Order Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners who are manufacturers of carbon compounds with the following prayers:- (a) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the respondent to provide the petitioners the copy of all the documents concerning the forwarding of samples by the respondents to two Government agencies and the test reports issued against the same by the said agencies more fully referred to in the show cause notice dated May 9, 2007 in such time and manner as may be permitted by the said Hon'ble Court. (b) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the respondent to from giving effect or further effect and/or acting on the basis of the purported show cause notices dated 22nd November, 2007 and 17th September, 2008 until the disclosure of all the documents concerning the testing of samples by the said two Government agencies any further in any manner whatsoever. (c) A writ of or in the nature of Certiorari directing and commanding the respondents, each of them, their subordinates and officers to transmit the records relating to the case so that appropriate directions as may be found just and proper by the said Hon'ble Court, may be give; (d) Rule NISI in terms of prayers above: (e) Injunction restraining the respondents and each of them, their subordinates and officers from proceeding against the petitioners in connection with the purported show cause notices dated 22nd November, 2007 and 17th September, 2008 till the disclosure of all documents including the test reports to the petitioners any further in any manner whatsoever; (f) Ad-interim order in terms of prayer above; (g) Costs of an incidental to this application be paid to the petitioner by the respondents; (h) Such further and/or other order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be given as to this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper. 3. The aforesaid prayers have been made in the background where the petitioners have been issued show cause notices by the department. The show cause notices were issued in the year 2007. Pursuant to the show cause notices, the petitioners appeared before the department. 3. The aforesaid prayers have been made in the background where the petitioners have been issued show cause notices by the department. The show cause notices were issued in the year 2007. Pursuant to the show cause notices, the petitioners appeared before the department. Having appeared, they did not file any show cause reply and the matter was argued before the department and on 10.2.2009, personal hearing was made to the petitioner. Having not gone for personal hearing, the petitioners preferred this writ petition before this Court on 9.3.2010 though the endorsement on the petition shows that it was on 6.2.2009 that the affidavit was sworn in. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that in the instant case the notices as issued, lack credibility because the Commissioner of the department itself has held in its discretion and finding at Annexure-1, vide order dated 9.5.2007 that there is no chemical examiner's report to establish as to the basic ingredients of the product produced by the petitioners and in that view of the matter the Commissioner had extended time for the issuance of show cause .notices under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Commissioner while deciding this, has taken note of all the materials on record. The argument of the learned cou0nsel for the petitioners is that this order of the Commissioner having not been assailed by the respondents, operates as "issue estoppel" against the respondents and therefore they are stopped by the orders of the Commissioner and therefore no such notices could have been issued and in that view of the matter, the notice issuing authority lacks jurisdiction in law and it was legal mala fide. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that he has demanded the report of the chemical analyst but that has not been supplied to him and therefore there is material suppression on account of the respondents and when there is material suppression, the show cause notices cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that he has demanded the report of the chemical analyst but that has not been supplied to him and therefore there is material suppression on account of the respondents and when there is material suppression, the show cause notices cannot be sustained. Further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that once when there is no sufficient material available with the department, there is no question of suppression of the facts and if there is no suppression of the facts, then the very jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against the petitioners is not available to the respondents and therefore the notices are bad in the eye of law and in this regard the petitioners placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision decided in the matter of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. VS. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune II, (2007)9 SCC 617 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that ". Acts of fraud or suppression, it is well settled, must be specifically pleaded. The allegations in regard to suppression of facts must be clear and explicit so as to enable the notice to reply thereto effectively. It was not the case of the Revenue that the activities of the appellant were not known to it. Admittedly, when the first show-cause notice was issued, the extended period of limitation was not resorted to. A notice should ordinarily be issued within a period of six months (as the law then stood) i.e. within the prescribed period of limitation but only in exceptional cases, the said period could be extended to 5 years. When in the original notice, such an allegation had not been made, we are of the opinion that the same could not have been made subsequently as the facts alleged to have been suppressed by the appellant were known to them. Without