JUDGMENT By Court.-Heard counsel for the parties. 2. These writ petitions are being filed by the petitioners against the orders issued by the designated authority under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (Annexure-9). According to the petitioners, the delineation of interest at Annexure-9 under Section 220(2) of the I.T. Act, is not according to the scheme of KVSS (Ann.exure-5) and therefore the interest part being inclusive, which is not sanctioned by the Scheme, therefore, is liable to be struck down. 3. For brining home his point, learned counsel for the petitioners emphasized that by assessment orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax that after an assessment, as penalty order was passed in the Assessment Year 1991-92 against the petitioner and in that order, a total penalty of Rs. 6,32,781/- was levied against the petitioner. This levy of penalty was upheld by the appellate authority i.e. C.I.T. (Appeals) vide its order dated 11.3.1997 and C.I.T. (Appeals) upheld the penalty as imposed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. According to the petitioner, against the order of rejection of appeal by the C.I.T., the petitioner had gone to the. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and his appeal was pending be. fore the I.T.A.T. On that day, when K.V.S.S. came into force, he made an application to the designated authority to take benefit of the scheme. The case of the petitioner is that the penalty amount alone as determined is the amount of Rs.6,32,781/-. 4. In another orders i.e. the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and the C.I.T. (Appeals), the interest is incorporated, therefore, if the amount which is added as an interest in Annexure-9 could not have been added because such amount cannot be considered to be an amount in terms of the scheme in Section 87(m), which defines "tax arrears" and also under Section 88(a)(iv) and therefore the interest as put in Annexure-9 is liable to be struck down and on that score, the order, at Annexure-9, is bad in the eye of law. 5. Learned counsel supported his contention that Section 88 of the KVSS starts with the computation of the amount payable for non-obstante clause or any of the provisions of the Income Tax Act, are not liable to be taken into consideration at the point of time when the amount payable is to be determined. 6. 5. Learned counsel supported his contention that Section 88 of the KVSS starts with the computation of the amount payable for non-obstante clause or any of the provisions of the Income Tax Act, are not liable to be taken into consideration at the point of time when the amount payable is to be determined. 6. In that view of the matter, learned counsel submits that K.V.S.S. is the self contained code, and no recourse can be held to any of the provisions of the Income Tax, and as such it has been held by the Honoble Supreme Court in the case decided in the matter of Jhunjhunwala & Others vs. State of U.P. reported in 2006 (8) page 196. 7. Learned counsel further submits that anything which is not determined until the date when the K.V.S.S. is promulgated, that amount cannot be said to be an amount due under Section 87(m) of the I.T. Act, and therefore that was not liable to be included in Annexure-9. 8. Further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if two views are possible then one favourable to the assessee is always required to be taken into consideration. Learned counsel further relied upon a case reported in (2006)7 SCC 714 in the case of Sneh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Customs, wherein the Honoble Supreme Court has held in paras 23 & 24, which are as under: 23. It is a trite law that while interpreting the statute. the courts not only may take into consideration the purpose for which the same had been enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. Evidently, with a view to suppress the mischief, if any, Section 76 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, was brought into the statute book. It cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be held that Parliament in. tended to apply the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act in Section 9-A of the Customs Tariff Act, prior to 2004. 24. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "strict interpretation" should be applied. The court shall not interpret the statutory provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden on a person. It would never be done by invoking the provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. 24. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "strict interpretation" should be applied. The court shall not interpret the statutory provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden on a person. It would never be done by invoking the provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are possible, the court ordinarily would interpret the provisions in favour of a taxpayer and against the Revenue. 9. On the strength of the above, learned counsel submits that the inclusion of the interest under Section 220 of the I.T. Act was without jurisdiction and therefore prays that Annexure-9 be quashed, so far as it relates to the inclusion of interest. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent-revenue urged that the concept of the payable tax arrears as contained in Clause (m) of Section 87 of the I.T. Act per se delineates that amount of tax penalty' or interest determined on or before the 31st March, 1988 is the tax arrears. 11. In the instant case, the tax penalty as leviable had already been determined by the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and upheld by the appellate authority and therefore as far as the penalty was concerned, it was a determined fact. Once the penalty is determined in the year 1995 and if it is not paid as stipulated under Section 220 of the Income Tax Act, as and when such assessed penalty is not paid, then Section 220 of the Income Tax Act delineates in sub-section (2) that a demand which has been raised, if remains unpaid within a period as prescribed under sub-section (1), the assessee becomes liable to pay simple interest of 1 % for every month as delineated in Section 220. Such charging is automatic as not having been paid after the demand having been made to the assessee. Once the demand was challenged before the Assistant Commissioner of Income Taxes and the demand was modified to Rs. Such charging is automatic as not having been paid after the demand having been made to the assessee. Once the demand was challenged before the Assistant Commissioner of Income Taxes and the demand was modified to Rs. 6,32,781/-, that should be considered to be determined and that demand having been made after the case having been decided by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, the demand became an invariable demand payable and in terms of Section 220 when the demand was not paid, the interest starts running and that become tax arrears, and it was an amount which was accumulated until 31st March, 1988, and therefore it cannot be said that the amount which has been added as interest is not the tax arrears. 12. Learned counsel for the revenue further asserted that in terms of Section . 88(a)(iv) of the I.T. Act what is payable is interest payable or penalty levied both and in that view of the matter, Section 88 which is non-obstante clause says that the amount payable under the scheme by the declarant shall be determined at the rates specified, therefore Section 88 only delineates the rates and it does not say that what should be determined. The determination of the tax arrears has to be under Clause (m) of Section 87 and the non-obstante clause is only for the purpose of specifying rates and the rates as per the tax arrears and penalty in this case are 50% and this is not the case of the petitioners that anything beyond 50% arrears of interest or penalty has been levied. His only grievance that the interest could not have been incorporated and that falls to the amount on the simple analogy because after the demand which was originally raised and the challenge to the demand having been enacted by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, the demand became payable and having been made in terms of the proviso made in Section 220, it cannot be said that the interest would not run and could not be challenged beyond 31st March, 1988 until that date what was the interest which accrued on the demand raised shall have to be paid by the assessee. 13. 13. We have considered the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment and we are of the considered view that Section 88 prescribes for the rates at which the charging has to be made on the basis of the arrears of an interest or penalty payable as delineated in Clause 4 of sub-clause (a) of Section 88 and to that extent there is no .challenge by the petitioner that anything beyond 50% has been charged from him but interest could not have been charged at all. 14. In our considered opinion, this is a misconceived argument because tax arrears amounts any amount of tax, penalty or interest which was determined on or before 31st March, 1988. As far as petitioner is concerned in his case the penalty was determined in 1995 and in terms of Section 220 of the Income Tax Act the interest started running and the interest as culminated on 31st March, 1988 has been charged, which is included in Annexure-9. In that view of the matter, the argument of the learned counsel that the excess levy has been made is not sustainable. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if two views are possible then one favourable to the assessee is to be taken into consideration. There can be no dispute of this proposition, but since we have taken a view that the tax arrears as delineated in Section 87(m) as a clear concept about the due amount there are no two views are accepted. 15. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application for decision in his favour of this petition. In that view of the matter, the petition being merit less and is accordingly dismissed.