Judgment (1) THIS appeal is directed under section 2 of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 assailing the order dated 20th October, 2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 1500/2004. [reported in 2011(1) MPLJ 191 ]. The writ petition was dismissed by a detailed order and mainly on the ground that the letter of intent issued in favour of respondents was not assailed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge while deciding this issue has relied on a decision of Apex Court in the case of Virendra Chaudhary vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others, (2009) 1 SCC 297 , paragraph 20 of the judgment. (2) IN this appeal, the appellant has filed two applications. (1) I.A.No. 93/10, an application seeking leave to produce additional documents on record. Along with this application, appellant has produced two documents, a Letter dated 28-12-2009 issued by the INdian Oil Corporation Limited sending an information to the appellant under Right to INformation Act, 2005 along with the copy of letter of allotment in favour of respondent No. 4 dated 10th November, 2004. (2) Another application is I.A.No. 1064/10 by which appellant has sought permission of this Court to amend the Memo of writ petition. By the aforesaid application, the appellant wants to insert various grounds in the Memo of writ petition by assailing letter of intent (hereinafter referred as 'LOI for short) dated 14-7-2004 (Annexure R/4) filed along with the return before the writ Court. Shri Prashant Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the case in proper perspective. The subject-matter for challenge in the writ petition was a final decision by the respondents in which the respondent No. 4 was placed at Serial No. 1 in the merit list. That decision of Selection Board was challenged in the matter and after the aforesaid decision is set aside by this Court, naturally, the consequential order i.e. the letter of intent shall also go. (3) HE has also argued on merits of the case and submitted that the allocation of marks to respondent No. 4 in respect of ownership of the land were wrongly awarded. Respondent No. 4 was awarded 20 marks, while the petitioner was awarded 10 marks. (3) HE has also argued on merits of the case and submitted that the allocation of marks to respondent No. 4 in respect of ownership of the land were wrongly awarded. Respondent No. 4 was awarded 20 marks, while the petitioner was awarded 10 marks. HE has referred the document Annexure X/1 in support of his contention by which M/s Himanshu Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. had issued a certificate in respect of extracts of the Minutes of the Company to show that in fact respondent No. 4 was not owner of the land but only filed this letter of Company showing that the Company had decided to give this land on lease. In fact, no document showing any lease or ownership in the land was produced. HE has placed reliance on the Apex Court's Judgment in the matter of Poonam Kumar vs. Jai Prakash Pandey and others, (2008) 5 SCC 325 in support of his contention. HE has also relied on certain paragraphs of the judgment which is referred by the learned Single Judge in the order in the case of Virendra Chaudhary vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others, (2009) 1 SCC 297 in support of his contention that the aforesaid judgment is not applicable in the present case. Apart from this, it was submitted by Shri Sharma that the respondents have not opposed the petition on the ground that letter of intent was not challenged before the Writ Court but the Writ Court on wrong premises has decided the cases on the aforesaid grounds. (4) SHRI R. D. Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 supported the order. It was submitted by him that the scope of interference in writ appeal is very limited . In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and others vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others, 1996 MPLJ 1074 and Mani vs. Sub-Divisional Forest Officer-cum-Authorised Officer, 1999(2) MPLJ 81 = 2000(4) M.P.H.T 105 . In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and others vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others, 1996 MPLJ 1074 and Mani vs. Sub-Divisional Forest Officer-cum-Authorised Officer, 1999(2) MPLJ 81 = 2000(4) M.P.H.T 105 . So far as the contention of the appellant in respect of ownership of the land is concerned, it was submitted by SHRI R. D. Jain, learned Senior Counsel that in fact the land was purchased in the name of aforesaid Company by a registered document dated 16-12-1998 in which the name of respondent No. 4 is appearing as a Director of the said Company. It is further submitted by him that ownership of the land at the time of filing of the application or at the time of issuance of letter of intent was not a mandatory condition. In support of this, he placed reliance on a judgment of Apex Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Tiwari and others vs. Shakuntala Shukla and others, (2002) 6 SCC 127 . In respect of the amendment application filed by the petitioner along with the application placing certain documents on record, it was submitted by Shri Jain that merit panel was prepared on 25th June, 2003. Petitioner made a representation in the shape of a notice on 10th July, 2004, of which reply was sent on 22nd July, 2004. In the reply in paragraph 6, it was very specifically stated by the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 that letter of intent was already issued on 14-7-2004. The letter is available at page 16 of the paper book. That though the writ petition was filed on 27th July, 2004 but in the entire writ petition, letter of intent was not challenged. Apart from this, In the return filed by the respondent No. 4, it was very specifically mentioned in paragraphs 5.4 and 6.2 that such letter of intent was issued which was not challenged by the petitioner. Stating the aforesaid, it was submitted that after a period of near about six years, the said letter of intent cannot be challenged at the stage of writ appeal, such application be not allowed. He has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Shiv Gopal Saha @ Shiv Gopal Sahu vs. Sita Ram Saraugi and others, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1478 . He has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Shiv Gopal Saha @ Shiv Gopal Sahu vs. Sita Ram Saraugi and others, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1478 . (5) SHRI N. K. Jain, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 also supported the order. He submitted that the letter of intent was issued after appreciating the merits of rival candidates. The letter of intent has not been challenged for a period of near about six years. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Gopal Saha (supra) and submitted that after a period of six years from the date when retail outlet was opened, it will not be appropriate for this Court to allow this appeal by setting aside the selection process. (6) SHRI Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, in reply to the aforesaid arguments, has submitted that when the petitioner has challenged the entire selection in the matter then if the selection process is set aside then the consequential order of issuance of letter of allotment or rejection of the representation shall also go. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it is better to deal with I.A.No. 93/10, an application seeking leave to produce additional documents on record and I. A. No. 1064/10, an application seeking amendment in the Memo of writ petition. (7) SO far as the amendment is concerned; the petitioner is seeking leave to amend the writ petition assailing Annexure R/4 which was filed by respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 along with their return. From the perusal of the return filed before the Writ Court it appears that such return was filed on 3rd October, 2004. Copy of Annexure R/4 was already filed in the year 2004 itself and a period of nearabout six years has elapsed since the date of filing of the reply and the production of the document. The petitioner was also intimated by reply of the notice on 22nd July, 2004, which is Annexure R/3 on record, that the LOI was issued to respondent No. 4 on 14th July, 2004. The petitioner was also intimated by reply of the notice on 22nd July, 2004, which is Annexure R/3 on record, that the LOI was issued to respondent No. 4 on 14th July, 2004. In view of the aforesaid, this fact was well within the knowledge of the petitioner that such LOI was already issued in favour of respondent No. 4 and therefore, even after filing of the written statement such amendment was not incorporated. Apart from this, when return was filed, the petitioner ought to have challenged the letter of intent issued in favour of respondent No. 4, but it appears that till the decision of the writ petition on 30th October, 2009 such prayer was not made and the learned Single Judge after hearing the arguments when dismissed the Writ Petition on the aforesaid ground, this application has been filed on 20th January, 2010 before this Court in writ appeal. In these circumstances, apparently, the aforesaid application suffers from laches on the part of appellant and after a lapse of six years, such application cannot be allowed. (8) THOUGH, it is true, that the principles of Civil Procedure Code in Order 6, Rule 17 are strictly not applicable in the writ jurisdiction but guidance can be taken from the aforesaid principles. When the petitioner/appellant was having sufficient opportunity to challenge the aforesaid order before the writ Court and after dismissal of the writ petition, by allowing the amendment application, clock cannot be reverted back. If such application is allowed, the consequence will be that the order passed by the learned Single Judge would be set aside and thereby causing serious prejudice to the respondents and, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that such application cannot be allowed. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the application seeking amendment in the writ petition at the belated stage. Accordingly, the application (I.A.No. 1064/2010) is rejected. (9) I.A.No. 93/10 is in respect of filing of additional documents. Along with the application, two documents have been filed. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the application seeking amendment in the writ petition at the belated stage. Accordingly, the application (I.A.No. 1064/2010) is rejected. (9) I.A.No. 93/10 is in respect of filing of additional documents. Along with the application, two documents have been filed. Though the aforesaid document is of 28-12-2009, by which the petitioner/appellant was intimated in respect of the order dated 10-11-2004 issued by respondents No. 1 and 2 by awarding of Indane Gas distributorship at Gwalior-D but this order could have been obtained by the petitioner after filing of the writ petition or even after filing of the return by the respondents. The petitioner had not taken any steps for obtaining such copy of the order and merely it has been obtained by the petitioner on 28-12-2009 will not be a ground to admit these documents in the appeal. Letter of intent which was issued by the respondents No. 1 and 2 on 14-7-2004 itself was on record as Annexure R/4. The petitioner was having sufficient opportunity to obtain these documents immediately thereafter but he after dismissal of the writ petition has obtained these documents which cannot be permitted to be placed on record. Accordingly, I.A.No. 93/10 is also rejected. (10) NOW the merits of the case may be seen. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in respect of ownership of the land, the respondent No. 4 has been awarded 20 marks, while the appellant, who is the owner of the land and is having registered lease deed in his favour, was awarded 10 marks, and thus, the respondents have adopted discriminatory treatment in awarding the marks. The petitioner/appellant who was having a registered document in his favour has been awarded less marks while, the respondent No. 4 was only having a letter from the Company in his favour, has been awarded 20 marks. Apart from this, in respect of experience, the appellant who was working as Manager in a Gas Company has been awarded only 12 marks, while respondent No. 4 having Grocery Shop has been awarded 11 marks. It is submitted that awarding of the marks is arbitrary and deserves to be set aside. So far as non-assailing of letter of intent is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgment in Poonam Kumar (supra). It is submitted that awarding of the marks is arbitrary and deserves to be set aside. So far as non-assailing of letter of intent is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgment in Poonam Kumar (supra). It is submitted that when the final selection itself has been challenged, it will not affect the merits of the case merely because the petitioner has not challenged the letter of intent in the petition. (11) SO far as the awarding of mark is concerned, it is settled law that in the case of administrative action scope of judicial review is limited. It can examine the decision making process, not merits of the decision. Merits of the decision are outside the scope of judicial review, as has been held by Apex Court in K. Vinod Kumar vs. S. Palanisamy and others, (2003) 10 SCC 681 . The members of Selection Board have allotted marks to each candidate and on the basis of this decided most suitable candidate for the distributorship. There are no allegations of mala fide against the Selection Board except awarding of marks in respect of land, criteria and experience. The Apex Court in K. Vinod Kumar (supra) considering the question held thus :- "11. The law is settled that over proceedings and decisions taken in administrative matters, the scope of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process and does not extend to the merits of the decision taken. No infirmity is pointed out in the proceedings of the Selection Board which may have the effect of vitiating the selection process. The capability of the appellant herein to otherwise perform as an LPG distributor is not in dispute. The High Court was not, therefore, justified in interfering with the decision of the Selection Board and the decision of BPCL to issue the letter of allotment to the appellant herein." Apart from this, it is stated by the respondents that there was a sale deed in favour of the Company, in which respondent No. 4 was the Director on 16-2- 1998, when the deed in question was executed. All these aspects were to be considered by the Selection Board and it was within the domain of the Selection Board to award the marks in respect of various counts under the policy. The Apex Court In case of K. Vinod Kumar held thus :- "8. All these aspects were to be considered by the Selection Board and it was within the domain of the Selection Board to award the marks in respect of various counts under the policy. The Apex Court In case of K. Vinod Kumar held thus :- "8. SO far as the requirement of Instruction (g) as stated above is concerned, it does not appear to be mandatory. The purpose of furnishing particulars of land in the application is to enable a determination as to whether the specified place would accommodate the godown facilities and distributorship arrangements from a commercial angle. This requirement is mandatory but satisfying the requirement at the stage of making the application is only directory. The particulars of such land can be made available even subsequent to the filing of the application and may even be subsequent to the selection. The consequence of failure to make the suitable land available within a period of two months from the date of selection is that the selection of such candidate would be liable to be cancelled. (12) IN view of the aforesaid settled law by the Apex Court, the requirement of land ownership was directive in nature and merely on the basis of this, the aforesaid selection process cannot be challenged. The Apex Court in Virendra Chaudhary (supra), considering the question held in paragraph 20 of the judgment, that "delay in challenging the letter of intent itself was sufficient ground to dismiss the writ petition." In this case, the letter of intent though was produced before the Writ Court but it was not challenged. The relief prayed in the writ Petition in the relief clause, reads as under :- "7. Relief Claimed :- In view of the facts and grounds mentioned in the Writ Petition and further in view of the documents annexed thereto, the humble petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ petition and issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent No. 1 to 3 cancel the selection of respondent No. 4 at position No. 1 in the empanelment displaced on 22-6-2004 for award or distributorship of Indane Gas for the location Owalior-D being illegal, improper, incorrect, irrational, arbitrary and mala fide. The petitioner may further kindly be held to be at Sr. The petitioner may further kindly be held to be at Sr. No. 1 of the list of empanelment and necessary writ/direction may kindly be issued commanding the respondent No. 1 to 3 to treat the petitioner at Sr. No. 1 on the list of empanelment with a further direction to grant the distributorship of LP.G/ Indane Gas. The cost of the petition and/or any other relief which this Hon'ble Court finds suitable may kindly be awarded." (13) IN the aforesaid relief clause it is specifically stated that the petitioner had challenged the selection of respondent No. 4 placing him at position No. 1 and claimed his position as Serial No. 1 in the list of empanelment, while the petitioner ought to have challenged the letter of intent which was issued before filing of the writ petition in the year 2004 and the petitioner was well aware with the reply of the notice that such letter of intent was issued in favour of respondent No. 4. The learned Single Judge, relying to the judgment of Virendra Chaudhary (supra) dismissed the writ petition. The respondent No. 4 is running distribution of INdane Gas for the last six years and he must have invested a huge amount. The Apex Court in paragraph 23 of the judgment of Virendra Chaudhary (supra) considering the question held that "INfrastructure therefore is required to be provided and a large number of employees are to be appointed therefore, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in not taking these factors into consideration in proper perspective" so after a period of six years, if this matter is remanded, it may cause serious prejudice to respondent No. 4. (14) IN view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed, Appeal dismissed.