JUDGMENT Hon'ble Devendra Pratap Singh,J. Heard Sri Gajendra Pratap, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri M.A. Siddqiui for the petitioner and Sri Varun Dev Sharma for the respondent caveator. 2. This petition by the Waqf Board is directed against an order dated 16.3.2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority in Execution Case no. 24 of 2009. 3. The case as set up by the petitioner is that one Hafeez Uddin executed a waqf deed in respect of a building known as Bungalow Nos. 160 and 160A, Carriappa Road, situated within the limits of Merrut Cantonment (here-in-after referred as disputed property). The said waqf deed was duly registered in April, 1926 and after the death of the Waqif Hafeez Uddin, his son Nizam Uddin became Mutawalli and on his death, the petitioner appointed an Administrator vide order dated 17.4.1984. 4. One Smt. Ghazala Rana, the daughter of the deceased Nizam Uddin executed a registered sale deed in favour of respondent no.2 in October, 1986 and thereafter she filed an application before the Waqf Board in October, 1987 claiming that she was the rightful owner and the disputed premises was not a waqf property and be declared as such and if it is found otherwise, she may be declared as Mutawalli and the sale deed be approved. 5. The Waqf Board rejected her application vide order dated 11.1.19888. Both Smt. Ghazala Rana and the respondent no.2 challenged the aforesaid orders dated 11.1.1988 and 17.4.1984 in a reference no. 36 of 1988 before the Tribunal under the Muslim Waqf Act. 6. The Tribunal after hearing the parties at length, passed a detailed order dated 28.4.2000 allowing the reference and setting aside the aforesaid two orders of the Board with a further declaration that the respondent no. 2 is the rightful owner of the transferred property. The petitioner, thereafter preferred a revision no. 465 of 2000 before this Court challenging the order of the Tribunal dated 28.4.2000 which remains pending but without any interim order. 7. It is further alleged that the respondent no. 2 filed a release application as P.A. Case No. 80 of 2006 under section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as Rent Act) against the tenant-respondent no.3 for release of the premises in his favour. 7. It is further alleged that the respondent no. 2 filed a release application as P.A. Case No. 80 of 2006 under section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (here-in-after referred to as Rent Act) against the tenant-respondent no.3 for release of the premises in his favour. After contest, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of release vide order dated 24.1.2008 and the resultant appeal was also dismissed by the District Judge vide order dated 26.8.2008. The respondent no. 3 thereafter preferred a writ petition no.504502 of 2008 before this Court but both the orders were upheld by a detailed judgement dated 1.10.2008. Undettered, the respondent no. 3 challenged the said order before the Apex Court through Special Appeal No.267432 of 2009 but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 30.1.2009, however, the respondent no. 3 was granted time uptil 31.7.2009 to vacate the premises on submission of an undertaking. 8. It is further pleaded that the Board came to know about the proceedings under the Rent Act on 17.8.2009 and after making enquiries when it was found that the aforesaid execution proceedings for eviction of the respondent no.3-tenant were pending before the Prescribed Authority, he filed an application under section 90 (3) of the Waqf Act, 1995 (here-in-after referred to as Waqf Act) for declaring the entire proceedings under section 21 of the Rent Control Act as void as it was passed without noticing the Waqf Board. The said application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 6.3.2010. 9. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that since no notice as required under section 90 (1) of the Waqf Act, 1995 was ever issued by the Court to the petitioner, in view of sub section (3) thereof, the Executing Court was bound to declare the release order as void. The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Single Judge unreported decision of this Court rendered in Civil Misc. Application No.89 of 1966 for review of a judgement and decree dated 3.2.1966 in Second Appeal No. 367 of 1966 (Zamir Uddin Quraishi Vs. Smt. Nasim Jahan and others). 10. Before the court deals with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to examine the background of the case. Application No.89 of 1966 for review of a judgement and decree dated 3.2.1966 in Second Appeal No. 367 of 1966 (Zamir Uddin Quraishi Vs. Smt. Nasim Jahan and others). 10. Before the court deals with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to examine the background of the case. A copy of the Waqf deed along with its Hindi version is available on record and the Waqif Hafeez Uddin himself admits, which is also not denied by the petitioner, that the disputed premises lies within the Meerut Cantonment. The Tribunal constituted under the Waqf Act in its order dated 25.4.2000, after considering the admission of the Board itself, the documents on record and the provisions of Govt. Grant Act read with the Governor Generals Order dated 12.9.1836, returned a finding that the disputed constructions were built on Old Grant land which is the property of the Union of India and none has any right except that of an Occupier and the land could be resumed by the Union of India after a month's notice. The Tribunal further found that the Waqf deed executed by Sri Hafeez Uddin was a void document as rights were created without the express permission of the Commandant of the Cantonment Board. The Tribunal went on to quash the order dated 17.4.1984 and the rejection order dated 11.1.1988 with the aforesaid finding. 11. It has not been denied during argument and, in fact, it is also evident from the record, that in the release application moved under the Rent Act there was a specific averment that the Tribunal vide its order dated 25.4.2000 had held that the transfer of rights over the disputed property by Smt. Ghazala Rana in favour of the respondent no. 2 was valid. 12. It would also be worthy of note that neither the operation of the order passed by the Tribunal has been stayed in the revision filed by the Board before this High Court, nor has it been quashed by any competent Court. 