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Karnataka High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 1008 (KAR)

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd v. State of Karnataka

2010-09-16

ASHOK B.HINCHIGERI

body2010
Judgment The petitioner’s grievance is over the second respondent’s rejection of its request for the exemption from the payment of property tax. The order, dated 13.07.2007 (Annexure-E) issued by the respondent No.2 in this regard is the subject matter of this writ petition. 2. Sri. T.R.Subbanna, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Smt Vidyulatha for the petitioner submits that the petitioner Company is cent percent Central Government Undertaking. There are no private shareholders in the Company. All the shares are held by the Central Government in the name of the President of India. All the Directors of the Board of the petitioner Company are appointed by the President of India. The entire dividend being earned by the petitioner Company goes to the Government of India. The property in question, upon which the property tax is sought to levied by the respondent No.2, belongs to the Central Government only. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the general public do not even have access to the petitioner Company. The nature of the petitioner’s activities being sensitive, utmost vigil is maintained in the areas of its operation. 3. He submits that the petitioner was paying a sum of about Rs.23,00,000/-(Rs. Twenty three lakhs only) towards the property tax to the second respondent’s predecessor, namely, Krishnarajapuram City Municipal Council under the self-assessment scheme. He submits that under Article 285 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is exempted from the payment of any tax. The said Article is extracted hereinbelow: “285. Exemption of property of the Union from State taxation- (1) The property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which such property was immediately before the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that tax continues to be levied in that State.” 4. Nextly, the learned Senior Counsel brought to my notice the provisions contained in Section 110 (1)(j) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act’), which is extracted hereinbelow: 110. General exemptions- (1) The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax:- (a) ………. (b) ………. Nextly, the learned Senior Counsel brought to my notice the provisions contained in Section 110 (1)(j) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act’), which is extracted hereinbelow: 110. General exemptions- (1) The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax:- (a) ………. (b) ………. (c) ………. (d) ………. (e) ………. (f) ……….. (g) ………. (h) ………. (i) ………. (j) buildings or lands belonging to the Central Government or any State Government used for purposes of Government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes; (k) ……….” 5. As the petitioner’s properties belong to the Central Government, the general exemption provided under Section 110(1)(j) of the Act, the provisions of which are extracted hereinabove, are directly attracted to the petitioner’s case, so contends the learned Senior Counsel. According to him, the expression ‘belonging to’ is indicative of some interest which may be less than that of full ownership. For advancing this argument, he draws support from the 15th Edition of the Wharton’s Law Lexicon. The expression ‘belonging to’ is explained in the said source as follows: “Belonging to, the expression “belonging to” and as such indicates something over which a person has dominion and lawful dominion, Mir Osman Ali Khan v. CWT, AIR 1987 SC 522 (525): 1986 Supp SCC 700. [Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), s.2(m)] – Though the word ‘belonging’ no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster “belonging to” is explained as meaning inter alia to be owned by, be the possession of. The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can therefore be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs, Raja Mohd Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923 (1924). [Transfer of Property Act 1882 s. 111(g)]” 6. Contending that the word ‘belong’ may be at times connotive of the ownership and at times only of the possession, he read out paragraph No.13 from the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of LATE NAWAB SIR MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN v. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH-TAX, HYDERABAD, reported in AIR 1987 SC 522 . Contending that the word ‘belong’ may be at times connotive of the ownership and at times only of the possession, he read out paragraph No.13 from the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of LATE NAWAB SIR MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN v. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH-TAX, HYDERABAD, reported in AIR 1987 SC 522 . The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow: “13. In the instant appeal, however, we are concerned with the expression ‘belonging to’ and not with the expression ‘owner’. This question had come up before this Court before a bench of five learned judges in Commr. Of Wealth-tax, West Bengal v. Biswanath Chatterjee, 103 ITR 536 at page 539 ( AIR 1976 SC 1492 at p. 1494) of the report, this Court referred to the definition of the expression ‘belong’ in the Oxford English Dictionary “To be the property or rightful possession of”. So it is the property of a person, or that which is in his possession as of right, which is liable to wealth-tax. In other words, the liability to wealth-tax arises because of the belonging of the asset, and not otherwise. Mere possession, or joint possession unaccompanied by the right to be in possession, or ownership of property would therefore not bring the property within the definition of “net wealth” for it would not then be an asset “belonging” to the assessee. The first limb of the definition indicated in the Oxford Dictionary may not be applicable to these properties in the instant appeal because these lands were not legally the properties of the vendees and the assessee was the lawful owner of these properties. The vendees were however, in rightful possession of the properties as against the vendor in view of the provisions of S. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The scheme of the Act has to be borne in mind. It has also to be borne in mind that unlike the provisions of Income-tax Act, S.2(m) of the Act uses the expression ‘belonging to’ and as such indicates something over which a person has dominion and lawful dominion should be the person assessable to wealth-tax for this purpose”. 7. He has also brought to my notice, this Court’s order, dated. 04.08.2010 passed in Writ petition No.9965/2007 wherein the second respondent’s demand for the payment of service charges from the post offices was quashed. 7. He has also brought to my notice, this Court’s order, dated. 04.08.2010 passed in Writ petition No.9965/2007 wherein the second respondent’s demand for the payment of service charges from the post offices was quashed. He also brings to my notice, the decision of this Court in the case of M.K.VIJAYALAKSHMI v. THE STATE BY CBI/SPE, BELLARY ROAD, BANGALORE, reported in ILR 2007 KAR 2439, wherein it is held that an employee of a Government Company becomes a public servant. 8. He also submits that as the petitioner is a Government Company, it is an instrumentality of the State. Therefore it is entitled to get all the exemptions which are given in respect of the Government properties. In this regard, he read out the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of AJAY HASIA v. KHALID MUJIB reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 . The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted hereinabelow: “9. The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may now be culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority’s case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression “other authorities”, it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government with the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority’s case as follows: (1) “One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.” (2) “Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.” (3) “It may also be a relevant factor……whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.” (4) “Existence of “deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.” (5) “If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.” (6) “Specifically, if a department of Govt. is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference” of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.” If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority’s case, be an ‘authority’ and, therefore, ‘State’ within the meaning of the expression in Article 12.” 9. For advancing the contention that no tax is leviable on the property of the Union Government by a municipality, he relies upon this Court’s decision in the case of UNION OF INDIA v. CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, RANT BENNUR, reported in AIR 2000 KAR 104 . 10. He has also relied on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of THE STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & OTHERS v. THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, VISAKHAPATNAM AND OTHERS, reported in (1964) 4 S.C.R 99 and contended that what has to be considered while levying the tax is the beneficial purpose of an entity. He has also relied on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. BROJO NATH GANGULY AND ANOTHER, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 . He has also relied on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of CENTRAL INLAND WATER TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. BROJO NATH GANGULY AND ANOTHER, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 . He relied on paragraphs 54 and 62 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereinbelow: “54. At the first blush it may appear that the case of S. S. Dhanea v. Municipal Corporation, runs counter to the trend set in the authorities cited above but on a closer scrutiny it turns out not to be so. The facts in that case were that the Cooperative Store Limited, which was a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 had established and was managing Super Bazars at different places including at Connaught Place in New Delhi. Under Section 23 of the said Act, the society was a body corporate by the name under which it was registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal. The Super Bazars were not owned by the Central Government but were owned and managed by the said society, though pursuant to an agreement executed between the said society and the Union of India, the Central Government had advanced a loan of rupees forty lakhs to the said society for establishing and managing Super Bazars and it also held more than ninety seven per cent of the shares of the said society. The appellant who was a member of the Indian Administrative Service was sent on deputation as the General Manager of the Super Bazar at Connaught Place. He along with other officials of the Super Bazar were prosecuted under the prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. He raised a preliminary objection before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, before who he was summoned to appear that no cognizance of the alleged offence could be taken by him for want of sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. On his contention being rejected, he appealed to this Court. He raised a preliminary objection before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, before who he was summoned to appear that no cognizance of the alleged offence could be taken by him for want of sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. On his contention being rejected, he appealed to this Court. Under the said Section 197, when any person who is or was inter alia a public servant not removable from his office save by of with the sanction of the government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court is to take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of the Central Government. As stated in the opening paragraph of the judgment in the said case, the question before the court was whether the appellant was a public servant within the meaning of clause twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code for purpose of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure……………” “62. There can thus be no doubt that the Corporation is a government undertaking in the public sector. The Corporation itself has considered that it is a Government of India undertaking. The complete heading of the said Rules is “Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited (A Government of India Undertaking)-Service, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1979”. 