Judgment : The petitioner is the Member Secretary of the Kerala State Youth Welfare Board which conducts Keralotsavam, every year. As the Member Secretary of the Kerala State Youth Welfare Board, the petitioner is also the Convenor of Keralotsavam, 2009. The petitioner states that the Manual issued by the Kerala State Youth Welfare Board for the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 provides for an appeal to a jury at various stages of the competitions which are held at the Panchayat, District and State level, that the Manual stipulates that all disputes arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 shall be within the jurisdiction of this Court, that the participants are bound by the stipulations in the Manual, that they are therefore not entitled to institute suits in the civil court and that they have by accepting the stipulations in the Manual waived their right to move the civil court seeking redressal of their grievances. The petitioner proceeds to state that during the previous year when Keralotsavam, 2008 was conducted, the participants at the District level competition who had secured the second place in Kasaragod district filed a suit, obtained an interim order of mandatory injunction directing the Organising Committee of Keralotsavam, 2008 to permit them to participate in the District level competition, that though the said team participated in the district level competition, the suit was thereafter dismissed as not pressed and that if suits are entertained by the civil courts and interim orders passed, it will upset the schedule of the competitions. It is stated that as a result thereof, the organizers are put to great hardship. On these grounds, the petitioner seeks the following relief: “(i) issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, order of direction, compelling the respondent to issue a direction to the civil court and Tribunals under the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court, that Hon’ble High Court of Kerala alone is having jurisdiction to decide any dispute preferred by any party with respect to Keralotsavam – 2009;” 2. This writ petition was filed on 23.11.2009. The Registry raised an objection to the maintainability of the writ petition in view of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel for the petitioner thereupon submitted that the writ petition may be placed before the Court for hearing. The writ petition was accordingly posted before me on 30.11.2009. This writ petition was filed on 23.11.2009. The Registry raised an objection to the maintainability of the writ petition in view of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel for the petitioner thereupon submitted that the writ petition may be placed before the Court for hearing. The writ petition was accordingly posted before me on 30.11.2009. On that day, I directed the Registry to number the writ petition and to send it up for admission on 1.12.2009 with the observation that the issue regarding maintainability of the writ petition can be decided at the time of admission. The writ petition was accordingly numbered and it was posted for admission on 1.12.2009. On that day, I appointed Sri. P. Gopal, Advocate of this Court as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. The writ petition was thereafter taken up for hearing and was heard on 7.12.2009. 3. I heard Sri. P.K. Muhammed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. P. Gopal, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the participants in Keralotsavam, 2009 at the three levels are bound by the stipulations in the Manual which inter alia stipulates that all disputes in connection with Keralotsavam, 2009 shall be within the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the participants are bound by the terms and stipulates in the Manual and can participate in the competitions only in accordance with the terms and stipulations therein, they should be deemed to have waived their right to move any forum other than this Court to redress their grievances. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.F. Charitable Trust, Hyderabad v. Special Deputy Collector (General), Land Acquisition, Hyderabad and others (AIR 1992 AP 130) to contend that the right to move the civil court is a right which can be waived or given up and that as the participants have impliedly agreed to abide by the terms and stipulations in the Manual, their right to move the civil court should be deemed to have been waived. 4. Sri. 4. Sri. P. Gopal, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court submitted that the Manual (a full text of which was made available by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and is incorporated in the records) is not statutory in nature and that the stipulation therein that all disputes arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 shall be within the jurisdiction of this Court does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The learned Amicus Curiae also submitted that there is no an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute it is no answer to a suit however frivolous the claim may be, to contend that the law confers no such right to sue. He further submitted that the jurisdiction of the civil court can be excluded only by an express provision of law or by a clear intendment arising from such law and that as the Manual published by the Kerala State Youth Welfare Board has no statutory backing, the stipulations therein cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The learned Amicus Curiae invited my attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in: (i) Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1969 SC 78); (ii) Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Others ((1974) 2 SCC 393); (iii) Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai & Others ((2002) 6 SCC 16); (iv) Abdul Gafur and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others ((2008) 10 SCC 97); and (v) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bal Mukund Bairwa ((2009) 4 SCC 299). 5. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar by Sri. P.K. Muhammed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. P. Gopal, the learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1969 SC 78) held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is all embracing except to the extent excluded by an expression provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. It was held that this is the purport of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The very same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Others ((1974) 2 SCC 393) wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “15. ….. It was held that this is the purport of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The very same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Others ((1974) 2 SCC 393) wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “15. ….. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one’s peril, bring a suit of one’s choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit.” 6. In Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai & Others ((2002) 6 SCC 16), the Apex Court held relying on the decisions of Ganga Bai’s case (supra) as follows: .“23. The plaintiff is dominus litus, that is, master of, or having dominion over, the case. He is the person who has carriage and control of an action. In case of conflict of jurisdiction the choice ought to lie with the plaintiff to choose the forum best suited to him unless there be a rule of law excluding access to a; forum of the plaintiff’s choice or permitting recourse to a forum will be opposed to public policy or will be an abuse of the process of law.” 7. Later, in Abdul Gafur and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others ((2008) 10 SCC 97), the Apex Court held in paragraph 16 as follows: .