13. In proceedings under Section 21 of the Rent Act there is no adjudication or determination of ownership or title between the parties or possession as such. The only adjudication under the said section is with regard to landlord and tenant relationship between the two contesting parties and eviction thereof. 13. In proceedings under Section 21 of the Rent Act there is no adjudication or determination of ownership or title between the parties or possession as such. The only adjudication under the said section is with regard to landlord and tenant relationship between the two contesting parties and eviction thereof. In any proceedings under the Rent Act, there is no determination of title. 14. Now, to consider the arguments in this background, it would be appropriate to quote section 90 (1), (2) and (3) which reads as follows:- "90.Notice of suits, etc. by Courts - (1) In every suit or proceeding relating to a title to or possession of a waqf property or the right of a mutawalli or beneficiary, the Court or Tribunal shall issue notice to the Board at the cost of the party instituting such suit or proceeding. (2) Whenever any waqf property is notified for sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for the recovery of any revenue, cess, rates or taxes due to the Government or any local authority, notice shall be given to the Board by the Court, collector or other person under whose order the sale is notified. (3) In the absence of a notice under sub-section (1), any decree or order passed in the suit or proceeding shall be declared void, if the Board, within one month of its coming to know of such suit or proceeding, applies to the Court in this behalf." 15. A perusal of the section shows that where in any suit or proceedings, title has to be adjudicted with regard to a property which is a waqf property, the court before which such proceedings are pending is obliged to notice the Board and if no such notice is given, the decree, order or the proceedings would be rendered void. Thus, the burden is on the court and not on the parties. The Court would go by the pleadings which are before it and only when it comes to the conclusion that the title adjudication which is going on before it is in regard to a waqf property, then it would order issuance of notice but not otherwise. In the release application, there is a specific mention of the order of the Tribunal dated 25.4.2000 to show that the disputed property was not a waqf property. In the release application, there is a specific mention of the order of the Tribunal dated 25.4.2000 to show that the disputed property was not a waqf property. This factum was never denied by the tenant-respondent no.3 before the Prescribed Authority. Therefore, there was absolutely no occasion for the court to have imagined that there is a dispute with regard to a waqf property and order issuance of notice. When the section talks about the title, it merely means that if the court is prima facie satisfied about the plausibility and genuineness of the fact that it is a waqf property then it is obliged to issue notice. In the present case, there was absolutely nothing before the Court to show that there was any prima facie title dispute with regard to waqf property. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mohd. Abdul Aziz Vs. Smt. Golla Bhumavva and others [AIR 1982 Andra Pradesh 349] was confronted with an issue where mortgagee of a property bequeathed it to a waqf and then took up a plea at the time of redemption that notice was necessary. A Division Bench held that even if the Board is in possession of a property but if it was under an invalid waqf, notice was not essential. As the Court has already noted above, that the Tribunal has already held that the disputed property was not a waqf property and which judgement has yet not been set aside by any competent court or even its operation stayed, therefore it cannot be said that the order was void. 16. The issue can be examined from another angle. It is now well settled, as already observed hereinabove that title is not decided in proceedings under the Rent Act where only relationship of landlord and tenant, subtenant or unauthorized occupant is to be determined. It is not the case of the petitioner that it was also the landlord of the disputed premises as there is not even a whisper in the application filed before the Executing Court where it claimed only title but did not lay any claim for rent as a landlord and therefore also the notice was not essential. 17. Much reliance has been placed in the decision of Zamir Uddin Quraishi (Supra). In that case a suit no. 17. Much reliance has been placed in the decision of Zamir Uddin Quraishi (Supra). In that case a suit no. 457 of 1963 was filed for possession and mesn profit by the plaintiff claiming to be its owner, which was dismissed and which decree was affirmed in second appeal by the High Court, where-after the Board made an application that the decree would be void in view of section 66 of the Waqf Act, 1960 (In para materia with section 90 of the Waqf Act) as no notice was issued and it was urged on behalf of the Board that since a dispute relating to the title in a waqf property was involved and therefore the notice was necessary. It was in this background that the learned Single Judge set aside the decree and remanded the matter to the trial court to decide afresh after notice to the Waqf Board. Facts are entirely different. Therefore, firstly because title was not an issue in the proceedings under the Rent Act, and secondly, there is already a decision of the Waqf Tribunal that the disputed property is not a waqf property, notice was not necessary. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is bound to be rejected. 18. Lastly, it has been urged that the execution proceedings should be stayed in view of section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. No doubt, section 10 mandates that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim. 20. This principle is hedged with the condition that the issue should be directly and substantially the same. The court has already held that the issue in both the proceedings are entirely different. The issue before the Tribunal and thereafter before this Court in the pending revision is with regard to the title and validity of the waqf while in the case at hand, the title is not at all an issue but the only issue relates to release of building for personal use between a landlord and tenant. Therefore, the argument has no force. 21. For the reasons above, this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected.