ORDER U.C. Maheshwari, J. 1. The Appellants-defendants No. 2 and 3 have filed this appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 11.10.2005 passed by Additional District Judge, Lakhnadon, district Seoni in Civil Regular Appeal No. 31-A/02, decreeing the suit of the Respondents No. 1 to 3 for declaration and possession against them by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19.8.02 passed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Lakhanadon in Civil Original Suit No. 55-A/2000, whereby such suit was dismissed. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that one Achhelal, predecessor in title of Respondent No. 1 (1) to 1 (3) filed the above mentioned suit against the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 and 3 for declaration and possession with respect of agricultural land bearing survey No. 0.10, 165/1, 170, 27/3, 169 and 235/1, area 0.10, 2.59, 0.19, 0.50, 0.09 and 0.39 hectares respectively, total area 3.56 hectares situated at village Gunehari, tah. Ghansour contending that in Revenue Case No. 6-A/27 of 1997-1998, the Naib Tahsildar, Ghansour, vide order dated 24.10.1998 in partition of the co-parcenary land had given such land to said Acchelal one of the co-parceners of the family. Pursuant to it the name of Achhelal was mutated as Bhumiswami separately on the abovementioned land in revenue record. While other ancestral land was given in such partition to other coparceners of the family. It is also pleaded that after such mutation, the Bhooadhikar Rin Pustika, Part-I and Part-II with the signatures of the Tahsildar were also given to Achhelal. Since then he became the sole Bhoomiswami of it. As per further averments said Achhelal being heart patient in connection of his treatment was residing at Jabalpur with his son and due to such reason in the year 1994 he gave his land for cultivation to the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 for four years. On expiry of such period, inspite of making the demand by Achhelal and Respondent No. 1. (2) his son, from Appellants and Respondent No. 2, the possession of such land was not given to them, on which Achhelal-plaintiff filed the impugned suit for declaration and possession of the aforesaid land. 3. The Respondent No. 2 and 3 namely Govind and the State of M.P. proceeded exparte in the trial court. 4. (2) his son, from Appellants and Respondent No. 2, the possession of such land was not given to them, on which Achhelal-plaintiff filed the impugned suit for declaration and possession of the aforesaid land. 3. The Respondent No. 2 and 3 namely Govind and the State of M.P. proceeded exparte in the trial court. 4. In the joint written statements of the Appellants by denying the averments of plaint, it is stated that the Plaintiff Achhelal was not the Bhoomi Swami of the alleged land. The alleged order of Naib Tahsildar dated 24.10.1998 passed in Revenue Case 6-A/27/1997-1998 being contrary to law and rights of the parties, the same was modified by the Naib Tahsildar, vide order dated 12.5.2000 in Revenue Case No. 8-A/27/1999-2000. So in view of such modification the earlier order had not given any right or title to the Plaintiffs. It is denied that after partition the disputed land was given to the Appellants in the year 1994 for agricultural purposes. In further pleadings, it is stated that the principle Plaintiff deceased-Achhelal voluntarily entered in an agreement to sell with the Appellants and Respondent No. 2-Govind, vide dated 17.5.1996 whereby after receiving the consideration of Rs. 17,000/- said Achhelal handed over the possession of such land to them. As the parties were belonging to the different branches of the real brothers, thus, in order to save the expenses of the registered sale deed only formal agreement was carried out between them. In such premises, on the strength of such agreement till registration of sale deed the Appellants had a right to protect their possession of the land under the part performance defined under Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act and prayer for dismissal of the suit is made. 5. In view of pleadings of the parties after framing the issues and recording the evidence, on appreciation of the same, by holding that the aforesaid land was neither given by Achhelal to the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 on contract for four years to cultivate the same nor the alleged agreement to sell had taken place between the principle Plaintiff-Achhelal and the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 dismissed the suit. 6. Such decree of the trial court was challenged by the deceased Plaintiff-Acchelal before the subordinate appellate court. 6. Such decree of the trial court was challenged by the deceased Plaintiff-Acchelal before the subordinate appellate court. In pendency of such appeal, the principle Plaintiff Appellant passed away, on which the Respondent No. 1 (1)to 1 (3), his legal representatives were substituted on record. Thereafter on consideration by allowing such appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court the aforesaid suit filed by Acchelal, the predecessor in title of Respondent No. 1 (1)to 1 (3) has been decreed, on which the present Appellants-defendant No. 2 and 3 have come with this appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Shri Rakesh Khare, learned appearing counsel of the Appellants, after taking me through pleadings of the parties, the available evidence and the exhibited documents, said that in the available circumstances, the subordinate appellate court has committed grave error in decreeing the suit of the Respondent No. 1 (1) to 1 (3) by setting aside the judgment and decree of trial court dismissing such suit on cogent grounds. In continuation he said that the approach of the appellate Court being contrary to the entries made in the revenue record is not sustainable under the law. It was also argued that contrary to the rights and title of the Appellants over the disputed land mere on the basis of old revenue record and taking into consideration the earlier partition order passed by the revenue court, without taking note that at subsequent stage such earlier order was modified by the revenue authorities, the suit of the Respondents has been decreed under wrong premises by the appellate court. With these submissions, he prayed for admission of this appeal on the proposed substantial questions of law, mentioned in the appeal memo. 8. After hearing the counsel, in order to consider the question of admission, I have carefully gone through the records of the courts below and also perused the impugned judgments. I have not found any deformity or perversity in appreciation of the evidence by the appellate court in passing the impugned judgment decreeing the suit of the Respondents. I have found the approach of the appellate court in consonance with the evidence available on record and also in accordance with the existing legal position. 