“16. Section 9 of the Code provides that the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. To put it differently, as per section 9 of the Code, in all types of civil disputes, the civil courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out from such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication by any statutory provision and conferred on other tribunal or authority. Thus, the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one’s choice, at one’s peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute.” 8. Thus, the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one’s choice, at one’s peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute.” 8. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bal Mukund Bairwa ((2009) 4 SCC 299), the Apex Court held as follows: “12. Section 9 of the Code is enforcement of the fundamental principles of law laid down in the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. A litigant, thus having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. Ex facie, in terms of Section 9 of the Code, civil courts can try al suits, unless barred by the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication.” 9. The Manual governing the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 is not a Manual prepared under a statute. The Manual does not have statutory backing and cannot therefore partake the character of a statute. The Manual prepared by the Kerala State Youth Welfare Board does not fall in the category of legislations, direct, subordinate or ancillary. In such circumstances, in the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court referred to above, the stipulations in the Manual cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits of a civil nature however grievous the claim may be. I therefore hold that the stipulation in the Manual governing Keralotsavam, 2009 that all disputes arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 shall be within the jurisdiction of this Court does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, to entertain suits and pass orders thereon. 10. That takes me to the question whether as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in view of the stipulations in the Manual the participants in Keralotsavam, 2009 can be said to have waived their right to institute a civil suit. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the participants should be deemed to have waived their right to institute a civil suit and should be deemed to have waived their right to approach any forum other than this Court as they have accepted the stipulations in the Manual and are bound by them. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the participants should be deemed to have waived their right to institute a civil suit and should be deemed to have waived their right to approach any forum other than this Court as they have accepted the stipulations in the Manual and are bound by them. In R.F. Charitable Trust, Hyderabad (supra), the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the question whether it is open to a landowner to give up or waive the right to claim enhanced compensation by seeking a reference under the Land Acquisition Act. It was held that the right to seek enhanced compensation is a personal right and if such right is waived or given up by voluntary action, considerations of public policy would not arise. It was held that as there is no prohibition in law against the land owner waiving the right to claim enhancement of compensation, the agreement entered into by the appellant in that case cannot be said to be contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal. 11. In the instant case, the petitioner contends that the participants in Keralotsavam, 2009 should be deemed to have waived their right to move the civil court on the basis that they have consented to the method of resolution of disputes prescribed in the Manual. Though the Manual provides for an appeal to a jury of appeal at all the three levels of competitions, as the Manual is not statutory in nature, the stipulations therein cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Manual does not in express terms state that the participants will have no right to move the civil court. The stipulation in the Manual which is relevant for the purpose of this case reads as follows: Malayalam In my opinion, the said stipulation in the Manual cannot have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. As noticed earlier, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be ousted only by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. It is only if the said test is satisfied that the principles of waiver can be applied. Further, in order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which warrants inference of the relinquishment of a known right. It is only if the said test is satisfied that the principles of waiver can be applied. Further, in order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which warrants inference of the relinquishment of a known right. In the absence of any stipulation in the Manual governing Keralotsavam, 2009 that the civil court will have no jurisdiction to entertain suits in respect of disputes arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 , merely by the reason of the stipulation therein, extracted above, it cannot be said that the participants have waived their right to institute a civil suit. The provision for an appeal to the jury of appeals as stipulated in the Manual cannot in view of the fact that the Manual is not statutory in nature prevent the participants from moving the competent civil court. As noticed in the very decision relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the essential element of waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which warrants inference of the relinquishment of a known right. The Apex Court has in Provash Chandra Dauli and another v. Biswanath Banerjee and another (AIR 1989 SC 1834) held that the essential element of waiver is that there must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants the inference of the relinquishment of such right. The Apex Court held as follows: “21. ….. Waiver is distinct from estoppel in that in waiver the essential element is actual intent to abandon or surrender right, while in estoppel such intent is immaterial. The necessary condition is the detriment of the other party by the conduct of the one estopped. An estoppel may result though the party estopped did not intend to lose any existing right. Thus voluntary choice is the essence of waiver for which there must have existed an opportunity for a choice between the relinquishment and the conferment of the right in question.” Thus, as the stipulation in the Manual does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, it cannot be held that the participants in Keralotsavam, 2009 have by mere participation in Keralotsavam, 2009 waived their right to move the civil court seeking redressal of their grievances. 12. 12. Further, none of the participants are on the party array either in an individual or representative capacity. The only respondent in the writ petition is this Court represented by the Register General and the relief sought in the writ petition is to compel this Court to issue a direction to the civil courts and tribunals under the jurisdiction of this Court that this Court alone has jurisdiction to decide any dispute arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009. Apart from the fact that no grounds have been made out to hold that the participants have waived their right to institute a civil suit, the petitioner has also no established any legal right in him to seek the relief prayed for in the writ petition. In the absence of any statutory backing for the Manual and as the guidelines therein are not statutory in nature, it cannot be held that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been expressly or impliedly barred. If the relief prayed for by the petitioner is granted, it will lead to a situation where all disputes arising out of the conduct of Keralotsavam, 2009 will be brought before this Court when such disputes can be resolved by the civil courts in the respective centres where the competitions are held and in the case of State level competitions by the competent court in the district where the State level competitions are held. For the reasons stated above, I hold that there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.