Judgment BHAGWATI PRASAD, J. These two appeals which are being decided by this common judgment, are filed against the decision in Company Application No. 1 of 2009 in Company Application No. 648 of 2008 rendered by learned Company Judge by oral judgment dated 7-8-2009, 26-8-2009, 28-8-2009 & 31-8-2009. One appeal i.e. Appeal No. 67 of 2009 has been filed by Mafatlal Denim Limited hich was the applicant before the Company Judge and another Appeal i.e. Appeal No. 109 of 2009 has been filed by SICOM Limited which was original respondent No. 1 before .learned Company Judge. The question which was raised before learned Single Judge was where there is an action under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "S.F.C. Act") and under Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "R.D.B. Act"), can the Company Court exercise powers under Sec. 391(6) of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to "Act of 1956") pending application under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 and stay the proceedings initiated under R. D. B. Act and S. F. C. Act pending before the respective judicial forums? 2. The applicant before learned Single Judge Mafatlal Denin Limited availed various loans from different Banks and Financial Institutions which includes AXIS Bank, EXIM Bank and SICOM Limited. The outstanding dues of all these three institutions payable by the appellant as on 4-2-2009, the date on which the meeting of the secured creditors was held pursuant to the orders of learned Company Judge, were as follows (a) SICOM Limited Rs. 3,057 lakh (b) AXIS Bank Ltd. Rs. 6,922 lakh (c) EXIM Bank Rs. 2,626 lakh 3. The appellant-Company having defaulted in making the payment to the Banks and Financial Institutions it felt that the loans are required to be restructured. For that purpose, a Scheme was required to be framed under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956. For that matter an application was contemplated before the Company Court. While the Company Court was being considered to be moved by Company for getting the Scheme sanctioned by the Company Court under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956, SICOM Limited issued a demand notice dated 18-7-2008 calling upon the appellant-Company to pay the amounts due to it amounting to Rs. While the Company Court was being considered to be moved by Company for getting the Scheme sanctioned by the Company Court under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956, SICOM Limited issued a demand notice dated 18-7-2008 calling upon the appellant-Company to pay the amounts due to it amounting to Rs. 1,61,74,750/- on or before 25-7 - 2008 and vide this notice this was also informed to the appellant Company that failing to make the payment, it would be compelled to take action which may be available in law including action under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act. 4. The Company Court vide order dated 26-12-2008 ordered that a meeting of the secured creditors be held on 4-2-2009 for considering the proposed Scheme. The appellant-Company also preferred an application on 31-12-2008 under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. This application was preferred apprehending that though the meeting as per the orders of the Company Court passed on 26-12-2008 will be held, SICOM Limited may take action in pursuance of its notice dated 18-7-2008 against the mortgaged and hypothecated assets. On this application, learned Company Judge issued notice and made it returnable on 19-1-2009. On 2-1-2009 learned Company Judge passed order that SICOM Limited, one of the secured creditors of the appellant-Company, is restrained from taking possession of any property or assets of the appellant Company in exercise of authority under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act. A further condition was put on the appellant-Company that it shall not create any interest or encumbrance or charge, in any manner, over the assets and property until finalization of the Scheme under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956. It was further ordered that status quo in relation to all assets and property shall be maintained. 5. The meeting of the secured creditors of the appellant-Company is claimed to have been held on 4-2-2009 pursuant to the orders of learned Company Judge dated 26-12-2008. In the said meeting, the Scheme proposing reconstruction of debts was approved with certain modifications (as compared to the draft Scheme) by the required statutory majority. The sole dissenter was SICOM Limited who had raised objections against the Scheme stating that the Scheme was not acceptable to it and it proposed to oppose the Scheme, if and when presented for sanction. 6. The sole dissenter was SICOM Limited who had raised objections against the Scheme stating that the Scheme was not acceptable to it and it proposed to oppose the Scheme, if and when presented for sanction. 6. While the application was pending before learned Company Judge, SICOM Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the objector") issued a further notice on 16-1-2009 recalling the entire principal amount together with interest which fell due against the appellant-Company. On 23-1-2009 the objector filed an affidavit-in-reply objecting to the prayer which was sought for under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 by stating that the application under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 was not maintainable and that the objector was not in favour of the Scheme. 7. In the meanwhile, there came another notice issued by the objector on 29-1-2009 informing the appellant-Company that they have decided to take over possession of the assets mortgaged/hypothecated to it to recover the dues as mentioned in the recall notice dated 16-1-2009. The further development was that the objector during the proceeding and hearing of the application, informed the Court that on 29-1-2009 the objector has filed an application under Sec. 19 read with Sec. 17 of the R.D.B. Act and has put the proceedings in motion before the Debts Recovery Tribunal ("D.R.T." for short) at Mumbai. 8. The appellant-Company has claimed that during the meeting on 4-2-2009 the proposed Scheme having been accepted by statutory majority as prescribed under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956, Company Petition No. 34 of 2009 in Company Application No. 648 of 2008 has been presented and it was prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to sanction the Scheme and it was also prayed that proceedings for recovery initiated by the objector be stayed. This was opposed by the objector that the relief prayed for under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 be not granted to the appellant Company. 9. Learned Company Judge, after hearing the rival submissions, decided the objection of the objector with regard to the application under Sec. 391 of Act of 1956 and held that such application would be maintainable. In this regard learned Company Judge has observed that a learned Single Judge of this Court had already taken a view in the matter of Re. Learned Company Judge, after hearing the rival submissions, decided the objection of the objector with regard to the application under Sec. 391 of Act of 1956 and held that such application would be maintainable. In this regard learned Company Judge has observed that a learned Single Judge of this Court had already taken a view in the matter of Re. Core Health Care Ltd., reported in 2007 (79) SCL 47 that application under Sec. 391 read with Sec. 394 would be maintainable. It was also observed that application under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 is not limited the Scheme for restructuring debt. In that view of the matter, being bound by a Coordinate Bench Judgment, application under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 was held maintainable despite the objection raised by the objector. It was also held that an application under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 would also be maintainable as the application under Sec. 391 (1) of the Act of 1956 is maintainable, if circumstances so required. Learned Company Judge has further held that scope of application is separate issue than its maintainability because there may arise a question that an order may not be feasible in view of the action of the objector under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act and proceedings under Sec. 19 of the R.D.B. Act. Learned Company Judge further observed that a stay as prayed for is not available automatically or mechanically on presentation of an application, but such order is left to the discretion of the Court and the Court has to decide each case judiciously and on its own facts and merits. 10. Learned Company Judge proceeded to decide the merits of the application under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 and observed at paragraph No. 9.3 of the judgment as under: "That the intention and policy of the Legislature with regard to Sec. 391 (6) of the 1956 Act is to enable the Company Court to consider the Scheme, and thereby, the desire of the statutory majority, and to independently decide what is in the best interest of the Company and to empower the Company Court to stay, when it may be necessary and justified, the commencement and continuation of such suits and proceedings on such terms and conditions as may be necessary and appropriate, until the application is disposed of." 11. It was further held by learned Company Judge in Paragraph Nos. 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10 which are reproduced hereinafter: "Para 9.7 - At such times competing situation and/or overlapping or conflict between the two proceedings under the two statutes arises, i.e. the question as to which one can have precedence over the other, arises. It would be so for the reason that the creditor F.I. would want its application before the D.R.T. decided expeditiously and as per the Scheme and time frame provided under Sec. 19, whereas the debtor-Company would urge that in exercise of the power under Sec. 39 1(6) the Company Court may stay the commencement of suit or proceeding while the application, and thereby, the Scheme, under Sec. 391 read with Sec. 394 can be examined by the Company Court. Para 9.8 - The Legislature has, so as to make its intention clear and to emphasise the aforesaid object of the R. D.B. Act, made provision by incorporating Sec. 34 in R. D. B. Act, which ordinarily, would take care of such situation. By this non-obstante clause, the provisions of R.D.B. Act, including Secs. 17 to 19 have been granted overriding effect. The said provision reads thus : 34. Act to have over-riding effect :- (1) Save as provided under sub sec. (2), the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (63 of 1951), the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984 (62 of 1984), the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986). Para 9.9 - The extent of the primacy that the Legislature intended to confer on the R.D.B. Act and particularly on Sees. 17 to 20, 25 and 28 thereof is evident and becomes clear also from the conjoint reading of the provisions under Sees. 18 and 17 which, by cumulative effect, mandate that the D.R.T. shall have plenary and exclusive jurisdiction. 