ORDER U.C. Maheshwari, J. 1. This revision is directed by the Applicant/judgment debtor under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the order dated 23-8-2010 passed by 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Balaghat in Execution Case No. 280-A/87, whereby the application of the Applicant filed under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure has been dismissed. 2. The fact necessary to consider the question of admission of this revision in short are that the predecessor in title of the Respondent/decree holder namely Thagi Bai had filed a Civil Suit bearing No. 280-A/87, against the Applicant for possession and perpetual injunction with respect of the disputed land bearing Survey No. 138/1 and 185/2 area 2.17 Decimal. Such suit was decreed by 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Balaghat for possession and perpetual injunction vide judgment and decree dated 30-4-1990. On challenging such decree by the Applicant in Civil Regular Appeal No. 25-A/90, by affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court such appeal was dismissed by 1st Additional District Judge, Balaghat vide judgment and decree dated 17-3-1998. Subsequent to affirming such decree on 10-11-2009 the Respondent herein (legal representative of Thagi Bai) has filed Execution Proceeding of aforesaid decree in the Court of 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Balaghat. In pendency of the same on behalf of the Applicant/judgment-debtor an application under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure was filed. As per averments of such LA, the possession of the disputed property was handed over to the decree-holder in the year 1995 and at present the same is in possession of Orilal and in such premises the Respondent/decree-holder is not in possession of the same. It is further stated that under execution of the impugned decree the Appellant is going to execute the decree with respect of other property of the Applicant while the decretal property is not in possession of the Applicant. Such Execution Proceeding is also challenged on the ground of limitation, as the same is filed beyond 12 years from the date of the decree passed by the trial Court i.e. on 30-4-1990 and in such premises the prayer for dismissal of the Execution Proceeding was made. 3. Such Execution Proceeding is also challenged on the ground of limitation, as the same is filed beyond 12 years from the date of the decree passed by the trial Court i.e. on 30-4-1990 and in such premises the prayer for dismissal of the Execution Proceeding was made. 3. In reply of the Respondent by denying the averments of IA, it is stated that the present application has been filed with intention to create obstruction in Execution of the decree as alleged the possession of the disputed property was never handed over to the Respondent/decree-holder or his predecessor-in-title. It is also denied that Execution Proceeding is filed barred by limitation. 4. The Executing Court taking into consideration the aforesaid entire circumstances held that the decree was not executed earlier in the year 1995. It is also held that Execution Proceeding is filed within limitation as the decree passed by the trial Court on 30-4-1990 was subjudice before the lower Appellate Court and such appeal was decided on 17-3-1998. In such premises, the limitation for filing the execution proceeding has been started from the date of dismissal of the appeal, hence the aforesaid application of the Applicant has been dismissed, on which the Applicant has come forward to this Court. 5. The Applicant's counsel after taking me through the abovementioned earlier judgment passed in the original civil suit and in regular appeal along with the impugned order and other papers placed on the record said that once the possession of the disputed property was taken over by the decree-holder in the year 1995 and the disputed property is not in the possession of the Applicant then without making inquiry in that regard, the execution Court could not have dismissed the application filed under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. In continuation he said that it is apparent fact on record that no opportunity to adduce the evidence has been extended to the Applicant in this regard. He also argued that in the available circumstances, the limitation for filing the execution proceeding is to be counted from the date of decree of the trial Court as on filing the appeal the terms of the interim stay was not complied with by the Applicant. Hence, the limitation to file the execution is not available to the Respondent/decree-holder from the date of passing the judgment and decree by the Appellate Court. Hence, the limitation to file the execution is not available to the Respondent/decree-holder from the date of passing the judgment and decree by the Appellate Court. In support of this contention he placed his reliance on the provision of Section 9 read with Article 136 of Limitation Act read with Order 41, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure and he also placed his reliance on a case of Apex Court in the matter of Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh AIR 2001 SC 279 and prayed for admission and allowing this revision. 6. Having heard the counsel I have carefully gone through the impugned order along with the aforesaid earlier judgments of the Civil Original Suit and Civil Regular Appeal and also perused other papers placed on the record. In the available circumstance, I am of the considered view that Execution Court had not committed any error in dismissing the application of the Applicant filed under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. 7. It is undisputed fact on record that initially the suit of the Respondent was decreed by the trial Court vide dated 30-4-1990 and such decree was challenged on behalf of the Applicant before the Appellate Court and such appeal was decided on 17-3-1998. As per Article 136 of Limitation Act, the execution proceeding can be filed within 12 years from the date of the passing the decree. In such situation the Executing Court had to consider from which date the limitation for filing the execution should be counted either from the date of decree of the trial Court or from the date of decree passed by the Appellate Court. It is undisputed fact on record that after filing the aforesaid civil regular appeal by the present Applicant, during pendency of the same no proceeding for execution was filed on behalf of the Respondent decree-holder. As per submission of the Applicant's counsel the conditional stay was granted in such appeal but due to non-compliance of such condition such stay order was not remained operative. As per submission of the Applicant's counsel the conditional stay was granted in such appeal but due to non-compliance of such condition such stay order was not remained operative. By referring the aforesaid case in the matter of Ratansingh (supra), it was argued that taking into consideration the provision of Section 9 and Article 136 of Limitation Act along with Order 41, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, in the case at hand the limitation for filing the execution proceeding ought to have been counted from the date of the decree of the trial Court i.e. 30-4-1990 and on counting the limitation from such date the execution proceeding filed on 10-11-2009 was hopelessly barred by time and in such premises it could neither be entertained nor proceeded further for execution of such decree. After going through the aforesaid case law cited by the Applicant, the same appears to be distinguishable on fact from the case at hand, hence the same is not helping to the Applicant. 8. I am of the considered view that after passing the decree by the trial Court if the same was remained sub-judice before the Appellate Court then on adjudication of such appeal the judgment and decree of the trial Court is merged in the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court and appeal being continuation of the suit, the limitation for filing the execution proceeding should be counted from the date of the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court. My aforesaid view is fully fortified by the decision of Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Sayed Abdul Rauf v. Nurul Hussain and Ors.: AIR 1992 Raj 3 in which it was held as under: 10. As I have already observed, on the recommendation of the Law Commission, the Parliament enacted the present Article 136 which substantially re-produces the repealed Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure and re-places Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. This was done with a view to overcome the difficulty which used to be faced by the litigants and the Courts. Enactment of Article 136 has simplified the controversy and has provided that for the execution of any decree or order of any Civil Court, the period of limitation would be twelve years. This period of limitation begins to run "when the decree or order becomes enforceable". Enactment of Article 136 has simplified the controversy and has provided that for the execution of any decree or order of any Civil Court, the period of limitation would be twelve years. This period of limitation begins to run "when the decree or order becomes enforceable". Whether there was a stay order or not, that was not material for the purposes of calculating the period of limitation and giving effect to the phrase 'when it becomes enforceable'. 11. It is settled law that the decree of the trial Court gets merged with the decree of the Appellate Court and the latter supersedes the decree of the trial Court. This merger takes place irrespective of the fact that the Appellate Court affirms, modifies or reverses the lower Court's decree. The aforesaid case was decided by such High Court taking into consideration the earlier decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Ratan Lal Singh: AIR 1974 SC 1380 . In such circumstance the case of Ratansingh "Supra" cited on behalf of the Applicant is not helping to the Applicant and in such premises, there is no option with this Court except to dismiss this revision at the stage of motion hearing by holding that Executing Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction or perversity in passing the impugned order holding the limitation to file the Execution Proceeding shall be counted from the date of judgment and decree of the Appellate Court. 9. Aforesaid view is also supported by a decision of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Ramkrishna Bajirao Gotmare, Applicant v. Kanhaiyalal Tribhuwanlal Shah: AIR 1990 Bom 361 in which it was held as under: An appellate decree supersedes the original decree on the basis of doctrine of merger and only appellate decree is enforceable; and the new Act has not brought about any change in the above crystallized legal position. Such result would ensue even on the effect of Order 41, Rule 35 of the Code which deals with the decree is appeal. Even if there is any doubt on the question its benefit must go to the decree-holder for whom obtaining a decree is generally a difficult task and realizing the fruits of the decree a distant dream. After all appeal is continuation of the suit. Even if there is any doubt on the question its benefit must go to the decree-holder for whom obtaining a decree is generally a difficult task and realizing the fruits of the decree a distant dream. After all appeal is continuation of the suit. True, it is that the original decree is enforceable despite pendency of appeal if there is no stay, but that aspect is beside the point. Crux of the matter is, once it merges into the appellate decree, it ceases to rule. Accordingly, the limitation for execution of decree would commence from the date of appellate decree irrespective of whether original decree was stayed or not. 10. So far other question raised by the Applicant's counsel that in the year 1995 the possession of the decretal property was taken over by the decree holder and now the decree is not executable is concerned, it is suffice to say that it does not appear from the proceeding of the Execution Court that at any point of time such decree was executed and possession of decretal property was made available to the decree-holder. In the lack of such circumstance the Executing Court has not committed any error in dismissing the application of the Applicant on such count also. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have not found any perversity, infirmity, illegality or anything against the propriety of law in the impugned order, resultantly, this revision being devoid of any merits, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. There shall be no order as to costs. However, taking into consideration that the execution proceeding is pending since long, the executing Court is directed to conclude the execution proceedings on or before 31-3-2011 under intimation to this Court.