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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 1024 (MP)

Mohammad Ashraf v. M. P. Housing Board

2010-10-08

U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2010
ORDER 1. This order shall govern the question of admission of above mentioned both the appeals, as the same have been arisen out of a common judgment passed by the Appellate Court in two different appeals arising out of a judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in Civil Original Suit No. 25-A/08 filed on behalf of the appellants. 2. These appeals are directed by the appellants/plaintiffs under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code being aggrieved by the common judgment and decree dated 21.4.2010 passed by 17th Additional District Judge (FTC), Jabalpur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 44-A/08 filed by the, appellants and Civil Regular Appeal No. 45-A/08 filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 and 2 whereby dismissing their appeal No. 44-A/08, the findings of the judgment and decree dated 22.9.2008 passed by 15th Civil Judge, Class-II, Jabalpur in Civil Original Suit No. 25-A/08 dismissing their suit in part for perpetual injunction with respect of land bearing Survey No. 99/21 (Old No.) area 09.029 hectare (4307.33 Sq Ft.) situated at village Khairi, Tahsil and District Jabalpur, has been affirmed while allowing the appeal of respondent No.1 and 2 the findings of such judgment of trial Court whereby the suit of the appellants was decreed for perpetual injunction with respect of land bearing Survey No. 99/26 (Old No.) area 0.040 hector (2153.66 Sq. Ft.) situated in the same village has been set aside and accordingly the appellants suit was dismissed in its entirety. 3. Hereinafter in this order the appellants of both the appeals are being said to be plaintiffs while the respondent No.1 to 3 are being said to be the defendant No.1 to 3 respectively. 4. The facts giving rise to these appeals in short are that the appellants/plaintiffs filed the abovementioned suit for perpetual injunction against the defendant No.1 to 3/respondents contending that they being Bhoomiswami of the abovementioned land bearing survey No. 99/26 and 99/21 area 0.040 and 0.029 hectare respectively are in possession of the same. The same was purchased by them from its earlier Bhoomiswami/the defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain, vide registered sale deed dated 24.8.1998. Pursuant to that after recording their names in the Revenue Record the requisite Bhoo-Adhikar Pustika were also issued to them. Subsequent to purchase the land the Revenue Department has changed the Survey number of those land, the same has become Survey No. 214/4. Pursuant to that after recording their names in the Revenue Record the requisite Bhoo-Adhikar Pustika were also issued to them. Subsequent to purchase the land the Revenue Department has changed the Survey number of those land, the same has become Survey No. 214/4. The respondent No.1 and 2 without having any title, right or authority are interfering in their possession of such land. It is also stated that on earlier occasions also such respondents tried to interfere in possession of their predecessor in title the defendant No.3. On which the defendant No.3 filed a Civil Original Suit No. 302-A/94 for perpetual injunction against the defendant No.1, 2 and some other official of the State. The same was decreed and respondents along with other official of the State were restrained to interfere with respect of said land in possession of the defendant No.3, Ashok Kumar Jain. It is further stated that defendant No. 1 being established by the State Government under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Grah Nirman Mandal Act, 1972 is functioning through defendant No.2 and by virtue of section 48 of Land Acquisition Act they had power to purchase and acquisition of the land. The disputed land was never acquisitioned in accordance with the provision of sections 48 and 49 of Land Acquisition Act. In spite of it, without having any title, right or authority on 24.8.2006 the defendants have collected some construction material on such land. On receiving such information from some contractor that the defendant No.1 and 2 are going to construct the road on such land. In order to protect the possession of the land the appellants filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 and 2 from any interference in their possession of such land. 5. In written statement of defendant No. 1 and 2 by disputing the averments of the plaint, it is stated that the plaintiffs are not the Bhoomiswami of such land. In accordance with the prescribed procedure through State of Madhya Pradesh some land of private sector of village Maharajpur and Khairi was acquisitioned by them to implement the scheme for construction the houses of Transport Nagar. In accordance with the prescribed procedure through State of Madhya Pradesh some land of private sector of village Maharajpur and Khairi was acquisitioned by them to implement the scheme for construction the houses of Transport Nagar. For the purpose of such acquisition the requisite notifications were issued and the same were published in the gazette as well as in daily news papers and pursuant to that the disputed land along with others was acquisitioned in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it's possession was also delivered to the defendant No. 1 and 2 on 1.6.1989, since then such defendants being Bhoomi swami are coming in possession of the same, the name of defendant No. 1 was also recorded in the record of rights. In further averments it is stated that in the aforesaid acquisition