17 to 20, 25 and 28 thereof is evident and becomes clear also from the conjoint reading of the provisions under Sees. 18 and 17 which, by cumulative effect, mandate that the D.R.T. shall have plenary and exclusive jurisdiction. The said Sections read thus : 'Section 18 - Bar of jurisdiction: On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Sec. 17. Section 17 - Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunal : (1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the Banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such Banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act. " Para 9.10 - Thus, as per Sec. 18 no Court or authority will, after enactment of R.D.B. Act, have any power or any authority and any Court or authority will not be entitled to exercise any authority or power in the matters pertaining to and incidental and/or ancillary to the recovery of debts of F.I's. when any application under Sec. 19 read with Sec. 17 is being considered by the D. R. T. Further, Sec. 19 prescribes, in detail, exhaustive procedure for deciding the application. The procedure required to be followed for this purpose has been exhaustively laid down in Sees. 17 to 20 and Sees. 25 to 28 which, conjointly and collectively constitute a complete Code in itself. Therefore, a conjoint reading of Sees. 17, 18 and 19 read with Sees. 25 to 28 of R.D.B. Act paints clear picture of the policy and intention of Legislature which is highlighted by Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act." 11.1. 17 to 20 and Sees. 25 to 28 which, conjointly and collectively constitute a complete Code in itself. Therefore, a conjoint reading of Sees. 17, 18 and 19 read with Sees. 25 to 28 of R.D.B. Act paints clear picture of the policy and intention of Legislature which is highlighted by Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act." 11.1. Learned Company Judge has further considered the following decisions in his judgment : (1) Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujarat, 2003 (12) SCC 274 (2) Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council, 2006 (8) see 677 (3) N.G.E.F. Ltd. v. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd., 2005 (8) see 219 (4) M/s. Bakemans Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. New Cawnpore Flour Mills, 2008 (6) AllMR 463 (5) Tata Motors Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd., 2008 (7) SCC 619 (6) Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., 1993 (2) SCC 144 12. Learned Company Judge, after having considered in details, various judgments cited at the Bar and the arguments, held in Paragraph No. 11 which reads as under : "Hence, in view of the fact that the R.D.B. Act is a special statute as compared to 1956 Act and is also a latter statute as against the 1956 Act and is also conferred with non-obstante clause, the R. D. B. Act would override the provisions of 1956 Act. However, in view of the applicant's contention that the 1956 Act operates in different field as against the S. F. C. Act and/ or R.D.B. Act, occasion of R.D.B. Act overriding the 1956 Act does not arise, the question, which comes out is whether overlapping or conflict may arise between statutes which may be operating in different fields." 13. Learned Company Judge has further proceeded to consider various decisions and held as under : "Para 11(a) - While considering the controversy which arose in light of the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Apex Court has, in the case between M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 , held that : "7. It is true that in both the Acts there is a non-obstante clause but the question to be determined is whether the non-obstante clauses operate in the same field or have two different spheres though there may be some amount of overlapping..... 8. In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases, we would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned, it operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is .to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. 9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Sec. 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Sec. 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Sec. 25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act." (Emphasis supplied) In the said judgment, although the Apex Court noticed that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act, the Apex Court held that the Premises Act being Special Act would override the provisions of the Rent Act. 11.1 (b) - Subsequently, in the judgment in the case between Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 , it has been observed that : This indicates that the object underlying the Rent Control Act is to make provisions for expeditious adjudication of dispute between the landlords and tenants, determination of standard rent payable by tenants and giving protection against eviction to tenants. The premises belonging to the Government are excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act which means that the Act has been enacted primarily to regulate the private relationship between landlords and tenants with a view to confer benefits on the tenants and at the same time to balance the interest of the landlords by providing for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenant. The Apex Court further observed that : This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted to deal with mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of public premises by providing a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. In order to secure this object the said Act prescribed the time period for the various steps which are required to be taken for securing eviction of the persons in unauthorised occupation. The object underlying the enactment is to safeguard public interest by making available for public use premises belonging to Central Government. Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest, Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse of such premises. (Emphasis supplied) Having thus noticed the objectives of the two statutes, the Apex Court held that : In our opinion, therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose' underlying both the enactments viz., the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. As regards the non-obstante clauses contained in Secs. 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Secs. 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act containing a specific provision in Sec. i4 barring jurisdiction of all Courts (which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act). 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Secs. 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act containing a specific provision in Sec. i4 barring jurisdiction of all Courts (which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act). This indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in spite of the above mentioned provisions contained in the Rent Control Act. (Emphasis supplied) and after having noticed the differences between the two statutes, the Apex Court held that the Public Premises Act would prevail over the Rent Control Act. 11.1(c) - The Hon'ble Apex Court also considered an earlier decision in the case between Kumaon Motor Owners' Union Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 785 wherein also, has recorded in Para 58 that : "58. ...... there was conflict between the provisions contained in Rules 131(2)(gg) and (1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 68B gave overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IV(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act whereas Sec. 43 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, gave overriding effect to the provisions contained in the Defence of India Rules. This Court held that the Defence of India Act was later than the Motor Vehicles Act, and therefore, if there was anything repugnant, the provisions of the later Act should prevail. This Court also looked into object behind the two statutes, namely, Defence of India Act and Motor Vehicles Act and on that basis also it was held that the provisions contained in the Defence of india Rules would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act." (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, after comparing the situation arising in light of provisions of two statutes having different object viz. Defence of India Act and Motor Vehicles Act, the Apex Court held that provisions of Defence of India Act will have overriding effect. Here also the controversy was resolved by considering the object of the statute. Defence of India Act and Motor Vehicles Act, the Apex Court held that provisions of Defence of India Act will have overriding effect. Here also the controversy was resolved by considering the object of the statute. 11.1(d) - In the judgment in the case between Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking & Industrial Company Ltd., AIR 1956 SC 614 , the Apex Court considered the provisions under Banking Companies Act, 1949 & Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951 and held that : On the other hand, if the rule as to the later Act overriding an earlier Act is to be applied to the present case, it is the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, that must be treated as the later Act and held to override the provisions of the earlier Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951. It has been pointed out, however, that Sec. 13, Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, uses the phrase 'notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time-being in force' and it was suggested that this phrase is wide enough to relate even to a future Act if in operation when the overriding effect has to be determined. But it is to be noted that Sec. 45A, Banking Companies Act has also exactly the same phrase. What the connotation of the phrase, 'for the time being is and which is to prevail when there are two provisions like the above each containing the same phrase, are questions which are not free from difficulty. It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. (Emphasis supplied) The Hon'ble Apex Court has thus held that it is desirable to determine the overriding effect in light of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the intention conveyed by the language. 