JUDGMENT Hon'ble Devendra Pratap Singh,J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This petition by the tenant is directed against concurrent orders dated 19.8.2008 and 17.3.2009 by which the release application filed by the respondent landlord under Section 21(1) (a) and (b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (herein after referred to as the 'Act') has been allowed by both the courts below. 3. Admittedly Smt. Shanti Devi (since deceased) was the owner and landlord of shop no.1013/2 Gali Durga Chand, Chauk Bazar, Mathura who filed an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Act against the petitioner who became a tenant after death of his father. On the death of Smt. Shanti Devi, the contesting respondent no.1 became its landlord. The release application was filed inter alia with the allegation that her son, Vijai Singh Verma has been a practising Advocate in the district of Mathura since 1984 and he has been dealing with his clients from the chamber situated in his residential house, but since it was a small chamber having no space for library, clerk etc., the disputed shop was required for opening of his chamber. It was stated that he had a big family of two sons and a daughter and to meet the expenses he had to advance his profession for which he required the said shop. It was further alleged that the shop in dispute is old and in dilapidated condition and she wants to demolish and reconstruct it for which she has the capacity and has also proceeded for sanctioning of map from the Development Authority. The petitioner contested the release application denying the need of the son. It was stated that Sri Vijai Sigh was only an enrolled lawyer and was looking after his personal cases only and in fact was engaged in the business of silver ornaments. It was further stated that he has been operating his lawyer's chamber from a huge hall from the premises situated in Gali Rawaliya Mandi Chowk which is a palatial house. It was further stated that adjacent to the disputed shop, another shop had been vacated by the outgoing tenant Gokul Chand which remained in the possession of the son of the landlady and apart from that rooms on the first floor of the disputed shop were available. It was further stated that adjacent to the disputed shop, another shop had been vacated by the outgoing tenant Gokul Chand which remained in the possession of the son of the landlady and apart from that rooms on the first floor of the disputed shop were available. It was further contended that the disputed shop had a frontage of only 5' and therefore was not fit for chamber. It was further pleaded that the disputed shop was not in a dilapidated condition so as to require demolition and reconstruction. During pendency of the case, Smt. Shanti Devi died, whereupon Vijay Singh became sole owner and landlord. After the parties led their evidence, the application was allowed by both the courts below on the ground that the landlord required the disputed accommodation for his chamber which he proposes to build after demolishing the present shop and the adjacent vacant shop. 4. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that both the courts below completely failed to take into consideration that the landlord had not approached the Court with clean hands in as much as he had suppressed the availability of the vacant adjacent shop and purposely did not disclose the measurement of the chamber which he was operating since two decades. 5. The Courts below have found that Sri Vijai Singh had been practising in the District Courts since 1984. Admittedly the release application was filed in 2005. So, it is apparent, that he had been functioning from the chamber situated in his building at Rawaliya Mandi Chowk for the last 20 years. It is evident from the record that the need was to set up a lawyer's chamber at the disputed shop but there was no mention about the availability of the adjacent vacant shop. Admittedly the landlord was in possession of the shop vacated by Gokul Chand. It was not their case in the release application that the landlord wanted to remove the partition wall between the two shops and utilise it for the chamber. Only when it was disclosed in the written statement, the need was changed by an affidavit in 2007 much long after filing of the release application. Further, no reason is forthcoming except bald statement that the chamber which the son had been operating for the last about 20 years, how it had become too small for his practice now. Only when it was disclosed in the written statement, the need was changed by an affidavit in 2007 much long after filing of the release application. Further, no reason is forthcoming except bald statement that the chamber which the son had been operating for the last about 20 years, how it had become too small for his practice now. It was incumbent upon the landlord to have specifically pleaded and proved reasons which required the shifting of the chamber after 20 years. It had to be proved by substantial evidence that existing chamber was small in comparison to the disputed shop. However, even the dimensions of the chamber which he operated for the last about 20 years, had not been disclosed throughout the proceeding before the Court below. 'Big' and 'small' are very subjective descriptions. For one, a hall of 12' x 12' may be a small room and for another a room of 10' x 10' may be a big hall. Therefore, it was all the more necessary for the landlord to have come out with clean hands after disclosing the measurement of the chamber already in use and he should have proved by cogent evidence that in the changed circumstances, the said chamber had become too small. In one of the affidavits, the landlord has only given reference to some cases which he says he was conducting but that by itself does not show that his need for a larger chamber was genuine and bonafide. No doubt, the landlord may need the shop for chamber but until and unless he proves that the need was both pressing and genuine, release cannot be allowed. Both the courts below on bald statements merely on the basis of length of practice have presumed that the existing chamber did not fulfil the increased need. 6. No doubt pleadings in a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act need not be strictly construed and the Court can act upon the evidence adduced during the proceedings as held by this court in the case of Jagdish Chandra Chawla Vs. 4th Additional District Judge, Allahabad [1996 (1) ARC 399] and in Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. 9th Additional District Judge [1990 (1) ARC 382]. However, as observed hereinabove, there was no evidence except bald statement that the existing chamber had become small without any proof of the reasons as to how. 7. 4th Additional District Judge, Allahabad [1996 (1) ARC 399] and in Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. 9th Additional District Judge [1990 (1) ARC 382]. However, as observed hereinabove, there was no evidence except bald statement that the existing chamber had become small without any proof of the reasons as to how. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently urged that a lawyer chamber cannot be forced to continue with his chamber established in his residential accommodation and both the courts below have rightly held that he requires a larger chamber and he cannot be forced to continue to operating his chamber from his residence. In support thereof, he has relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Rakesh Kumar Agarwal Vs. 8th Additional District Judge [2006 (4) ARC 789] and the decision in Babu Singh Vs. 13th Additional District Judge [2001 (43) ALR 614]. 8. There cannot be any iota of doubt that the need of a chamber for a lawyer is genuine. He should have enough space for library and clerk as held in Rakesh Kumar's case (Supra). However, the facts in Rakesh Kumar's case were entirely different. In the present case, it is admitted to the respondent that he has been running his chamber for the last about 20 years from the date of filing of the release application at his resident and he has set up a need that now the chamber which he has been using is not sufficient for his increased need. But, as already found, he has miserably failed to prove this fact by any evidence. Merely by saying that the present chamber is falling short of his requirement, would not mean that his need becomes bona fide and genuine especially in the back draw of the fact that the consistent case of the tenant had been that the landlord was only enrolled does not an advocate but in fact was looking after a shop dealing with silverware. 9. So far as the case of Babu Singh (Supra) is concerned, the facts are also entirely different. In Babu Singh's case the lawyer had pleaded that the privacy of his family members was being jeo pardise by the activities in his chamber which was in his residential house and further he pleaded that it was not sufficient due to enrolling practice that he had. In Babu Singh's case the lawyer had pleaded that the privacy of his family members was being jeo pardise by the activities in his chamber which was in his residential house and further he pleaded that it was not sufficient due to enrolling practice that he had. He also pleaded that he needed a garage also for his car. A perusal of the decision shows that he had proved his requirement by cogent evidence including by filing copies of his income tax return etc. However, in the present case, apart from bald statement no cogent evidence was on record to prove that he needed to shift his chamber to a larger place and the courts below have only acted upon surmises. 10. Thus, none of the two decision support the case of the petitioner. 11. For the reasons above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned orders dated 19.8.2008 and 17.3.2009 are hereby quashed. 12. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.