going into the question regarding classification and marketability and leaving the same open, we intend to dispose of the appeals on the point of limitation only. This court in P & B Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. VS. Without going into the question regarding classification and marketability and leaving the same open, we intend to dispose of the appeals on the point of limitation only. This court in P & B Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. VS. CCE has taken the view that in a case in which a show cause notice has been issued for the earlier period on certain set of facts, then, on the same set of facts another SCN based on the same/similar set of facts invoking the extended period of limitation on the plea of suppression of facts by the asses see cannot be issued as the facts• were already in the knowledge of the Department. " 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Collector of Central Excise vs. M/s Chemphar Drugs and Liniments, (1989)2 see 127 wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the asses see declared the goods on the basis of their belief of the interpretation of the provisions of the law that the exempted goods were not required to be included and these did not include the value of the exempted goods which they manufactured at the relevant time. The Tribunal found that explanation was plausible, and also noted that the department had full knowledge of the facts about manufacture of all the goods manufactured by the respondent when the declaration was filed by the respondent. The respondent did not include the value of the product other than those falling under T.I. 14-E manufactured by the respondent and this was in the knowledge, according to the Tribunal, of the authorities. These findings of the Tribunal have not been challenged before us or before the Tribunal itself as being based on no evidence. In that view of the matter and in view of the requirements of Section 11-A of the Act, the claim had to be limited for a period of six months as the Tribunal did. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion. The appeal therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed." 6. In that view of the matter and in view of the requirements of Section 11-A of the Act, the claim had to be limited for a period of six months as the Tribunal did. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion. The appeal therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on another judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case I of Densons Pultretaknik vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2003)11 SCC 390 wherein it is held that "whether the Tribunal was justified in invoking the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A. Prima facie, it is apparent that there was no justifiable reason for invoking a larger period of limitation. There is no suppression on the part of the appellant firm in mentioning the goods manufactured by it. The appellant claimed it on the ground that the goods manufactured by it were other articles of plastic. For the insulating fittings manufactured by it, the tariff entry was correctly stated. The officers concerned of the Department, as noted above, after verification approved the said classification list. This court has repeatedly held that for invoking an extended period of limitation under the said provision duty should not have been paid, short levied or short-paid by a suppression of facts or in contravention of any provision or rules but there should be wilful suppression. (Re: Easland Combines vs. CCE). By merely claiming it under Sub-Heading 3926.90 it cannot be said that there was any wilful misstatement or suppression of fact. Hence, there was no justifiable ground for the Tribunal for invoking the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act." 7. The limitation for issuance of notice is generally one year and it is only in the case of proven misrepresentation of facts that the limitation for notice can be extended to five years. In the instant case, there is no fact which gets established or proved which entitles the department to get an extension of five years of limitation. He further stretches his argument that if. the department has knowledge of I the proven facts then also from the date :of knowledge, the extension of limitation of five years is not available to the department. He further stretches his argument that if. the department has knowledge of I the proven facts then also from the date :of knowledge, the extension of limitation of five years is not available to the department. Only one year will be available and in that view of the matter the notices were beyond the limitation. . 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petition is filed• against issuance of notices only. The petitioners have not responded to the notices because seizure was made on 24.11 .2006 and thereafter the notices were issued in the year 2007. The petitioners appeared before the respondents but did not file any written submission. The present writ petition though was prepared in the year 2009, was filed in 2010 therefore the learned counsel for the respondents submits that it was a belated thought and a delayed action on the part of the petitioners though they conceived the filing of petition in 2009 and awaited up to 2010. This it self puts the petitioners in a position where their own stand appears to be shaky and the challenge is delayed and it suffers from delay and laches. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents further is that the notices can only be challenged on account of lack of jurisdiction or lack of authority. None of these points have been urged, argued, pleaded or pressed at the time of arguments. The only argument which has been placed at the service is that the notices have been issued without there being sufficient material and that the Commissioner had already held against the respondents and therefore stopped by the orders of the Commissioner. Therefore, the defence of, he petitioner is not liable to be considered at this stage and these things can only be considered as the defence of the petitioners and the same cannot be considered as this constitutes investigation of facts in writ jurisdiction and this can only be investigated at the level when the reply is filed and the petitioners join issue before the department. Investigation of facts in a writ jurisdiction is not known to the law and therefore this writ petition is misconceived. 10. Investigation of facts in a writ jurisdiction is not known to the law and therefore this writ petition is misconceived. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has further urged that at the time when the matter was being enquired into by the department, one of the officers working with the petitioners, who was supervising production process, has said that the coaltar was never heated by him at a temperature less than 350°C and the product, which the petitioners have sought to pass on, was the product which can only be 8roduced if the coaltar is heated at 100 C and therefore there was a patent misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners that in his self-assessment he passed on the product as dehydrated coaltar and in that view of the matter, since there was a patent misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners the department had the jurisdiction to issue the notices because on such misrepresentation, if the department does not issue notices to the erring parties, then it derelicts its duties and that dereliction in the matter of loss of revenue cannot be permitted and in that view of the matter, the notices issued are perfectly legal. The petitioners have the remedy of appearing and contesting the notices which they should avail instead of asking this Court for adjudicating the disputed question of facts. They should appear before the department and should not shy away on the ground that the chemical report has not been submitted by the department because it is not only on the basis of the chemical analysis that a produce can be identified. In the instant case, there is patent fact available on the record and that is the evidence of the Supervisor of the manufacturing unit of the petitioners themselves and that can constitute an admission against the petitioners themselves and in the light of the admission itself, nothing further can be required to be established because the coaltar was heated on more than 350°C and at that temperature, the dehydrated coal tar cannot be said to be a product of the petitioners. The product would be something different and as it has come on the record from one of the end users of the product that it was Naptha and from whose facilitation the samples were collected. The product would be something different and as it has come on the record from one of the end users of the product that it was Naptha and from whose facilitation the samples were collected. This also goes to show that the product supplied by the petitioners was not a dehydrated coaltar but was Naptha, may be in the fluid form. 11. We have considered the rival submissions and we are of the considered view that in view of the Supreme Court decision in the matter of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Charminar Nonwovens Ltd., 2004(167) E.L.T. 372 (S.C.) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered that there was an earlier decision and yet in subsequent matters the notices were issued. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that such notices can be issued and not liable to be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that by the decision of the Commissioner the issue had already been settled and it operates as issue estoppel, does not stand to reason because doctrine of issue. estoppel does not apply in this case. It was argued before us and since we have a direct decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court which says that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the matter should not be gone into in investigation of facts. We think that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the issue estoppel is not sustainable. The further argument of the tearned counsel for the petitioners that there was a finding of the Commissioner and that finding should be considered as to be binding. Suffice it to say that it cannot be said that the order of the Commissioner would be of the nature that they will stop the respondents from issuing show cause notices after they discovered evidence of positive nature of none else than Supervisor of their own factory who has deposed that the coaltar was never heated less than 350°C in the facility of the petitioner and at that level it cann0t be said that the end product would be the dehydrated coaltar. In that view of the matter, the evidence was sufficiently available with the respondents to assume that there was misrepresentation and this inference of the respondents that there was misrepresentation is further fortified from the fact that one of the end users, to whom the petitioners used to supply the products and from whom samples were taken, stated that it was Naptha and that added cause for issuance of notice. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, we consider that going into the merit of the case at this stage is not called for. The Investigation of facts in the matter that whether the notices are sustainable or not, should better be done by the department authorities and we, in that view of the matter, refrain from interfering in the matter of issuance of notice. It would not in fitness in observing against the department that it has no jurisdiction to issue the notices. The petitioners would be at liberty to go before the department and join issue there. 13. Any observation made on facts will not prejudice the mind of the department authorities because we have not critically examined the facts of the case. 14. With the aforesaid observations, this petition is considered meritless and hence dismissed.