ORDER S.K. Gangele, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the promotion of the respondent No. 5 to the post of Assistant Grade-III. 2. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated 30-4-1983 in Nagar Panchayat, Daboh, District Bhind. In the year 1992, the petitioner was transferred to Nagar Panchayat Bhander. Thereafter he was again transferred from Bhander to Aantri, District Gwalior in 1997. 3. The respondent No. 5 was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk in Nagar Panchayat Daboh, District Bhind on 8-2-1988. The Nagar Panchayat issued gradation list of Lower Division Clerks. In the aforesaid list the respondent No. 5 was placed at Serial No. 2. His date of appointment has been mentioned as 8-2-1988. The name of the petitioner was not mentioned in the aforesaid gradation list. 4. The post of Upper Division Clerk (Assistant Grade-II) had fallen vacant and the respondent No. 4 requested the Deputy Director Urban Administration to grant sanction for promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II from the Assistant Grade-III. Consequently, the District Selection Committee in its meeting held on 13-11-1995 found the respondent No. 5 suitable for promotion and recommended his name for promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-II. The Deputy Director Urban Administration vide letter dated 15-11-1995 approved the promotion of the respondent No. 5 to the post of Upper Division Clerk and thereafter the respondent No. 5 was promoted to the post of Upper Division Clerk (Assistant Grade-II) vide an order dated 1-1-1996. When the petitioner came to know about the promotion of the respondent No. 5, he submitted an application to the Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat requesting to supply copy of the promotion order of the respondent No. 5 on 11-8-2006 and thereafter he submitted a representation in regard to promotion of respondent No. 5 to the post of Upper Division Clerk. Thereafter he filed the present petition. 5. The respondent No. 5 in its return raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the petitioner that the petition is not maintainable because there is a delay of 10 years in challenging the order of promotion. It has further been submitted by the respondent No. 5 that he has been promoted against the reserved quota of Scheduled Caste, hence, the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of promotion of the respondent. 6. It has further been submitted by the respondent No. 5 that he has been promoted against the reserved quota of Scheduled Caste, hence, the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of promotion of the respondent. 6. The respondents No. 1 to 3 in the return pleaded that the respondent No. 5 was promoted against the quota reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate, hence, the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of promotion. It has further been contended that there is a delay and latches in challenging the order of promotion by the petitioner. 7. The Nagar Panchayat has also taken the same stand in its return. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is an employee of the Municipal Council, Nagar Panchayat Daboh because his lien has been maintained at Nagar Panchayat Daboh. The respondent No. 5 is junior to the petitioner, hence, his promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk is illegal. It has further been contended by the learned Counsel that there cannot be any reservation to a single post. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel relied on the following judgment: (i). Dr. Chakradhar Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others 1988 2 SCC 214 and (ii). Munna Lal Karosiya v. State of M.P. and Others. 2010 1 M.P.H.T. 360 9. Contrary to this, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, Municipal Council and respondent No. 5 have contended that the respondent No. 5 has been promoted to the post which is reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate, hence, the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of promotion and there are delay and latches in challenging the promotion order. 10. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated 30-4-1983 issued by the Nagar Panchayat Daboh, District Bhind. The respondent No. 5 was appointed as Lower Division Clerk on 8-2-1988 by Nagar Panchyayat Daboh, District Bhind. The petitioner was subsequently transferred to other Municipal Councils. The service conditions of the petitioner have been governed by the Rules named as 'The Madhya Pradesh Municipal Employees (Recruitment And Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968' (hereinafter called as the 'Rules of 1968'). Section 2 (e) (f) and (g) of the Rules, 1968 prescribes the definition of Municipal employees, Municipal service and post, which are as under: 2. Definitions. The service conditions of the petitioner have been governed by the Rules named as 'The Madhya Pradesh Municipal Employees (Recruitment And Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968' (hereinafter called as the 'Rules of 1968'). Section 2 (e) (f) and (g) of the Rules, 1968 prescribes the definition of Municipal employees, Municipal service and post, which are as under: 2. Definitions. - In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires: - (a) xxxxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxxxxxx (c) xxxxxxxxxxx (d) xxxxxxxxxxx (e) "Municipal Employee" means a person appointed to or borne on the cadre of the Municipal staff other than a member of the State Municipal Service (Executive); (f) "Municipal Service" means the service or group of posts in connection with the affairs of the Municipality other than the State Municipal Service (Executive); (g) "Post" means a whole time employment under the Municipal Council but