JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This second appeal has been filed on behalf of defendant-appellant-appellant challenging the judgments and decree of both the learned courts below. 3. The matter arises out of Title Suit No. 142 of 1979, which was filed by plaintiffs-respondents-respondents for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of rent by the defendant as well as bona fide personal requirement of the plaintiffs. The said suit was decreed on contest by the learned Munsif-I, Buxar vide his judgment and decree dated 10.5.1982. 4. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant filed Title Appeal No. 40 of 1982, which was dismissed on contest by the learned Additional District Judge-cum-Fast Track Court No. 3, Buxar, vide his judgment and decree dated 12.3.2007. Against the aforesaid judgments and decree of the learned courts below, the instant second appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant- appellant vehemently challenges the judgments and decree of the learned courts below claiming that from the plaint itself it was quite apparent that the suit was a pure and simple suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal necessity and court fee has also been paid on the said relief. He further submits that although the suit was decreed, but there was no finding at all with respect to the relevant issues, namely, relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, default in payment of rent by the defendant and any personal necessity of the plaintiffs and hence it was incumbent upon the learned courts below to dismiss the claim and suit Of the plaintiffs as no such suit was maintainable under Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 and that of the Act of 1982, which provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by a court on one or more of the six grounds mentioned in the said Section as (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) & (f). In this regard, he relies upon a decision of this Court in case of Deepak Kumar Verma & Others V/s. Ram Swarup Singh, reported in 1991(2) PLJR 541. 6. From the arguments of the parties as well as the materials on record, it is quite apparent that the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was filed in the year 1979 when the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction). Control Act, 1982 was not in existence and hence it was under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1977. It is also apparent from the impugned judgments that there were no findings at all with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and default in payment of rent or even personal necessity of the plaintiffs. But it is pertinent to note that the defendant did not deny the title of the plaintiffs, rather in his pleading and evidence admitted the ownership of the predecessor of the plaintiffs and claimed that the defendants predecessors in interest were in permissive occupation of the suit land. But it is pertinent to note that the defendant did not deny the title of the plaintiffs, rather in his pleading and evidence admitted the ownership of the predecessor of the plaintiffs and claimed that the defendants predecessors in interest were in permissive occupation of the suit land. In the said circumstances, the defendant clearly admitted the title of the plaintiffs and their predecessor and with regard to his possession of the suit land he admitted that it was on the basis of the permission given by the plaintiffs or their predecessor. 7. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the fact admitted by the defendant was that the plaintiffs were the owners and the relationship between the parties was of licensor and licensee. Hence when in an eviction suit, the plaintiff failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant but proves his title, the Court would definitely have a discretion under the provision of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant an equitable relief of ejectment on the basis of title, which is accepted by the defendant, provided the plaintiff had done nothing to disqualify him from receiving an equitable relief. 8. In the instant case, there is nothing to show that the plaintiffs have done anything to disqualify themselves from receiving the equitable relief and the said suit has been fairly tried by the learned courts below. In the said circumstances, the provision of Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 will not provide a bar to the grant of equitable relief to the plaintiffs. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of the Honble Apex Court in case of Firm Sriniwas Rani Kumar V/s. Mahabir Prasad & Ors., reported in A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 177, in which it was specifically held that when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, but had not made in the pleading, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. It was also held that a demand of the plaintiff based on the defendants own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. 9. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned judgments and decree of the learned courts below nor does it find any substantial question of law involved in the instant second appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed at this stage of hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.