of land the defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain, the then recorded Bhoomiswami had taken the compensation of it in the year 1992. Subsequently under the false pretext the defendant No.3, Ashok Kumar Jain, without having any right, title or authority by filing the suit for perpetual injunction got the decree with respect of the disputed land. It is also stated that during subsisting the acquisition proceeding the Land Acquisition Officer demanded Rs.12,00,000/- vide notice dated 18.5.1989 from the defendant No. 1, on which a cheque of aforesaid sum was delivered to such authority. Thereafter compensation of the land was received by defendant No. 3, Ashok Kumar Jain. Therefore, the plaintiffs who are claiming the rights and title under the authority of defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain did not have any authority to claim the possession over the disputed land or to file the suit for perpetual injunction. With these pleadings, the prayer for dismissal of the suit with compensatory cost of Rs. 5,000/- is made. The defendant No.3 filed his written statement by admitting all the facts of the plaint stated by the plaintiffs. 7. With these pleadings, the prayer for dismissal of the suit with compensatory cost of Rs. 5,000/- is made. The defendant No.3 filed his written statement by admitting all the facts of the plaint stated by the plaintiffs. 7. In view of the pleadings of the parties after framing the issues and recording the evidence on appreciation of the same taking into consideration that although the total area of the acquisitioned land was rightly mentioned in the notification issued under sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act but in such notification Survey No. 99/26 has not been specifically mentioned only Survey No. 99/21 was mentioned, the trial Court decreed the suit in part for perpetual injunction till the extent of Survey No. 99/26 for area 0.040 hectare while the same was dismissed with respect of Survey No. 99/21, area 0.029 hectare. Being dissatisfied with such decree of the trial Court against dismissal part of the suit, the plaintiffs filed their Regular Civil Appeal bearing No. 44-A/08 while against the decree of perpetual injunction with respect of Survey No. 99/26, defendant No. 1 and 2 filed the Civil Regular Appeal bearing No. 45-A/08 in the subordinate appellate Court. After hearing both the parties in such appeals on consideration by allowing the appeal of the defendants No. 1 and 2 the decree of perpetual injunction passed by the trial Court with respect of Survey No. 99/26 area 0.040 hectare has been set aside while by dismissing the appeal of the plaintiffs the decree regarding dismissal of such suit in part has been affirmed and in such premises, the entire suit of the plaintiffs/appellants has been dismissed. On which the appellants have come forward with this appeal to this Court. 8. Shri Y.K. Munshi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri J.S. Shah, after taking me through the pleadings of the parties, evidence available on record and also the exhibited documents argued that in the available fact and set of evidence the appellate Court by dismissing the appeal of the respondents No. 1 and 2 and allowing their appeal ought to have decreed their suit in toto but under the wrong premises by allowing the appeal of the defendants No.1 & 2 and setting aside the decree of the trial Court dismissed their appeal. In Continuation he said that the objections of the defendants, on which their suit was dismissed are not sustainable under the law as under the notification of sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, out of aforesaid two numbers, one number i.e. 99/20 was not mentioned in the notification and besides this in compliance of sections 11, 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act within two years from the date of aforesaid notification under section 6 of such Act, the award of compensation was not passed, hence, the entire proceeding of such acquisition had been lapsed and lost its sanctity. He further said that defendant No. 1 and 2 had utterly failed to prove that in the aforesaid land acquisition proceedings the physical possession of the land was taken over from the defendant No.3 and handed over to the defendant No.1 and 2. In such premises he said that there is sufficient evidence in the matter to draw the inference that such land was remained in possession of the defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain even, after holding the acquisition proceedings. In continuation he said that it has not been proved on record by any cogent and reliable evidence that compensation of aforesaid both the land was given to defendant No.3 and the same was received by him on the contrary on entering into the witness box defendant No.3 had categorically stated that he did not receive any such compensation of the land. Besides this, he further argued that defendant No. 1, 2 and their officials tried to interfere in the possession of such land when the same was in possession of defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain, the predecessor in title of the possession. On which the defendant No. 3 filed earlier suit for perpetual injunction against the respondent No.1, 2 and some other person, the same was decreed. So in view of such earlier decree of perpetual injunction in favour of the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs, they had right to protect their possession and therefore, on the strength of such earlier decree on a subsequent cause of action being purchaser of the land, the plaintiffs were entitled for the decree of the perpetual injunction and Courts below ought