does not include any employment where the employee is paid from contingency; Rule 4 prescribes the methods of recruitment and one of the method is by direct recruitment and Rule 5 (a) prescribes reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which is as under: 4. Methods of recruitment. - Recruitment to the Municipal service or a post or class of posts may be made by one or more of the following methods: (a) by direct recruitment; (b) by promotion of a person employed in the Council; (c) by transfer or deputation of a person serving in connection with the affairs of any local authority or of the State. Rule 12 prescribes the procedure for recruitment by promotion, which is as under: 12. Recruitment by promotion. - (1) Recruitment by promotion shall be made on consideration of merits, seniority being taken into account where merits are equal. (2) In selecting candidates for promotion regard shall be had to - (i) tact and energy; (ii) intelligence and ability; (iii) integrity; and (iv) previous record of service. (3) In the case of posts carrying a maximum monthly salary not exceeding Rs. 95/- the Chief Municipal Officer and in other cases the District Selection Committee shall consider the cases of all the eligible candidates and may in his or its discretion interview any of the candidates. (4) The Chief Municipal Officer of the District Selection Committee, as the case may be, will select candidates and will arrange their names in the order of preference. (4) The Chief Municipal Officer of the District Selection Committee, as the case may be, will select candidates and will arrange their names in the order of preference. Where the Chief Municipal Officer is the competent authority for making appointments, the orders will be issued by him. In other cases the District Selection Committee shall recommend the names of the candidates found suitable for promotion to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee will then make a final selection. Rule 15 prescribes the gradation list and Rule 16 prescribes the seniority, which are as under: 15. Gradation list. - A gradation list shall be maintained for the Municipal service in which shall be arranged in order of seniority the names of the Municipal employees holding the posts included in the Municipal service: Provided that when the Municipal service consists of two or more district branches or group of posts and transfers are not ordinarily made from one branch or group of posts to another, a separate gradation list shall be maintained for each branch or group of posts of the service. 16. Seniority. - (1) The seniority of a directly recruited or a promoted Municipal employee appointed on probation shall count during his probation from the date of his appointment: Provided that if more than one person has been selected for appointment on probation at the same time, the inter se seniority of the persons so selected shall be according to the order of merit in which they were recommended for appointment by the District Selection Committee in those cases where the appointments are made from the panel of names recommended by such committee, and according to the order of merit determined by the appointing authority at the time of selection in other cases. (2) The same order of inter se seniority shall be maintained on the confirmation of the normal period of probation. If, however, the period of probation of any Municipal employees is extended, the appointing authority shall, after consultation with the District Selection Committee, determine whether he should be assigned the same seniority as would have been confirmed on the expiry of the normal period of probation or whether he should be assigned a lower seniority. 11. If, however, the period of probation of any Municipal employees is extended, the appointing authority shall, after consultation with the District Selection Committee, determine whether he should be assigned the same seniority as would have been confirmed on the expiry of the normal period of probation or whether he should be assigned a lower seniority. 11. It is clear from the aforesaid rules that once, a person is appointed to or borne on the cadre of the Municipal staff other than a member of the State Municipal Service (Executive), he has to be treated an employee of the particular Municipality and his seniority has to be counted in the aforesaid Municipality in accordance with the Rule 16 of the Rules of 1968. The aforesaid rules are applicable to Nagar Panchayat also because subsequently the Municipalities have been renamed as Nagar Panchayats. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed by the respondent No. 4, hence, his seniority has to be maintained in the cadre of L.D.C. of the respondent No. 4. Maybe, he was transferred to any other Nagar Panchayats because his lien was maintained at respondent No. 4. The same directions have been issued by the Department of Local Self Government vide circular dated 9-6-1999. It has clearly been mentioned in the aforesaid circular that if an employee, who is not a member of the State Municipal Service (Executive) transferred to other local bodies then his case shall be considered for promotion in the parent institution in accordance with his seniority. The aforesaid circular is not contrary to any statutory provisions, hence, it has binding effect. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed earlier in comparison to the respondent No. 5, hence, the petitioner is senior to the respondent No. 5. 12. In regard to reservation of post, the Nagar Panchayat in reply to the petition vide letter dated 6-6-2008 has clearly mentioned that only one post of U.D.C. (Assistant Grade-I) has been sanctioned in the Nagar Panchayat. It is not a case that the post is interchangeable to other post. It is a single post. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh v. Faculty Association and Ors. It is not a case that the post is interchangeable to other post. It is a single post. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh v. Faculty Association and Ors. reported in 1998 4 SCC 1 , has held that there cannot be any reservation to a single post cadre and held as under after overruling other judgments of smaller Benches: 26. The decision in Chakradhar Paswan case that for a single post cadre no reservation can be made for the backward classes has also been followed in Chetana Dilip Motghare v. Bhide Girls' Education Society and it has been held in the said decision that when the post is a solitary post in the cadre, the roster and carry-forward scheme underlying any reservation policy cannot apply. A contrary view, however, has been taken in the decision of State of Bihar v. Bageshwari Prasad, Suresh Chandra v. J.B. Agarwa and later on in a three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Madhav. Following the said three-Judge Bench decision in Madhav case reservation in a single post cadre by rotation of roster point has been upheld in Union of India v. Brij Lal Thakur and the decision rendered in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research v. Faculty Assn. The latter decision is the subject-matter of challenge in the review petition before us in CA No. 3175 of 1997. 27. Since the decision in Madhav case by a three-Judge Bench upholding the reservation for the backward classes even in single post cadre on the basis of rotation of roster point is the main decision which has also been followed in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Research case we propose to consider the decision in Madhav case in some detail. The brief facts in Madhav case may be indicated as follows: In the National Savings Scheme Service, only one post of Secretary was available. The Government applied the rule of reservation to that post by rotating the vacancies in accordance with the 40-point roster. When Point 4 vacancy in the post, reserved for Scheduled Tribes, was filled by promoting an ST candidate from the post below, such promotion was set aside by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the post of Secretary being a single-point post, granting of reservation was unconstitutional. When Point 4 vacancy in the post, reserved for Scheduled Tribes, was filled by promoting an ST candidate from the post below, such promotion was set aside by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the post of Secretary being a single-point post, granting of reservation was unconstitutional. The correctness of the said decision was assailed in Madhav case. 28. It has been held in Madhav case that (i) appointment to an office or post under the State is one of the means to render socio-economic justice; (ii) Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution introduced in 1995 by the 77th Amendment of the Constitution, has resuscitated the objectives of the Preamble to, and Articles 46 and 335 of the Constitution of India to enable the Dalit and Scheduled Tribe employees to improve excellence in the higher echelons of service and a source of equality of opportunity in the matter of social and economic status; (iii) Parliament has removed the lacuna pointed out by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney case1 that Articles 16(1) and 16(4) do not apply to appointment by promotion but apply to initial appointment. By the 77th Amendment of the Constitution, the legal position enunciated in Rangachari decision has been restored and reservation of promotion to 50% quota as per the Indra Sawhney case is available to members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; (iv) the carry-forward scheme has been upheld in Indra Sawhney case; (v) reservation could be provided even to the isolated posts on the basis of the rule of rotation by relying on the decision in Arati Ray Choudhury case; (vi) extension of reservation is not unconstitutional. On the other hand, such scheme provides opportunity and facilities to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for being considered for promotion to hold single posts consistent with equality of opportunity on a par with others; (vii) in Paswan case even though it was held that a single post cannot be reserved because such reservation would amount to 100% reservation, the question whether the single post reservation by rotation could be granted and whether it would be violative of Article 16(1) was not gone into and such question has been kept open. In Arati Ray Choudhury case the application of rule of carry forward and appointment by rotation of roster in a single post has been approved; (viii) in Sabharwal case a Constitution Bench considered whether reservation as per the roster for the purpose of promotion could be valid and consistent with Article 16(1) of the Constitution and held in favour of such reservation; (ix) Chetana Dilip Motghare v. Bhide Girls' Education Society has not been correctly decided and the decisions in Vidyulata Arvind Kakade v. Digambar Gyanba Surwase and Arati Ray Choudhury cases were not properly appreciated in Bhide Girls' case; (x) in State of Bihar v. Bageshwari Prasad the rule of rotation has been held valid by indicating that the said rule does not offend Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution; (xi) the judgment in Chakradhar Paswan case was also distinguished in Bageshwari decision. 