11. The sum and substance of the Senior Advocate’s argument is that once it is shown that the petitioner is a Government undertaking, certain consequences should follow. The exemptions granted in respect of the Central Government’s properties are to be extended to the properties being owned by the Central Government undertakings also. For buttressing this submission, he has strenuously tried to put an innovative interpretation on Section 110 (1)(j) of the Act. He submits that if the legislature wanted to make a distinction between the properties of the Central Government and the properties of the Central Government undertakings, it would have only used the expression ‘properties owned by the Central Government’ and not the properties ‘belonging to the Central Government’. 12. He submits that if the legislature wanted to make a distinction between the properties of the Central Government and the properties of the Central Government undertakings, it would have only used the expression ‘properties owned by the Central Government’ and not the properties ‘belonging to the Central Government’. 12. Sri Devdas, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent No.1 would support the impugned order. He submits that the exemption provided for is only in respect of the properties belonging to the Government and not the Government undertakings. He draws support from the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of BOARD OF TRUSTEES, VISAKHAPATNAM PORT TRUST v. STATE OF A.P, reported in AIR 1999 SC 2552 . In the said case, the Central Government has absolutely vested the properties in the Port Trust Board. The considered view taken is that the Port Trust Board is not a Department of the Central Government; it has the distinct identity of a company. It is distinct from the Central Government. It can not, therefore, claim exemption from taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution of India. 13. Sri K.N.Puttegowda, the learned standing counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner is a commercial establishment. It collects enormous fees by renting its land for the parking of the aircrafts by the private civil aviation operators. He further submits that the petitioner has constructed and rented out the commercial establishments, etc. He also brings to my notice that in the impugned order, the respondent No.2 has already exempted the petitioner from paying the tax in respect of the playground, park and the area being utilised for the civic amenities. 14. He submits that the aircrafts being manufactured by the petitioner are not being exclusively supplied to the Government of India and that many of the aircrafts, equipments, etc., being manufactured by the petitioner are sold to the non-Governmental parties making huge profits. The petitioner is therefore not entitled to claim the benefit under the second proviso to Section 110(1) of the said Act, which reads as follows: “Provided further that for purpose of clause (j), a certificate issued by Government or any officer duly authorised by Government that any building or vacant land is used for purposes of Government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes shall be binding on the corporation.” 15. He also brings to my notice that the petitioner was indeed paying the property tax to the second respondent’s predecessor bodies, namely, City Municipal Councils of Krishnarajapuram and Mahadevapura. When it was paying the property tax to the said local bodies, it never raised the issue that it was not liable to pay the property tax. Only on the recorganization of the local bodies and the inclusion of Krishnarajapuram and Mahadevapura local bodies in the BBMP, the objection is raised for the first time. 16. Sri K.N. Putte Gowda has relied on this Court’s decision in the case of VIJAYA BANK v. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE AND OTHERS, reported in 1987 (2) KLJ 244, wherein it is held that a building owned by a nationalized bank is not entitled to exemption from the payment of property tax. 17. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of the contentions raised on behalf of the respective parties, it would be appropriate for me to formulate the following point for my determination: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the exemption from the payment of property tax under Section 110 (1) (j) of the Act? 18. The plain reading of the said sub-section reveals that such an exemption is provided for only to the building or lands belonging to the Central Government or any State Government used for purposes of Government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes. To qualify to get the exemption under the said provision of law, two requirements are strictly necessary a) the property has to belong to the Central or any Government and b) it has to be used only for the purposes of the Government. 19. The expression ‘belonging to’ has to be widely construed to mean not only the ownership but also the possession of the Government. If the Government has taken a private building for Government purpose, the exemption could be granted in respect of such a building also. The expression ‘belonging to the Government’ can be thought of in both the contexts of either the Government owning the property or the Government taking it on lease or any other basis for Governmental purpose. If the Government is using its property for non-Governmental purpose, then also under Section 110(1)(j) of the Act, it is not entitled to exemption. The expression ‘belonging to the Government’ can be thought of in both the contexts of either the Government owning the property or the Government taking it on lease or any other basis for Governmental purpose. If the Government is using its property for non-Governmental purpose, then also under Section 110(1)(j) of the Act, it is not entitled to exemption. That the Governmental property being used for non-Governmental purpose is also to be exempted from the payment of the tax if sans merit. 20. The words belonging to the Central Government cannot however be enlarged to include the property belonging to the Government Companies, Corporations, Boards, Undertakings, etc. when the legislature, in exercise of its wisdom, has provided for the exemption only in respect of the Governmental properties, the beneficial provision cannot be extended to the Government Undertakings, Boards, Corporations, etc. If the legislature wanted, it would have included them also in Section 110(1)(j) of the Act. 21. The words “buildings and lands belonging to the Central Government or any State Government” in the enactment have a settled meaning. I do not see any need to provide for a modifier or an additional word. The Court, as an interpreter, need not give a different meaning. The legislative draftsmen or drafters are also not ordinary men. It has to be presumed that they use the words with correct meaning. 22. When a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous and where no doubts or difficulties have cropped up, the words of the statute shall be given effect to, irrespective of the consequences. The Apex Court has this to say in the case of VIJAYA BANK vs. SHYAMALA KUMAR LODH, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 635 . The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: “19….. Every word used by the legislature carries meaning and therefore effort has to be made to give meaning to each and every word used by it………” 20. The legislature never wastes its words or says anything in vain and a construction rejecting the words of a statute is not resorted to, excepting for compelling reasons…….” 23. It is also beneficial to refer to para 179 of the Hon’ble’ble Supreme Courts judgment in the case of MOHD. SHAHABUDDIN vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 : “179. It is also beneficial to refer to para 179 of the Hon’ble’ble Supreme Courts judgment in the case of MOHD. SHAHABUDDIN vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 : “179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute……..” 24. It is profitable to refer to the Hon’ble’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. PARMESHWARAN SUBRAMANI AND ANOTHER, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 729 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: “18. It is settled law that where there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to undertake any exercise to read something into the provisions which the legislature in its wisdom consciously omitted. Such an exercise if undertaken by the courts may amount to amending or altering the statutory provisions. 19. In a plethora of cases, it has been stated that where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of legislation or the intention of the legislature, when the language of the provision is plain. The court cannot rewrite the legislation for the reason that it had no power to legislate. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The court cannot, on an assumption that there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, correct or make up assumed deficiency, when the words are clear and unambiguous. Courts have to decide what the law is and not what it should be. The courts adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but cannot set at naught legislative judgment because such course would be subversive of constitutional harmony.” 25. Courts have to decide what the law is and not what it should be. The courts adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but cannot set at naught legislative judgment because such course would be subversive of constitutional harmony.” 25. The authorities relied upon by the petitioner’s side do not come to the rescue of the petitioner in any way. They only reiterate the position that the Government Corporations, Boards, Trusts, Companies and Undertakings are the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, the decisions relied upon by the respondents in the case of Board of Trustees, Visakhapatnam and the Vijaya Bank (supra) have not left the issue in gray area. 26. The issue is no more res integra. It is held by this Court and the Apex Court that the Nationalised Bank and an autonomous Board created by the Central Government are not exempted from the payment of property tax. 27. Equally unacceptable is the argument that there is constitutional bar against the local body to impose the property tax on the petitioner. Because Article 285 of the Constitution of India only deals with the immunity of the property of the Central Government from State taxation. In the case of FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, JALALABAD AND ANOTHER, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 74 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “7. The question that arises before us is: If the property of the Corporation is the property of the Union of India and, thus, exempt from taxation imposed by the State or any authority within a State. Authority in the present case would include local authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. has held that a government company is distinct from the Central Government and cannot claim exemption from taxation under Article 285 of the Constitution. The case of the Corporation cannot be any different. The Act under which it is constituted specifically makes the Corporation a body corporate having the attributes of a company.” 28. Thus, considering the constitutional and statutory provisions and the gamut of case-law to which elaborate references are made hereinabove, I answer the point, which has fallen for determination, in the negative. The Act under which it is constituted specifically makes the Corporation a body corporate having the attributes of a company.” 28. Thus, considering the constitutional and statutory provisions and the gamut of case-law to which elaborate references are made hereinabove, I answer the point, which has fallen for determination, in the negative. I have no hesitation in turning down the petitioner’s prayer for blanket exemption from the payment of property tax. 29. But it does not mean that the petitioner cannot be given any relief in this petition. The statute provides for general exemptions in respect of certain buildings and lands. In this regard, Section 110(1) of the said Act in its entirety, as extracted hereinbelow, has to be considered: “110. General exemptions.