench judgment referred to above, the State Government issued as many as eight G.Os., viz., G.O.Ms.No.419, G.O.Ms.No.420, G.O.Ms.No.421, G.O.Ms.No.422, G.O.Ms.No.423, G.O.Ms.No.424 and G.O.Ms.No.425, dated 25.03.2008 and G.O.Ms.No.551, dated 27.03.2008 in favour of the various societies, which are shown as respondent Nos.4 to 11 respectively in these three writ petitions, whereunder different parcels of lands were alienated in their favour for being allotted to their members. The validity of these orders is assailed in these writ petitions by certain individuals and registered bodies in public interest. II. BACKGROUND: 4. The State Government, realizing the urgent need for prudent management of the land resource located in urban and semi-urban areas for making provision for housing to “the targeted sections of society”, issued G.O.Ms.No.242, Revenue (Assignment-I) Department, dated 28-2-2005. By issuing the said G.O., the Government intended to have a comprehensive policy of meeting housing requirement of targeted sections of society by creation of land bank. The land was divided into five categories having regard to its ownership, usefulness for housing and location. This G.O., envisaged constitution of committees for short-listing the land for housing and other institutional needs keeping in mind the demand for the next twenty years. The Collector & District Magistrate of the District concerned is made the competent authority to transfer the Government land to land bank. He is entrusted with the power of acquiring private land for public purposes. The said G.O., also envisaged constitution of a Committee, known as “Empowered Committee”, which is vested with the powers to decide allotment of land, its apportionment and usage based on hierarchy of needs. It is also prescribed in the said G.O., that the Government will issue separate orders on the methodology to be adopted for selecting the Housing Societies/Institutions for allotment/alienation of land out of land bank, the conditions of allotment and on conferment of ownership rights. 5. On the same day of issue of G.O.Ms.No.242, the Government issued two other G.Os., bearing Nos.243 and 244. 5. On the same day of issue of G.O.Ms.No.242, the Government issued two other G.Os., bearing Nos.243 and 244. The first of the said G.Os., purported to lay down guidelines, such as approach, methodology, the beneficiaries, the competent authority and the conditions for allotment of the land. The categories of beneficiaries indicated in G.O.Ms.No.243 are Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court; MLAs; MPs; All India Service Officers; Accredited Journalists from recognized and registered newspapers; the State Government Employees and Panchayat Raj Teachers working in the State of Andhra Pradesh; Recognized National and International Sports persons and eminent persons in the field of Culture and Arts; Defence employees, Central Government employees and employees of PSUs; Widows of Kargil and other war heroes and extremist violence who are hailing from Andhra Pradesh; Weaker Sections; and Institutions – Educational/Charitable/Religious etc. The above mentioned categorization was made the basis for pricing of the land for alienation. The said G.O., also prescribed plot sizes for beneficiaries specified therein under 3 categories. Extents of 500 Sq. yards each are prescribed for Supreme Court and High Court Judges, MPs., MLAs., and All India Service Categories; 400 to 100 Sq. yards for Government employees; and 300 Sq. yards for Journalists. Under G.O.Ms.No.244 interse apportionment of plot sizes among the All India Service Officers and other employees is envisaged, ranging between 500 Sq. yards and 100 Sq. yards. 6. Under G.O.Ms.No.522, Revenue (Assn.V) Department, dated 4-5-2006, the State Government, accepting the proposals of the Collector, Ranga Reddy District/Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, allotted Government land admeasuring Ac.245.00 in Ranga Reddy District. The categories of allottees, respective extents of lands and their location are indicated in the following table: (TABLE ) The appendix of the said G.O., contains guidelines and conditions subject to which allotments are to be made. 7. G.O.Ms.No.522 was the subject matter of challenge before the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006, referred to supra. The said Writ Petition was allowed, G.O.Ms.No.522 was quashed and liberty was given to the Government to make fresh allotments in the light of the directions and observations contained in the said judgment as referred to hereinbefore. 7. G.O.Ms.No.522 was the subject matter of challenge before the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006, referred to supra. The said Writ Petition was allowed, G.O.Ms.No.522 was quashed and liberty was given to the Government to make fresh allotments in the light of the directions and observations contained in the said judgment as referred to hereinbefore. Purporting to accept and implement the said judgment in so far as allotment of Government land in favour of mutually aided co-operative housing societies instead of individual members are concerned and also having decided that the allotment of house sites shall be made in accordance with the policy enunciated in G.O.Ms.Nos.242, 243 and 244, the Government issued series of G.Os., viz., G.O.Ms.No.419 dated 25-3-2008 and seven others referred to earlier, whereby allotment of lands was made in favour of the societies instead of individuals. The extents of lands and their location were the same as covered by G.O.Ms.No.522 dated 4-5-2006 with some of the conditions contained in the said G.O., having been varied. These G.Os., are called in question in the present batch of Writ Petitions. 8. Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to mention that G.O.Ms.No.421, dated 25-3-2008, which was issued in favour of the A.P. High Court Judges’ Mutually Aided Co-operative Society Limited, was withdrawn by the State Government, vide: G.O.Ms.No.482, dated 20-4-2009, on the request of the said Society. This fact has been placed on record by Sri K.S.Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.2956 of 2008, through his letter, dated 1-5-2009, addressed to the registry. The learned counsel submitted a copy of the said G.O., while informing the registry that his clients are not-pressing the Writ Petition qua respondent No.6, for Court’s perusal. In view of this subsequent event, G.O.Ms.No.421, dated 25-3-2008, which ceased to exist, is eschewed from consideration in these cases. III. PLEADINGS: A) PETITIONERS’ CASE: The petitioners in these three Writ Petitions assailed the said G.Os., in public interest. Their case, as reflected in the averments contained in their respective Writ Petitions, is as under: (a) W.P.No.7956 OF 2008: 9. In this Writ Petition, petitioner No.1 was one of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006. III. PLEADINGS: A) PETITIONERS’ CASE: The petitioners in these three Writ Petitions assailed the said G.Os., in public interest. Their case, as reflected in the averments contained in their respective Writ Petitions, is as under: (a) W.P.No.7956 OF 2008: 9. In this Writ Petition, petitioner No.1 was one of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006. Their main grievance is that the State Government failed to follow its own policy guidelines contained in G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 and also brazenly violated the directions given and the unequivocal findings rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006. The petitioners pointed out violation of the following conditions contained in G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244: “(i) Allotment of land only in designated areas as per availability of land. (ii) Land shall be allotted in the satellite townships to be developed by HUDA, APHB etc. (iii) Land in the prime locations of Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts should be allotted only in favour of government organizations, public purpose, institutions only. (iv) Land located within the proposed outer ring road should not be allotted for house sites. (v) Beneficiary shall not sell the site for fifteen years. (vi) In the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad lands has to be alienated preferably for the construction of flats. (vii) Allotment of land at prevailing market value for Central Government Employees. (viii) The land value is also pegged at the prevailing price on 04-5-2006”. The petitioners pointed out that all the allotments made by the Government are in respect of the lands situated in the prime locations within the Ring Road and the limits of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and surrounded by various important institutions carrying on various activities. It is useful to refer to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the affidavit, which are as under: “20. The village Poppalaguda, Nanakramguda, Gopannapally, Vattinagulapalli, Nizampet and Pet Basheerabad are prime locations and within the outer Ring Road. The villages in which the land is allotted to various categories of persons detailed above are highly sought after places for residence and offices. The Golf Course, the Indian Business School, the Delhi Public School, the Okridge Public School and the offices of Infosys, Microsoft, Wipro, Templeton, ISTA Hotel (7 Star Spa), Business Associates are established in these localities. The central business district is established at Nanakramguda. The Golf Course, the Indian Business School, the Delhi Public School, the Okridge Public School and the offices of Infosys, Microsoft, Wipro, Templeton, ISTA Hotel (7 Star Spa), Business Associates are established in these localities. The central business district is established at Nanakramguda. The villages of Poppalguda, Manikonda Jagir, Gopanpally and Vattinagulapalli are neighbouring villages of Nanakramguda. The large number of private apartment buildings, row houses are coming up on these areas. The road to the International Airport is passing through Nanakramguda village and the villages in which the lands are allotted are adjacent/nearby to the Ring Road. 21. The Nizampet and Pet Basherabad are prime locations for residential and commercial buildings and biggest housing complex that is KPHB is near Nizampet. The Mytas township being constructed by Satyam Group is adjacent to Nizampet village and within the limits of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation limits. In Pet Basheerbad the Satyam software development office is located and various other residential apartments”. The petitioners also pleaded that while allotting the lands, the Government failed to stipulate the condition of ineligibility of members of the societies who own a house or house site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children, in terms of the Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006. (b) Writ Petition No.7997 of 2008: 10. The pleadings in this Writ Petition are more or less similar to those raised in Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008. In addition to them, it is pleaded that identification of categories of beneficiaries under G.O.Ms.No.243 is neither based on any empirical data nor any reasonable and objective criteria having nexus with the object sought to be achieved and the same is, therefore, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and against public policy. 11. It is also pleaded that in recent years the Government has acquired private lands to a tune of 5000 acres situated in various villages of Ranga Reddy District for I.T. Projects, Bio-tech parks, Apparel Park, Discovery City, Hardware Park etc., on the ground that sufficient Government land is not available. The villages in which the lands are allotted under the impugned G.Os., are located in the I.T. Corridor earmarked for I.T. Companies. The villages in which the lands are allotted under the impugned G.Os., are located in the I.T. Corridor earmarked for I.T. Companies. On one hand the Government is acquiring the lands belonging to poor agriculturists in the name of public interest by invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and paying meagre compensation for those lands and, on the other, is allotting Government land to private societies. While the average price per acre in the area is not less than Rs.20.00 crores per acre, allotment of land on basic registration value is wholly arbitrary. Allotment of lands on such meagre prices to the persons irrespective of their private possessions is illegal. The persons belonging to media are neither Government servants, nor people of eminence, nor holding any positions in the Government. Allotment to the members of Press at concessional rate would affect the concept of “Free Press”. The Government holds the public land as a trustee for the benefit of public at large and allotment of lands under the impugned G.Os., without conducting auction or inviting tenders is against public interest. Allotment of land to the Judges of the High Court affects independence of the judiciary, which is one of the basic features of the Constitution. (c) WRIT PETITION No.23682 of 2008: 12. The impugned G.Os., are violative of the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli (for short “the 1317 Fasli”). Section 24 of the said Act provides for allotment of land by the District Collector in the manner prescribed and Section 25 does not contemplate any permanent alienation but it only provides for placing the land at the disposal of the concerned agencies for any public purposes. A fortiori, the A.P. (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands and Land Revenue Rules, 1975 (for short “Alienation of State Lands Rules”) framed under Section 25 of the 1317 Fasli have no application and Assignment of House Sites in Villages & Towns in Telangana Area Rules, 1975 (for short “the Assignment of House Sites Rules”) directly apply as the said Rules deal with assignment of house sites for private purposes, whether individuals, firms or societies and whether the grant is free or is made on payment of full or a concessional value for the land. Therefore, allotment of land under the impugned G.Os., by placing reliance on Rules 2(i) and 10 of the Alienation of State Lands Rules, is erroneous. The impugned G.Os., are contrary to the declared policy of the State Government in existence from 1961 onwards, under which land in and around Hyderabad has been prohibited from alienation for house site purposes. The impugned allotment is also contrary to Board Standing Orders. G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 are also violative of the policy specified in G.O.Ms.No.242 on the following aspects. The allotments are not need based, but were made as of right. No comprehensive exercise was contemplated in respect of acquisition cost of land, identification of the persons who are in need of shelter, determination of hierarchy of needs, demand for land, apportionment of usage based on hierarchy of needs, and recommended price to be fixed for the land proposed for allotment. Allotments were made in violation of the policy norm governing the location viz., plots were allotted in areas where only flats alone shall be constructed and allotted. Norms regarding prohibition of allotment of sites near Satellite Township and within Outer Ring Road are violated. Classification was made only for pricing purpose. Discrimination in pricing among the identified categories is indulged in. Assessment of availability of land is not made. The Collector & District Magistrate has not given approval for allotment. The Empowered Committee, envisaged in G.O.Ms.No,243, has not stipulated the rates. Beneficiaries were identified first irrespective of need or necessity as envisaged in G.O.Ms.No.242. Categories (2) to (4) in G.O.Ms.No.243 are discriminated against Category (1) in fixing the ratio of extents of land where lesser land is available. The State cannot indulge in discrimination among the citizens while undertaking welfare activity. Allotment among the four institutions of Democracy as a one time welfare measure is wholly unconscionable, reeks of favouritism and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The allotments are contrary to the Directive Principles of the State policy and the concept of Welfare State. The allotments being beyond the conditions of service and employment, the Government is obligated to treat all the citizens equally. Necessity ought to be the only criteria when free or concessional allotments are made. The persons belonging to All India Service constitute creamy layer and, therefore, are not entitled to affirmative action. The allotments are violative of the ‘trust’ doctrine. The allotments being beyond the conditions of service and employment, the Government is obligated to treat all the citizens equally. Necessity ought to be the only criteria when free or concessional allotments are made. The persons belonging to All India Service constitute creamy layer and, therefore, are not entitled to affirmative action. The allotments are violative of the ‘trust’ doctrine. B) RESPONDENTS’ CASE: a) The stand of official respondents 1 to 3: The gist of the stand taken by respondents 1 to 3, as reflected in various counter-affidavits and additional counter-affidavits filed by them, is referred to hereunder to the extent it is relevant. 