11.1(e) - In the judgment in the case between Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fair growth Financial Services Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 958 the Apex Court considered the provisions under Special Act (Trial of Offence Relating to Transactions and Securities) Act, 1992 vis-a-vis the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986, and held that : "9. 11.1(e) - In the judgment in the case between Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fair growth Financial Services Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 958 the Apex Court considered the provisions under Special Act (Trial of Offence Relating to Transactions and Securities) Act, 1992 vis-a-vis the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986, and held that : "9. It is clear that both these Acts are special Acts. This Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that in such an event it is the later Act which must prevail." In the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of the provisions of the two statutes and observed that : The whole aim of these provisions is to ensure that monies which are siphoned off from Banks and financial institutions into private pockets are returned to the Banks and financial institutions. The time and manner of distribution is to be decided by the Special Court only. Under Sec. 22 of the 1985 Act, recovery proceedings can only be with the consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or the Appellate Authority under that Act. The Legislature being aware of the provisions of Sec. 22 under the 1985 Act still empowered only the Special Court under the 1992 Act to give directions to recovery and to distribute the assets of the notified persons in the manner set out under Sec. 11 (2) of the 1992 Act. This can only mean that the Legislature wanted the provisions of Sec. 11 (2) of the 1992 Act to prevail over the provisions of any other law including those of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. (Emphasis supplied) Having noticed the provisions under the two statutes, the Apex Court further observed that : It is clear that the Legislature intended that public monies should be recovered first even from sick companies. Provided the sick company was in a position to first pay back the public money, there would be no difficulty in reconstruction. The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction whilst considering the scheme for reconstruction has to keep in mind the fact that it is to be paid off or directed by the Special Court. The Special Court can, if it is convinced, grant time or instalments. The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction whilst considering the scheme for reconstruction has to keep in mind the fact that it is to be paid off or directed by the Special Court. The Special Court can, if it is convinced, grant time or instalments. There can, therefore, be no stay of any proceedings for recovery against a sick company so far as the Special Court under the 1992 Act is concerned. (Emphasis supplied) In the said judgment, it is further observed that : The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, provides in Sec. 13, that its provisions are to prevail over any other Act. Being a later enactment, it would prevail over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Had the Legislature wanted to exclude the provisions of the Sick Companies Act from the ambit of the said Act, the Legislature would have specifically so provided. The fact that the Legislature did not specifically so provide necessarily means that the Legislature intended that the provisions of the said Act were to prevail even over the provisions of the Sick Companies Act. 11.1 (t) - In the case between Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (supra) the Apex Court referred to the judgment in the case between 1. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1170 and observed in Paragraph 51 of the judgment that.: The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of man and the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another TO only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier directions should have effect." 14. Having discussed the implications of the arguments and various decisions which were cited at the Bar, learned Company Judge has delineated his findings as under : "13.6(a) - The R.D.B. Act is a special and also a latter statute vis-a-vis the 1956 Act. Having discussed the implications of the arguments and various decisions which were cited at the Bar, learned Company Judge has delineated his findings as under : "13.6(a) - The R.D.B. Act is a special and also a latter statute vis-a-vis the 1956 Act. 13.6(b) - Besides the aforesaid two crucial aspects the R.D.B. Act is also conferred with non-obstante clause which even otherwise, gives overriding effect to the provisions whereas the 1956 Act is a general and earlier statute. 13.6(c) - It is also pertinent that by virtue of the provision in Sec. 1 (4) the Legislature has set pecuniary jurisdiction for the Tribunal which provides that the Tribunal will exercise jurisdiction in those matters where the claim is of more than Rs. 10 lacs. The Legislature has, thus, placed such claims/ dues of F. Is. in a different league and thereby, conferred extra priority to all direct and incidental or ancillary matters connected with the adjudication and the recovery of the dues of F.Is. 13.6(d) - By enacting the R.D.B. Act and inserting Sec. 18 and the non-obstante clause (Sec. 34) even while the Sec. 391(6) existed, the Legislature has created an exception qua the exercise of power under Sec. 391(6) by the Company Court or placed the matters of the dues of F.Is. outside the reach of Company Court's power under Sec. 391(6). 13.6(e) - Section 391(6) is not framed in the same manner or with similar scope and effect i.e. it is not as wide and sharp as Sec. 22 of S.I.C.A. or even Sec. 446 or Sec. 537 of the 1956 Act. 13.6(f) - The R.D.B. Act came to be enacted and brought in force w.e.f 27-8-1993 i.e. after the 1956 Act which contains, by virtue of sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 391, the power to stay the commencement or continuation of any suit or proceedings against the Company and yet the provisions under Secs. 18 and 19 and Sec. 34 came to be incorporated in the R.D.B. Act in 1993 and the R.D.B. Act came to be further amended in 1995 (by Act 28 of 1995) and then in 2000 (by Act 1 of 2000) when sub-sec. (19) of Sec. 19 also came to be added and still the said provision i.e. sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 391 of the 1956 is not included in the purview of (2) of Sec. 34 of R.D.B. Act. (19) of Sec. 19 also came to be added and still the said provision i.e. sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 391 of the 1956 is not included in the purview of (2) of Sec. 34 of R.D.B. Act. Differently put, despite the fact that the provision under Sec. 391 (6) was in existence at the time of enactment of Secs. 18, 19 and 34 of R.D.B. Act, the Sec. 391(6) is not taken under the protective umbrella of Sec. 34(2) and it is not saved, like the other six statutes which have found place in sub-sec. (2), from the effect of the provisions of R.D.B. Act and its overriding effect. 13.6(g) - From the non-inclusion Sec. 391(6) of the 1956 Act in the list of the statutes included in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 34 coupled with the exclusion of the entire family of Secs. 391 to 394, particularly Sec. 391(6) from Sec. 19 (though Sec. 529A has been included in the fold of Sec. 19(19) of the Act) and/or sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 34 it is clear that though the Legislature was aware about Sec. 391(6) it still conferred plenary powers on D.R.T. and also provided Secs. 17 to 19 and 34 therein. This also discloses that the Legislature wanted the said provisions of R.D.B. Act to prevail and if the Legislature did not want the said provisions to prevail, it would have so provided in the R.D.B. Act. In Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fair growth Financial Services Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has observed : "Where there are two special statutes which contain non-obstante clauses the later statute must prevail. This is because. at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non-obstante clause. If the Legislature still confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause it means that the Legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. If the Legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it would and would provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment continue to apply. (Emphasis supplied). 13.6(h) - The later enactment of the R.D.B. Act and provision in the nature of Sec. 18 and Sec. 34(c) read with the statement of Objects and Reasons) are the clear pointers of the Legislature's intention to ensure elimination of the mischief it felt acute viz. (Emphasis supplied). 13.6(h) - The later enactment of the R.D.B. Act and provision in the nature of Sec. 18 and Sec. 34(c) read with the statement of Objects and Reasons) are the clear pointers of the Legislature's intention to ensure elimination of the mischief it felt acute viz. the delays (including procedural) in adjudication, working out of priorities and recovery of dues of Banks/F.Is." 15. In his ultimate conclusion, learned Company Judge has found as under : "To my mind when the Legislature enacts, with a specific object and policy, a statute and creates a special forum thereunder and confers exclusivity to the forum, then the Courts have to not only give effect but also precedence to such special intention and policy of the Legislature and the objective of the statute. Hence, the exclusivity of the D.R.T's. jurisdiction in the matters relating to adjudication, working out of priorities and execution of recovery and all incidental and ancillary matters and its plenary power to prescribe and regulate its procedure has to be given precedence over the general principle. Sec. 391(6) cannot cast its shadow on the proceedings before the D.R.T. and cannot stay the proceedings otherwise it would result into Company Court truncating the powers of D.R.T. and regulating D.R.T's. proceedings. " 16. The aforesaid discussion summarized pertains to the implication of the R.D.B. Act and in its later part of the judgment learned Company Judge considered the questions in relation to the proceedings under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act and relying on certain decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that while the proceeding under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act has not been considered appropriate to be stayed appropriate even under Sec. 226 of the Constitution of India, learned Company Judge has observed at Paragraph No. 16.16 thus: "Consequently. I am inclined to hold, in light of earlier discussion with regard to the scope and effect of lion-obstante clause that when the Legislature has, in the public interest, conferred such special power on the Corporation coupled with a provision having non-obstante clause, it would not be in consonance with the provisions or the legislative policy to hold that such exercise of the statutory right under Sec. 29 can be interfered with by the Company Court in exercise of the power under Sec. 391(6)." 17. Learned Counsel for the appellant-Company has relied on various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to bring home the points canvassed by him. 18. The mainstay of the arguments of learned Counsel for the appellant Company was: (a) that the Court has to consider whether the provisions of Sec. 391 and the provisions of S.F.C. Act and R.D.B. Act operate and occupy the same field so as to determine the question of implied repeal of the former Act by the latter. (b) The Court has to further consider whether there is conflict in the two Acts which will have to be resolved. The arguments were addressed at great length and written submissions have also been filed in which the appellant-Company has submitted that the following questions are required to be determined : (i) The provisions of special Act will override the provisions of General Act. (ii) The provisions of a later Act will override the provision of an earlier. (iii) Whether later enactment having a non-obstante (such as Sec. 34 of R.D.B. Act and Sec. 46B of S.F.C. Act) will override the provisions of prior enactments, the following questions need to be answered first : (a) Whether there is a direct conflict between the provisions of the two enactments? (b) Whether Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law? (c) Whether the two laws occupy the same field? If there is a "direct conflict" between two provisions and they cannot stand together on harmonious construction, only then the Court has to decide which will prevail. If there is no direct conflict, the Court will then have to see whether the later Act is enacted to lay down an exhaustive Code as the subject-matter replacing the earlier Act or whether two Acts occupy the same field. For determining this, the Court may consider the object and purpose of the Act. In any event, unless the Court answers any of three questions in the affirmative, there is no question of considering whether later/ special Act will prevail over the prior/General Act or there is no question of considering the effect of the overriding provision/non-obstante clause. This Court will, therefore, have to consider : (i) Whether there is any direct conflict between the provisions of Secs. This Court will, therefore, have to consider : (i) Whether there is any direct conflict between the provisions of Secs. 391 to 394 of the Companies Act on the one hand and the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act on the other hand. (ii) Whether the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act (Sec. 29) lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter of Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 of the Companies Act. (iii) Whether the provisions of Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 of the Companies Act on the one hand and the provisions of the R. D. B. Act/S. F. C. Act on the other hand occupy the same field. The question is not whether the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act generally override all the provisions of the Companies Act. To illustrate reliance is placed on the decision in the matter of Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that R.D.B. Act will override only Sees. 442, 446 and 557 of the Companies Act and not the whole of the Companies Act. There is no dispute that winding-up petition under Sees. 433 and 434 of the Companies Act for winding-up of the Company is certainly maintainable even when proceedings before the D. R. T. are pending because there is no conflict between Sees. 433 and 434 of the Companies Act and the provisions of R.D.B. Act. The relevant judgments on which reliance is placed by the appellant for the aforesaid propositions are: (i) Municipal Council, Palai v. T. I. Joseph, AIR 1962 SC 1561 (ii) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shankar, 1971 (1) SCC 442 (iii) Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujarat, 2003 (12) SCC 274 (iv) Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council, 2006 (8) SCC 677 . 18.1. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions of the Companies Act and the provisions of R. D. B. Act and S. F. C. Act do not occupy the same field, and therefore, it cannot be said that this would have the tendency of overlapping each other. 18.1. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions of the Companies Act and the provisions of R. D. B. Act and S. F. C. Act do not occupy the same field, and therefore, it cannot be said that this would have the tendency of overlapping each other. The provisions of the R.D.B. Act and the S. F. C. Act are, in fact, to effect recovery by the substitution of the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure which was lengthy one and there is no provision in any of the Acts R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act covering the aspect dealt with Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 of the Act of 1956 for modification of the rights and contracts between the parties. R.D.B. Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the D.R.T. only in respect of : (i) the adjudication of the claim of banks and financial institutions; (ii) the enforcement thereof, and (iii) to determine the priorities inter se between the Banks, financial institutions and workers (Sees. 17, 18 & 19 of the R.D.B. Act). 19. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that R.D.B. Act does not give any jurisdiction to the D.R.T. to effect a compromise between the debtor-Bank/financial institution and the creditor as is conferred by Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 of the Act of 1956 upon the High Court. According to learned Counsel, the R.D.B. Act or S.F.C. Act does not in any manner lay down any exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter under Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 of the Act of 1956. Thus, there is no question of considering any overriding effect of Sees. 17, 18, 34 of the R.D.B. Act or Sec. 29 and Sec. 46B of the S.F.C. Act over Sec. 391 to Sec. 394 including Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. Learned Counsel has tried to explain in his written submission the impact of certain decisions which have been considered by learned Company Judge in the following terms : (i) Kumaon Motor Owners' Union Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 785 : The Court has affirmatively held that there is an apparent conflict between Sec. 43 of the Defence of India Act and Sec. 68B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, read with Sec. 6(4) thereof. It is thereafter that Court considers that the Defence of India Act is special statute passed to meet an emergency arising out of Chinese invasion in 1962 and would, therefore, prevail. (Paras 12 and 14). (ii) Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. Life Insurance Corporation, AIR 1981 SC 670 It is evident from the facts that not only there is direct conflict between the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupancy Act) but they occupy the same field qua public premises and the Public Premises Act is exhaustive Code qua their eviction. The Court holds that there is direct conflict between Slums Areas (Improvements and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Public Premises Act. (iii) Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, AIR 1977 SC 265 : The Supreme Court while considering the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (as amended in 1975) & Slums Areas (Improvements and Clearance) Act, 1956, has in fact held when two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non-obstante clause, the later Act will prevail. (Paras 20, 21 & 22) (iv) Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 : In this judgment again the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act have been compared with Public Premises Act and it has been held that both occupy the same field and there is a conflict between the two procedure. Consequently, later will prevail. (Paras 40 and 61). (v) Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 958 : The Supreme Court has after considering in details the provisions of Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 enacted after the Harshad Mehta scam, gave a finding that there is a direct conflict between S.I.C.A. and the Special Courts Act. It is in this context that the Special Courts Act has been considered to override S.I.C.A. 20. R.D.B. Act vis-a-vis Secs. 442, 446 and 537 of the Act of 1956 :- The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, 2000 (4) SCC 406 deals only with the conflict between Sees. 442, 446 and 537 of the Act of 1956 vis-a-vis the provisions of the R.D.B. Act. No other provisions, much less Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 have been even remotely considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 442, 446 and 537 of the Act of 1956 vis-a-vis the provisions of the R.D.B. Act. No other provisions, much less Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 have been even remotely considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is in this context of the above referred provisions (i. e. Sees. 442, 446 and 537) of the Act of 1956 that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that the provisions of the R.D.B. Act will prevail over the said provisions only and not the entire Companies Act. In doing so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that the D. R. T. has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of adjudication, execution and distribution of the sale proceeds and working out priorities as between banking and financial institutions and other creditors of the Company so far as the money realized under the R.D.B. Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has nowhere observed that under the R.D.B. Act, D.R.T. has exclusive jurisdiction on all issues - i.e. issues falling under Secs. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956. In fact, the R.D.B. Act does not cover the issue of proposing the Scheme (as contemplated under Secs. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956) and sanction thereof. In the circumstances, there is no conflict between the R.D.B. Act and the Companies Act vis-a-vis Secs. 391 to 394 thereof. In fact, in the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala, 2009 (4) SCC 94 , while considering the issue regarding conflict between the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act and Kerala General Sales Tax Act vis-a-vis the overriding effect of R.D.B. Act and the Securitization Act in view of Secs. 34 and 35 of the said Acts respectively, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the judgment of Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (supra) and explained that the provisions of R.D.B. Act provide for exclusive jurisdiction only for adjudication, execution and determination of priority and are in no way conflicting with the provisions of the above referred Sales Tax Act. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that where there is no conflict, there is no question of applying the overriding provisions of the R.D.B. Act and the Securitisation Act. In the instant case also : (1) There is no direct cont1ict between Sees. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that where there is no conflict, there is no question of applying the overriding provisions of the R.D.B. Act and the Securitisation Act. In the instant case also : (1) There is no direct cont1ict between Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 on the one hand and the R. D. B. Act or the S. F. C. Act on the other; (2) The R.D.B. Act and the S.F.C. Act do not lay down any exhaustive Code which covers the subject-matter of Secs. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956. The R.D.B. Act is exclusiveness is limited as stated above; and (3) The two laws i.e. on one hand Secs. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 and the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act on the other, do not occupy the same field. 21. In the circumstances, the overriding provisions of the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act would not override in any manner whatsoever the provisions of Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956, which enable the Company to propose a Scheme of compromise/arrangement. 22. Learned Counsel has submitted that in comparing the provisions of Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 with the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, (S.l.C.A.), it is seen that both provide for a scheme of restructuring and would conflict with each other in case the Company is sick as defined under S.I.C.A. It is in these circumstances that the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ashoka Organics v. A.R. C.I.L., 2008 (3) CLJ 61 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Motors Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd., 2008 (7) SCC 619 have taken the view that since S.I.C.A. is an exhaustive Code in respect of sick undertakings and there is a direct conflic between S.I.C.A. on one hand and Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 on the other in respect of the sick Company, the provisions of S.I.C.A. would override the provisions of the Act of 1956. In fact the judgment in the case of Tata Motors Ltd. (supra) clearly establishes that Secs. 391 to 394 are conflicting with S.I.C.A. which provides for a Scheme of restructuring. However, the said provisions of Sees. In fact the judgment in the case of Tata Motors Ltd. (supra) clearly establishes that Secs. 391 to 394 are conflicting with S.I.C.A. which provides for a Scheme of restructuring. However, the said provisions of Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 would not have any conflict with R.D.B. Act or S.F.C. Act as the said R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act do not have any provisions of any nature whatsoever for restructuring the debt of the Company vis-a-vis the Banks and financial institutions. 23. Learned Counsel submitted that this Court in the matter of Core Healthcare v. Nirma Ltd., 2007 (79) SCL 47 and a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court have taken the view that the Scheme under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 is maintainable even if proceedings are pending before the D.R.T. under the R.D.B. Act and that there is no conflict. The objector when confronted with the judgment of Core Healthcare Ltd. (supra) has conceded to this position as observed by learned Single Judge in Paragraph No. 7.2 of the said judgment. 24. In view of the above, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no conflict between Secs. 391(1)/(2) to 394 of the Act of 1956 on the one hand and the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and/or S.F.C. Act on the other hand, and therefore, the Scheme proceedings under Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 are maintainable in spite of pendency of any proceedings before the D.R.T. under the R.D.B. Act. 25. Learned Counsel in his written submission has submitted that the very object of Secs. 391 (1) and (2) would be frustrated, if the Court is not able to restrain a Bank or financial institution from taking any coercive action under R.D.B. Act or S.F.C. Act pending consideration of a (Statutory) Scheme, for by the time the Scheme is considered and sanctioned by the Court, if the mortgaged asset of the appellant-Company is taken possession of and disposed of by SICOM Limited and the very purpose of proposing/ sanctioning the Scheme would stand frustrated. Learned Counsel has drawn strength from the following decisions (i) In Re : Deepika Chit Fund (P) Ltd., 2005 (3) CLJ 151 (AP) (Paras 37-41) (ii) Unreported judgment of this Court in Core Healthcare Ltd. v. State. 26. Learned Counsel has drawn strength from the following decisions (i) In Re : Deepika Chit Fund (P) Ltd., 2005 (3) CLJ 151 (AP) (Paras 37-41) (ii) Unreported judgment of this Court in Core Healthcare Ltd. v. State. 26. Learned Counsel has further submitted that provision of Sec. 391 (6) being only enabling provision it can never be in conflict with any other provision. It only entitles the Court to pass an order whose life would be till the final order is passed under Sec. 391(1) of the Act of 1956. While urging so, the following has been submitted in the written submission in the following terms : "The alleged conflict would depend upon what order is passed. If such is the situation, it cannot be said that the (enabling provision itself is in conflict with any provisions of the R.D.B. Act/S.F.C. Act). No enabling provision which enables the Court to pass an order, can be said to be in conflict with the R.D.B. Act or the S.F.C. Act." 27. Learned Counsel has further submitted that there is an exception carved out in Sec. 14 of the R.D.B. Act which is within the scope of R.D.B. Act and if under this exception the Company Court can issue injunction under Sec. 391 (6) then it would be a travesty of justice. Learned Counsel has further submitted that learned Company Judge has relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions which were decided in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution which is entirely a different domain than the exercise of powers under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956, and therefore, a wrong application of law has been made by learned Company Judge. The purpose and intent of the exercise of power under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 is to enable the Court to pass adequate orders to see that the final order that the Court may pass under Sec. 391 (1) of the Act of 1956 remains implementable. The purpose and intent of the exercise of power under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 is to enable the Court to pass adequate orders to see that the final order that the Court may pass under Sec. 391 (1) of the Act of 1956 remains implementable. Finally, learned Counsel has submitted the following in the written submission : "In the event, the relief under Sec. 391(6) is refused, the Company Petition itself will not survive and the question of considering the Scheme becomes academic, SICOM Limited by its aggressive conduct is trying to pressurize the appellant to pay more/get better terms than the one offered in the Scheme, and thereby, steal a march over the other two secured creditors who constitute more than 75 % and are supporting the Scheme. The refusal of relief under Sec. 391(6) to the appellant, in the facts of the present case, therefore, necessarily means prematurely dismissing the Company Petition itself and rejection of the Scheme." 28. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 while supporting the arguments, submitted that even the provisions of the D.R.T. Act are enabling provisions, and therefore, these enabling provisions cannot come to conflict of the Companies Act. Therefore, the question of conflict being not there, the powers under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956 are liable to be exercised. 