JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads as follows: "9(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides." 3. On the own showing of the appellant, his minor child is living with the mother at Ambikapur in the State of Chhatisgarh since February 2006. 4. We have considered the submissions of the appellant and the respondents. 5. The words ordinarily resides carries its own connotation of a continued residence and abode as distinct from the temporary habitation at another place. On the own showing of the appellant, the minor whose custody is sought is ordinarily a resident of Ambikapur at Chhatisgarh. 6. The Supreme Court considering the meaning of the words ordinarily resides in 2000 (1) PLJR (SC)71 (Union of India & Ors. V/s. Dudh Nath Prasad) atparagraphs 14 and 16 has held as follows: "14. The word "reside" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary as "dwell permanently or for a considerable time; to have ones settled or usual abode; to live in or at a particular place". The meaning, therefore, covers not only the place where the person has a permanent residence but also the place where the person has resided for a "considerable time". 16. If the two meanings referred to above are to be read alongwith the word "ordinarily", it becomes clear that a person, before he can be said to be "ordinarily residing" at a particular place, has to have an intention to stay at that place for a considerably long time. It would not include a flying visit or a short or casual presence at that place." 7. In view of the legislative interdict we have no reason to interfere with the impugned order under appeal to come to a different conclusion. 8. The appeal is dismissed. 9. Any application preferred by the appellant under the Act before a Court of competent jurisdiction shall naturally be considered on its own merits when the present order shall have no bearing, as we have declined interference on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction only.