14. The Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 operates as resjudicata/constructive resjudicata. G.O.Ms.No.522, by which alienation of land was made, was interfered with only on two grounds, viz., allotments in favour of individuals, who are not members of societies/groups, was bad; and non-inclusion of the persons, who may have received the benefit of concessional allotments from the Government earlier or as member of any society or group to which concessional allotment was made, was not legal. Neither the identity of the beneficiaries nor the location and allotment of land has been interfered with under the said judgment. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted to once again raise the same issues, which were raised but were not successful in the earlier round by operation of doctrine of resjudicata/constructive resjudicata and application of the principle underlying Order II Rule 2 C.P.C. 15. The Division Bench has not declared G.O.Ms.No.522 as illegal on the ground that it did not contain any condition of ineligibility of the persons, who own a house or house site in their names or in the name of their spouses or children and the said judgment merely contains certain observations reflecting the views of the Bench, which do not constitute any direction to the Government to stipulate such a condition. 16. The Government, after examination of the issue, decided not to incorporate any condition to render the persons owning houses or house sites, as that would amount to discrimination. The one time allotment of the house sites is in recognition of the services rendered by various categories of persons, as an incentive. Therefore, the allotment of lands to various categories under the impugned G.Os., is not on the ground that they belong to weaker sections. 17. The one time allotment of the house sites is in recognition of the services rendered by various categories of persons, as an incentive. Therefore, the allotment of lands to various categories under the impugned G.Os., is not on the ground that they belong to weaker sections. 17. Earlier to issue of G.O.Ms.No.12 dated 11-1-2002 amending the Alienation of State Lands Rules, State lands could be alienated only for a public purpose and, that too, by following the procedure prescribed in the said Rules. After issue of G.O.Ms.No.12, the lands of the State can be alienated not only for public purpose, but also “for any specified purpose”. Under Rule 10 of the said Rules, the Government is empowered to alienate the State lands in Telangana area by following a reasonable procedure. The Division Bench recognized this power of the Government in its judgment in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 and traced the allotments to the said Rule, though the said Rule was not specifically referred in the order of allotment. 18. The core issue that was framed by the Division Bench in the earlier Writ Petition was whether the decision of the Government to relax the conditions embodied in G.O.Ms.Nos.242, 243 and 244 to facilitate allotment of lands to individuals belonging to the identified categories was constitutionally valid and the Bench specifically held that no serious view can be taken on allotment of lands to groups or societies comprising identified persons including the MPs., and MLAs; Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court; the Members of All India Service; employees of other categories; persons who have excelled in different fields of public life and sports; and journalists. The Government seriously considered the observations of the Division Bench and after obtaining clearance from the Council of Ministers, as required under Business Rules, allotted the Government lands to eight mutually aided co-operative societies. In doing so, the Government complied with the directions of the Division Bench and incorporated the relevant clauses in the impugned G.Os. By no stretch of imagination allotment of land to the identified categories, who have served the State/public, for the purpose of housing can be termed as distribution of largesse to the persons of the choice of the Government. 19. There is no illegality in fixing the basic value as on 4-5-2006 as sale price. By no stretch of imagination allotment of land to the identified categories, who have served the State/public, for the purpose of housing can be termed as distribution of largesse to the persons of the choice of the Government. 19. There is no illegality in fixing the basic value as on 4-5-2006 as sale price. Provision for houses/house sites to lower and middle class people and for those to whom allotments were made under the impugned G.Os., are governed by two different policies and they are not comparable with each other. 20. There is nothing wrong in acquiring private lands for using for public purpose, which comprehend the purpose of allotting house sites to the identified categories under the impugned G.Os. 21. While one of the modes of disposing the Government properties is by way of public auction, under Rule 10 of the Alienation of State Lands Rules the lands can be disposed of either through public auction or by following a reasonable procedure. 22. Highly talented educated individuals are entering the Government service at meagre pay scales when compared to private sector. It is always open for the Government to take note of the fact that the Government servants are rendering services to the State/public sacrificing their other lucrative opportunities. 23. The elected representatives, Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court and journalists, who are serving the State/public shall be reasonably compensated for the services they render to the Society. 24. The Government has also taken note of the fact that in normal circumstances it has become highly impossible to acquire a piece of land for construction of dwelling houses with their meagre incomes. Various persons/individuals serving the State in different walks of life are needed to be given security about their future and providing house sites to them is one such measure. 25. All India Service Officers of Andhra Pradesh origin, serving in other State cadres, is given the benefit as most of them work in the State on deputation for a considerable length of their service rendering service to the State. This apart, allotment of land to such officers would encourage people in the State to compete for selection in All India Services and talented people will enter the Government Service if such benefits are made available to them. Same is the case with respect to persons working in Indian Revenue Service. 26. This apart, allotment of land to such officers would encourage people in the State to compete for selection in All India Services and talented people will enter the Government Service if such benefits are made available to them. Same is the case with respect to persons working in Indian Revenue Service. 26. There is no prohibition in G.O.Ms.No.243 on allotment of land within Outer Ring Road or in the area where flats culture is in existence within the limits of Municipal Corporations. 27. As the earlier Division Bench has not interfered with the allotments on those grounds, the same cannot be raised once over. 28. The contention that identification of categories was made without any empirical data by adopting a per-determined criteria, is denied as incorrect. 29. The idea behind allotment of land to the deserved sections is to encourage them to perform their duties without any fear or favour and it is a kind of benevolent act on the part of the Government. Such a gesture would attract the talented and educated people into public/Government service, who otherwise prefer employment in private sector in view of remunerative service terms. 30. By the impugned allotments, neither the independence of the Judiciary is affected nor the freedom of Press is curtailed. 31. The comprehensive policy enunciated in G.O.Ms.No.242 and the guidelines contained in G.O.Ms.No.243 cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 32. Though the allotment of house sites is not a part of service conditions of the public servants, Judges and public representatives, it is always open to the Government to take welfare measures in recognition of the services rendered by them as an act of benevolence by following a reasonable method/procedure. b) The stand of private respondents-beneficiaries: 33. In their separate counter-affidavits these respondents raised the pleas which are in effect identical to the stand taken by respondents 1 to 3 in their counter-affidavits referred to supra. 34. Respondent No.4-Society, which claims to have comprised 22 members of All India Service Officers of Andhra Pradesh nativity borne on other State cadres and served the Government of Andhra Pradesh on deputation for a period of three years or more as on 29-4-2006, filed a separate counter-affidavit. They pleaded that allotment of land in their favour is neither illegal nor unconstitutional. They pleaded that allotment of land in their favour is neither illegal nor unconstitutional. The issue of legality of allotment of land covered by G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 522 was subject matter of previous litigation and the impugned G.O., was issued in its favour after duly taking into consideration the judgment of this Court in the said Writ Petition. 35. The Government has got power under Part-IV of the Constitution to distribute material resources, which term is wide enough to include not only natural or physical resources, but also movable or immovable properties and all private and public sources of meeting material needs. By working in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Members of the Society rendered/are rendering yeoman service to this State and its people and the classification made by the Government for the purpose of alienation of land is inconformity with Article 14 of the Constitution. None of the members of the Society were the beneficiaries of earlier allotments and there is no justification to impose a condition regarding not owning a house or house site. 36. Respondent No.5-Society pleaded that the transfer of land made under the impugned G.Os., is in the nature of sale of land for consideration and not an allotment. 37. It is further pleaded that G.O.Ms.No.242 contained a comprehensive policy of the Government to meet the housing requirements of its employees, middleclass citizens, the poor and those who are in public life. It envisaged creation of land bank for allotment to various housing co-operative societies and other targeted groups and the said G.O., cannot be found fault with on any valid ground. G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 contained policy guidelines of the Government for allotment of land out of the said land bank. This Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not adjudicate upon the validity of such policy guidelines. 38. The Members of Legislative Assembly/Council and Parliament are devoting their life and energy to the Society in public interest and they need every encouragement by providing incentives such as allotment of house sites. 39. The G.O., issued in favour of respondent No.5-Society alienating the land is strictly in accordance with the policy of the State contained in G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 dated 28-2-2005. 39. The G.O., issued in favour of respondent No.5-Society alienating the land is strictly in accordance with the policy of the State contained in G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 dated 28-2-2005. Following the said G.O., the State Government executed sale deed dated 28-3-2008 (wrongly mentioned as 28th February, 2008) alienating Ac.57.00 in Survey No.277 of Poppalaguda village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, after receiving Rs.3,10,56,500/- as sale consideration. A further sum of Rs.30.00 lakhs was spent for stamp and registration fees. As the land is full of boulders, hillocks etc., the Society is required to spend a further amount of Rs.30.00 crores for its development. 40. Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008 suffers from laches as petitioner No.2 approached this Court about three years after declaration of policy by the State Government and he failed to question the policy decision taken in G.O.Ms.No.242 dated 28-2-2005. 41. Respondents 7,8,9,10 and 11 also filed separate counter-affidavits, wherein they have raised similar contentions. The common thread that runs through all those counter-affidavits is that they want the Writ Petitions to be thrown out on the ground of resjudicata/constructive resjudicata. They have also raised the common plea that the allotments/alienations are made in their favour in recognition of their services and the element of sacrifice involved in their opting for Government service leaving out lucrative offers available in the private sector. 42. Respondent No.10 sought to justify the allotments in their favour with reference to collection of revenues. According to them, the substantial sum of direct taxes collected in excess of Rs.18,615/- crores in Andhra Pradesh will go to the State Government and allotment of land to them at basic value would increase their morale and motivation, which would in turn reflect in better performance by way of enhanced tax collections, that would inevitably benefit the State Government. 