29. Per contra, Mr. S. N. Soparkar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for SICOM Limited submitted that learned Company Judge has no jurisdiction to grant relief as prayed for under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. He further submitted that the question of jurisdiction and whether to exercise the same are two distinct questions. The question of jurisdiction depends on the dominating positions of the law which governs the case and according to learned Counsel, under Sec. 17 read with Sec. 19 of the R. D. B. Act has contained Code for the recovery of the debts due to Banks and financial institutions. So also the proceedings under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act has a purpose of realisation of the funds from the defaulting institutions. Learned Counsel has relied on the findings of learned Company Judge in Paragraph Nos. 13, 15 and 16.15 of the judgment. So also the proceedings under Sec. 29 of the S.F.C. Act has a purpose of realisation of the funds from the defaulting institutions. Learned Counsel has relied on the findings of learned Company Judge in Paragraph Nos. 13, 15 and 16.15 of the judgment. Learned Counsel submitted that the legislative Scheme and intention of both the Acts convey that they have primacy over the Companies Act, the reasons are : (a) both contains non-obstante clause, (b) both are special Acts (c) both serve larger, more important and predominant public interest of enabling F.I./S.F.C. to recover its dues as expeditiously as possible. In that sense, the Companies Act is a general piece of legislation prescribing procedures or rights and obligations by or against the Companies in general but these Acts have a larger public interest to sub serve. (d) both acts are complete Codes in themselves. Under the R.D.B. Act, the D.R.T. has complete power in relation to the recovery of the dues of F. I. including power to grant injunction, stay order, attachment before judgment, and/or appointment of Receiver or Commissioner. Similarly, the S.F.C. Act also makes complete provision for realizing dues by taking over possession of the industrial unit, then by selling it or changing the management. These Acts are complete Codes in themselves, the general law, namely the Companies Act must give way to these Acts and any interpretation which prevents furtherance of achievement of Special Acts must be avoided. (e)The subsequent and/or special laws having non-obstante ria use have overridden the provisions of Companies Act to the extent of conflict. To examine whether there is any conflict, one must examine the legislative intent and purpose. It is not correct to state that there would be conflict between two laws only if observance of one law leads to breach of another law. There would be conflict between two laws if one law (which is general and earlier in point of time) comes in the way of fulfilment of the object and purpose of another special and subsequent law, brought in for larger public good. If the legislative desire of enactment of the latter law is likely to be frustrated by even the procedural operation of the earlier law, then for larger public good the earlier law is to be treated as inapplicable. ( AIR 1977 SC 265 at page 275 Para 23). If the legislative desire of enactment of the latter law is likely to be frustrated by even the procedural operation of the earlier law, then for larger public good the earlier law is to be treated as inapplicable. ( AIR 1977 SC 265 at page 275 Para 23). (f) In fact, even the requirement of a law to seek only permission and nothing more from the Body/Authority/Court under a general law is regarded as repealed, the moment a special law is enacted covering the same issue on the short ground that once a special forum is created every other Authority/Body/Court would lose jurisdiction. In this connection, strong reliance is placed on the following judgments : 1. Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Limited, AIR 2001 SC 958 2. Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, 2000 (4) SCC 406 3. N. G.E.F. Ltd. v. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd., 2005 (8) SCC 219 4. Sanvan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, AIR 1977 SC 265 5. M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance C01poration of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 6. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 (g) There is a direct conflict between R.D.B. Act/S.F.C. Act on one hand and Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 on the other. At least in relation to Sec. 391(6) there is a direct conflict. It is for the D.R.T. to decide whether to grant or not to grant interim order, including injunction or appointment of Receiver. It is for the S.F.C. to decide whether to take over possession, sell or transfer possession of an industrial unit. These rights are not qualified under the respective special statutes. If it is assumed that under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956, a Company Court would have the power to prevent F.I./ S.F.C. from taking action under the Acts, their exclusive jurisdiction is made amenable to jurisdiction of a Company Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the above judgments repeatedly held that even seeking permission from other Body/Authority/Court on enactment of a special Act would stand repealed, the natural corollary is that in relation to the proceedings before the D. R. T. or the proceedings that a S.F.C. may take, Company Court cannot exercise prohibitive power. Otherwise, the purpose of enacting these laws and giving them such powers is frustrated. Otherwise, the purpose of enacting these laws and giving them such powers is frustrated. (h) Section 18 of the R.D.B. Act bars every Court other than the Supreme Court of India or this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, from doing anything in relation to D.R.T. proceedings. A Company Court would not come in this exception and would have no jurisdiction in relation to the D.R.T. proceedings. So also in relation to the proceedings under the S.F.C. Act. 30. Learned Counsel further submitted that the appellant-Company would not make itself liable to be favoured with an order in discretionary jurisdiction because except a paltry sum which has been paid by it, the appellant-Company has defaulted in great detail. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in various decisions which have been quoted by learned Company Judge that such discretion is not liable to be exercised even under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which has not been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to be granted in wide and persuasive writ jurisdiction. Learned Counsel further submitted that the maintainability of application under Sec. 391(1) was questioned by his client before learned Company Judge but faced with difficulty that learned Single Judge of this Court has already taken a view which would be binding, the arguments were not stretched because of judicial propriety. However, the challenge to Sec. 391 has not been given up by his client as is understood by the appellant. 31. In the appeal being O.J. Appeal No. 109 of 2009, filed by SICOM Limited, Mr. A. L. Shah, learned Advocate with Mr. Sanjay A. Mehta for the appellant submitted that it is not correct to assume that the maintainability of application under Sec. 391 has been given up by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of his client but the arguments were not carried further only because there is already a judgment of this Court in the matter of Core Healthcare Limited and the same being binding on learned Single Judge, the arguments were not carried further and all these arguments are available before this Court and are being advanced and thus adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. S.N. Soparkar, learned senior Counsel that in view of various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which learned Single Judge has considered, the provisions of S.F.C. Act and R.D.B. Act are in conflict with Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956, and therefore, they supersede. 32. Replying to this argument, Mr. Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 1, submitted that since the arguments were not carried further, it would be deemed that learned Counsel has given up the challenge otherwise he would have asked to refer the matter to a Larger Bench and could have submitted that he seeks to argue the matter and it could not have been left to the discretion of the Court. 33. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the records and have given our thoughtful consideration. 34. To start with, we would like to make a reference to what has been submitted on behalf of the appellant in the written submissions which is quoted herein below : "The very object of Secs. 391(1) and (2) would be frustrated, if the Court is not able to restrain a Bank or financial institution from taking any coercive action under R.D.B. Act or S.F.C. Act pending consideration of a (Statutory) Scheme, for by the time the Scheme is considered and sanctioned by the Court, if the mortgaged asset of the appellant-Company is taken possession of and disposed of by SICOM and the very purpose of proposing/sanctioning the Scheme would stand frustrated. The alleged conflict would depend upon what order is passed. If such is the situation, it cannot be said that the (enabling) provision itself is in conflict with any provision of the R.D.B. Act/S.F.C. Act. No enabling provision which enables the Court to pass an order, can be said to be in conflict with the R.D.B. Act or S.F.C. Act. In the event, the relief under Sec. 391(6) is refused, the Company Petition itself will not survive and the question of considering the Scheme becomes academic. SICOM by its aggressive conduct is trying to pressurize the appellant to pay more/get better terms than the one offered in the Scheme, and thereby, steal a march over the other two secured creditors who constitute more than 75 % and are supporting the Scheme. SICOM by its aggressive conduct is trying to pressurize the appellant to pay more/get better terms than the one offered in the Scheme, and thereby, steal a march over the other two secured creditors who constitute more than 75 % and are supporting the Scheme. The refusal of relief under Sec. 391(6) to the appellant, in the facts of the present case, therefore, necessarily means prematurely dismissing the Company Petition itself and rejection of the Scheme." 34.1. The aforesaid submissions of the appellant show that unless there is an exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 (6) of the Act of 1956 the question of consideration of the Scheme itself under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 will become academic. Thus, according to the submissions of the appellant itself, a conflict would depend on the order which is passed under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the very purpose of proposing/sanctioning the Scheme would stand frustrated. These submissions on behalf of the appellant per se exhibit that there is a direct bearing of the exercise of the jurisdiction under the provisions of Sec. 391(6) the Act of 1956 on the ultimate outcome. If the proceedings under R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act are continued the very purpose and object of the proposed Scheme under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 would get frustrated. By pondering over these consequences it can safely be concluded that there can be a conflict in between the provisions of two sets of Acts (i.e. Companies Act and R.D.B. Act/S.F.C. Act) and that conflict may arise out of the negative nature of the order under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. 35. The question of conflict can be examined from different angle. As and when any order of sanction of a new Scheme is passed under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 then the original contract in between the parties i.e. the Company and the financial institutions undergoes a radical change. The contracting parties cannot relegate on the original contract. Thus, there is a direct interference by exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 on the original contract entered into, in between the contracting parties. This directly means that the financial institutions cannot execute a contract entered into by them originally. The contracting parties cannot relegate on the original contract. Thus, there is a direct interference by exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 on the original contract entered into, in between the contracting parties. This directly means that the financial institutions cannot execute a contract entered into by them originally. The sanctioning of a Scheme under the Act of 1956 has an inhibiting effect on exercise of the powers of the financial institutions, which otherwise can be exercised by them, taking recourse to R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act qua the original contract. Thus, there is a direct impediment as to the scope and operation of R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act, because once there is an exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 the original contract gets modified in terms of the orders of the Company Court. 36. The powers available to the financial institutions under Sees. 17, 18 and 19 are very wide. Most specifically when it comes to safeguard its money by issuing attachment and appointing receivers. With the sanctioning of a new Scheme such powers will get frustrated. Thus, there appears to be a direct conflict. 37. With regard to the aforesaid discussion, this may be kept in mind that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanvan Sing v. Kasturi Lal (supra) has categorically held that if the permission from the Slum Areas (Improvements and Clearance) Act, 1956 affects the rights of the Rent Control Act then there is a direct conflict in the provisions of two Acts and in these terms, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at Paragraph No. 15 as under : " . . . . . . .. . The reason is that the relevant provisions of that Act devise an overriding procedure by reason of which no suit or proceeding can be instituted without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act are to that extent inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act and have to be subordinated to it." 38. The financial institutions cannot execute the original contract as entered in between the Company and the financial institutions if powers are exercised by the Company Court under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956. The financial institutions cannot execute the original contract as entered in between the Company and the financial institutions if powers are exercised by the Company Court under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956. Thus, to that extent the provisions of two sets of Acts are inconsistent and in conflict with each other. Thus, the first question as has been canvassed by learned Counsel for the appellant-Company that whether there is a direct conflict in between the provisions of Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 and R.D.B. Act and S. F. C. Act stands answered against the Company. 39. Now, what has to be seen is whether two Acts R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the matters specified in Secs. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956. It can be seen that under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 the Company Court sanctions a fresh Scheme, then the course as provided under R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act for immediate recovery is interfered. Recovery of money of the financial institutions become delayed. The object and purpose of R.D.B. Act has a clear providence that the financial institutions at present are experiencing a considerable difficulty in recovering loan and enforcement of security charges. That purpose gets frustrated. Once the object and the purpose of R.D.B. Act gets frustrated by providing a new Scheme of repayment under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 by the Company Court, it interferes with the Scheme of R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act where the recoveries are provided expeditiously. Thus, the object and purpose of R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act are frustrated, if any injunction is granted against the financial institutions under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. This would not be in conformity with the law laid down by the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. For ready reference, a reference is made to Paragraph No. 23 of the judgment in the case of Sarwan Sing v. Kasturi Lal (supra) which is reproduced as under: "The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it because our reason for according priority to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands impliedly repealed pro tanto. Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non-obstante clauses in the earlier law, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of Sec. l4A and Chapter III of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in Secs. 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act." 40. May be that the R.D.B. Act does not envisage a compromise between the parties, but it enables the recoveries. The monies' recovery is also field of the compromise which will make it a delayed payment. Thus, a sanctioned compromise will abrogate the right already accrued. If the sanctioning of the Scheme is permitted, the existing right of the financial institutions to immediately recover monies will be gone. Thus, the two operating fields are not in consonance. Exhaustiveness of the Act thus will have to take a back stage when the very purpose of the R.D.B. Act gets frustrated. 41. In view to ascertaining the meaning of the statute it is important to know what it does not mean. The R.D.B. Act in operation does not mean that the recovery be deferred. It implies therefor that no effect be allowed to frustrate it as per the Scheme of the Act. In this light also, if the incidence of compromise is not there in the Act then it propounds the intention of the Legislature that recovery of the public monies is first priority. 42. The third question whether the provisions of Sees. 391 to 394 of the Act of 1956 and the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act occupy the same field is dealt with as follows. It may be noticed that R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act provide for the recovery of money and Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 provides deferment of that recovery in accordance with the Scheme to be formulated and sanctioned by it. Thus, to that extent that the two set of laws has a tendency of interference with the application of each other, they occupy the same field one delays the payment, another expedites it. Thus, to the extent that Companies Act provides for the deferment of the recovery and R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act are meant for speedy recovery will be holding the field. Thus, to the extent that Companies Act provides for the deferment of the recovery and R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act are meant for speedy recovery will be holding the field. Once, it is held that in the field of recovery R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act will hold the field the Companies Act will have to make way for their operations. 43. Law regarding the conflict of statutes has been summarised by learned Single Judge in great detail which has been quoted by us hereinabove. We are avoiding repetition of the same but we are of the considered opinion that in view of the mandate of Legislature in favour of R.D.B. Act and S. F. C. Act that there should be speedy recovery the same cannot be permitted to be frustrated by permitting the Company Court to frame a Scheme under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 when recovery proceedings are pending. It may further be noticed that under Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act, the Legislature has omitted the Act of 1956 to be included and this omission is considered by us to be a conscious omission so as to give primacy to the R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act. 44. The argument of learned Counsel for the appellant that in the case of Allahabad Bank (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not held that the provisions of R.D.B. Act and S.F.C. Act would have primacy over Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956, and it has only dealt with import of Sees. 442, 446 and 557. It may be worthwhile to mention here that the Hon'ble Court in that case was not called upon to decide the question of the implication of Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956, and therefore, if there is no finding to that effect in the judgment in the Allahabad Bank (supra) it cannot be said that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is no conflict in between the provisions of Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 and the provisions of R.D.B. Act. 45. Finding of the Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Rank v. Canara Bank (supra) if carefully examined, throws a considerable light on the controversy involved in this case. 45. Finding of the Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Rank v. Canara Bank (supra) if carefully examined, throws a considerable light on the controversy involved in this case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at Paragraph No. 25 of the judgment as under : "Thus, the adjudication of liability and the recovery of the amount by execution of the certificate are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer and no other Court or authority much less the Civil Court or the Company Court can go into the said questions relating to the liability and the recovery except as provided in the Act. Point No. 1 is decided accordingly." 46. Here, if we notice that the Court has held exclusivity of D.R.T. in the matter of adjudication of liability then this liability in the instant case would mean the liability under the original contract. This was a contract wilfully agreed in between the parties and the objector has a right to enforce the same. The exercise of jurisdiction by Company Court will transform the contract without the willingness of the objector. Thus, whatever protection Legislature intended to confer on it will be taken away. If right accrued under one Act is taken away by the operation of another Act, then there is an obvious conflict in operation of these two Acts. 46.1. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held as under : "While it is true that the principle of purposive interpretation has been applied by the Supreme Court in favour of jurisdiction and powers of the Company Court in Sudarsan Chits (J) Ltd. case 1984 (4) SCC 657 , and other cases the said principle, in our view, cannot be invoked in the present case against the Debts Recovery Tribunal in view of the superior purpose of the R.D.B. Act and the special provision contained therein. In our opinion, the very same principle mentioned above equally applies to the Tribunal Recovery Officer under the R.D.B. Act, 1993 because the purpose of the said Act is something more important than the purpose of Secs. 442, 446 and 537 of the Companies Act. In our opinion, the very same principle mentioned above equally applies to the Tribunal Recovery Officer under the R.D.B. Act, 1993 because the purpose of the said Act is something more important than the purpose of Secs. 442, 446 and 537 of the Companies Act. It was intended that there should be a speedy and summary remedy for recovery of thousands of crores which were due to the Banks and to financial institutions, so that the delays occurring in winding-up proceedings could be avoided." 46.2. The reasoning of the Apex Court quoted hereinabove applies with full force on the controversy involved in the present case. Purpose of permitting the Company to pay under a new Scheme would frustrate the very purpose of enacting the R.D.B. Act. This will mean that the financial institutions will have to stop a speedy and summary remedy and wait for its money upto a time fixed in new Scheme. A conflicting situation. 46.3. In the very same judgment, the Apex Court referring the judgment in the case of Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (supra) has held as under : "Therefore, in view of Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act, the said Act overrides the Companies Act, to the extent there is anything inconsistent between the Acts. " 46.4. This is a clear statement of law regarding the overriding effect of the R.D.B. Act. We have noticed inconsistencies above, therefore, also the R.D.B. Act will have primacy over Sec. 391 of the Companies Act. In the very same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that: "But the position under the R.D.B. Act is different. Sections 442, 446 and 537 are not saved by the R.D.B. Act. Even Sec. 34(2) of the R.D.B. Act does not save the provisions of the Companies Act." 46:5. The aforesaid observation clearly enunciates that there being a conscious omission of Companies Act from Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act. It has no savings from the R.D.B. Act. 46.6. The non-inclusion of Companies Act in Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act cannot be seen to be an omission without intention. As and when there is an omission of mentioning an Act in the provision of another Act, it should be construed to be a conscious omission. It has no savings from the R.D.B. Act. 46.6. The non-inclusion of Companies Act in Sec. 34 of the R.D.B. Act cannot be seen to be an omission without intention. As and when there is an omission of mentioning an Act in the provision of another Act, it should be construed to be a conscious omission. A reference in this regard be made to Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page No. 71 : "As a general rule, as Blackburn J. pointed out in R. v. Cleworth, 1864 (4) B. & S. 927, if it appears that the class or thing which it is sought to bring within the Act (under consideration) was known to the Legislature at the time when the Act was passed, and that class is omitted. "It must be supposed to have been omitted intentionally." 46.7. Thus, it would follow that the Companies Act was not intended to have been saved from the operation of R.D.B. Act. 46.8. In the same judgment Allahabad Bank (supra) the Hon'ble Court has further observed at Paragraph No. 50 as under : "For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that at the stage of adjudication under Sec. 17 and execution of the certificate under Sec. 25 etc., the provisions of the R.D.B. Act, 1993 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer in respect of debts payable to Banks and financial institutions and there can be no interference by the Company Court under Sec. 442 read with Sec. 537 or under Sec. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. In respect of the monies realised under the R.D.B. Act, the question of priorities among the Banks and financial institutions and other. creditors can be decided only by the Tribunal under the R.D.B. Act and in accordance with Sec. 19(19) read with Sec. 529A of the Companies Act and in no other manner. The provisions of the R.D.B. Act, 1993, are to the above extent inconsistent with the provisions of the Companies Act, ] 956 and the latter Act has to yield to the provisions of the former. This position holds good during the pendency of the winding-up petition against the debtor Company and also after a winding-up order is passed. No leave of the Company Court is necessary for initiating or continuing the proceedings under the R.D.B. Act, 1993. This position holds good during the pendency of the winding-up petition against the debtor Company and also after a winding-up order is passed. No leave of the Company Court is necessary for initiating or continuing the proceedings under the R.D.B. Act, 1993. Points 2 and 3 are decided accordingly in favour of the appellant and against the respondents." 46.9. In addition to the adjudication, the R.D.B. Act has exclusive jurisdiction for execution for the monies recoverable by the financial institutions. The order passed under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 will not permit such execution. This execution relates to the original contract in the instant case. Any modification in the contract is not envisaged in the Scheme of the R.D.B. Act. Thus, such exclusive jurisdiction is required to be given primacy resultantly an overriding effect of the R.D.B. Act over Companies Act. Argument of the respondent that the provision of R.D.B. Act are enabling provisions. Therefore, they cannot come in conflict is required to be noticed to be rejected in view of the discussions noted hereinabove. 47. In the matters of recovery by the financial institutions, non-obstante clause is used in Sec. 34 of R.D.B. Act. It would thus have primacy over the provisions of Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 so far it relates to the recovery of the contracted amount in between the parties in terms of the original contract. To that extent, the provisions of the R.D.B. Act will eclipse provisions of Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 and in that view of the matter as and when proceedings under R.D.B. Act for recovery are instituted, the exercise of jurisdiction by Company Court under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956 would be of no consequence because it would be futile to pass a Scheme under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956. Thus, the proceedings of R.D.B. Act are not liable to be stayed under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956. To that extent the findings of learned Single Judge that application under Sec. 391 of the Act can be maintained cannot be considered to be laying down a good law. This is held that as and when there are proceedings pending under the R.D.B. Act exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956cannot be considered to be lawfully available. 48. This is held that as and when there are proceedings pending under the R.D.B. Act exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391 of the Act of 1956cannot be considered to be lawfully available. 48. As regards exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 391(6) of the Act of 1956, it would not be available in view of overriding provisions of R.D.B. Act/S.F.C. Act, it may be noticed here as well that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided in the cases noticed by learned Single Judge that as and when there is proceedings under S.F.C. Act the same should not be interfered under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a jurisdiction which is very wide and the jurisdiction under Sec. 391 (6) is only limited that too circumscribed by terms which can be imposed. Therefore, also in view of the fact that the appellant-Company has not made any payment to the objector financial institutions over and above a paltry sum, may be around Rs. 60 lakh. That being the position, the conduct of the appellant-Company is also of the nature which does not call for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in its favour. 49. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal of appellant-Company fails. The appeal filed by the objector succeeds to the extent indicated above. Learned Counsel for the appellant-Company prays that the stay order which has been operating in the meanwhile may be extended till the parties approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned Counsel for the respondents was not agreeable to such request. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the effect and operation of this judgment will remain in abeyance upto 29-3-2010. (HSS) Appeal dismissed.