JUDGMENT : R.S. Garg, J. This writ appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed by the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1006 of 2000 challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dated 16th May, 2006 dismissing the said writ petition. 2. The appellant had filed Writ Petition No. 1006 of 2000 challenging the order dated 7th April, 2000 passed by the State Government cancelling its earlier order dated 24-8-1996 whereby the land in question was exempted from Scheme Nos. 77 and 94 of Village Khajrana. 3. The case of the appellant as set up in the writ petition is that the appellant who is a Housing Co-operative Society, had purchase an area of 17.60 acres comprising of Survey Nos. 790, 791, 813, 1266, 1267, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1298, 790/1445, 790/1483, 1212/1484, and 1274/1522 of Village Khajrana, Tahsil and District Indore by registered sale-deed, after obtaining exemption under section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and 16-9-1985. Out of the aforesaid 17.60 acres of land, about 6.5 acres of land fell within the Ring Road and remaining approximately 11 acres was available for housing purposes. At the instance of the appellant, the order dated 24-8-1996 was passed exempting the land in question (excluding the area reserved for 250 wide Ring Road) on the condition that the appellant will develop the remaining are a privately in accordance with Scheme Nos. 77 and 94 and will not be entitled for any compensation for the land left for Ring Road. The order dated 24-8-1996 was stayed by the State Government by the subsequent order dated 13-9-1996 and thereafter no decision was taken on the issue, therefore, the appellant had filed Writ Petition No. 1217 of 1997 which was disposed of by this Court by order dated 10-2-1998 directing the State Government to decide the pending question within three months by giving opportunity to the petitioner and respondent No. 2 - Indore Development Authority ("IDA" for short). The State Government thereafter passed the order dated 7th April, 2000 cancelling its earlier order dated 24-8-1996 and withdrawing the exemption which was granted in respect of the land in question. The order dated 7th April, 2000 was impugned in the Writ Petition No. 1006 of 2000. 4. The State Government thereafter passed the order dated 7th April, 2000 cancelling its earlier order dated 24-8-1996 and withdrawing the exemption which was granted in respect of the land in question. The order dated 7th April, 2000 was impugned in the Writ Petition No. 1006 of 2000. 4. The respondents No. 1 and 3 had filed their reply to the writ petition taking the stand that the impugned order dated 7th April, 2000 was passed after taking opinion of the Advocate General and that section 52 of the Adhiniyam does not empower the State Government to release and land per se and in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxmi chand vs. Indore Improvement Authorities dated 16-4-1979 passed in Writ Petition No. 4526 of 1978 land seized to be in the ownership of the person after the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. 5. The respondent No. 2 had also filed reply to the. writ petition taking the stand that the final notification under section 50(7) of the Adhiniyam for Scheme 7 and 894 were issued on 6-10-1978 and 10-8-1984 respectively. The petitioner had challenged the inclusion of the land in question in Scheme No. 94 in Writ Petition No. 222 of 1989 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment of the Division Bench was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The further stand is that the land included in scheme No. 94 was duly acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and was vested free from all encumbrances in the answering respondent, therefore it could not be released. 6. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 16th May, 2006 dismissed the Writ Petition No. 1006 of 2000 filed by the appellant and affirmed the order of cancellation dated 7th April, 2000. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in proceeding on the premises that the order dated 24-8-1996 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the respondent No. 2-IDA. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has not discussed the reasons but has only stated the conclusions for up-holding the order dated 7th April, 2000. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has not discussed the reasons but has only stated the conclusions for up-holding the order dated 7th April, 2000. He further submitted that the land of other Societies has been exempted in similar circumstances and the appellant has wrongly been discriminated while cancelling the exemption and that section 52 of the Adhiniyam the State has power to release the land from the Scheme and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxmichand referred to in the impugned order of the State is not attracted in the facts of the present case. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 3 submitted that the appellant had purchased the land after its acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, the appellant had no valid title in its favour. He submitted that under the provisions of the Act exemption order could not have been passed once the Scheme was finalized and that no error has been committed by the State in passing the order dated 7th April, 2000. The respondent No. 2-IDA has also supported the order of the State dated 7th April, 2000 by adopting the arguments adopted by the State. 