Judgment :- Sabhahit, J. This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the order dated 28.04.2006 passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, (hereinafter called ‘the Tribunal’), Bangalore, in Application No.5218/2003, rejecting the application and declining to interfere with the order passed by the first respondent – State dated 06.06.2003, wherein de novo enquiry has been ordered against the applicant – petitioner herein by invoking the provisions of Rule 26(c) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, (hereinafter called the ‘KCS (CC & A) Rules’). 2. The petitioner herein joined service in the Health Department of the Government of Karnataka as a Lecturer on 22.07.1982. e was p[rHeGGGGUHHe was promoted as Professor of Forensic Medicine during August 2000. He has worked in Victoria Hospital, Bangalore, and Mysore Medical College Hospital, Mysore. One Mr. Naushad was admitted to Victoria Hospital for treatment of burn injuries on 13.11.2000 and Naushad died due to burn injuries. Smt. Khamar Taj, the mother of Naushad, the deceased through her advocate wrote a letter to the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Victoria Hospital, along with an affidavit stating that the age of her son had been wrongly mentioned as 17 years in the post mortem report instead of 18 ½ years. On the basis of the said letter, the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police wrote to the Professor of Forensic Medicine to make correction with regard to the age of the deceased Naushad in the post mortem report. The Government issued a show cause notice dated 20.03.2001 to the petitioner seeking his explanation as to why he testified the age of the deceased Naushad as 17 years in his post mortem report, though the inpatient slip mentioned the age of the deceased Naushad as 12 years. Being not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the writ petitioner, charges were framed against him and enquiry officer was appointed. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report dated 10.01.2002 stating that the charges against the petitioner had not been proved. The disciplinary authority by the order dated 13.02.2002, accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer exonerating the petitioner of the charges and the petitioner was exonerated of the charges. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report dated 10.01.2002 stating that the charges against the petitioner had not been proved. The disciplinary authority by the order dated 13.02.2002, accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer exonerating the petitioner of the charges and the petitioner was exonerated of the charges. However, on the basis of the letter dated 17.10.2002 received from the Human Rights Commission calling upon the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, to furnish report about exoneration of the petitioner of the charges, the enquiry report was sent to the Human Rights Commission. The Human Rights Commission asked for action taken by the disciplinary authority on the enquiry report and reminder was sent to the Principal Secretary to submit about the follow-up action. Thereafter, the first respondent – State has passed an order on 06.06.2003 ordering de novo enquiry against the petitioner, which is impugned in the application No.5218/2003. 3. The application was resisted by the respondents herein contending that the matter was sensitive and on the basis of the letter received from the Human Rights Commission, power of review under Rule 26(C) of the KCS (CC & A) Rules has been exercised by the Government. 4. The Tribunal, after hearing the counsel for the parties, by order dated 28.04.2006, held that the power of review has been exercised by the first respondent – State in accordance with law and there was no merit in the application and accordingly, dismissed the same by order dated 28.04.2006. Being aggrieved by the same, this writ petition is filed by the applicant before the Tribunal. 5. We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary enquiry. Enquiry report was submitted on 10.01.2002 stating that the charges had not been proved, which was accepted by the Government and he was absolved of the charges. Thereafter, only on the basis of the letter received by the Human Rights Commission, the first respondent, by order dated 06.06.2003, without even notifying the petitioner, has set aside its earlier order dated 13.02.2002 accepting the report of the enquiry officer holding that the charges had not been proved against the petitioner and has ordered de novo enquiry and the same is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the earlier enquiry report, which was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was in favour of the writ petitioner, could not have been set aside by the first respondent – State while exercising the power of review, without giving opportunity to the writ petitioner. Even otherwise, exercise of power of review by the first respondent – State was not justified as the said power has been exercised at the dictate of the Human Rights Commission and no ground whatever was made out for review of the order dated 13.02.2002. 7. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that though the enquiry report was submitted on 10.01.2002 holding that charges had not been proved against the petitioner and inquiry report was accepted, in view of the letter received from the Human Rights Commission calling for report from the first respondent – State, the order dated 13.02.2002 has been reviewed and by order dated 06.06.2003, de novo enquiry has been ordered against the petitioner and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is justified. 8. We have given careful consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinized the material on record. 9. The material on record would clearly show that the writ petitioner had conducted post mortem examination over the dead body is Naushad, who died due to burn injuries and in the post mortem report dated 14.10.2000, he had recorded the age of the deceased Naushad as 17 years. The age mentioned by the petitioner in the post mortem report was contrary to the records pertaining to admission of Naushad in the hospital, which showed that he was aged 12 years. A detailed enquiry was held and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 10.01.2002 holding that the charges against the petitioner had not been proved. The said report, which was in favour of the petitioner has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and the petitioner has been exonerated of the charges by order dated 13.02.2002. A detailed enquiry was held and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 10.01.2002 holding that the charges against the petitioner had not been proved. The said report, which was in favour of the petitioner has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and the petitioner has been exonerated of the charges by order dated 13.02.2002. However, the first respondent – State, by order dated 06.06.2003, has ordered de novo enquiry by setting aside the enquiry report dated 10.01.2002, wherein it was held that the charges against the petitioner had not been proved and the order of the first respondent – State dated 13.02.2002, wherein the enquiry report was accepted by the disciplinary authority and the petitioner was exonerated of the charges. It is not disputed by the respondents that no opportunity whatever was granted to the writ petitioner before taking action against him by ordering de novo enquiry and by setting aside the earlier enquiry report, which was in his favour and was accepted by the disciplinary authority and on the basis of which, he was exonerated of the charges by order dated 13.02.2002. Therefore, admittedly, the order dated 06.06.2003 ordering de novo enquiry against the petitioner would affect the conditions of service of the petitioner and could not have been passed, without affording opportunity to the petitioner to show cause as to why the enquiry report dated 10.01.2002, which was in his favour and accepted by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 13.02.2002, wherein, he was exonerated of the charges, should not be set aside and de novo enquiry should not be held against him, in exercise of power of review by the first respondent – State. Therefore, the order dated 06.06.2003 is passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. In exercise of the principles governing the power of review, no order could be passed against a person without affording opportunity to him to show cause as to why an order, which was in his favour should not be set aside and a fresh enquiry has to be ordered. In exercise of the principles governing the power of review, no order could be passed against a person without affording opportunity to him to show cause as to why an order, which was in his favour should not be set aside and a fresh enquiry has to be ordered. The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the power of review exercised by the first respondent – State is justified, without considering the question as to whether the said order dated 06.06.2003 could be passed, without affording opportunity to the petitioner before setting aside the enquiry report submitted on 10.01.2002 and the order of the first respondent accepting the report and exoneration of the petitioner of the charges dated 13.02.2002. Therefore, we hold that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside and the writ petition is entitled to be allowed. Accordingly, we pass the following Order:- The Writ Petition is allowed. The order passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore, in Application No.5218/2003 dated 28.04.2006, dismissing the application is set aside and the said application is allowed. The order dated 06.06.2003 passed under Rule 26(C) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, is set aside with liberty to the respondents to take action, if necessary, in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made in this order.