9. I have not found any deformity or perversity in appreciation of the evidence by the appellate court in passing the impugned judgment decreeing the suit of the Respondents. I have found the approach of the appellate court in consonance with the evidence available on record and also in accordance with the existing legal position. 9. As per record the disputed land alongwith some other land being ancestral property of the predecessor in title of the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 and of deceased-plaintiff Achhelal was partitioned between them in Revenue Case No. 6-A/27/1997-1998 by Naib Tahsildar, Ghansour, vide order dated 24.10.1998, in which the land in disputed was given to the said Achhelal while other land was given to the branches of other co-parcenor of the family. In compliance of such order after carrying out the mutation of Acchelal in the revenue record, the Bhoo Adhikar and Rin Pustika Part-1 and Part 2 bearing No. 136132 were also given to Achhelal. In such premises, there was sufficient circumstance to draw an inference that the present Appellants or/and the Respondent No. 2 subsequent to aforesaid partition did not have any title over the disputed land. 10. So far subsequent order of Naib Tahsildar, Ghansour passed on 12.5.2000 in Revenue Case No. 8-A/27/1999-2000 is concerned, on perusing such order it is apparent that firstly such order was passed, without having or obtaining any permission of the review under Section 51 of M.P. Land Revenue Code from the senior official and secondly such subsequent order was passed by Naib Tahsildar without considering the circumstance that earlier order of his court was not set aside either by the revisional authority or appellate authority in any competent proceeding. It also appears from the impugned judgment of the appellate court that such subsequent order of revenue court has not been discarded only on the aforesaid count but was also discarded on the ground that the circumstances, described in such order, the revenue court did not have any authority to decide the title of the disputed property. Such approach of the appellate court appears to be in consonance with the legal position. Such approach of the appellate court appears to be in consonance with the legal position. Thus, in the lack of any document of title, mere on the basis of khasra, in which the name of the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 was recorded on the basis of aforesaid subsequent inadmissible order of the revenue court, the appellate court has not committed any error in deciding the title of the parties on the basis of their existing legal rights and title over the property. So such findings being based on revenue record is a finding of fact and the same could not be termed to be substantial question of law under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure for admission of this appeal. 11. The courts below have concurrently held that the Appellants did not have any legal title or right to retain the possession of the disputed land. The alleged agreement to sell off such property, projected on behalf of the Appellants have also not been found to be proved. Thus, such findings based on appreciation of evidence being findings of facts, in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 , could not be interfered under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure at the stage of Second appeal, in which it was held as under: The right of appeal is neither natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force of the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal can not be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts however, erroneous can not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this Section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of law. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of law. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial-court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court can not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrivedat without evidence. 12. As per initial case of the deceased-Plaintiff the predecessor in title of Respondent No. 1 (1) to 1 (3), after partition of the alleged land, he being heart patient had gone to Jabalpur for his treatment and in such premises he gave such land for four years to the Appellants to cultivate the same on contract. 12. As per initial case of the deceased-Plaintiff the predecessor in title of Respondent No. 1 (1) to 1 (3), after partition of the alleged land, he being heart patient had gone to Jabalpur for his treatment and in such premises he gave such land for four years to the Appellants to cultivate the same on contract. On consideration the trial court had not relied on such case of the Plaintiff and simultaneously holding that by efflux of time the Plaintiff has lost his right in the property and dismissed the suit but the appellate court, on re-appreciation of the evidence and documents held that the present Appellants claiming the right on the basis of agreement to sell or sale, his possession could not be deemed to be the possession as lessee and his right could not be deemed to be protected as occupancy tenant under Section 169(2) or 185(2) of the M.P. land Revenue Code and such findings of the appellate court being based on earlier verdict of this Court in the matter of Rubnanju v. State of M.P. reported in 1998 RR 194 and in the case of Ram Lal v. Mangal Singh reported in 2000 RN 30 is not giving rise to any substantial question of law on this count also. 13. Incidentally one question was also argued on behalf of the Appellants that in the available circumstances on the basis of the agreement to sell the Appellants had right to protect their possession under Part Performance of the contract defined under Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act there is specific findings of the appellate court stating that the Appellants herein neither proved their case in consonance of the ingredients of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act nor proved their readiness and willingness to get executed sale deed from the deceased-plaintiff in their favour and in such premises such defence was discarded by the appellate court. Such approach of the appellate court based on appreciation of the evidence being finding of fact and in consonance with the available evidence, could not be termed to be substantial question of law for admission of this appeal. 14. Such approach of the appellate court based on appreciation of the evidence being finding of fact and in consonance with the available evidence, could not be termed to be substantial question of law for admission of this appeal. 14. In view of aforesaid discussion, I have not found, any perversity, infirmity, illegality or any other substance in the case giving rise to any substantial question of law requiring any consideration under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure at this stage. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of any such question deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing.