JUDGMENT Rakesh Saksena, J. 1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 27th March, 2001 passed by Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Sessions Trial No. 358/2000, convicting the Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, further imprisonment for one month. 2. In short, the prosecution case is that Nanda Bai, the deceased, was married to accused/Appellant about 9-10 months before the occurrence which took place on 13-7-2000. In the night of 13-7-2000, Nanda Bai suffered severe burn injuries in her house. She was taken to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal, where, on her report Dehati Nalishi (Exh. P-8) was recorded by the police. Her dying declaration (Exh. P-10) was also recorded by Dr. R.S. Raikwar. In both the aforesaid statements, Nanda Bai disclosed that when she insisted accused to not to consume liquor, he poured kerosene and set fire to her. During treatment, on the same day, she died. After inquest proceedings, her dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. Dr. V.K. Athwal (P.W. 6), Assistant Professor of Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal performed the post-mortem examination of the body and found that deceased died due to 95% burn injuries. Post-mortem report is Exh. P-12. 3. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed for trial. According to accused, he did not commit the offence. At the time of occurrence, he was strolling outside his house and deceased was cooking inside the house. While cooking, deceased got burnt. He extinguished the fire and took her to hospital. Trial Court relying on the evidence of dying declaration (Exh. P-10) recorded by Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10), evidence of Dehati Nalishi (Exh. P-8) recorded by Sub Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4) and the medical evidence of Dr. V.K. Athwal (P.W. 6) held the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant was falsely implicated by the deceased. He had tried to save the deceased when she caught fire; in that course he had also suffered injuries. Counsel submitted that the evidence of dying declaration was not reliable because deceased had suffered 95% burn injuries, therefore, she was not in a position to make any dying declaration. He had tried to save the deceased when she caught fire; in that course he had also suffered injuries. Counsel submitted that the evidence of dying declaration was not reliable because deceased had suffered 95% burn injuries, therefore, she was not in a position to make any dying declaration. It was also possible that deceased might have committed suicide. Learned Counsel further submitted that since the Appellant was under intoxication and suddenly a quarrel had erupted between him and his wife when she asked him to not to consume liquor, Trial Court committed error in holding that accused intended to commit murder of his wife. Conviction of accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was, therefore, not justified. At the most, Appellant could have been held liable under Section 304-Part I or Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Accused has been in custody since the date of his arrest, i.e., 15-7-2000. She placed reliance on the decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sharif Khan v. State of M.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 2116/1997. 5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the State submitted that the dying declaration recorded by doctor and Dehati Nalishi (Exh. P-8) recorded by Inspector S.K. Verma, which was treated as a dying declaration was reliable. Trial Court committed no error in placing reliance on the aforesaid dying declaration and holding the accused guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Placing reliance on the Apex Court decision State of M.P. v. Ramprasad AIR 1968 SC 881 , learned Counsel submitted that in case of setting fire after pouring kerosene, it could not be held that accused had no intention to cause death of the victim. He, thus, supported and justified the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel of both the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the evidence on record carefully. 7. It has not been disputed that deceased suffered burn injuries and died as a result of such injuries. Accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that deceased suffered injuries by burning. Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) deposed that on 14-7-2000 Nanda Bai was admitted in the burn ward of Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. It has not been disputed that deceased suffered burn injuries and died as a result of such injuries. Accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that deceased suffered injuries by burning. Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) deposed that on 14-7-2000 Nanda Bai was admitted in the burn ward of Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. According to Sub Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4), in the night of 13-7-2000 when he was posted in the Police Station, Kamla Nagar, Bhopal he received information that Nanda Bai was admitted in the burn ward of hospital. He had gone to hospital and saw Nanda Bai in burnt condition. He recorded a report (Exh. P-8) given by Nanda Bai. After death of Nanda Bai, Dr. V.K. Athwal (P.W. 6) conducted the post-mortem examination and vide post-mortem examination report (Exh. P-12) found following injuries: (i) II-III degree burns over face, and over except naso-labial fold and folds around eyes, (ii) II-III degree burns over both upper limbs starting from shoulder tip up to finger tips, (iii) II-III degree burns over both lower limbs starting from groin up to foot, (iv) II-III degree burns over chest and abdomen starting from neck up to groin all over except at right iliac fossa, and (v) II-III degree burns over back starting from neck up to gluteal fold. In his opinion, death was due to respiratory failure as a result of burns. Thus, it is clearly established that deceased had died due to burn injuries. 8. Now the question before us is whether the death of deceased was caused by the accused. Though, prosecution examined Ashok (P.W. 1), Rajesh (P.W. 2) and Anil (P.W. 3), who were the neighbours of deceased and had reached at the spot immediately after the occurrence, but they did not support the prosecution case and were, therefore, declared hostile. They, however, stated that they saw Nanda Bai lying in the hut in burnt condition. 9. The prosecution case mainly rested on the evidence of dying declaration recorded by Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) and Police Officer S.K. Verma (P.W. 4). 10. Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) was posted as R.S.O. in Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. According to him, Nanda Bai was got admitted in the burn ward of hospital on 14-7-2000. She had burn injuries and her condition was serious. At 1.30 a.m., he recorded the statement of Nanda Bai. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) and Police Officer S.K. Verma (P.W. 4). 10. Dr. R.S. Raikwar (P.W. 10) was posted as R.S.O. in Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. According to him, Nanda Bai was got admitted in the burn ward of hospital on 14-7-2000. She had burn injuries and her condition was serious. At 1.30 a.m., he recorded the statement of Nanda Bai. She stated that her husband used to quarrel and beat her daily after consuming liquor. On the day of occurrence at about 11-11.30 p.m. he was drinking liquor. When she asked him to stop drinking, he got enraged and after taking kerosene out of stove poured it on her and ignited her. Dying declaration is Exh. P-10. Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10) categorically stated that when he recorded the above statement, Nanda Bai was in her full senses. We are unable to accept the submission made by learned Counsel for the Appellant that since doctor did not record any certificate about the physical and mental condition of the deceased before recording her statement, his evidence was unreliable. It is to be noted that the person who recorded this statement was himself a doctor, therefore, in our opinion, it was not necessary for him to have endorsed a certificate about the fitness of deceased. Learned Counsel for the accused referring to document (Exh. P-16) argued that when Executive Magistrate had come to record dying declaration of Nanda Bai, Dr. Raikwar himself found that Nanda Bai was not able to make statement. Dr. Raikwar explained that initially when Executive Magistrate started recording dying declaration, he certified that patient could give statement and she was conscious, but she could only speak that she got burnt at about 11.30 p.m. on 13-7-2000, and thereafter, she went unconscious and could not answer then he again endorsed remark that she cannot give statement because of drowsiness. In our opinion, this conduct of Dr. Raikwar shows his fairness. No suggestion was put to Dr. Raikwar that he had any ill will or animus against the accused to record false dying declaration against him. As far as the fact that Nanda Bai could not give statement before Executive Magistrate, it is significant to note that the part of dying declaration (Exh. P-16) was recorded by Executive Magistrate at about 3.45 a.m., whereas the dying declaration by Dr. As far as the fact that Nanda Bai could not give statement before Executive Magistrate, it is significant to note that the part of dying declaration (Exh. P-16) was recorded by Executive Magistrate at about 3.45 a.m., whereas the dying declaration by Dr. Raikwar was recorded at 1.30 a.m. Merely because at 3.50 a.m. Nanda Bai became drowsy, it cannot be presumed that she was not able to make statement at 1.30 a.m. also. 11. Another piece of evidence is Dehati Nalishi (Exh. P-8) recorded by Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4). According to S.K. Verma, the intimation about burning of Nanda Bai and that she was admitted in the hospital was recorded in Rojnamcha Entry (Exh. P-7) at Police Station, Kamla Nagar, Bhopal. In consequence to this information, he went to hospital. At that time, Nanda Bai was able to speak. On his query, she informed that she lived with her husband in Hut No. 140 at Sudama Nagar. She was married to accused about nine months ago. Since she was deserted by her first husband, she had married accused. Her husband Prakash used to consume excessive liquor daily. On the day of occurrence when she asked him to not to consume liquor, he threatened her saying that she was nobody to ask him and that he would dispose her of. He took out kerosene from the stove, poured it on her and set fire to her by match-stick. He burnt her with a view to kill her. Thumb impression of Nanda Bai was also taken on the said report. According to S.K. Verma, he also recorded her statement (Exh. P-9) under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein she reiterated the same story. Since after giving these statements Nanda Bai expired, these statements could be treated as dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. On the basis of Dehati Nalishi, First Information Report (Exh. P-8/A) was recorded at Police Station, Kamla Nagar, Bhopal. Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4) recorded Exh. P-8 at 2.55 a.m. This report was recorded after the dying declaration (Exh. P-10) was recorded by Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10). It also reflects same version which was given by deceased to Dr. Raikwar in dying declaration (Exh. P-10). There is absolutely no inconsistency between the aforesaid dying declarations. Inspector S.K. Verma also said that he had questioned the deceased in. P-10) was recorded by Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10). It also reflects same version which was given by deceased to Dr. Raikwar in dying declaration (Exh. P-10). There is absolutely no inconsistency between the aforesaid dying declarations. Inspector S.K. Verma also said that he had questioned the deceased in. Hindi and she had answered in Hindi. He categorically denied that Nanda Bai did not know Hindi. 12. Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4) went at the spot and drew spot map (Exh. P-2) and seized Nutan stove, burnt match-stick and burnt clothes from the spot vide seizure memo (Exh. P-3). His evidence in this regard stands corroborated from the evidence of Jitendra (P.W. 5). 13. After closely scrutinizing and appreciating the evidence of dying declarations (Exh. P-8, Exh. P-9 and Exh. P-10), we find these statements genuine and reliable. There appeared absolutely no reason for Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10) and Inspector Verma (P.W. 4) to have fabricated these documents. Further there appeared no reason for the deceased to have made false statement accusing her husband. Merely from the fact that accused tried to extinguish the fire, it cannot be presumed that he did not set fire to her or that she committed suicide. We are satisfied that the statements given by deceased were true and voluntary. In P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 443 , Apex Court observed as: 12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has not power of cross-examination. Such as power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. 14. Applying the above principles to the facts of the case, in our opinion, Court below was right and fully justified in relying upon the dying declarations (Exh. P-8 and Exh. P-10) recorded by Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4) and Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10). 15. Though, defence witness Vimal Bai (D.W. 1) stated that when some people informed her, she went to the house of accused and saw Nanda Bai burning and accused extinguishing the fire, but we find her evidence not reliable in view of the trustworthy evidence of dying declarations made by the deceased. Evidence of Vimal Bai that deceased did not know Hindi and only spoke Marathi also appears not reliable in view of the evidence of Inspector S.K. Verma (P.W. 4) and Dr. Raikwar (P.W. 10), who categorically deposed that Nanda Bai spoke Hindi. Apart from it, Vimal Bai only saw Nanda Bai in burnt condition and accused extinguishing fire; she did not now about any dispute or altercation which might have occurred between them. 16. After sincerely appreciating the evidence of dying declaration, we are satisfied that accused/Appellant set fire to deceased, as a result of which she died. 17. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, conviction of Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was not justified, as according to her, it could not be held that Appellant intended to commit murder of deceased because the incident occurred on a sudden quarrel on spur of the moment without any premeditation when deceased asked the accused to not to consume liquor. She placed reliance on the case of Sharif Khan (supra) of this Court. In the case of Sharif Khan (supra), this Court observed: 20. She placed reliance on the case of Sharif Khan (supra) of this Court. In the case of Sharif Khan (supra), this Court observed: 20. ...Since the incident had occurred on the point of serving meals, the quarrel started all of a sudden and in a heat passion the Appellant poured kerosene on the deceased and lit the fire, therefore under Exception 1 of Section 300, IPC the present case would come because the Appellant lost the power of self-control and on account of grave and sudden provocation, cause the death to the deceased. On going through the entire episode and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and also examining the dying declaration, it is gathered that Appellant was having knowledge that the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased and litting the fire, death may be caused to the deceased and, therefore, according to our considered view, the case would fall under Section 304-II, IPC. The case of Hari Shankar (supra), placed reliance by learned Counsel for the Appellant is squarely applicable in the present factual scenario. 18. In our opinion, the facts and circumstances of the case of Hari Shankar v. State of Rajasthan (1998) 8 SCC 355 , were different. In that case accused threw burning stove on the deceased resulting in his death due to burn injuries. In those circumstances, Apex Court held that it could not be said that it was merely a rash and negligent act on the part of the Appellant and he could be attributed the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. He was, therefore, liable to be convicted under Section 304-Part II of the Indian Penal Code and not under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. In our opinion, in the present case, when deceased asked the accused to not to consume liquor, he became violent and poured kerosene and set fire to deceased. The act of pouring kerosene and setting fire, in our opinion, is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of deceased, therefore, it cannot be held that the case of accused falls within the ambit of Section 304-I or 304-II of the Indian Penal Code. The act of pouring kerosene and setting fire, in our opinion, is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of deceased, therefore, it cannot be held that the case of accused falls within the ambit of Section 304-I or 304-II of the Indian Penal Code. We find support from the ratio of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad (supra), facts whereof were almost similar to the case in hand. It observed as under: 8. ...In the present case, Ram Prasad poured kerosene upon the clothes of Mst. Rajji and set fire to those clothes. It is obvious that such fire spreads rapidly and burns extensively. No special knowledge is needed to know that one may cause death by burning if he sets fire to the clothes of a person. Therefore, it is obvious that Ram Prasad must have known that he was running the risk of causing the death of Rajji or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death. As he had no excuse for incurring that risk, the offence must be taken to fall within 4thly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, in other words, his offence was culpable homicide amounting to murder even if he did not intend causing the death of Mst. Rajji. He committed an act so imminently dangerous that it was in all probability likely to cause death or to result in an injury that was likely to cause death. We are accordingly of the opinion that the High Court and the Sessions Judge were both wrong in holding that the offence did not fall within murder. 20. In view of the above enunciation of law, we find that the Trial Court committed no error in convicting the accused/Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, we affirm the finding of conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court. 21. Appeal dismissed.