29. In Madhav case in support of the view that even in respect of single post cadre reservation can be made for the backward classes by rotation of roster, the Constitution Bench decision in Arati Ray Choudhury case has been relied on. We have already indicated that in Arati case the Constitution Bench did not lay down that in single post cadre, reservation is possible with the aid of roster point. The Court in Arati case considered the applicability of roster point in the context of plurality of posts and in that context the rotation of roster was upheld by the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench in Arati case had made it quite clear by relying on the earlier decisions of the Constitution Bench in Balaji case and Devadasan case that 100; reservation was not permissible and in no case reservation beyond 50% could be made. Even the circular on the basis of which appointment was made in Arati Ray Choudhury case was amended in accordance with the decision in Devadasan case. Therefore, the very premise that the Constitution Bench in Arati case has upheld reservation in a single post cadre is erroneous and such erroneous assumption in Madhav case has been on account of misreading of the ratio in Arati Ray Choudhury case. It may be indicated that the latter decision of the Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal case has also proceeded on the footing that reservation in roster can operate provided in the cadre there is plurality of post. It may be indicated that the latter decision of the Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal case has also proceeded on the footing that reservation in roster can operate provided in the cadre there is plurality of post. It has also been indicated in Sabharwal decision that the post in a cadre is different from vacancies. 30. It also appears that the decision in Indra Sawhney case has also not been properly appreciated in Madhav decision. In Indra Sawhney case it has not been held that there can be reservation in a single cadre post. There is no dispute that a carry-forward scheme, provided it does not result in reservation beyond 50%, is constitutionally valid but that does not mean that by the device of carry-forward scheme, 100% reservation on some occasions can be made even when the post is only a single cadre post. In Madhav decision and Brij Lal decision, reliance has been placed on Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution for holding that even in respect of a single post such reservation can be made with the aid of rotation of roster. In our view, Article 16(4-A) relates to reservation in promotional post in the cadre, but the said Article 16(4-A) does not deal with the question of reservation in a single cadre post. 31. There is no difficulty in appreciating that there is need for reservation for the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes and such reservation is not confined to the initial appointment in a cadre but also to the appointment in a promotional post. It cannot however be lost sight of that in the anxiety for such reservation for the backward classes, a situation should not be brought about by which the chance of appointment is completely taken away so far as the members of other segments of the society are concerned by making such a single post cent per cent reserved for the reserved categories to the exclusion of other members of the community even when such a member is senior in service and is otherwise more meritorious. 32. 32. Articles 14, 15 and 16 including Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) must be applied in such a manner so that the balance is struck in the matter of appointments by creating reasonable opportunities for the reserved classes and also for the other members of the community who do not belong to reserved classes. Such view has been indicated in the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Balaji case, Devadasan case and Sabharwal case. Even in Indra Sawhney case the same view has been held by indicating that only a limited reservation not exceeding 50% is permissible. It is to be appreciated that Article 15(4) is an enabling provision like Article 16(4) and the reservation under either provision should not exceed legitimate limits. In making reservations for the backward classes, the State cannot ignore the fundamental rights of the rest of the citizens. The special provision under Article 15(4) [sic 16(4)] must therefore strike a balance between several relevant considerations and proceed objectively. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in State of A.P. v. U.S.V. Balram and C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India. It has been indicated in Indra Sawhney case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not in the nature of an exception to Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 but an instance of classification permitted by Clause (1). It has also been indicated in the said decision that Clause (4) of Article 16 does not cover the entire field covered by Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16. In Indra Sawhney case this Court has also indicated that in the interests of the backward classes of citizens, the State cannot reserve all the appointments under the State or even a majority of them. The doctrine of equality of opportunity in Clause (1) of Article 16 is to be reconciled in favour of backward classes under Clause (4) of Article 16 in such a manner that the latter while serving the cause of backward classes shall not unreasonably encroach upon the field of equality. 33. The doctrine of equality of opportunity in Clause (1) of Article 16 is to be reconciled in favour of backward classes under Clause (4) of Article 16 in such a manner that the latter while serving the cause of backward classes shall not unreasonably encroach upon the field of equality. 33. In Trilok Nath Tiku v. State of J&K it has been held by this Court that where the percentage of reservations is not reasonable, having regard to employment opportunities of the general public to the cadre of service in question, the population of the entire State, the extent of their backwardness and the like, the interference by the Court against unreasonable reservation is called for. 34. In a single post cadre, reservation at any point of time on account of rotation of roster is bound to bring about a situation where such a single post in the cadre will be kept reserved exclusively for the members of the backward classes and in total exclusion of the general members of the public. Such total exclusion of general members of the public and cent per cent reservation for the backward classes is not permissible within the constitutional framework. The decisions of this Court to this effect over the decades have been consistent. 35. Hence, until there is plurality of posts in a cadre, the question of reservation will not arise because any attempt of reservation by whatever means and even with the device of rotation of roster in a single post cadre is bound to create 100% reservation of such post whenever such reservation is to be implemented. The device of rotation of roster in respect of single post cadre will only mean that on some occasions there will be complete reservation and the appointment to such post is kept out of bounds to the members of a large segment of the community who do not belong to any reserved class, but on some other occasions the post will be available for open competition when in fact on all such occasions, a single post cadre should have been filled only by open competition amongst all segments of the society. 36. 36. Mr Kapil Sibal has contended that in some higher echelons of service in educational and technical institutions where special expertise is necessary to hold superior posts like Professors and Readers, there should not be reservation even if there is plurality of posts in such cadre as indicated in the majority view in Indra Sawhney case. It is, however, not necessary for us to decide the said contention for the purpose of disposal of these matters, where the question of reservation in single cadre post calls for decision. 37. We, therefore, approve the view taken in Chakradhar case that there cannot be any reservation in a single post cadre and we do not approve the reasonings in Madhav case, Brij Lal Thakur case and Bageshwari Prasad case upholding reservation in a single post cadre either directly or by device of rotation of roster point. Accordingly, the impugned decision in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research cannot also be sustained. The review petition made in Civil Appeal No. 3175 of 1997 in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh, is therefore allowed and the judgment dated 2-5-1997 passed in Civil Appeal No. 3175 of 1997 is set aside. 13. The aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench has further been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Ors. v. K. Govindappa and Anr. 2009 1 SCC 1 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: 20. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the decisions cited by learned Counsel in support thereof. In dealing with the issue raised in this appeal, it has to be kept in mind that some of the earlier decisions in Madhav case, in Suresh Chandra v. J.B. Agarwal and Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research v. K.L. Narasimhan, in which reservation by rotation even in respect of a single post had been approved, was subsequently overruled in the Constitution Bench decision in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research v. Faculty Assn. and it was held that in no case could reservation be made applicable in respect of a single post. The Constitution Bench approved the views expressed in Chakradhar Paswan (Dr.) case following those expressed by the earlier Constitution Bench in Arati Ray Choudhury case. and it was held that in no case could reservation be made applicable in respect of a single post. The Constitution Bench approved the views expressed in Chakradhar Paswan (Dr.) case following those expressed by the earlier Constitution Bench in Arati Ray Choudhury case. In view of the above, the only question which we are called upon to consider is whether the High Court was right in treating the post of Lecturer in History in Respondent 2 college as a single isolated post forming a separate cadre in itself and not part of the cadre of Lecturers comprising all the different disciplines taught in the college. 21. In this regard, Mr Hegde has explained the difference between "post" and "cadre" and that the two expressions could not be equated with each other. He has also explained that the expression "cadre" was not synonymous with "service" and that merely because there were single posts in the different disciplines taught in the college, it did not mean that each post constituted a separate cadre within the cadre of Lecturers. 22. While there can be no difference of opinion that the expressions "cadre", "post" and "service" cannot be equated with each other, at the same time the submission that single and isolated posts in respect of different disciplines cannot exist as a separate cadre cannot be accepted. In order to apply the rule of reservation within a cadre, there has to be plurality of posts. Since there is no scope of interchangeability of posts in the different disciplines, each single post in a particular discipline has to be treated as a single post for the purpose of reservation within the meaning of Article 16(4) of the Constitution. In the absence of duality of posts, if the rule of reservation is to be applied, it will offend the constitutional bar against 100; reservation as envisaged in Article 16(1) of the Constitution. 23. The decision in Chakradhar Paswan (Dr.) case, which has been subsequently approved by the Constitution Bench in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research case makes it clear that isolated and separate posts can exist within a cadre and in case of such posts, if there was only one post, the same could not be set apart for a reserved candidate." 