to have decreed the entire suit but the appellate Court committed error in dismissing the suit in toto by ignoring the factum of aforesaid earlier decree. It was also argued that in view of fresh mutation of defendant No.3 on the strength of the above mentioned decree of perpetual injunction over the disputed land in revenue record, subsequently on purchasing the same from such defendant No.3 by the appellates their names were mutated in the Revenue Records and pursuant to that also the appellants being in settled possession of such land the Courts below ought to have decreed the suit and protect their possession till they are dispossessed by the defendant No. 1 and 2 by following the prescribed procedure of law and prayed for admission of both the appeals on the proposed substantial question of law mentioned in paragraph 16 of the appeal memo. He has also placed his reliance on some reported cases of the apex Court as well as of this Court the same shall be taken up for consideration at the appropriate stage of this order. 9. Having heard the counsel, keeping in view the arguments after going through the records of the Courts below and the impugned judgment, I have found the findings of the appellate Court, for allowing the appeal of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and also for dismissing the appeal of the appellants as well as their suit, in consonance with the available evidence and the existing legal position. 10. The appellate Court has dismissed the suit of the appellants in it's entirety holding that prior to 24.8.1998, on which the sale deed Ex. P 1 was executed by defendant No.3 in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants, the disputed land was already acquisitioned for respondent No. 1 and 2 for implementation of their some scheme and it's compensation was also paid to the respondent No.3. Thereafter defendant No.3 did not have any right or authority to transfer or sale such land with possession or otherwise to the plaintiffs/appellants and in such premises they did not have any better right on such land then the right of Ashok Kumar defendant No.3. It is settled proposition of law that where the seller did not have any right in the questionable property then even on execution of sale deed by him regarding such property, such document does not confer any title in favour of the purchaser. It is settled proposition of law that where the seller did not have any right in the questionable property then even on execution of sale deed by him regarding such property, such document does not confer any title in favour of the purchaser. Such question is answered by this Court in the matter of Omprakash Soni v. Rajmal Jain, reported in 2000 MPACJ Page No. 27 and also in the matter of Bapulal v. Bhanwarlal, reported in 1982 MPWN 173 . 11. In the record I have found the notification issued by the Collector, Jabalpur under sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act published in the gazette of State of Madhya Pradesh in which besides other Land Survey No. 99/21 is also mentioned for acquisition and in such notification the area of such land is mentioned 0.069 hectare while as per case of the plaintiffs the land bearing Survey No. 99/21 is having the area 0.029 hectare while Survey No. 99/26 is having the area 0.040 hectare. As such the total area of the land was rightly mentioned in such notification. Thus, in such premises the approach of the appellate Court holding that looking to the area of both the survey number the acquisition appears to be correct. Such approach is also based on other connected papers of notification exhibited on the record from Ex. D 1-C to Ex. D-22-C. The award of the compensation was also passed by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer vide dated 21.9.1992, in such award the name of defendant No.3 the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs is mentioned and as per further averments of it in compliance of the award the sum of compensation was paid to defendant No.3. Besides this, the papers for taking over the possession of the property and handing over the same to defendant No. 1 and 2 (Ex. D. 9-C) also placed on record in which also the same area of the land as stated in the notification is mentioned. Apart this Ex. D. 19-C amended compensation sheet of Form No. 13 is also placed and marked on record, according to which defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain had been paid the compensation for the land bearing Survey No. 99/21 area 0.029 hectare and Survey No. 99/26 area 0.040 hectare. Apart this Ex. D. 19-C amended compensation sheet of Form No. 13 is also placed and marked on record, according to which defendant No.3 Ashok Kumar Jain had been paid the compensation for the land bearing Survey No. 99/21 area 0.029 hectare and Survey No. 99/26 area 0.040 hectare. I have also found a letter dated 28.7.1989 sent by the Collector, Land Acquisition Officer, Jabalpur to the official of defendant No. 1 and 2 contending that possession of the acquisitioned land of village Maharajpur and Khairi had been handed over to the authority of defendant No.1 and 2 on 1.6.1989. 12. Under the abovementioned circumstances the Courts below had to examine the matter with this angle that subsequent to acquisition of the disputed land under the provision of Land Acquisition Act for defendant No.1 and 2 whether the Civil Court had any jurisdiction to entertain any Civil Suit either for declaration or/and for perpetual injunction at the instance of the person from whom the land was acquisitioned with possession and the compensation has also been paid to him. In other words whether such dispute could be entertained and adjudicated by the Civil Court. Such question was answered by the apex Court in the matter of State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1955 , in which it was held as under:- 2. A....................We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the case under section 9 of Civil Procedure Code stands excluded, and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under section 4, and declaration under section 6, except by High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. 