43. In the reply affidavits the petitioners, apart from denying various pleas raised by the respondents, specifically denied application of resjudicata or constructive resjudicata. IV. SUBMISSIONS:- (A) COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS: Sri K.S.Murthy (Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008) (i) The impugned G.Os., are contrary to the Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 in so far as provision for allotment of house sites to members of the societies, who own a house or house site in their name or in the names of their spouses or children is concerned. (ii) Allotment of lands for house sites in prime locations and within the outer ring road is contrary to G.O.Ms.No.243 dated 28-2-2005. (iii) Acquisition of lands belonging to poor farmers on one hand and allotment of lands to private respondents on the other is arbitrary or unreasonable and irrational. (iv) Allotment of lands on the basis of basic value instead of on market value has resulted in huge revenue loss to the public exchequer, seriously affecting public interest. (v) Having enunciated a policy under G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243, it is not permissible for the State to violate its own policy by purporting to exempt various conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.243. (vi) While the basic value of the land in question was more than two crores at the time of issuance of the impugned G.Os., the basic value as it existed on 7-7-2006 was adopted, which is impermissible in law and this has resulted in not only loss of revenue to the Government towards differential market value, but also towards stamp duty. (vii) Various functionaries of the State, such as the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretaries of Revenue and Finance, Minister for Housing and District Collector, Ranga Reddy District are all the beneficiaries under the impugned allotments and this action of the State is vitiated by self-interest and bias at the cost of the poor and other sections of general public. (viii) The impugned allotments, made as a measure of providing incentives for the so-called services rendered by the individual beneficiaries, are contrary to the very concept “need based allotments” envisaged in G.O.Ms.No.242. Sri S.Sriram (Writ Petition No.7997 of 2008) (ix) In addition to the contentions (1) to (8) supra advanced by Sri K.S.Murthy, the impugned allotments are vitiated as the State failed to identify the “targeted sections” and lay down the methodology for selecting the societies/institutions as adumbrated in G.O.Ms.No.242. (x) G.O.Ms.No.243 failed to evolve any criteria for categorization and identification of targeted sections and, therefore, the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.242 is not carried out by the State in its letter and spirit. (xi) The findings in the Division Bench Judgment operate as sub silentio qua G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 as validity of the said G.Os., was not put in issue therein. (xi) The findings in the Division Bench Judgment operate as sub silentio qua G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 as validity of the said G.Os., was not put in issue therein. (xii) Neither the principle of resjudicata nor constructive resjudicata applies to the present Writ Petition as the consideration in the previous round was confined only to the validity or otherwise of the exemptions granted in favour of the allottees from some of the conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.243. (xiii) The purported categorization contained in G.O.Ms.No.243 was only for pricing and the same does not constitute proper categorization envisaged in G.O.Ms.No.242 for the purpose of allotment to the targeted sections. (xiv) Allotment/alienation of public land, held by the Government in trust, at concessional rates constitute dispensing of the largesse of the State and the same shall be preceded by proper norms, which are completely absent in G.O.Ms.Nos.242, 243 and 244. (xv) The discretion vested in the State for granting of largesse must be confined to and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standards, which are completely lacking in the impugned allotments. (xvi) Adopting 4-5-2006 as the cut-off date for ascertaining basic value of the land is arbitrary and irrational. Rule 10 of the 1317 Fasli Rules, which contains a non-obstante clause to enable the State to alienate the lands, envisages reasonable procedure to be followed and choosing 4-5-2006 as the cut-off date for fixing the value defies the reasonable procedure envisaged in the said rule. (xvii) Provision of house sites to the persons, who already own a site, does not constitute “a welfare measure” within the meaning of Article 31(c) of the Constitution of India. (xviii) Allotment of house sites to accredited journalists affects independence of the media and runs counter to the concept of “free media”. (xix) The impugned allotments do not achieve any rational purpose having nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (xx) Free press is held to be one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The State patronization of the media persons affects the impartiality and objectivity in dissemination of critical information on the activities of the Government to the general public. (xx) Free press is held to be one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The State patronization of the media persons affects the impartiality and objectivity in dissemination of critical information on the activities of the Government to the general public. (xxi) Similarly, judiciary and other institutions, established under the constitutional mandate, shall not be patronized as it will not only blur objectivity on their part in discharge of their constitutional duties without fear or favour, but also curtails their freedom in decision making. Sri S.Niranjan Reddy (Writ Petition No.23682 of 2008) (xxii) Besides the contentions (1) to (21) supra advanced by Sri K.S.Murthy and Sri S.Sriram, Rules 2(i) and 10 of the Alienation of State Lands Rules have no application to the allotments made under the impugned G.Os., as they were made under Section 25 of the 1317 Fasli Rules, which do not contemplate any permanent alienation, but only provide for placing the land at the disposal of the concerned agencies for any public purpose. (xxiii) The impugned G.Os., are contrary to the declared policy of the State Government under which land in and around Hyderabad has been prohibited from alienation for house site purpose besides being contrary to the Board Standing Orders. (xxiv) G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 are violative of the policy enunciated in G.O.Ms.No.242. (xxv) Rule (i) {sic. (j)} of the Alienation of State Lands Rules, which defined “public purpose” reflected the declared intention of the State under Section 25 of the 1317 Fasli Act and Rule 10 of the said Rules shall be construed in the light of Section 25 and not de hors it. (xxvi) Rule 2(1) of the Assignment of House Sites Rules, read with Rules 10 and 11 thereof, which governed the assignments for free or on payment of full or concessional value of the land, are patently violated. (xxvii) The sale of lands under the impugned G.Os., is contrary to the A.P. Board Standing Orders, which are held to be applicable to Telangana Area by this Court in Koppula Narasaiah Vs. Government of A.P., - 2000(6) ALT 337 - and in particular BSO 21 Para 14. (xxviii) The ban imposed in G.O.Ms.No.1122 dated 29-6-1961 and levied in respect of 176 villages vide: G.O.Ms.No.1409, dated 19-8-1978 is still continuing in 190 villages, which include the villages in respect of which the impugned G.Os., are issued. Government of A.P., - 2000(6) ALT 337 - and in particular BSO 21 Para 14. (xxviii) The ban imposed in G.O.Ms.No.1122 dated 29-6-1961 and levied in respect of 176 villages vide: G.O.Ms.No.1409, dated 19-8-1978 is still continuing in 190 villages, which include the villages in respect of which the impugned G.Os., are issued. The impugned G.Os., are in violation of G.O.Ms.No.234, dated 4-5-1995, which envisaged auction in case of dire housing needs. (xxix) G.O.Ms.No.242 falls within the scheme envisaged by the Assignment of House Sites Rules and G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 violate G.O.Ms.No.242 in respect of the following aspects, viz., the allotments are not based on need, absence of comprehensive exercise in respect of acquisition cost of land, identification of sections which require shelter, determination of hierarchy of needs etc., and also due to various reasons contained in the counter-affidavit and referred to hereinbefore. (xxx) The allotments made outside the designated areas are in violation of G.O.Ms.No.242. (xxxi) While the Collector is the designated authority, the applications were made directly either to the Chief Minister or to the Government. (xxxii) Difference in value has not been stipulated by the Empowered Committee. (xxxiii) Allotments are made contrary to the stipulation that the land should be situated within the satellite township to be developed by HUDA and A.P. Housing Board and in violation of the stipulation that the land shall not be situated in the prime locations within the outer ring road. (xxxiv) There is a complete shift from the need based allotment to allotment based on the service rendered and as an incentive. There is discrimination in prescribing size of plots and making available plots among identified beneficiaries and such discrimination is not permissible while distributing largesse as a welfare measure. (xxxv) Doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata are not applicable to bonafide public interest litigation and the issues raised in the present Writ Petition are neither raised nor decided in the earlier round to attract the said doctrine. At any rate, the said doctrine cannot be applied against the party who succeeded in the previous round of litigation. (xxxvi) Pricing among categories 1 to 7 is per se discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. No identification of categories is made on the basis of a comprehensive study based on different vocations such as Professors, Doctors, Lawyers and other persons carrying on professions useful to the Society. (xxxvi) Pricing among categories 1 to 7 is per se discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. No identification of categories is made on the basis of a comprehensive study based on different vocations such as Professors, Doctors, Lawyers and other persons carrying on professions useful to the Society. (xxxvii) The State failed to discharge the burden that its action in confining the allotments to few sections of the Society is not discriminatory. (xxxviii) The impugned allotments are in violation of trust doctrine. (xxxix) A trustee has to act for the benefit of the beneficiaries, i.e., people. Any action for the benefit of the trustees is in violation of the principles of trust. (xl) The allotments made in favour of All India Service employees, ignoring the creamy layer concept, is unconstitutional, as, these officers are not entitled to affirmative action. (xli) The impugned allotments are contrary to the directive principles of the State policy, which obligate the State to minimize inequality. (xlii) Beyond the conditions of service and employment, the Government is obligated to treat all citizens equally. (B) COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: ADVOCATE GENERAL: (i) While Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 was filed questioning G.O.Ms.No.243, which relaxed the conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.242 in respect of seven aspects, the Division Bench in the said Writ Petition interfered with relaxation in respect of two aspects only viz., allotments in favour of individual beneficiaries and non-inclusion of past beneficiaries of allotment and, hence, the said Division Bench judgment operates as resjudicata/constructive resjudicata with regard to all other aspects. (ii) Section 24 of the 1317 Fasli Act vested the land in Government. Section 25 of the said Act, the Alienation of State Lands Rules and the Assignment of House sites Rules, 1975 empower the State to utilize the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to poor and needy and in any other manner for the benefit of people at large. (iii) Allotment of land in favour of various categories identified by the State under the impugned G.Os., constitutes public purpose. (iv) Allotment of lands falls within the domain of State policy and the Courts will be slow to interfere with such a policy decision. (v) Rule 2(i) of Assignment of House Sites Rules applies for house sites for private purposes only and not to cases where Government allots lands in furtherance of its policy. (iv) Allotment of lands falls within the domain of State policy and the Courts will be slow to interfere with such a policy decision. (v) Rule 2(i) of Assignment of House Sites Rules applies for house sites for private purposes only and not to cases where Government allots lands in furtherance of its policy. (vi) De hors the procedure prescribed by the Assignment of House Sites Rules, the State has the power to deal with the property vested in it; and, being the Principal, it retains the power to assign the lands for public purpose even though the power is delegated under the Assignment of House Sites Rules. (vii) The State is entitled to deal with the land vested in it subject to rationality and non-arbitrariness; and according to the policy discernable from G.O.Ms.No.242 and the above mentioned Rules do not fetter the authority of the Government in this regard. (viii) G.O.Ms.No.12, dated 11-1-2002, amended Rule 2(b) of the Alienation of State Lands Rules by adding the words “or for any specified purpose” and this provision, therefore, empowers the State Government to alienate the lands in favour of the targeted sections. (ix) Rule 10 of the said Rules enables the Government to alienate or sell the lands by following any reasonable procedure and, therefore, public auction is not the only method by which the lands vested in the State should be disposed of. (x) G.O.Ms.No.242 is not challenged in any of the Writ Petitions and the said G.O., being the foundation for making the impugned allotments, which remain unchallenged, the allotments cannot be interfered with. (xi) The State Government issued the impugned G.Os., by taking corrective steps with respect to the two aspects on which this Court invalidated previous allotments by incorporating the necessary conditions and, therefore, the impugned allotments do not call for further interference. (xii) Allotment of land to the persons owning houses/house sites under G.O.Ms.No.522 was not interfered with by the Division Bench and the findings rendered by it in its judgment are mere observations and they do not operate as a mandatory direction or binding precedent. (xiii) The allotments made are not need based and the same is evident from the categorization made for pricing in G.O.Ms.No.243. (xiii) The allotments made are not need based and the same is evident from the categorization made for pricing in G.O.Ms.No.243. (xiv) Involvement of functionaries, such as the Minister for Housing, Chief Secretary, Principal Secretaries for Revenue and Finance and the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, in the allotment of lands is saved by application of doctrine of necessity and no exception can be taken in this regard. Sri S.S.Prasad, Senior Counsel for Respondents 5 and 9: (xv) The Division Bench judgment in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 binds both the parties and the same operates as resjudicata/constructive resjudicata. (xvi) All the contentions, which are raised in the present batch of Writ Petitions, were raised in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006 and the cause of action is common for both these Writ Petitions and, hence, the petitioners in the present batch of Writ Petitions cannot be permitted to raise the same contentions once over and circumvent the judgment which has become final. (xvii) Any intervention in this batch of Writ Petitions will affect and nullify the operative directions contained in the previous Division Bench judgment. The principle of Order II, Rule 2 CPC squarely applies to the present cases. (xviii)The validity of G.O.Ms.No.242 was never questioned either in the previous Writ Petition or in the present batch of Writ Petitions. (xix) While the Division Bench in the previous Writ Petition interfered only on two aspects, it has not set aside G.O.Ms.No.522 with regard to the allotments made in favour of the persons irrespective of their owning a house or house site obviously for the reason that the Division Bench did not want to interfere with the allotments already made and intended to apply the observations made by it for future allotments only. (xx) No Mandamus can be read into the observations of the Division Bench regarding private possessions of the allottees as the same amounts to the Court suggesting alternative policy by interfering with the declared policy of the State. The Division Bench merely expressed its wish without invalidating G.O.Ms.No.522 on that count. (xxi) The Division Bench kept in view the distinction between the two conditions pertaining to the persons receiving the benefit of allotment previously and having private possessions and declined to issue a Writ of Mandamus regarding the latter condition. The Division Bench merely expressed its wish without invalidating G.O.Ms.No.522 on that count. (xxi) The Division Bench kept in view the distinction between the two conditions pertaining to the persons receiving the benefit of allotment previously and having private possessions and declined to issue a Writ of Mandamus regarding the latter condition. (xxii) The Writ Petitions suffer from laches as the G.Os., issued in the year 2005 were questioned in the year 2008. (xxiii)Since the Division Bench quashed G.O.Ms.No.522 partly, the petitioners are prevented from questioning the remaining conditions, which are incorporated in the impugned G.Os. Sri E.Manohar, Senior Counsel for Respondent No.6 (xxiv) The observations contained in the Division Bench judgment pertaining to private possessions do not constitute a mandatory direction and the State is not bound by those observations. (xxv) The petitioners, who are not the persons aggrieved, cannot maintain the present Writ Petitions as a piece of public interest litigation. The State has large number of land in its custody and, therefore, no public interest is affected by allotment of a few hundreds of acres. (xxvi) Whether a particular condition shall be imposed while making allotments or not cannot be a subject matter of public interest litigation unless Article 14 is violated in making such allotments. Sri S.R.Ashok, Senior Counsel for Respondents 4 and 11: (xxvii) The power of allotment is traceable to Rule 10 of Alienation of State land Rules. (xxviii) The plea of absence of legislative back up raised by the petitioners is incorrect and unsound. (xxix) The present Writ Petitions are barred by the principles of resjudicata/constructive resjudicata. (xxx) No policy can be challenged unless the same is perverse, irrational, illegal or opposed to public policy and the impugned policy does not suffer from any of these vices. (xxxi) The allotments were made as a measure of incentive in order to enable the officers, who are likely to serve the Government for nearly 30 years and work better and there is no warrant to interfere with such a governmental policy. Sri D.Prakash Reddy, Senior Counsel for Respondent No.8: (xxxii) As the previous Division Bench decided the Writ Petition, wherein identical contentions were raised, a co-equal Bench cannot reopen the same issues. (xxxiii) The allotments were not made for providing shelter, but were made in recognition of the services rendered. Sri D.Prakash Reddy, Senior Counsel for Respondent No.8: (xxxii) As the previous Division Bench decided the Writ Petition, wherein identical contentions were raised, a co-equal Bench cannot reopen the same issues. (xxxiii) The allotments were not made for providing shelter, but were made in recognition of the services rendered. Therefore, comparison of the impugned allotments with the allotments made under the Schemes, such as Rajeev Gruha Kalpa, is neither proper nor correct. (xxxiv) Mere absence of classification of beneficiaries will not vitiate the policy decision of the State. 44. Elaborate reply submissions were made by Sri K.S.Murthy, Sri S.Sriram and S.Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the writ petitioners. 45. All the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties made a copious reference to the case law, which will be dealt with hereinafter at appropriate stage. V. DISCUSSION: Locus standi and laches: 46. Let us first deal with these two aspects, which are raised by the respondents and which may not detain us for long. Taking up the objection of locus first, it is necessary for us to notice the march of law with regard to locus standi. 47. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S.P.Gupta and others Vs. President of India and others AIR 1982 SC 149 traced the history and development of Public Interest Litigation and rejected the objection regarding locus standi of practicing lawyers to challenge the validity of transfer of a Judge, refusal to reappoint an additional judge, and a circular issued by the Law Ministry. In this regard, P.N.Bhagwati,J, as he then was, whose opinion received concurrence of other Members of the Bench on this aspect, held: “Para 17. In this regard, P.N.Bhagwati,J, as he then was, whose opinion received concurrence of other Members of the Bench on this aspect, held: “Para 17. IT may therefore now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons. Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, such as under trial prisoners languishing in jails without a trial, inmates of the Protective Home in Agra, or harijan workers engaged in road construction in the district of Ajmer, who are living in poverty and destitution, who are barely eking out a miserable existence with the?: sweat and toil, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society and who do not have easy access to justice, this Court will not insist on a regular writ petition to be filed by the public-spirited individual espousing their cause and seeking relief for them. This Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono publico. It is true that there are rules made by this Court prescribing the procedure for moving this Court for relief under Article 32 and they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach this Court. But it must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. But it must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The court would therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public-minded individual as a writ petition and act upon it. Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only way in which this can be done is by entertaining Writ Petition and even letters from public-spirited individuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose constitutional or legal right has been violated but who by reason of their poverty or socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court for relief. It is in this spirit that the court has been entertaining letters for judicial redress and treating them as Writ Petition and we hope and trust that the High Courts of the country will also adopt this proactive, goal-oriented approach. But we must hasten to make it clear that the individual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in court. We may also point out that as a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such determinate class or group of persons is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of a third party, where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such cases”. (Emphasis added). It may be noted that while the judgment in S.P.Gupta (1 supra) was overturned by a Larger Constitution Bench in S.C. Advocates-on-Record Association Vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 on the aspect of primacy of the Chief Justice of India in the matter of appointment of Judges of High Courts and Supreme Court, the view of the Constitution Bench on the aspect of locus taken in S.P.Gupta (1 supra) has not been disturbed. 48. In Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S.Muddappa AIR 1991 SC 1902 , the Supreme Court held that the restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury have yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation, that even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out, the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing and that law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. 49. In Chairman, Railway Board Vs. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 , the Supreme Court upheld the locus of an Advocate, who instituted a public interest litigation to espouse the cause of a foreign national, who was subjected to gang rape by some employees of Railway Department. In this context, the Supreme Court noticed the expanding horizons of public interest litigation and broadened concept of locus with reference to the earlier case law and held: “Para 17. In the context of Public Interest Litigation, however, the court in its various Judgments has given widest amplitude and meaning to the concept of locus standi. In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. In the context of Public Interest Litigation, however, the court in its various Judgments has given widest amplitude and meaning to the concept of locus standi. In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1982 SC 1473 = (1982) 3 SCC 235 , it was laid down that Public Interest Litigation could be initiated not only by filing formal petitions in the High court but even by sending letters and telegrams so as to provide easy access to court. (See also: Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1984 SC 802 = 1984 (2) SCR 67 = 288 (1984) 3 SCC 161 and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Students Parent Medical College, Shimla and Ors. , AIR 1985 SC 910 = (1985) 3 SCC 169 on the right to approach the court in the realm of Public Interest Litigation ). In Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B. S. Muddappa and Ors. , AIR 1991 SC 1902 = 1991 (3) SCR 102 = (1991) 4 SCC 54 , the Court held that the restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of a broad and wide construction in the wake of Public Interest Litigation. The court further observed that public-spirited citizens having faith in the rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing causes of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. There has, thus, been a spectacular expansion of the concept of locus standi. The concept is much wider and it takes in its stride anyone who is not a mere "busy-body". 50. In M.S.Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise (2000) 7 SCC 552 , the Supreme Court, while holding that even a rival trader in liquor business has locus standi to question the Excise Commissioner’s order, followed its view reflected in the earlier judgments, including the one in Chairman, Railway Board (4 supra), and held that the Court has changed its view from the earlier strict interpretation regarding locus standi as adopted in Nagar Rice & Flour Mills Vs. N.Teekappa Gowda & brothers – (1970) 1 SCC 575 and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. N.Teekappa Gowda & brothers – (1970) 1 SCC 575 and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar – (1976) 1 SCC 671 , and a much wider canvass has been adopted in later years regarding a person’s entitlement to move the High Court involving writ jurisdiction. 51. In Dr.Kashinath G.Jalmi Vs. The Speaker (1993) 2 SCC 703 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of laches and locus standi of the appellants therein in questioning the decision of the Speaker on disqualification of certain members of Goa Legislative Assembly, held that the relief claimed against the alleged usurpation of public office being in the nature of class action without the petitioners therein seeking any relief personally to them, the Writ Petitions should not have been dismissed merely on the ground of laches. The Supreme Court further held that the motive or the conduct of the persons, who moved the Court, can be relevant only for denying them the costs even if their claim succeeds, but the same cannot be a justification to refuse to examine the question raised therein. 52. The instant batch of cases is filed by certain individuals and organizations, who gave detailed account of their credentials in espousing public causes. None of the respondents have doubted the said credentials. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, referred to above, we do not see any reason, whatsoever, to non-suit the petitioners on the ground of lack of their locus. As members of public, they can legitimately claim that the impugned allotments affect them personally apart from affecting the millions of citizens of the State. The relief claimed in these Writ Petitions, thus, satisfies the description of class action, and the locus of the petitioners, to question the impugned allotments cannot, therefore, be doubted with any legitimacy. 53. As regards laches, it is worth noticing that Dr.Rao V.B.J.Chelikani, petitioner No.1 in Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008, was petitioner No.2 in Writ Petition No.13730 of 2006. Petitioner No.2 in Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008 joined for the first time. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.7997 and 23682 of 2008 approached this Court for the first time. 54. The language of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not laced with any condition or limitation for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts. Petitioner No.2 in Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008 joined for the first time. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.7997 and 23682 of 2008 approached this Court for the first time. 54. The language of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not laced with any condition or limitation for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts. However, the superior Courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint, including the one that the High Courts will not entertain belated claims. (See: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 ; Tilokchand and Motichand Vs. H.B.Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898 , and the Nine Judge Constitutional Bench judgment in Mafatlal Industries Vs. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 ). 55. In R. S. Deodhar v. State of Maharastra AIR 1974 SC 259 the Supreme Court laid down the following propositions: “ (1) The rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. (2) It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. It may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Art. 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui viva for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like”. 56. 56. In our considered view, the Writ Petitions cannot be dismissed on the ground of laches for two reasons, viz., (1) the previous litigation initiated by petitioner No.1 in Writ Petition No.7956 of 2008 resulted in quashing of the earlier allotments and fresh allotments have given raise to a fresh cause of action to every member of the general public to question the said allotments. Their failure to question the previous allotments does not bar them from approaching this Court based on the fresh cause of action. Viewed from this angle, time for filing Writ Petition started running from the date of issuance of G.O.Ms.No.419 and batch dated 25-3-2008. The Writ Petitions filed within a few months therefrom cannot, therefore, be said to suffer from laches; and (2) in Dr.Kashinath G.Jalmi (6 supra) the Supreme Court noticed that usurpation of public office of members of legislative assembly was a continuous cause and such an action can be challenged so long as the cause of action continues. The allotment of vast extents of public land affords a continued cause of action and the relief claimed in these Writ Petitions is in the nature of a class action. If the petitioners have failed to question the earlier allotments and G.O.Ms.No.243, they cannot be non-suited on the ground of laches in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred to supra. 57. For the above mentioned reasons, we reject the two objections pertaining the locus standi and laches. THE DIVISION BENCH JUDGMENT. 58. The judgment of the Division Bench in WP.No.13730 of 2006 was the focal point around which the arguments of all the parties centered. It is the case of the petitioners that the said judgment does not restrict the scope of the present batch of writ petitions and the impugned G.Os., are liable to be struck down for violation of the dicta contained therein, as well as on grounds, which were not either raised by the petitioners in the previous writ petition or not considered even if raised. As noted above, it is their case that the doctrines of resjudicata or constructive resjudicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC have no application to the present cases on hand. 59. As noted above, it is their case that the doctrines of resjudicata or constructive resjudicata or Order II Rule 2 CPC have no application to the present cases on hand. 59. Per contra, the learned Advocate General and other counsel representing the respondents submitted that the said judgment of the Division Bench restricted the scope of the present cases and the petitioners are not entitled to raise various contentions, which were earlier raised in the previous case and considered, which were raised and not-pressed or were not raised at all by operation of the doctrines of resjudicata, constructive resjudicata and also the principle underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC. 60. To consider the question whether the doctrines of resjudicata, constructive resjudicata and principle of Order II Rule 2 CPC apply or not, it is necessary to analyze the pleadings in the writ petition and the judgment of the Division Bench in WP.No.13730 of 2006. The said writ petition was filed by three individuals, one of whom is petitioner No.1 in WP.No.7956 of 2008. They sought for invalidation of G.O.Ms.No.522, dated 04.05.2006, whereunder different extents of lands were allotted to the members of the societies, which are respondents in this writ petition on the ground that allotments under the said G.O. were made in relaxation of several conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.243. 61. In paras 3 and 7, the petitioners therein averred as under: “This writ petition is filed challenging G.O.Ms.No.522 Revenue (ASN.V) Department, dated 04.05.2006 allotting Government land to an extent of Acs.245.00 guntas in various villages of Ranga Reddy District in favour of Hon’ble Judges of High Court of A.P., M.Ps., MLAs., serving pre 1989 left over AIS Batches, serving post 1989, All India Services Officers, working Journalists etc., in relaxation of orders issued in G.O.Ms.No.243, Revenue (ASN.I) Department dated 28.02.2005. This writ petition is filed in public interest as valuable Government property belonging to the people of the State which is held in trust by the State Government is being disposed off in favour of the persons without any public interest and contrary to the obligation of the State to provide land, shelter and employment to the persons belonging to the weaker sections of the society and below poverty line persons on various grounds as detailed in the writ petition.” “It is respectfully submitted that all the petitioners are income tax, municipal tax payers. They contributed to the public exchequer by way of direct and indirect taxes. They are public spirited citizen and interested in protection of public property and their misuse. The State Government under the impugned G.O. is seeking to dispose off the public property at throw away price in favour of individuals without any public interest. The subject property can be put to public use or the same can be disposed off at market value by way of open auction and the money realized through the same can be utilized for housing, education and well being of the common man or for the infrastructure projects for the benefit of one and all. Since the petitioners are contributing to the public exchequer by way of direct and indirect taxes, they have a interest in the subject matter and to see that valuable public property is utilized in the best possible manner for the benefit of public at large as against few individuals. They are filing the present writ petition as a public interest litigation as public property is being disposed off by the Government contrary to public interest and the same can be utilized for the benefit of the public at large.” 62. The petitioners therein pleaded that various relaxations from the conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.243 regarding location of the land, exempting two categories of persons from prohibition of allotment of lands if they have received the benefit of concessional allotment earlier etc., as arbitrary. In addition thereto, the petitioners questioned certain other terms subject to which allotments were made such as alienation on basic rate, failure to exclude the persons, who had a house or house site in their or their family members names. The petitioners also raised the contentions such as the allotment of land without following the transparent procedure of public auction as illegal and in violation of the trust doctrine. 63. It is the common case of all the parties that while most of the pleas that were raised in the previous writ petition are again raised in the present batch of cases, the main plea that has been raised for the first time in at least two of these three writ petitions, namely; WP.Nos.7997 of 2008 and 23683 of 2008, pertains to the validity of G.O.Ms.No.243 and the allotments being contrary to the provisions of the 1317 Fasli Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Division Bench in its judgment in WP.No.13730 of 2006 in explicit terms observed that the petitioners before it have not questioned the constitutionality and vires of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.242 read with G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 and therefore it was not necessary for it to delve into the question whether the allotment to societies or groups of categories offends any constitutional or statutory provision. That part of the judgment may be usefully reproduced hereinbelow: “Before proceeding further, we consider it necessary to mention that the petitioners have not questioned the constitutionality and vires of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.242 read with G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244, dated 28.02.2005, which envisaged allotment of land to societies or groups of the identified categories i.e., the Members of Parliament/Legislative Assembly, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, Members of All India Services, Journalists etc., and, therefore, it is not necessary to delve into the question whether the allotment to societies or groups of these categories offends any constitutional or statutory provision.” 64. The Division Bench therefore framed the issue that fell for its consideration in the following terms. “The core issue which requires consideration is whether the decision of the State Government to relax the conditions embodied in G.O.Ms.No.242 read with G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244, dated 28.02.2005 to facilitate allotment of land to the individuals belonging to the identified categories is constitutionally valid.” \ 65. The Bench then went on to consider the said issue and held that relaxation of the restriction contained in the policy enshrined in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.02.2005 on allotment of land to individuals was not sustainable. The Division Bench also found fault with another relaxation of the guidelines contained in G.O.Ms.No.243 pertaining to the ineligibility of the persons, who have received the benefit of concessional allotment from the Government earlier either individually or as a member of any society. With regard to the persons who possess house or house sites, the Division Bench made certain observations and gave specific findings, the effect of which will be discussed at an appropriate place. 66. In the above factual matrix, it is necessary to examine whether the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata have no application to the present cases can be sustained. 66. In the above factual matrix, it is necessary to examine whether the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata have no application to the present cases can be sustained. Before delving into this question, the basic issue that needs to be considered is whether doctrine of resjudicata/ constructive resjudicata is applicable to public interest litigation (for short, ‘PIL’). 67. While Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP.No.23682 of 2008 placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Purushotham Rao Vs. Union of India and others (2001) 10 SCC 305 to buttress his contention that these doctrines are not applicable to PIL, the learned Advocate General and Sri S.Satyanarayana Prasad placed heavy reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Forward Construction Company and others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1986 SC 391 and State of Karnataka and another Vs. All India Manufacturers Organization and others (2006) 4 SCC 683 . 68. In Forward Construction Company (9 supra) a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that in view of Explanation VI to Section 11 CPC, the said provision applies to PIL as well if it is proved that the previous litigation was the public interest litigation not by way of a private grievance and that the same was a bona fide litigation in respect of a right, which is common and is agitated in common with others. It was further held that the onus of proving want of bona fides in respect of the previous litigation is on the party seeking to avoid the decision. In that case, a plot of land was reserved under development plan for Bombay and the verified Andheri Town Planning Scheme for a bus depot of the Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport Undertaking (for short, ‘BEST’). BEST proposed to build two buildings, which will include the bus depot. The carpet area spared after meeting the needs of the depot was to be given on rent. A writ petition challenging the user of the plot for commercial purpose came to be filed and was dismissed by the High Court. The validity of permission granted under Rule 4(a)(i) of the Development Control Rules for change of user of the plot to commercial purpose was not in issue in that writ petition. A writ petition challenging the user of the plot for commercial purpose came to be filed and was dismissed by the High Court. The validity of permission granted under Rule 4(a)(i) of the Development Control Rules for change of user of the plot to commercial purpose was not in issue in that writ petition. Subsequently, another writ petition was filed for the same purpose, and the validity of permission granted under Rule 4(a)(i) of the Development Control Rules was specifically challenged therein. In this factual background, the Supreme Court held that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The Supreme Court further held that the principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter, that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided and that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The Supreme Court, however, on the strength of the finding of the High Court in the previous writ petition that it was not a bonafide writ petition, held that Section 11 was not attracted to the facts of that case. 69. In State of Karnataka (10 supra), which is popularly known as “Nandi Corridor case”, a retired Chief Engineer filed a writ petition challenging the development project of the State Government (Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project). The said writ petition having been dismissed, a body by name All India Manufacturers Organization filed another writ petition on the common cause of action and identical averments. The Supreme Court, while holding that Explanation III to Section 11 squarely applies, as the issue was directly and substantially in issue in the previous case and that the findings recorded therein have reached finality, held that the doctrine of resjudicata applies even though it was a PIL. The Supreme Court, while holding that Explanation III to Section 11 squarely applies, as the issue was directly and substantially in issue in the previous case and that the findings recorded therein have reached finality, held that the doctrine of resjudicata applies even though it was a PIL. The Supreme Court held that the principle and philosophy behind Explanation IV to Section 11 is to prevent abuse of the process of the Court through reagitation of the settled issues. Repelling the contention that Section 11 has no application to PIL, the Supreme Court held that as long as it is shown that the previous litigation was in the public interest and not by way of private grievance and was instituted bona fide in respect of a right, which is common and is agitated in common with others, a previous PIL would be a judgment in rem and it binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before the Court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had been raised or should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of a PIL. The Supreme Court followed the dicta laid down in Forward Construction Company (9 supra). 70. We have, however, before us a two Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Purushotham Rao (8 supra), wherein the Supreme Court struck a different note as regards the application of the doctrine of resjudicata to PIL. It is held therein that the principles of Section 11 and Order II Rule 2 CPC contemplate an adversarial system of litigation, where the Court adjudicates the rights of the parties and determines the issues arising in a given case, that PIL or a petition filed for public interest cannot be held to be an adversarial system of adjudication and the petitioner in such case merely brings it to the notice of the Court as to how and in what manner the public interest is being jeopardized by arbitrary and capricious action of the authorities and that therefore the principle of constructive resjudicata cannot be made applicable in each and every PIL, irrespective of the nature of litigation itself and its impact on the society and the larger public interest, which is being served. 71. 71. It is noteworthy that the contesting party in that case placed reliance on the three Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Forward Construction Company (9 supra) in support of its contention that the previous judgment operates as constructive resjudicata, as evident from paragraph 10 of the report. However, in paragraph 19, the Supreme Court, while adverting to the judgment in Forward Construction Company (9 supra) and taking note of the fact that in the said case it did record a conclusion that Section 11 of CPC applied to PIL, referred to and relied on its judgment in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs. State of U.P. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504 (known as Doon Valley case) and reproduced the following observations of the Court in the said case. “We may not be taken to have said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not apply. At the same time, it has to be remembered that every technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence when a matter of grave public importance is for consideration before the Court. Even if it is said that there was a final order, in a dispute of this type it would be difficult to entertain the plea of res judicata.” 72. The Supreme Court, therefore, chose to follow the said judgment in holding that the principle of constructive resjudicata cannot be made applicable in each and every PIL irrespective of the nature of the litigation itself and its impact on the society and the larger public interest, which is being served. 73. Thus, we are faced with two divergent views of the Supreme Court regarding application of Section 11 CPC to PIL. 74. It needs to be noted that while the two judgments in Forward Construction Company (9 supra) and Nandi Corridor case (10 supra) are of larger Benches of three learned Judges; the judgments in Doon Valley case (11 supra) and V. Purushotham Rao (8 supra) are of Benches comprising two learned Judges. Even these two Judgments did not lay down an absolute proposition that Section 11 CPC is completely excluded in all situations in PIL cases. They merely laid down that depending upon the facts of the case and the gravity of the situation, the Courts can always entertain PIL notwithstanding Section 11 CPC. Even these two Judgments did not lay down an absolute proposition that Section 11 CPC is completely excluded in all situations in PIL cases. They merely laid down that depending upon the facts of the case and the gravity of the situation, the Courts can always entertain PIL notwithstanding Section 11 CPC. But, in Forward Construction Company (9 supra) and Nandi Corridor case (10 supra) the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms held that in view of Section 11 (vi) CPC the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata apply to PIL with the same force as to disputes in an adversarial litigation, subject to the rider that the previous litigation was instituted bona fide. In the present situation where judgments reflecting contradictory views exist, which view should be followed needs to be considered. 75. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Raghubir Singh AIR 1989 SC 1933 , upon consideration of the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis with reference to English and Indian case law, held that in order to promote consistency and certainty in the development of law and its contemporary status, the rule has been evolved that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. 76. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673 , wherein the Supreme Court after referring to several judgments including Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Mumbai Shramik Sangha (2001) 4 SCC 448 and Pradip Chandra Parija Vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik (2002) 1 SCC 1 held that the law laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength and it would be inappropriate if a Division Bench of two Judges starts overruling the decisions of Division Benches of three Judges. The Court further held that such a practice would be detrimental not only to the rule of discipline and the doctrine of binding precedents but it will also lead to inconsistency in decisions on the point of law; consistency and certainty in the development of law and its contemporary status – both would be immediate casualty. 77. In Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability Vs. 77. In Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability Vs. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 97 , the Supreme Court held: “No coordinate Bench of this Court can even comment upon, let alone sit in judgment over, the discretion exercised or judgment rendered in a cause or matter before another coordinate Bench”. 78. In para 6, the Supreme Court held: “In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done here, the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment……..”. 79. In State of Bihar Vs. Kalika Kuer (2003) 5 SCC 448 the Supreme Court held that the earlier judgment by a larger Bench cannot be ignored by invoking the principle of per incuriam and the only course open to the coordinate or smaller Bench is to make a request for reference to the larger Bench. 80. In Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand (2008) 10 SCC 1 a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court made an in-depth analysis of the case law on the aspect and held that the comments and observations made by the two Judge Bench in UPSEB Vs. Pooran Chandra Pandey (2007) 11 SCC 92 which came in conflict with the dicta laid down by the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, Tribunals and other judicial fora nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench. 81. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, Tribunals and other judicial fora nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench. 81. In the light of the law laid down in various judgments of the Apex Court referred to above, the larger Bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Forward Construction Company (9 supra) and Nandi Corridor case (10 supra) bind us and a fortiori we hold that the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata very much apply even to PIL cases, provided the previous litigation was initiated by a bona fide person in public interest with common community interest. THE DOCTRINES OF RESJUDICATA – CONSTRUCTIVE RESJUDICATA AND ORDER II RULE 2 CPC: A. RESJUDICATA: 82. The doctrine of resjudicata is based on public policy and founded on two principles, namely; (i) nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, meaning, no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause and (ii) public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation. Section 11 CPC is not the foundation of the principle of resjudicata, but it is merely a statutory recognition thereof (Nandi Corridor case - 10 supra). The main purpose of the doctrine is that once the matter has been determined in the former proceeding, it should not be open to the parties to re-agitate the same again and again. Resjudicata comprises cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel (Ishwar Dutt Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and another (2005) 7 SCC 190 ). 83. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and others vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 , the Supreme Court held: “4.The rule of res judicata applies if “the matter directly and substantially in issue” in a suit or proceeding was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit between the same parties and had been heard and finally decided by a competent Court. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, decided the application between the parties to the present proceeding for determination of standard rent in respect of the same piece of land let for construction of buildings for residential or business purposes. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Borivli, decided the application between the parties to the present proceeding for determination of standard rent in respect of the same piece of land let for construction of buildings for residential or business purposes. The High Court has held that a decision of a competent Court may operate as res judicata in respect of not only an issue of fact, but mixed issues of law and fact, and even abstract questions of law. It was also assumed by the High Court that a decision relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain or not to entertain a proceeding is binding and conclusive between those parties in respect of the same question in a later proceeding. 5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure, it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.” (Emphasis added). 84. One of the essential ingredients for the application of the doctrine of resjudicata is that the matters, which were raised in the subsequent proceedings, were directly and substantially in issue in the previous proceedings. The meaning of the said words, namely; “directly and substantially in issue” is explained in Explanation III to Section 11 CPC to the effect that the matter must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. 85. In Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr Vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and others (2000) 3 SCC 350 , the Supreme Court, on the weight of the authority of various jurisdictions and the learned authors, such as, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code, Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Miller, Spencer, Bower, Turner etc., held that the matter, which was directly and substantially in issue as distinguished from the matter, which was collaterally or incidentally in issue alone constitutes resjudicata. 86. 86. The Supreme Court quoted Mulla’s 15th Edition, page 104 with approval, which reads: “The matter in respect of which relief is claimed in an earlier suit can be said to be generally a matter “directly and substantially” in issue but it does not mean that if the matter is one in respect of which no relief is sought it is not directly or substantially in issue. It may or may not be. It is possible that it was “directly and substantially” in issue and it may also be possible that it was only collaterally or incidentally in issue, depending upon the facts of the case. The question arises as to what is the test for deciding into which category a case falls? One test is that if the issue was ‘necessary’ to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be resjudicata in a latter case.” 87. The learned author relied on some of the Supreme Court judgments and stated that one has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue. The learned author further opined that a material test to be applied is whether the Court considers the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision. 88. The judgments in Mysore State Electricity Board Vs. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Limited and others AIR 1963 SC 1128 , Narayana Prabhu Venkateswara Prabhu Vs. Narayana Prabhu Krishna Prabhu (1977) 2 SCC 181 , State of Maharashtra and another Vs. National Construction Company, Bombay and another (1996) 1 SCC 735 and Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited and another Vs. Union of India and others (1999) 4 SCC 149 on which reliance is placed by Sri S.Niranjan Reddy need not be specifically discussed as the judicial opinion expressed in all these decisions is consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the previous cases and the principles were applied to the varied facts of each of these cases. 89. 89. If we apply the above settled principles pertaining to resjudicata to the facts of the present cases, it is evident that the broad issue that was common in the previous and the present cases is validity of allotment of land to different categories of the society. The prayer in the previous writ petition is generic in nature which sought invalidation of G.O.Ms.No.522, dated 04.05.2006, as being illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional, without jurisdiction, void ab initio and violative of petitioners’ fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 90. However, as noted above, while the allotment made in the said G.O. was challenged on various grounds including that the allotments were contrary to the trust doctrine, price being low, not being need based, the method of sale otherwise than by way of public auction being illegal etc., the counsel representing the petitioners therein confined their submissions to relaxation of conditions embodied in G.O.Ms.No.242 read with G.O.Ms.Nos.243 and 244 in making allotment of the land to the individuals belonging to the identified categories. As the petitioners confined their challenge to the aspect of relaxations only, the Division Bench also limited its consideration to that extent. Therefore, the matter, which was directly and substantially in issue, centered round the allotments made in relaxation of the conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.243. The validity of G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 qua the constitutional and relevant statutory provisions was neither raised nor put as an issue nor was considered by the Division Bench. Thus, the validity of the said G.Os. was not directly and substantially in issue and the two writ petitions in the present batch of cases, which raised this issue for the first time, cannot be said to be barred by the principle of resjudicata. But, at the same time, we may hasten to add that while questioning the allotments on various grounds, the validity of G.O.Ms.No.243 was very much a relevant aspect, which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in the former writ petition. Similarly, various pleas, other than the plea relating to validity of relaxations, which were raised in the pleadings, ought to have been pressed, but the petitioners therein failed to do so. The impact of the failure of the petitioners to press these issues in the former writ petition has to be next considered applying the doctrine of constructive resjudicata. (b). CONSTRUCTIVE RESJUDICATA. 