- (1) The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax:- (a) places set apart for public worship and either actually so used or used for no other purpose; (b) choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultries the rent charged for occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes; (c) places used of the charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by Government. (d) such ancient monuments protected under the Karnataka Ancient and Historical Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1961 and the Ancient Monuments and Archeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (Central Act 24 of 1958) or parts thereof as are not used as residential quarters or public offices; (e) charitable hospitals and dispensaries but not including residential quarters or attached thereto; (f) such hospitals and dispensaries maintained by railway administrations as may from time to time be notified by Government, but not including residential quarters attached thereto; (g) burial and cremation grounds included in the list published by the Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 394; (h) Government lands set apart for free recreational purposes and all such other Government land as may be notified by it, from which in the opinion of the Government no income could be derived; (i) building or lands exclusively used for,- (a) students hostels which are not established or conducted for profit; (b) educational purposes by recognised educational institutions; (c) the offices of Labour Associations registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and belonging to such Association; (i) buildings or hands belonging to the Central Government or any State Government used for purposes of Government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes; (k) buildings or lands belonging to any Urban Development Authority constituted under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987, the Bangalore Development Authority, the Karnataka Housing Board or any local authority the possession of which has not been delivered to any person, in pursuance of any grant, allotment or lease; (l) land which is registered as land used for agricultural purposes in the revenue accounts of Government and is actually used for the cultivation of crops; Provided that nothing contained in clauses (a), (c) and (e) shall be deemed to exempt from property tax, any building or vacant land for which rent is payable by the person or person using the same for the purposes referred to in the said clauses; Provided further that for purpose of clause (j), a certificate issued by Government or any officer duly authorised by Government that any building or vacant land is used for purposes of Government and not used or intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes shall be binding on the corporation. (2) Notwithstanding the exemptions granted under this section it shall be open to the corporation to collect service charges for providing civic amenities and for general or special services rendered at such rates as may be prescribed.” 30. If the petitioner has constructed any Temple, Gurudwara, Mosque or Church, it is entitled to exemption under Section 110(1)(a) of the Act. If it has constructed the Kalyan Mantaps for the benefit of its residents and if no rent is being collected from them, it can seek exemption under 110 (1)(b) of the said Act. Likewise, under Section 110(1)(e) of the said Act, if the petitioner is running charitable hospitals and dispensaries but not including the residential quarters attached thereto, it is entitled to exemption. If there are burial and cremation grounds in the petitioner’s area, exemption could also be sought under Section 110(1)(g) of the Act. If the petitioner’s building houses any hostels, schools, colleges, trade union offices, etc., then the exemption could be sought under Section 110(1)(i) of the Act. 31. Further the second proviso to Section 110(1) also provides for seeking exemption from the payment of property tax in respect of those lands and buildings, which are exclusively used for the purposes of the Government. If any of the petitioner’s lands and factory buildings are being exclusively used for manufacturing, serving and overhauling the Central Government’s aircrafts, defence equipments, accessories, etc., then also the exemption could be sought invoking Section 110(1)(j) and the second proviso. 32. If the petitioner seeks exemptions under the other sub-sections and the proviso to which the reference is made hereinabove, the respondent No.2 is duty-bound to consider them meaningfully and subject to the petitioner producing the proof in support of its exemption claims. 33. At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel requests that sometime be granted to the petitioner to file the exemption claims invoking different sub-sections of Section 110(1) of the Act alongwith the documents in support and proof of the same and that until such time, the respondent No.2 should be directed not to resort to the coercive recovery measures. Sri K.N.Putte Gowda and Sri R.Devdas resist this prayer. 34. Sri K.N.Putte Gowda and Sri R.Devdas resist this prayer. 34. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, considering that: a) the petitioner is a Central Government undertaking, b) its dues towards the property tax are a whopping Rs.23,83,00,000/-, c) the probability of the respondent granting exemption for some lands and buildings, this Court deems it necessary and just to make the following transitional arrangement: i) The petitioner shall submit the exemption applications under different sub-sections of 110(1) extracted hereinabove within a period of one month. The respondent No.2 shall consider the petitioner’s claims and pass appropriate orders within one month from the date of the receipt of the petitioner’s anticipated exemption claim applications. ii) The petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,00,000/- (Rupees eight crores only) towards the property tax amounts demanded. If the respondent No.2 refixes the petitioner’s liability to pay the property tax below Rs.8,00,00,000/-, the excess amounts are to be refunded to the petitioner. If the refixation of the property tax exceeds Rs.8,00,00,000/-, the respondent No.2 shall recover the differential amounts from the petitioner in accordance with law. iii) If the petitioner deposits Rs.8,00,00,000/- (Rupees eight crores only) within 15 days from today, the respondent No.2 shall not resort to any precipitative action until it passes fresh order on the petitioner’s exemption claim-applications. Further, if the petitioner does not deposit the amounts and/or does not submit fresh exemption claims, within the time-frame stipulated hereinabove, it shall be open to the respondent No.2 to give effect to its impugned order. 35. Accordingly this petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.