13. This question is also answered by the apex Court in the matter of S.P. Subramanya Shetty v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1997 SC 2076 , in which it was held as under:- 4. In view of the settled legal position that the notification had become final and the proceedings had attained finality, the Civil Suit was not maintainable. This question is also answered by the apex Court in the matter of S.P. Subramanya Shetty v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1997 SC 2076 , in which it was held as under:- 4. In view of the settled legal position that the notification had become final and the proceedings had attained finality, the Civil Suit was not maintainable. This Court has repeatedly held that a Civil Suit relating to acquisition proceedings is not maintainable and by implication, cognizance under section 9, Civil Procedure Code, is barred. The Court cannot issue mandatory injunction against the State to denotify the acquisition under section 48. Therefore, the question of granting injunction against the authority from proceedings in accordance with the law does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant injunction. The Court cannot compel the Government to withdraw the notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. It is for the Government to consider the same on merits and it keeping in mind subservience of public interest. In view of the fact that notification was upheld by this Court and has become final, the Government cannot retract from the steps taken. 14. On arising the occasion, this Court has also answered this question in the matter of Pashu Chikitsa Vibhagiya Sahkari Nirman Samiti Maryadit Bhopal v. State of M.P., reported in 2000 (3) MPLJ 244 in which it was held as under:- "4..................We are in agreement with the contention so raised by the learned counsel for the State. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity and legality of notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 of the Act except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By a necessary implication, the power of Civil Court to take cognizance under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code stand excluded. With this background, the suit was maintainable. Consequently, the view taken be the District Judge is correct and is confirmed." 15. Subsequent to aforesaid decision such question is further answered by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Dev Kumar Ben Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2005 (3) JLJ 286 = ( 2005 (4) MPLJ 146 ), in which it was held as under: 11. Subsequent to aforesaid decision such question is further answered by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Dev Kumar Ben Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2005 (3) JLJ 286 = ( 2005 (4) MPLJ 146 ), in which it was held as under: 11. In this case, notification is not under challenge, but declaration is sought that acquisition proceedings have lapsed on the expiry of period of two years after acquisition of land. In the relief clause, plaintiff has prayed that it be declared that after publication of notification under section 4 of the Act on 15.12.1995 entire proceedings had lapsed as the award was not passed within two years and fresh notification under section 6 of the Act on 13.8.1998 without publication of notification under section 4 is void contrary to law and is unenforceable against the plaintiffs. 12. In this case, proceedings under section 4 of the Act have not been challenged. What is under challenge is the fresh notification under section 6 of the Act dated 13.8.1998. Therefore, in such situation, whether such suit will be maintainable. Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (supra) has held that the Act being a complete Code in itself, jurisdiction of civil Court is excluded by necessary implication and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. Thus, in view of the judgment of the apex Court in the aforesaid case which has been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pashu Chikitsak (supra), covering the question of law has been delivered in the matter of the Act, therefore, judgment referred in the case of Dhulahhai (supra) will not be applicable to the present case. Therefore, the suit as filed itself is not maintainable. Even otherwise, since the proceedings are under section 17 of the Act and emergency clause was invoked, therefore in the light of the judgment in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) provisions of section 11-A of the Act will not be applicable. Therefore, the suit has rightly been dismissed by the trial Court." 16. Even otherwise, since the proceedings are under section 17 of the Act and emergency clause was invoked, therefore in the light of the judgment in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) provisions of section 11-A of the Act will not be applicable. Therefore, the suit has rightly been dismissed by the trial Court." 16. In view of the aforesaid legal position in the available circumstances of the case at hand neither the earlier suit COS No. 302-A/94 filed for perpetual injunction by defendant No.3 and decided on 22.7.1996 nor the impugned suit filed by the appellants under the rights acquired from defendant No.3 were entertainable and in such premises the aforesaid decree for perpetual injunction passed in COS No. 302-A/94 being ab-initio void was not binding against the defendant No. 1 & 2 and in such premises also the approach of the appellate Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants does not appear to be perverse or contrary to law. Therefore, in such premises this appeal is not involving any substantial question of law requiring any consideration under section 100 Civil Procedure Code at this stage. 17. In view of the aforesaid, when the suit of the appellants itself is not maintainable other question raised by the appellants' counsel do not require any consideration on other merits of the case but for the sake of argument, I deem fit to examine such grounds also to consider the question of admission. 18. After selling the property the seller did not have any right, authority or title in such property. In other words it could be said that after acquisition of land and receiving the compensation the person like defendant No.3 whose land was acquisitioned did not have any right or authority to file the suit for perpetual. injunction or to sell the same to the appellants or other person and in such premises, the appellants being purchaser on the strength 0 such defective title of their predecessor did not have any right or authority to file the impugned suit for perpetual injunction stating that they are in settled possession of the property. 19. Besides the above in view of the provisions of section 48 of Transfer of Property Act every previous transfer of the property had override effect over the subsequent transfer of such property by the same person. 19. Besides the above in view of the provisions of section 48 of Transfer of Property Act every previous transfer of the property had override effect over the subsequent transfer of such property by the same person. In such premises in view of earlier concluded proceedings of Land Acquisition the appellants' sale deed did not confer any title to the appellants, hence this appeal does not involve any subsequent question of law. 20. In the lack of any proved circumstances by any admissible document showing that after acquisition of the aforesaid land and payment of compensation to defendants No.3, at later stage the same was given back to such defendant No.3, it could not be deemed that on the date of the sale deed executed by the defendant No.3 in favour of plaintiffs, the land was in possession of defendant No.3 and was handed over to appellants. So in such premises also the impugned judgments are not giving rise to any substantial question of law. 21. The aforesaid earlier decree of perpetual injunction passed in favour of the defendant No.3 being ab-initio void had not given any right to such defendant No.3 to get mutated such land in his name in the Revenue Record and on the strength of such illegal mutation on selling such land by defendant No.3 to the plaintiffs if they got mutated their names in such record, then such entries could not be deemed to confer the title or possession to the plaintiffs over the disputed land. Even otherwise revenue entries in the record of right could not be deemed to be sufficient to hold the title and possession of the property with the appellants, unless the title is proved by admissible documents. So on the ground of such earlier decree also this appeal is not involving any substantial question of law. 22. Even otherwise revenue entries in the record of right could not be deemed to be sufficient to hold the title and possession of the property with the appellants, unless the title is proved by admissible documents. So on the ground of such earlier decree also this appeal is not involving any substantial question of law. 22. At this juncture, I would like to mention here that as per the case of the plaintiffs their predecessor in title defendant No.3 got mutated such land on his name on the basis of aforesaid earlier decree, if such earlier decree was passed for perpetual injunction in favour of the defendant No.3 then on the strength of such decree in the lack of any declaration of title in favour of the defendant No.3 he did not have any authority or right to get it mutate in his name in the record of rights from the Revenue Authority. So also the Revenue Authority did not have any authority or jurisdiction to mutate the name of the defendant No.3 on the strength of such decree or under his right on the strength of the sale deed executed by defendant No.3 to mutate in the names of the plaintiffs. From the available circumstances it appears that under some conspiracy with defendant No.3 and subsequently with plaintiffs/appellants the concerning Revenue Officer mutated the name of the defendant No.3 in the Revenue Record and thereafter on the strength of sale deed executed by the defendant No.3 In the name of plaintiffs/appellants. Such act of the Revenue Authority in the available circumstances could not be deemed to be a bona fide as on the strength of any decree for perpetual injunction the disputed land could not be recorded by such authority in the revenue record in the name of defendant No.3 Bhoomiswami as the same is not permissible under the law unless some declaration was made in such decree. In such premises while considering the question of admission of this appeal, I do not want to pass any operative direction against such Revenue Authority, defendant No.3 and all concerned but in the available circumstance, I deem fit to direct the Chief Secretary of State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the Principal Secretary of Revenue Department to take appropriate action against the concerning person individually the delinquent officers/officials who permitted the mutation in the revenue record only on the strength of the decree of perpetual injunction. I hope and trust that such authorities shall proceed to take such action within three months from the date of this order under intimation to this Court. 23. In view of the aforesaid legal position the Civil Court did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the Civil Original Suit either for perpetual injunction or for other relief with respect of the matter relating to the land acquisition proceeding then the other questions raised on behalf of the appellants that on acquisition of the land from defendant No.3 the physical possession of the same was never handed over to the defendants under the land acquisition proceedings or the sum of the compensation as per the award was not received by defendant No.3 or the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under the acquisition proceedings was beyond the limitation of two years from the date of notification of section 6 of Land Acquisition Act and it's impact over the right of the parties could neither be considered by the subordinate trial and appellate Court nor the same could be considered by this Court under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code in this appeal. 24. Coming to consider the case laws cited by the appellants' counsel the same are being taken into consideration one by one. (A) State of U.P. v. Rajiv Gupta, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 is concerned. such case was arisen from some writ petition in which the procedure adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer and the question of limitation about passing the award was challenged and such W.P. was decided by the competent Court having jurisdiction to decide such petition but the present case being arisen from the Civil Original Suit in view of the principle laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Dhirendra Kumar (supra). the cited case is not helping to the appellants for framing any substantial question of law in the matter. (B) Mohd. Arif v. State of M.P., reported in 1998 RN 224 = 2000 (2) MPHT 467 is concerned, this case being based on said decision of the apex Court in the matter of Rajiv Gupta (supra), for the reason on which such case is not helping to the defendants/appellants, this case is also not helping to them. (C) Charushila Poharker v. Collector, Jabalpur, reported in 2002 (2) MPHT 60 (NOC) is concerned, the same being based on Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act is decided in some different circumstances, thus it being distinguishable on fact, in the available circumstances is not helping to the plaintiffs/appellants. It is made clear that in the cited case the question of land acquisition or it's any proceedings was not under challenge. (D) National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta and others, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 339 , is concerned, this case was decided taking into consideration that physical possession of the entire land even after payment of 80% sum of the compensation, was not taken over by the Authority under the Land Acquisition Act, which is not the situation here, on the contrary in the present case there is sufficient evidence for holding that the physical possession of the land was taken from the Bhoomiswami defendant No.3 and handed over to the defendant No. 1 and 2, therefore the cited case is not helping to the plaintiffs/appellants. (E) Prataprai N. Kothari v. John Braganza, reported in 1999 AIR SCW 1284 is concerned, such case was decided taking into consideration the position that both the parties could not prove their title over the property and in such circumstances on the strength of the long possession of one party the case was decided while in the case at hand it has been established that after Acquisition of the disputed land it's title and possession remained with the defendant No. 1 and 2. So in such premises also this cited case is not helping to the appellants on the contrary in view of the observation made by the apex Court in the matter of Ganguhai Bahiya Chaudhary v. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar, AIR 1983 SC 742 and also by this Court in the matter of Kamal Singh v. Jairam Singh, reported in 1986 (1) MPWN 116, unless the legal possession is proved by the party like plaintiffs/appellants their suit for perpetual injunction could not he decreed. 25. In view of the aforesaid long discussion and legal position I have not found any perversity, infirmity, illegality in the impugned judgment of the appellate Court giving rise to any question of law rather than substantial question of law requiring any consideration at the stage of Second Appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. Hence both the appeal being devoid of any such question deserves to be and are hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. However, the Chief Secretary of State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the Principal Secretary of Revenue Department is directed to take appropriate action/steps against the concerning Revenue Officers (s) and the person (s) as directed in paragraph 22 of this order under intimation to this Court. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary of State of Madhya Pradesh and the Principal Secretary of Revenue Department immediately for it's compliance. 26. As this order has been passed jointly in S.A.No. 742/10, hence a copy of this order be kept with the record of S.A.No. 834/10. 27. Both the appeals are dismissed as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.