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2010 DIGILAW 1013 (RAJ)

Anand Sagar Mehta v. State of Rajasthan

2010-05-11

MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon'ble SHARMA, J.-Both. these revision petitions have been filed against the order dated 21.2.2009 passed by Special Judge, printing and Stationary Embezzlement Cases and Additional Special Judge, CBI Cases, Jaipur in Special Criminal case No. 35/08 (3/06) whereby charge has been framed against the accused petitioner Anand Sagar Mehta for the offence under Sections 120B read with section 420 B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and against the accused petitioners Suresh Meghraj Pujara and Chandra Meghraj Pujara for the offence under Sections 120B read with Section 420 IPC. 2. As both these revision petitions relate to framing of charge against the accused petitioners in Criminal Case 35/08 (3/06) pending before the Addl. Special Judge, CBI Cases, Jaipur, they are being disposed by this common order. 3. Brief facts 'giving rise to these revision petitions are that on 1.3.2004 the General Manager (Vigilance) and Chief Vigilance Officer, UCO Bank wrote a letter to the Superintendent of Police, SPE CBI Jaipur making complaint against Shri Anand Mohan Sagar Mehta, the then Chief Manager in respect of acts of omission and commission committed by him in advance portfolio at Johari Bazar, Jaipur Branch. On the basis of which on 8.3.2004 an FIR was lodged. The CBI completed the investigation and submitted a charge sheet in the matter. After registration of the criminal case, the Bank invoked the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur by filing application under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 against M/s. Meghsons Departmental Store and its partners etc. The said application was filed on 28.1.2005 and was registered vide No. 18/2005. The petitioners submitted that on perusal of the original application would go to show that there is no such allegation as levelled in the FIR. The CBI filed the charge sheet against the petitioners and others for various offences including sections 120 B read_ with Section 420 IPC and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1980 in the alternate section 420 IPC read with section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1980. It has been averred in the petition that M/s. Meghsons Departmental Store, Jaipur was granted financial assistance by the Bank. It has been averred in the petition that M/s. Meghsons Departmental Store, Jaipur was granted financial assistance by the Bank. On account of default in repayment of the loans, the Bank filed a suit for recovery, a complaint was made by the General Manager and the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Bank on the basis whereof investigations were undertaken by the CBI, which resulted in filing of the charge sheet against the accused petitioners. The allegations in the charge sheet reveal that the accused petitioners conspired with each other in fraudulently diverting the funds of the Bank. Offences relating to forgery were also included in the charge sheet. The suit between the firm and the Bank was settled on a compromise arrived at between the parties which was reduced in writing. The firm agreed to pay the amount compromised between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The firm deposited the agreed amount with the Bank and ultimately the OA No. 18/05 filed by the Bank was not pressed by the Bank before the Tribunal and the same was dismissed on 16.4.2009. The securitisation appeal filed by the firm came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 16.4.2009. Consequent upon the compromise arrived at between the partners of the firm, the petitioners submit that since the subject matter of the dispute had been settled between the firm and the Bank, it would be unreasonable to continue with the criminal proceedings which had been commenced on a complaint filed on behalf of the Bank. The Special Judge framed the charge against the petitioners on 21.2.2009 without any basis and evidence. The petitioners also filed a misc. petition for quashing of the entire proceedings on the basis of the order of DRT in which the entire matter has been settled between the parties to the suit. 4. Mr. Jairaj Tatia, learned counsel for the petitioners in both these revision petitions averred that the trial Court framed the charge against the accused petitioners mainly considering that there was loss to the Bank of Rs. 132 lacs. The learned counsel averred that the petitioners did not cause any loss to the Bank, rather the petitioners abided all the norms of the Bank and after following the due process, had obtained the facility. 132 lacs. The learned counsel averred that the petitioners did not cause any loss to the Bank, rather the petitioners abided all the norms of the Bank and after following the due process, had obtained the facility. The learned counsel averred that the charge deserves to be quashed on the ground that in this case the firm was granted financial assistance by the Bank. On account of default in repayment of the loans, the Bank filed a suit for recovery, a complaint was made by the General Manager and the Chief Officer of the Bank on the basis whereof investigations were undertaken by the CBI, which resulted in filing of the charge sheet against the accused petitioners. The allegations under the charge sheet indicate that the accused persons conspired with each other in fraudulently diverting the funds of the Bank. Offence alleging forgery were also included in the charge sheet. The learned counsel argued that from the material on record, as per the investigating agency, the basic intention o( the accused persons appears to have been to misrepresent the financial status of the firm in order to avail of credit facility to an extent to which the firm was not entitled. In other words, the main intention of the firm and its partners was to cheat the Bank and induce it to part with additional amount of credit to which the firm was not otherwise entitled. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, the same has been made compoundable under sub section 2 of section 320 Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Lastly it was submitted that the dispute between the Bank and the firm has set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them where under the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the firm. The learned counsel argued that in such circumstances the charge framed the against the accused petitioners deserves to be quashed. The learned counsel placed reliance on Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI and another ( AIR 2009 SC 428 = 2009(1) RLW 185 (SC)) and Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591 ). 5. On the other hand, Mr. The learned counsel placed reliance on Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI and another ( AIR 2009 SC 428 = 2009(1) RLW 185 (SC)) and Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591 ). 5. On the other hand, Mr. Tej Prakash Sharma, Special Public Prosecutor, appearing for the CBI opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and contended that the trial Court rightly framed the charge against the accused petitioners after considering the material available on record. Making due payment cannot exonerate the accused petitioners from a prima facie charge against them. Reliance has been placed on Satya Narain Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC 607 , State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005(1) Crimes 1 (SC) = RLW 2005(3) SC 414, Om Prakash Sharma vs. CHI, Delhi (2000) 5 SCC 679 P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 , State of T.N. vs. J. Jayalalitha (2005) SCC 440, State of M.P. vs. S.B. Johari and others (2000) 2 SCC 57 , P.S Rajya vs. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1 , State of Delhi vs. Gyan Devi and others (2000) 8 SCC 239 , State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj and others (1997) 4 SCC 393 = RLW 1997(1) SC 165, State of M.P. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 , Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration and another (1996) 9 SCC 666, State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (2003) 2 SCC 711 , Minakshi Bala vs. Sudhir Kumar and others (1994) 4 SCC 142 and Central Bureau of Investigation vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad and others (2009 (3) Crimes 48 (SC). 6. In the latest case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. A Ravishankar Prasad and others (supra) the Apex Court while considering the ratio laid down in CBI vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 59, and Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2008) 9 SCC 677 ) on which reliance was made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in paras 26, to 43 which are relevant for the present controversy, held as under: 26. The decision in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591 was relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. The decision in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591 was relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. The court observed that for the purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider whether the allegations in the complaint prima facie make out an offence or not. It is not necessary to scrutinize the allegations for the purpose of deciding whether such allegations are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any action by way of quashing the complaint is an action to be taken at the threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint. For quashing the complaint by way of action at the threshold, it is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the allegations incorporated in a complaint or FIR., a criminal offence is constituted or not. 27. In this case, the court further held that looking to the facts of the case it appears that after completion of civil suit further investigation in connection with complaints may not be expedient. In concluding para, it was observed as under: "In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a matter of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the companies concerned. Even if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the Bank, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating." 28. The tenor of the judgment indicates that quashing of the complaint would depend 6n the facts of the each case. 29. In Union of India & Others vs. B.R. Bajaj & Others (1994) 2 SCC 277 the court after examining this Court's judgment in Ch. Bhajan Lars case (supra) observed that at the state of FIR the court should refrain from interfering when the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence. 30. 29. In Union of India & Others vs. B.R. Bajaj & Others (1994) 2 SCC 277 the court after examining this Court's judgment in Ch. Bhajan Lars case (supra) observed that at the state of FIR the court should refrain from interfering when the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence. 30. In B.S. Joshi & Others vs. State of Haryana & Another (2003) 4 SCC 675 the Court reiterated the legal position that the court's inherent powers have no limit but should be exercised with utmost care and caution. Inherent powers must be utilized with the sole purpose to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. In exercise of inherent powers, proper scrutiny of facts and circumstances of concerned case are absolutely imperative. 31. In Nikhil Merchand vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Another (2008) 9 SCC 677 , this Court while relying on the aforesaid judgment in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) observed that on overall view of the facts the Court was satisfied that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings. 32. In Jagdish Chanana & Others vs. State of Haryana & Another 2008 (4) Scale 411 this court observed as under: "The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transaction that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise." 33. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transaction that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise." 33. In Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 582 in which one of us (Bedi, J.) was the author of the judgment observed as under: "We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law." 34. In a recently delivered judgment of this Court in Smt. Rumi Ohar vs. State of West Bengal & Another JT 2009 (5) SC 321, this court approved the observations of the Special Judge. The observations of Special Judge are set out as under:- "The learned Special Judge in his order dated 16.12.2006 rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant herein, stating: "I have gone through the record, citation and considered the circumstances. It is true that the accused has put a good gesture by paying of the dues of the bank but I am at one with the Ld. PP that this payment cannot exonerate the accused from a prima facie charge. If I allow this, then I may have to swallow in a case of bribery that the accused has paid back the amount to the sufferer the amount received as bribe. It is a question of trial whether there was any criminal intention on the part of this Lady accused in this crime. The criminal intention is to be inferred from the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. Simply because the money has peen returned, I cannot shut the mouth of the prosecution from adducing evidence against this accused. It is a question of trial whether there was any criminal intention on the part of this Lady accused in this crime. The criminal intention is to be inferred from the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. Simply because the money has peen returned, I cannot shut the mouth of the prosecution from adducing evidence against this accused. Thus, I do not like to pass any order in favour of the accused. The prayer for discharge of accused No.7, Rumi Ohar stands rejected. Let the case proceed. Fix 7.2.07 for consideration of charge. The sureties must produce all the accused persons on that date." 35. The facts of the instant case are quite akin to Rumi Dhar (supra), s case. In the instant case, the charge-sheet clearly reveal substantial material on record making a clear case under Section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents and their connivance with the bank officials. 36. The High Court in the impugned judgment has misunderstood and misapplied the ratio of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami & Am. vs. State of Uttarachal & Ors. 2007 (12) Scale 15 to the facts of this case. One of us (Bhandari, J.) was the author of the judgment is in para 24 at page 25 which reads as under: "Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute." 37. The court in para 27 also observed that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 38. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute." 37. The court in para 27 also observed that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 38. Let us consider the facts of this case and apply the ratio of Goswami is case (supra) where facts are as follows: (I) allegations are that accused have committed serious offences such as forgery, fabrication of documents and used those documents as genuine; (II) allegations are that accused/respondents herein, A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad have entered into a conspiracy with the Chairman and Managing Director and other officials of the Indian Bank, Chennai with the object of cheating the Indian Bank in the matter of recommending, sanctioning, disbursing huge credit facilities running over hundreds of crores. (III) Trial of all four cases are at advanced stage in which 92 witnesses have already been examined. 39. While applying the ratio of Goswami's case (supra), how any court in its legitimate exercise of power under section 482 Cr.P.C. quash the proceedings against accused A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad in the face of aforesaid allegations. In the instant case, wrong application of the ratio of the said judgment has led to grave miscarriage of justice. 40. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly reveals that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case. The object incorporating inherent powers in the Code is to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure ends of Justice. 41. Both English and the Indian Courts have consistently taken the view that the inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 42. When we apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the respondents. 42. When we apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the respondents. It is also not possible to conclude that material on record taken on face value make out no case under Section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that this is one case where adequate material is available on record 'to proceed against the respondents. 43. In our considered view it was extremely unfortunate that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erroneously invoked inherent power of the court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court ought to have considered the entire material available to establish a case against the respondents under section 120-B read with Section 420 IPC. It is significant that the respondents and the other bank officials share the charges under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC. Quashing the charges against the respondents on the pending cases against the other bank officials. In the case of CBI vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad (supra) the Central Bureau of Investigation aggrieved by the judgment of the Madras High Court by which I the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings against the respondents A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad, filed special leave petition before the Apex Court. Before the Apex Court CBI contended that the respondents committed serious offences, such as forgery, fabrication of documents and using the said documents as genuine. The respondents, A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad also entered into conspiracy with the Chairman and Managing Director and other officials of the Indian Bank, Chennai with the object of cheating the Indian Bank in the matter of recommending/sanctioning/disbursing huge credit facilities. On completion of investigation charge-sheets were filed and four cases were registered against M. Gopalakrishnan, formerly CMD, Indian Bank, Chennai and other public servants, bank officials and A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad and their group concerns under Section 120-B read with section 420 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In that case also the company settled the entire outstanding dues by paying an amount of Rs. In that case also the company settled the entire outstanding dues by paying an amount of Rs. 157 crores and the petitioners before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai have been dismissed as settled out of court. As quote above the Apex Court reversed the judgment of the Madras High Court, quashing the entire criminal proceedings. In the instant matter in the similar situation the order passed by the trial Court in framing the charge against the accused petitioner in the circumstances quoted above in the case of CBI vs. A. Ravishanker Prasad (supra) cannot be said to be erroneous. It is true that In the instant matter the dues of the UCO Bank have been paid and the Debt Recovery Tribunal dismissed the OA filed by the Bank: As per the latest ratio laid down by the Apex Court observing that respondents and the other bank officials share the charges under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC and quashing the charges against the respondents would also have very serious repercussions on the pending cases against the other bank officials. In the instant case, the trial Court framed the charge against the accused after considering the ,material available on the record. Evidently the Bank's officers made complaint to the CBI and the CBI after completion of investigation filed charge sheet. On the basis of material available on record the trial Court by a detailed order framed charge against the accused petitioners. Merely because the dues of the Bank have been cleared by the firm and the DRT dismissed the application filed by the Bank, cannot be a ground for quashing the charge framed against the accused petitioners. In these circumstances the argument of the learned counsel being devoid of merit on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in CBI vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad and others (supra), J is rejected. The trial Court rightly framed the charge against the accused petitioners. When I apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the accused petitioners. The trial Court rightly framed the charge against the accused petitioners. When I apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the accused petitioners. It is also not possible to conclude that material on record taken on face value make out no case under Section 120-B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act against the accused petitioners. Prima facie, I am of the opinion that this is one case where adequate material is available on record to proceed against the accused petitioners. Simply because the money has been returned, this court cannot, shut the mouth of the prosecution from adducing evidence against the accused petitioners. Payment made by the firm to the Bank cannot exonerate the accused petitioners from a prima face charge levelled against them. 7. I may make a mention that this court on August 12, 2009 stayed the further proceedings in criminal case No. 35 (3/06) pending before the Special Judge CBI Cases, Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1229/09. 8. The Apex Court in Satya Narain Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SC 607, bars grant of stay of proceedings by use of any power by any court or any and even by High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and considered the object of the provisions of section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Apex Court held as under: 14. We have heard the parties. Section 19(3) (c) of the said Act reads as follows: "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).xxx xxxx xxx (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings." It is thus to be seen that this section provides: (a) that no court should stay the proceedings under the Act on any ground and (b) that no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. To be noted that (b) above is identical to Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which deals with revisional power of the Court. If Section 19 was only to deal with revisional powers then the portion set out in (b) above, would have been sufficient. The legislature has, therefore, by adding the words no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground clearly indicated that no stay could be granted by use of any power on any ground. This therefore would apply even where a Court is exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is another reason also why the submission that, Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption would not apply to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, cannot be accepted. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code. Thus the inherent power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision contained in any other enactment. Thus if an. enactment contains a specific bar then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar. As has been pointed out in the cases of Madhu Limaye vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in 1977(4) SCC 551 , Janata Deal vs. H.S. Chowdhary & others, reported in 1992(4) SCC 305 and Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India and others reported in 20000) SCC 168, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be resorted to if there was a specific provision or there is an express bar of law. We see no substance in the submission that Section 19 would not apply to a High Court. Section 5(3) of the said Act shows that the Special Court under the said Act is a Court of Session. Therefore, the power of revision and/or the inherent jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court. Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act there can be no stay of trails. We clarify that we are not saying that proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases proceedings under Section 482 can be adopted. Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act there can be no stay of trails. We clarify that we are not saying that proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases proceedings under Section 482 can be adopted. However, even if petitioner under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code is entertained there can be no stay of trials under the said Act. It is then for the party to convince the concerned Court to expedite the hearing of that petition. However merely because the concerned Court is not in a position to take up the petition for hearing would 'be no ground for staying the trial even temporarily. 9. Hon'ble Thomas J. concurring with the judgment of S.N. Variava J. in I the aforesaid case further held as under: 23. In the objects and Reasons for bringing the Act with new measures the law-markers declared it in abundantly clear terms that a provision prohibiting the grant of stay is included in the statute for speeding up the proceedings. This can be discerned from the following words: In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory orders have also been included. 24. The prohibition is couched in a language admitting of no exception whatsoever, which is clear from the provision itself. The prohibition is incorporated in sub-sec. (3) of Section 19 of the Act. The sub-section consists of three clauses. For all the three clauses the controlling non-obstante words are set out in the commencing portion as: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Hence none of the provisions in the Code could be invoked for circumventing anyone of the bans enumerated in the sub-section. 25. Clause (a) of the sub-section prohibits reversal or alteration of any finding or sentence or order passed by a Special Judge on the ground of absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required for taking cognizance of an offence punishable in the Act, unless in the opinion of the appellate or revisional court a failure of justice has in fact occasioned thereby. 26. Clause (b) contains the prohibition against stay of proceedings under this Act, but it is restricted to sanction aspect alone. 26. Clause (b) contains the prohibition against stay of proceedings under this Act, but it is restricted to sanction aspect alone. No error, omission or irregularity in the sanction shall be a ground for staying the proceedings under this Act unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. In determining whether there was any such failure of justice it is mandated that the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection regarding that aspect could or should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. We may now point out that merely because objection regarding sanction was raised at the early stage is not a ground for holding that there was failure of justice. If the special judge has overruled the objection regarding that aspect it is normally inconceivable that there could be any failure of justice even if such objections were to be upheld by the High Court. Overruling an objection on the ground of sanction does not end the case detrimentally to the accused. It only equips a judicial forum to examine the allegations against a public servant judicially. Hence it is an uphill task to show that discountenance of any objection regarding sanction has resulted in a failure of justice. The corollary of it is thus: The High Court would not normally grant stay on that ground either. 27. It is in clause (c) .of the sub-section that the prohibition is couched in unexceptional terms. It reads thus: No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground. 28. The mere fact that yet another prohibition was also tagged with the above does not mean that the legislative ban contained in clause (c) is restricted only to a situation when the High Court exercises powers of revision. It would be a misinterpretation of the enactment if a court reads into clause (c) of Section 19 (3) a power to grant stay in exercise of inherent powers of the High Court. 29. We are informed that several High Courts, overlooking the said ban, are granting stay of proceedings involving offences under the Act pending before courts of Special Judges. 29. We are informed that several High Courts, overlooking the said ban, are granting stay of proceedings involving offences under the Act pending before courts of Special Judges. This might be on account of a possible chance of missing the legislative ban contained in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act because the title to Section 19 is previous sanction necessary for prosecution. It could have been more advisable if the prohibition contained in sub-section (3) has been included in a separate Section by providing a separate distinct title. Be that as it may, that is no ground for by-passing' the legislative prohibition contained in the sub-section. 10. For these reasons, both the revision petitions being devoid of merit stand dismissed. The interim order granted by this Court on 12.8.2009 stands vacated. The stay applications also stand dismissed. As per the decision of the Apex Court in Satya Narain Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial as early as possible.