9. We heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. A perusal of the order dated 7th April, 2000 indicates that the State Government had cancelled its earlier order dated 24-8-1996 by assigning the reasons; firstly, that the land of the Society was already acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and vested in the State; secondly, under section 52 of the Adhiniyam the State has no power to exempt any land or part of the land which is included in the Scheme; and thirdly, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxmichand vs. Indore Improvement Authorities dated 16-4-1979 passed in Writ Petition No. 4526 of 1978 after the final publication of the scheme, the ownership of the land owner comes to an end in respect of the land acquired for the scheme. The legality of the order dated 7th April, 2000 and correctness of the reasons contained in the said order was in issue before the learned Single Judge. 11. The legality of the order dated 7th April, 2000 and correctness of the reasons contained in the said order was in issue before the learned Single Judge. 11. In order under appeal the learned Single Judge mainly proceeded on the basis that while passing the order dated 24-8-1996 the State had failed to ensure the compliance of proviso to section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam which requires giving of an opportunity of hearing to the Town and Country Development Authority before modifying a Town Development Scheme. From Annexure P/2 which is the note-sheet of the concerned Minister, we find that before passing the order dated 24-8-1996 an opportunity of hearing was given to the IDA and IDA has submitted oral as well as written arguments. During the course of arguments before this Court also learned counsel for the State and IDA admitted the fact that before passing the order dated 24-8-1996 the IDA was heard. Thus, we are unable to hold the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the exemption order dated 24-8-1996 was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the IDA in contravention of the proviso to section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam. 12. Learned Single Judge has held that after final publication of notification issued under section 50(7) of Adhiniyam, the land in question was not capable of transfer/sale by its original holder but it needs consideration that under section 50(7) of the Adhiniyam the final Town Development Scheme comes into operation from the specified date and no specified date has been disclosed in the matter. The reasoning for reaching to the conclusion that the direction relating to release could not be issued by the State taking recourse to the provisions of section 52(2) of the Adhiniyam is not found in the order under appeal. The appellant's contention that other similarly situated land have been exempted from the scheme subsequently also needs examination. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. 13. The appellant's contention that other similarly situated land have been exempted from the scheme subsequently also needs examination. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. 13. Once the findings of the learned Single Judge as regards non-compliance of section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam as also the finding of the Single Judge that there could be no release of land by the State Government under section 52(2) of the Adhiniyam, having already been set aside by us, in paras 11 and 12 above, now the question that remains is in what terms this writ appeal should be disposed of. 14. During the course of arguments the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant had submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, lands belonging to appellant comprised in Survey No. 791 admeasuring 0.340 hectare, Survey No. 813 admeasuring 0.105 hectare, Survey No. 1298 admeasuring 0.522 hectare, and Survey No. 1272/1484 admeasuring 0.041 hectare; total 1.008 hectare = 2.5 acres included in Scheme No. 77 have been released by the Authority on 5-1-2002. A perusal of the record shows that before the learned Single Judge. IA. 9158/2005 was filed on 26-9-2005 bringing the aforesaid facts on record duly supported by order of the IDA dated 5th January, 2002 (Annexure P/13). Based on this subsequent event the learned Counsel further submitted that before the learned Single Judge IA 990/06 was filed on 24-1-2006 bringing on record the fact that IDA has exempted the lands included in the scheme in favour of either individuals or societies on the ground that such persons/societies had not claimed compensation with regard to the portion of the land included and utilized for construction of the ring road. In the application it has been pleaded that the lands of one Rameshwar Dayal Totla comprised in Survey Nos. 336, 340, 342 and 346 were released. Similarly land of R. R. and Company represented by Ramesh Kumar Jain comprised in Survey Nos. 1280, 1283, 1284, 1285/2, 1285/3, 1285/4, 1355/2 and 1357, total 3.028 hectare were also released. The lands of one Santosh s/o Chhitar of village Piplya Hana comprised in Survey Nos. 307 to 313, 314/1, 314/2, 315/3, 322, 324/1 to 324/3 and 336, total area 6.725 hectare were also released. 