14. It is clear from the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if there is only one post, the same could not be reserved for a reserved candidate. In the present case, the post of U.D.C. is a single post and it has been reserved for a single candidate, hence, it is contrary to law. 15. The next question raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents about the delay and laches. Although there is a delay and latches on the part of the petitioner to challenge the promotion of the respondent No. 5, however, the petitioner has clearly contended that he came to know about the promotion of the respondent No. 5 in the year 2006 and thereafter he submitted an application to the Municipal Council for supply of certain documents. The aforesaid application has been filed as Annexure-P/8, dated 11-8-2006 and thereafter he filed the present petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basanti Prasad v. Bihar School Examination Board (2009) 6 SCC 791 , has held as under in regard to delay and laches: 18. In the normal course, we would not have taken exception to the order passed by the High Court. They are justified in saying that a delinquent employee should not be permitted to revive the stale claim and the High Court in exercise of its discretion would not ordinarily assist the tardy and indolent person. This is the traditional view and is well supported by a plethora of decisions of this Court. This Court also has taken the view that there is no inviolable rule, that, whenever there is delay the Court must refuse to entertain a petition. This Court has stated that the writ court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may condone the delay in filing the petition, if the delay is satisfactorily explained. 19. Reference may be made at this stage to the decisions of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service wherein this Court has approved the view expressed by the Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd. The Court had observed: (Lindsay case, PC pp.239-40) Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd. The Court had observed: (Lindsay case, PC pp.239-40) Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy. 20. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal it was held as under: 23. ... There can be doubt that the petitioners were guilty of gross delay in filing the writ petitions with the result that by the time the writ petitions came to be filed.... 24. ... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. ... Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third-party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. ... Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third-party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third-party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. 21. In Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India it was observed: (SCC p. 368, para 9) 9. ... While there are different periods of limitation prescribed for the institution of different kinds of suits by the Limitation Act, 1963, there is no such period prescribed by law in respect of petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether relief should be granted to a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution where the cause of action had arisen in the remote past is a matter of sound judicial discretion governed by the doctrine of laches. Where a petitioner who could have availed of the alternative remedy by way of suit approaches the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is appropriate ordinarily to construe any unexplained delay in the filing of the writ petition after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit as unreasonable. This rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. There may be cases where even a delay of a shorter period may be considered to be sufficient to refuse relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There may also be cases where there may be circumstances which may persuade the court to grant relief even though the petition may have been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for a suit. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public, etc. 22. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public, etc. 22. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court, where it has been emphasised time and again, that, where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third-party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere. However, if the delay is properly explained, and if the third-party rights are not going to be affected, the High Court may entertain the petition and consider the case of the aggrieved person on merits. 16. As per the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in my opinion, the petition could not be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 17. Consequently, the petition of the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order Annexure-P/7, dated 1-1-1996 in regard to promotion of the respondent No. 5 to the post of Upper Division Clerk is hereby quashed. The respondent No. 4 is directed to consider the case of the petitioner and other candidates for promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk in accordance with law. Necessary orders be passed in this regard within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. If the petitioner be found suitable, he be granted seniority from the date when the respondent No. 5 was promoted. However, he shall not be entitled arrears of salary on the principle of 'No Work No Pay', looking to the facts and circumstances and looking to the fact that the petitioner has challenged the order of promotion belatedly. 18. No order as to costs.