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2010 DIGILAW 1020 (MP)

Ramesh Singh v. M. P. State Electricity Board

2010-10-06

ALOK ARADHE, S.R.ALAM

body2010
ORDER 1. Heard on the question of admission. 2. This intra-Court appeal arises from the order dated 13-9-2010 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 5710/2010 (S). 3. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the Appellant challenged the validity of the order dated 31-3-2010 by which the period of suspension from 25-3-2000 to 22-9-2002 was directed to be treated as period spent on duty and it was directed that the pay and allowances for the said period shall be restricted to the subsistence allowance already paid to the Petitioner. The Appellant challenged the aforesaid order before the learned Single Judge. 4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition preferred by the Appellant on the ground that under Fundamental Rule 54-B (3), the Competent Authority has formed an opinion that the period from 25-3-2000 to 22-9-2002 cannot be treated as unjustified because the Appellant was suspended on the basis of a criminal case. Though in the said case the Appellant was acquitted, yet the same was on the basis of benefit of doubt. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant was entitled to payment of salary and allowances from the date of his acquittal till the date of his joining, i.e., for the period of 8-5-2002 till 6-9-2002. It was further submitted that pay and allowances ought to have been granted to the Appellant for the period of suspension as well. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in General Manager, UCO Bank and Anr. v. M. Venu Ranganath (2007) 13 SCC 251 . 6. We have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the Appellant. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in General Manager, UCO Bank and Anr. v. M. Venu Ranganath (2007) 13 SCC 251 . 6. We have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the Appellant. Rule 54-B (3), which is relevant for the purpose of controversy involved in the instant writ appeal is extracted below: (3) Where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reason directly attributable to the Government servant it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served in him and after considering the representation if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount not being the whole of such pay and allowances as it may determine. 7. Thus, from perusal of F.R. 54-B (3) of the Fundamental Rules it is apparent that the authority who is competent to pass order of reinstatement is required to form an opinion as to whether suspension was wholly unjustified. If the authority comes to the conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, then the incumbent would be entitled to full pay and allowances under Sub-rule (8) of Rule 54-B. In the instant case, the Competent Authority vide order dated 31-3-2010, which was assailed in the writ petition by the Appellant, has found that suspension of the Appellant was mandatory as challan against him was filed in the Court for a criminal case. The Appellant was acquitted by the Court only by giving benefit of doubt, therefore, it cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. Accordingly, the period of suspension from 25-3-2000 to 22-9-2002 was directed to be treated as on duty and his pay and allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence allowance already laid to him. The Appellant was acquitted by the Court only by giving benefit of doubt, therefore, it cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. Accordingly, the period of suspension from 25-3-2000 to 22-9-2002 was directed to be treated as on duty and his pay and allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence allowance already laid to him. Thus, cogent reasons have been assigned by the Competent Authority while passing the order in terms of Rule 54-B (3) of the Fundamental Rules. The discretion conferred by the rule has rightly been exercised by the Competent Authority. 8. The reliance placed by the Appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to above, is of no assistance to the Appellant as while interpreting the Regulation 15(2) in the said case the Supreme Court held that regulations did not draw any distinction between the clear acquittal and the acquittal given on the basis of benefit of doubt. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case it was held that the employee is entitled to payment of salary and allowances. However, in the instant case the relevant provision, i.e., F.R. 54-B (3) has been differently worded and not pari materia to Regulation 15(2), which was involved in the aforesaid case which was decided by the Supreme Court. 9. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any merit in the writ appeal. The same deserves to and is hereby dismissed.