91. The impact of the failure of the petitioners to press these issues in the former writ petition has to be next considered applying the doctrine of constructive resjudicata. (b). CONSTRUCTIVE RESJUDICATA. 91. In Nandi Corridor case (10 supra) the Supreme Court quoted the judgment in Henderson Vs. Henderson (1843-60) All England Reporter 378 as under: “The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” 92. The Supreme Court also referred to the judgment in Greenhalgh Vs. Mallard (1947) 2 All England Reporter 255 (CA) and quoted as under: “I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” 93. In paragraph 40, the Supreme Court referred to and relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715 and it is useful to quote the said paragraph hereinbelow. “The judgment in Greenhalgh (supra) was approvingly referred to by this Court in State of U. P. v. Nawab Hussain ( (1977) 2 SCC 806 ). Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit, Class II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra ( (1990) 2 SCC 715 ) expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit, Class II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra ( (1990) 2 SCC 715 ) expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. (supra) by holding that: "An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had (sic) decided as incidental to or essentially connected with (sic) subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata" 94. Though Sri S. Niranjan Reddy made a strenuous effort to persuade us to accept the contention that the doctrine of constructive resjudicata has no application to the present cases, we have not felt impressed by this contention. The main purpose of filing the previous writ petition was to question the allotment of lands. Had the petitioners therein been diligent, they would have questioned the validity of G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 because the said issue was not only relevant in adjudication of the validity of allotments, but also intrinsically connected therewith. As discussed above, the pleadings in the previous case were wide ranging touching various aspects besides relaxations. Though the contentions advanced before the Court were confined to validation of relaxations, the petitioner’s core grievance was against very allotments. In the light of such a grievance, validity of G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 was clearly a part of subject matter of the litigation, which might and ought to have been raised in the previous writ petitions. The said issue having not been raised in the previous writ petition, the petitioners in the present batch of cases cannot be permitted to raise the same. Doing so would defeat the public policy on which the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata are rested. A litigant cannot be allowed to approach the Court by filing successive petitions by raising different issues at different stages. Doing so would defeat the public policy on which the doctrines of resjudicata and constructive resjudicata are rested. A litigant cannot be allowed to approach the Court by filing successive petitions by raising different issues at different stages. Similarly, persons who were not parties to the earlier litigation cannot be permitted to raise new pleas in the name of public interest by initiating fresh rounds of litigation again and again. It is not the pleaded case of the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.7997 and 23682 of 2008, nor it has been argued on their behalf that the previous writ petition was not filed in bonafide public interest with common community interest. 95. As a result of our finding that the principle of constructive resjudicata applies to the present batch of cases, we are of the view that the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise various questions, other than those which were pressed in the previous litigation, such as the validity of G.O.Ms.No.242, whether the State Government deviated from the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.242 by not properly identifying the categories of beneficiaries, whether the allotment is need based or not, whether the allotments made to All India Service Officers was constitutionally valid, whether the allotments in favour of the said categories violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India, whether the allotments were made in violation of trust doctrine, whether the allotments were made contrary to the directive principles of State policy and concept of welfare State etc. In other words, the contours of this Court’s consideration in the present cases are specifically confined to testing the validity of the impugned G.Os., on the anvil of the judgment of the Division Bench in the previous case. 96. Though Sri S. Niranjan Reddy and Sri S. Sriram cited a number of judgments on each of the above aspects, it is quite unnecessary for us to discuss them in the view we have taken that all these aspects should have been properly raised and argued in the previous writ petition. Similarly, it is not necessary for us to delve into the aspect of application of Order II Rule 2 CPC. 97. Similarly, it is not necessary for us to delve into the aspect of application of Order II Rule 2 CPC. 97. To recapitulate at the cost of repetition, the Division Bench interfered with G.O.Ms.No.522 on two aspects, i.e., allotment of land in favour of individual beneficiaries and exempting the persons from the condition of ineligibility in case they have received previous benefits either individually or as Members of a Society. It is not disputed that while issuing the impugned G.Os., both these aspects have been taken care of by the State Government and there is no grievance to the petitioners in this respect, but the most contentious issue over which elaborate arguments have been advanced before us by the learned counsel for the respective parties is the effect of certain findings of the Division Bench on the legality and propriety of the State Government in allotting lands in favour of members of the societies, who own properties of their own either in their names or in the names of their spouse or children. 98. All the learned counsel for the petitioners emphatically argued that the Division Bench in the previous case held in no uncertain terms that allotment of house sites to the persons, who are owning their own properties, was unconstitutional, improper and thereby strongly disapproved the said policy of the State Government, while the learned Advocate General and the other learned Senior Counsel, who appeared for the State and the beneficiary societies respectively resisted with equal force the said contention and according to them they are mere observations and are not in the nature of the mandatory directions to compel the State to follow those observations. 99. Having regard to these irreconcilable stands, it is necessary for us to first advert to the relevant portions of the judgment, which contain various findings and observations on the issue of validity of allotment of land in favour of the members of the societies, who own houses or house sites of their own. The Division Bench noted the arguments of Sri G. Mohan Rao as under: WHETHER THE IMPUGNED G.Os., ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PREVIOUS DIVISION BENCH JUDGMENT? The Division Bench noted the arguments of Sri G. Mohan Rao as under: WHETHER THE IMPUGNED G.Os., ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PREVIOUS DIVISION BENCH JUDGMENT? “Shri Mohan Rao then argued that if the impugned policy is implemented, it will encourage profiteering because those who already have land or houses will acquire additional land at a throw away price and dispose of the same at the market rate which has skyrocketed in last few years. Learned counsel then argued that the State Government does not enjoy absolute freedom in the matter of allotment of public property and the distribution of the State’s largesse to the chosen individuals…….”. The Division Bench, while considering this submission, held: “A reading of G.O.Ms.No.522 makes it clear that the decision of the Government to relax the guidelines contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.02.2005 is intended to give undue benefit to the individuals belonging to identified categories who may not have been eligible for allotment of land in terms of the earlier policy. While no serious exception can not (sic) be taken to allotment of land to the groups or societies comprising the identified categories of persons, including the Members of Parliament and Legislative Assemblies, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, the members of All India Services, officers and employees of other categories, persons who have excelled in different fields of public life and sports and journalists, but there can be no rationale or justification for allotting land to the individuals irrespective of the fact that they may be possessing properties in different parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh either in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children or they may have already been benefited by allotment of land at concessional rate either directly or through society. It is also interesting to note that for first two categories, all the restrictions have been removed except the one that they may not be having any house or house-site in Hyderabad or Secunderabad. This would mean that they are eligible for allotment of land even though they may have house or house-site in the name of their spouse or children or may have been benefited by allotment of land in other districts at concessional rate directly or indirectly. This would mean that they are eligible for allotment of land even though they may have house or house-site in the name of their spouse or children or may have been benefited by allotment of land in other districts at concessional rate directly or indirectly. In respect of categories 3 to 6, partial restriction has been maintained in the form of Clause 3(d), but even for these categories, there is no restriction on the allotment of land even though the allottees may be having house or house-sites either in their name or in the name of their spouse or children. There does not appear to be any plausible reason for not ensuring that the allotment of land in the name of providing house-sites to the needy people does not become a source of profiteering by those who already have house or house-site either in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children or who may have already been benefited by the policy of concessional allotment.” (Emphasis added). 100. The Division Bench, while noting the arguments of the learned Advocate General, who sought to justify allotment of land in favour of the persons, who already own house or house site, in unequivocal terms, rejected the said argument as meritless. We can do no better than reproducing the relevant portion of the judgment of the Division Bench hereunder: “The argument of the learned Advocate General that restriction against the allotment of land to those who already own house or house-site either in their name or in the name of their spouse or children in the State of Andhra Pradesh has been relaxed in order to treat all the persons of identified categories equitably is wholly meritless. How can the State offer(s) (sic) a justification for relaxation of a rational, reasonable and just restriction in the matter of allotment of land to the haves of the society when even those who are allotted miniscule parcels of land or house-sites or houses under schemes like Indiramma or Rajeev Gruhakalpa are not treated eligible if they already own house site etc. In our opinion, there is no valid ground or justification to accept such distorted interpretation of the doctrine of equality, which is one of the basic edifice of the Constitution. In our opinion, there is no valid ground or justification to accept such distorted interpretation of the doctrine of equality, which is one of the basic edifice of the Constitution. Such policy may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days when the Kings and Rulers were absolute owners of the public property and they enjoyed unbridled power to distribute State largess to the persons of their choice and liking, but it is wholly incompatible with the modern democratic set up of this country, which is governed by a written Constitution and which makes a promise to the people that there shall be justice, social, economic and political – and Equality of Opportunity of Status. The allotment of land to those who already own house or house-site either in their name or in the name of their spouse or children or who may have already been benefited by concessional allotment, directly or indirectly, lends credibility to the plea of the petitioners that such allotments are totally opposed to the concept of equality, fairness and public interest.” (Emphasis added). 101. On the strength of the various findings including those referred to above, the Division Bench in its concluding part of the judgment directed as under: “In the result, the writ petition is allowed and G.O.Ms.No.522, dated 04.05.2006 is quashed insofar as it provides for allotment of land to individuals, who are not members of the societies/groups and who may have received the benefit of concessional allotment from the Government earlier or as member of any society or group to which concessional allotment was made. G.O.Ms.No.1424, dated 28.09.2006 whereby the land has been earmarked for respondent Nos.4 is declared to be in consonance with the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.02.2005 subject to the rider that all the restrictions contained in that G.O. will apply to the allotment of land by respondent No.4 to its members. The Government will also do well to incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment of land to those who own house or house-site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children and make the same applicable to the allotment made to respondent No.4 and all future allotments, which may be made in accordance with the policy enshrined in G.O.Ms.Nos.242 and 243 dated 28.02.2005. However, it is made clear that this order of ours will not preclude the Government from making allotment to societies or groups of the identified categories in accordance with the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.02.2005 and it will be open to the identified categories of persons to form new society and get the same registered or make applications as groups for the purpose of allotment of land in terms of the policy contained in G.O.Ms.No.243, dated 28.02.2005.” (Emphasis is supplied). 