1280, 1283, 1284, 1285/2, 1285/3, 1285/4, 1355/2 and 1357, total 3.028 hectare were also released. The lands of one Santosh s/o Chhitar of village Piplya Hana comprised in Survey Nos. 307 to 313, 314/1, 314/2, 315/3, 322, 324/1 to 324/3 and 336, total area 6.725 hectare were also released. To support this assertion the learned Senior Counsel had placed on record the order issued by the Director, Town and Country Planning, CEO of IDA. 15. From the records aforesaid pleas raised as subsequent events having occurred during the pendency of the writ petition as also this appeal, was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant places reliance upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in W. A. No. 228/08, Baburao and 8 others vs. State of M. P. and others decided on 30-10-2009. The learned Senior Counsel emphasized the following observation of this Court. (8) Shri P. K. Saxena, learned senior counsel had invited our attention to documents which have been produced along with list on 14-5-2009. Learned senior counsel invited our attention to an allotment order dated 26th March, 2004, issued in favour of one Bharat s/o Balaram Mukati, Prahlad s/o Balaram Mukati and others. A perusal of this document shows that the Authority has allotted a plot in Sector-E of Scheme No. 94 on the terms and conditions settled therein. Similarly, our attention has been invited to a letter issued by the Authority to the Town and Country Planning Department, whereby the land ad-measuring 60,700 sq. ft. have been allotted to Bharat and Prahlad s/o Balaram Mukati in two parts. It would be further noteworthy that the land of Balaram Mukati was also acquired in Scheme No. 94. Our attention has further been drawn to an order issued by the State Government on 28-10-1996 whereby the State Government has released land comprised in Survey No. 539 of Piplya Hanafrom the Scheme. We have further been referred to an agreement entered into one Rameshwar Dayal s/o Mahadev Totla, whereby certain alternative left over lands have been allotted by IDA with certain terms and conditions to said Rameshwar Dayal. We have further been referred to an agreement entered into one Rameshwar Dayal s/o Mahadev Totla, whereby certain alternative left over lands have been allotted by IDA with certain terms and conditions to said Rameshwar Dayal. In case of one Kusum Kunwar Gupta of Sneh Nagar Gruh Nirman Sahakari Samtha, an agreement has also been placed on record to show that in accordance with resolution No. 9 dated 31-1-1986 certain lands have been released under an agreement. (9) On the basis of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it has been argued by the appellants that the appellants being similarly situated persons namely Manoharlal Nagpal s/o Bhagwandas Nagpal, Santosh Kumar s/o Chhitar and Smt. Sumitrabai wd/o Suresh etc. are required to be given the same treatment and they are also entitled to allotment of land left over on same terms and conditions. (10) Shri A. S. Kutumbale, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents/State Government and Shri Sudarshan Joshi, learned counsel for the Authority have defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge and have submitted that no interference in our appellate jurisdiction is called for inasmuch as the interest of the landowners has been sufficiently safeguarded. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents referred to an order passed by the Director, Town and Country Planning, Bhopal in Case No. 41/2003 filed by present appellants under section 57 of the Adhiniyam. It was forcefully submitted that application under section 57 of the Adhiniyam was relegated to the Authority to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. The said order has been placed on record along with reply of the Authority as Annexure R/9. To further bolster the said submission, reference was made to an order dated 30-8-2006 passed by the Authority pursuant to the order of the Director referred to above, which is available on record as Annexure R/10. A perusal of the order passed by the Authority shows that the request of the appellants under section 57 of the Act for disposal of the land in their favour has been turned down on the ground that even left over lands, included in Scheme No. 94 abutting 250 ft. wide Ring Road, have been developed and no question arises for disposal of the lands as per the order of the learned Single Judge and the appellants cannot pre-empt their right to purchase the aforesaid left over lands. wide Ring Road, have been developed and no question arises for disposal of the lands as per the order of the learned Single Judge and the appellants cannot pre-empt their right to purchase the aforesaid left over lands. (12) After hearing learned counsel and on perusal of the record, we feel disposed to observe that no statutory authority can be permitted to violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited Madurai and others vs. A. V. Vishvanatha Sastri and another, reported in AIR 1955 SC 13 wherein the Apex Court observed in para 6 as under: - "Article 14 guarantees to all persons the right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. This Article not only guarantees equal protection as regards substantive laws but procedural laws also come within its ambit. The implication of the Article is that all litigants similarly situated are entitled to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief, and for defense with like protection and without discrimination. " Again in the matter of Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited vs. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra and another, (2008) 10 SCC 139 Apex Court has observed that Article 14 is designed to prohibit discrimination and equals cannot be treated unequally. Likewise, un-equals cannot be treated equally. (13) On the basis of the trite position of the right of equality envisaged by Article 14 and reinforced by various judicial pronouncements, it is clear that similarly situated persons cannot be discriminated in the eye of law. (15) In view of the above analysis, we allow this appeal and modify the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the following terms: - The appeal is allowed, resultantly the order passed by the learned Single Judge is modified and the respondents are directed to allot and/or release left over lands after charging the amounts from each landowner/appellant on same terms and conditions as has been done in the case of Balaram Mukati and all other similarly situated persons. The exercise shall be completed by the respondents, jointly or severally, positively within a period of six months. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs and leave the parties to bear their own costs. The exercise shall be completed by the respondents, jointly or severally, positively within a period of six months. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs and leave the parties to bear their own costs. 16. The learned Counsel for the Parties also addressed us, on the question as to whether after accomplishment of the schemes lands could be released under section 52 of the Adhiniyam by the State Government. 17. Before considering the rival submissions it would be necessary to consider as to what are the powers conferred upon the State Government under section 52. Undisputedly the State has the power to pass appropriate orders under section 52 including modification of a particular scheme as envisaged by section 52(1)(b). The only requirement is that an opportunity of hearing is to be given to the development authorities. Not only this the directions given by the Government under this section shall be binding upon the Authority. This question regarding scope of powers of the State Government is no longer disputed as the Apex Court in the matter of State of M. P. and others vs. Keval Yadav, reported as (2004) II SCC 317, after considering section 52 had to observe as under: - 6. The aforesaid provisions unmistakably show that there exists power of control with the State Government and the State Government is empowered to issue directions which have to be carried out by the authorities. It is no longer res Integra that while exercisins power of control the Government can issue directions which have to be complied with by the authorities. It is a different thing that if any order passed by the State Government is contrary to law or otherwise invalid, in which even the same can independently be challenged in a Court of law. Once we hold that State has powers to pass all orders under section 52 and the later order cancelling the earlier order dated 24-8-1996 is bad the consequences have to follow. 18. Now it is necessary to consider the impact of the subsequent events which have been noted by us hereinabove. Undisputedly the land of the appellant, as noted hereinabove, was released on 5-1-2002 to the extent of 1.008 hectare by the Development Authority on 5-1-2002. 18. Now it is necessary to consider the impact of the subsequent events which have been noted by us hereinabove. Undisputedly the land of the appellant, as noted hereinabove, was released on 5-1-2002 to the extent of 1.008 hectare by the Development Authority on 5-1-2002. The exemption and/or release of lands from these very schemes in favour of the individuals and societies has also not been disputed by the respondents. In these circumstances the observations in the matter of Baburao (supra) would apply with full force to this case also inasmuch as in the matter of release of lands of similarly situated persons no discrimination can be allowed to stand the scrutiny under Judicial review. In the matter of Baburao (supra), though the question related to allotment of land left after construction of the ring road, in this particular case undisputedly the lands have been released in favour of the individuals/societies. In this view of the matter we are unable to uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge. As a result the appeal succeeds, it is allowed the order of learned Single Judge is set aside and as a consequence writ petition is allowed and the order of the State Government dated 7-4-2000 Annexure P/1 is quashed, as a result the order dated 24-8-1996 Annexure P/3 passed by the State Government is restored releasing the land of the appellant society on terms indicated therein. We make it clear that the release of lands ordered by the State Government by Annexure P/3 shall abide by the conditions No. 1 and 2 appended thereto. In the facts of the case we leave the parties free to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.