102. According to the learned Advocate General and the learned Senior Counsel for the State and the private respondents respectively the Division Bench quashed G.O.Ms.No.522, dated 04.05.2006 only on two grounds, namely: (i) that it provided for allotment of land to the individuals, and (ii) that it has not rendered ineligible the persons who have already received the benefit of concessional allotment earlier. They argued that the observations of the Division Bench that “the Government will also do well to incorporate an additional restriction against the allotment of land to those who own house or house-site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children and make the same applicable to the allotment made to respondent No.4 and all future allotments”, as distinguished from the quashing of G.O.Ms.No.522 on other grounds clearly reflect the intention of the Division Bench not to render the said category of individuals ineligible but to merely leave it open for the State Government to apply its mind and take its own decision without giving any mandatory directions. The reason for this, contend the learned counsel, is because giving any mandatory directions amounts to interference with policy matters of the State and that therefore the Division Bench consciously refrained from giving any such direction. The learned counsel sought to fortify these submissions by placing reliance on judgments of the Supreme Court in Sumtibai Vs. Paras Finance Company AIR 2007 SC 3166 , Asif Hameed and others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364 and Mallikarjuna Rao and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1990) 2 SCC 707 . 103. We have given our earnest consideration to these submissions. In Sumtibai (31 supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle of law that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1990) 2 SCC 707 . 103. We have given our earnest consideration to these submissions. In Sumtibai (31 supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle of law that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647 and the judgment in Quinn vs. Leathem 1901 AC 495 in holding that what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. While repelling the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent before the Court, the Supreme Court held that the observations in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others (2005) 6 SCC 733 do not constitute the ratio to the effect that no third party can be impleaded in a suit for specific performance. In Asif Hameed (32 supra), the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, while upholding the selections into two medical colleges in the year 1986-87, observed that it would be ideal to constitute an independent statutory body for conduct of entrance test for the MBBS/BDS course in the State. In a later round of litigation, the High Court held that the observations made in the previous case were of binding nature and a Mandamus was issued for carrying out those observations/ directions. While interfering with the said judgment, the Supreme Court traced the legislative power to take policy decision regarding management and admissions to medical colleges in the State and held that by giving a direction to constitute a statutory independent body, the High Court transgressed its self-imposed limits in issuing the Mandamus. It is of relevance to note that while reversing the said judgment, the Supreme Court held: “The Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers.” (Emphasis added) 104. In Mallikarjuna Rao (33 supra), the Supreme Court reiterated its view taken in Asif Hameed (32 supra) and held that while the observations made by this Court that it would be advisable to frame a rule for the Animal Husbandry Department similar to the rule contained in the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Service was only advisory in nature, it further held that the High Courts or the Administrative Tribunals cannot issue such directions or advisory sermons to the executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively within the domain of the executive under the Constitution. 105. In our considered view, the aforesaid judgments are of no application to the cases on hand. A careful analysis of the previous Division Bench judgment reveals that the Division Bench has recognized the power of the State and has also found justification in its decision to allot the land to the groups or societies comprising the identified categories of the persons including the Members of the Parliament and Legislative Assemblies, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, the Members of All India Service, officers and employees of other categories, persons who have excelled in different fields of public life and sports and journalists. However, while so holding, the Division Bench held in unequivocal terms that there can be no rationale or justification for allotting the land to the individuals falling under the two categories, namely: (i) those who own properties in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children, and (ii) those who may have already been benefited by allotment of land at concessional rate either directly or through society. The Division Bench felt that there is imperative need to ensure that the allotment of land in the name of providing house sites to the needy people does not become a source of profiteering by those who fall in either of the above two categories. The above findings, if understood in the light of the law laid down in Quinn (35 supra) and the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Orissa (34 supra) and Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat and others (1987) 1 SCC 213 referred to and discussed in Sumtibai (31 supra), cannot be understood as mere observations, but they constitute the essence of the judgment. In our view, the binding force of these findings constituting the soul of the judgment and consequently its ratio is not in any manner whittled down or diluted by the expressions such as “there does not appear to be any plausible reason” and “the government will also do well to incorporate an additional restriction”. It is true that in its operative portion of the judgment, the Division Bench quashed G.O.Ms.No.522, dated 04.05.2006 to the extent that it provided for allotment of land to the individuals, who are not the members of the society/groups and who may have received the benefit of concessional allotment from the government earlier and observed that the government will do well to incorporate an additional restriction against the abovementioned two categories of the persons rendering them ineligible. But, in our opinion, it is presumptuous for the respondents to assume that the Division Bench refrained from quashing G.O.Ms.No.522 in toto as it would have thought that doing so would amount to impinging into the State’s executive policy. In a recent judgment of the Apex Court in Mohd. Abdul Kadir and another vs. Director General of Police, Assam and others (2009) 6 SCC 611 the settled legal position is restated by holding: “While Courts cannot be and should not be makers of policy, they can certainly be catalysts, when there is a need for a policy or a change in policy.” The Division Bench was certainly conscious of the settled principle of law on the subject that it is well within its power to strike down such a policy and grant appropriate directions to reframe the policy in tune with the constitutional mandate. As held in Asif Hameed (32 supra), the Courts would not interfere in the matters of executive policies of the State so long as they do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers. The Division Bench in no uncertain terms opined that the policy of the State to provide house sites to those who possess house or house site was wholly incompatible with the modern democratic set up governed by a written Constitution and that the same was opposed to the concept of equality, fairness and public interest. The Division Bench in no uncertain terms opined that the policy of the State to provide house sites to those who possess house or house site was wholly incompatible with the modern democratic set up governed by a written Constitution and that the same was opposed to the concept of equality, fairness and public interest. The observation that “the government will also do well to incorporate an additional restriction” is therefore required to be understood in conjunction with the abovementioned findings contained in the judgment, but not in isolation in order to gauge the binding nature of the operative part of the judgment. 106. In our view, while it could have been perfectly legitimate for the previous Division Bench to have quashed G.O.Ms.No.522 in toto, its not doing so and leaving the State to reframe its policy in the light of the findings contained in the judgment, was only to provide an opportunity to the State to take corrective steps, but the same cannot be understood as the Court leaving the State with an option or freedom to repeat the same constitutional impropriety that was held to have been committed in G.O.Ms.No.522 by including one of the above stated categories viz., those who have a house or house site, as the beneficiaries of allotment of State land. Such an understanding of the Division Bench judgment will render the specific and categoric findings contained in its judgment nugatory. We will not countenance the same. 107. As noted above, the previous Division Bench held that the two categories, referred to above, namely: (i) the persons, who received the benefit of concessional allotment earlier, and (ii) the persons, who have house or house sites in their name or in the name of their spouse or children, are not eligible for allotment of house sites. It is interesting to note that in the impugned G.Os., while the first category, referred to above, was rendered ineligible for allotment, the second category is, however, retained for concessional allotment. Nothing is stated in the G.Os., offering justification for retaining this category for concessional allotment. 108. Even in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, no specific reasons have been assigned for the State to retain this category contrary to the specific findings of this Court. Nothing is stated in the G.Os., offering justification for retaining this category for concessional allotment. 108. Even in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, no specific reasons have been assigned for the State to retain this category contrary to the specific findings of this Court. It is useful to extract the relevant portion of the counter affidavit hereunder: “In reply to ground No.(ii), it is stated that, it is true that the condition that members of society who own a house/house sites in their name or in the name of their spouse or children are not eligible for allotment was not imposed. It is reiterated that insofar as this condition is concerned the Hon’ble High Court has only observed that the government “will do well in imposing such condition”, but there is no positive/categorical direction to impose such condition. In the absence of a direction by the Hon’ble High Court, it is not correct to contend that allotments made through impugned G.Os., without such a condition is contrary to the judgment of this Hon’ble Court referred above. This Hon’ble Court left the discretion to the government with regard to imposing the said condition and the government after taking note of the said observations and after giving a serious thought to the same thought it fit not to impose the said condition to avoid discrimination amongst same class/group.” 109. During hearing, we have asked the learned Advocate General whether any specific reasons were mentioned in the minutes of the Cabinet, which was stated to have taken a conscious decision. The learned Advocate General submitted that no such reasons were contained in the minutes or in the note file. It is therefore clear from the above that except stating that the government thought it fit not to render the said category ineligible to avoid discrimination among the same class/group, no other reason impelled the State to include the said category contrary to the specific findings of this Court. The State was all through labouring under the impression that in the absence of a Mandamus, its discretion was not hindered. Even if no Mandamus was issued, it was not permissible for the State to act contrary to the specific findings of this Court, which, in our view, constituted the ratio descidendi, unless it has come out with weighty reasons for doing so. Even if no Mandamus was issued, it was not permissible for the State to act contrary to the specific findings of this Court, which, in our view, constituted the ratio descidendi, unless it has come out with weighty reasons for doing so. Indeed, the faint justification of purported avoidance of discrimination does not stand scrutiny of this Court in the face of the strongest possible condemnation of the action of the State in making available the benefit of concessional allotment to this category of persons in the previous judgment. Therefore, in our view, even in the absence of a specific writ of a Mandamus from this Court, on the last occasion, the action of the State in not excluding the said category of persons from the list of beneficiaries runs contrary to the ratio of the previous judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. CONCLUSION AND THE RESULT:- 110. From the discussion undertaken above, the conclusion is irresistible that the impugned G.Os., to the extent that they did not render ineligible the persons, who own a house or house site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children for allotment of house sites by the respective societies of which they are members, cannot be sustained in law. In view of the same, all the impugned G.Os., except G.O.Ms.No.421 dated 25-3-2008, which was rescinded and consequently ceased to exist, are quashed. As a result of quashing of the impugned G.Os., possession of various parcels of the land allotted to respondents 4,5,7 to 11-Societies shall stand restored to the Government. If respondent No.1 seeks to make fresh allotments, it can do so by issuing fresh G.Os., by incorporating necessary condition rendering the persons, who own a house or house site in their own name or in the name of their spouse or children, ineligible for allotment by the respective Societies. Before issuing such G.Os., respondent No.1 shall call for details of the members, who satisfy the eligibility criteria for allotment of house sites. The respective Societies shall submit the applications of each of the members personally signed by them along with their sworn affidavits, inter alia, declaring that they are not owning a house or house site either in their name or in the name of their spouse or children. Respondent No.1 shall keep these details in its web-site for information of general public. Respondent No.1 shall keep these details in its web-site for information of general public. On the basis of such declarations, respondent No.1 shall assess the requirement of land to be distributed as house sites to the eligible members only and allot the extent of land which is necessary for such allotment to each of the Societies. Respondent No.1 shall also incorporate in the G.Os., that if any member of the Society makes a false declaration, allotment of house site will be liable for cancellation apart from the member, making such a false declaration, being liable for civil and criminal consequences. 111. All the Writ Petitions are, accordingly, disposed of. There can be no order as to costs. 112. As a sequel to disposal of the Writ Petitions, all the miscellaneous applications, pending in the respective Writ Petitions, stand disposed of.