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2010 DIGILAW 1053 (HP)

Kal Dassi v. Land Acquisition Collector

2010-08-20

V.K.AHUJA

body2010
JUDGMENT : V.K. Ahuja, J. This is an appeal filed by the appellant under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (here-in-after referred to as ‘the Act’) as against the award, dated 9.5.2001, passed by the learned District Judge, Kinnuar, vide which he had answered the reference petition filed by the appellant in negative and had dismissed the petition for enhancement filed under Section 18 of the Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the land of the petitioner was acquired vide notification dated 5.3.1988, which was situated at Jhakri, for construction of residential accommodation for the staff of Nathpa Jhakri Power Project. The notification was issued and the proceedings were initiated by the Land Acquisition Collector, who passed an award dated 4.7.1991. A sum of Rs.91,671/- was granted by the Land Acquisition Collector for the double storeyed roofed house situated in the land in question. Aggrieved by the said award of the Collector, the appellant filed a reference petition under Section 18 of the Act claiming compensation to the extent of Rs.1,62,336/-. The petition filed by the appellant was dismissed and the order passed by the Collector awarding compensation to the appellant was upheld by the learned District Judge. 3. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned District Judge shows that he made a reference to the statement of PW-3 Lalit Kumar, who had assessed the market value of the building of the petitioner at Rs.1,62,335/-. The statement of the said witness was not relied upon since he had not stated about his experience in the field of Civil Engineering. A perusal of the statement of PW-3 Lalit Kumar further shows that he had applied the rates of 1987 as per the Schedule of PWD and allowed premium and worked out the value of the property in question in the month of February to April, 1991 when he allegedly visited the spot. The value had to be assessed on the date of issuance of the notification on 5.3.1988, but the said Lalit Kumar applied the Schedule of 1987 and granted premium for four years. He neither stated about his experience in construction of buildings nor gave any other details to show that he was expert in the field of assessment of the valuation of a house. He neither stated about his experience in construction of buildings nor gave any other details to show that he was expert in the field of assessment of the valuation of a house. A perusal of the valuation report submitted by him Ext.PX, proved by him, also shows that he had added 5% for unforeseen items, 150% for brick work due to hike in prices and also added 65% cost index for carriage and hike in prices. These rates have been given by him apart from the premium granted for four years while applying the Schedule of 1987, though the valuation was to be made for the year 1988. 4. The learned District Judge had discussed in detail the report submitted by PW-3 Lalit Kumar and the additions made and had finally concluded that the report submitted on behalf of the NJPC by RW-1 K.K. Gupta, who assessed the value at Rs.91,671/-, has to be accepted as correct and the petitioner was held entitled to the assessment on perusal of the said report and the statement of RW-1 K.K. Gupta. I do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned District Judge and as such, the petitioner was rightly held not entitled to any enhancement on the basis of the report Ext.PX proved by PW3 Lalit Kumar. 5. The only point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, during the course of arguments, was that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the petitioner was entitled to separate assessment for the land apart from the building standing thereon. He placed reliance upon the decision in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sahaswan, District Badaun through its Secretary versus Bipin Kumar and another, (2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 283. Reliance was placed upon the observations made in para 8 of the said judgment, but this decision does not lead to an inference that separate valuation has to be granted for the land apart from the value assessed for the building. It was observed that the High Court also erred in considering only three years increase whereas there was four years difference between the respondent’s sale deed and the acquisition proceedings. Thus, taking an increase of 60% over the price of Rs.15.40 per sq.yard, the value comes to Rs.24.64 per sq.yard. It was observed that the High Court also erred in considering only three years increase whereas there was four years difference between the respondent’s sale deed and the acquisition proceedings. Thus, taking an increase of 60% over the price of Rs.15.40 per sq.yard, the value comes to Rs.24.64 per sq.yard. This was observed while giving an increase over the price of the land from the date of the sale deed and the acquisition proceedings. This decision, therefore, does not help the learned counsel for the appellant in any manner. 6. Reliance was also placed upon the decision in Tejumal Bhojwani (dead) through LRs and others versus State of U.P., (2003) 10 Supreme Court Cases 525, in which the following observations were made in para 7: “7. Next submission of the learned Senior Counsel is that the claimants were entitled to separate compensation for the tubewell as well as for the structure standing on the land and the High Court committed error while denying compensation for the above items, although the Land Acquisition Officer has granted compensation for those items. We find substance in the argument. However, learned counsel appearing for the Parishad argued that the claimants were not entitled to compensation for value of land and building separately and for that purpose cited a decision of this Court in Ratan Kumar Tandon v. State of U.P. We find that the said decision is distinguishable. In that case we find that there was a capitalization of the value of land and structure and, therefore, the claimants were not given separate compensation for land and building. Here we find that there was no capitalization of value of land and structure by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award. On the other hand, the Land Acquisition Officer has given compensation separately for the land, building and tubewell. In that view of the matter, the claimants are entitled to separate compensation for land, tubewell and structure.” 7. In the aforesaid case, the respondent had relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ratan Kumar Tandon versus State of U.P. to show that the claimants were not entitled to compensation for value of land and building separately. It was held that the said decision was distinguishable. There was capitalization of the value of land and structure and, therefore, the claimants were not given separate compensation for land and building. 8. It was held that the said decision was distinguishable. There was capitalization of the value of land and structure and, therefore, the claimants were not given separate compensation for land and building. 8. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Advocate General has relied upon a decision of a Division Bench in Collector Land Acquisition and another versus Durginder Pal and others, 1997(2) Shim.L.C.477, a perusal of which shows that a similar question arose in that case also and value of land and buildings had been separately assessed. A reference was also made to a decision of the Apex Court. The observations made in paras 7 and 8 are relevant and are being reproduced below: “7.In Rattan Kumar Tandon and others v. State of U.P., (1997) 2 SCC 161, the apex Court had an occasion to deal with a similar situation. It was held:- “It is well settled law that when land and building are acquired by a notification, the claimant is not entitled to separate valuation of building and the land. They are entitled to compensation on either of the two methods but not both. If building is assessed, it is settled law that the measure of assessment be based on either the rent received from the property with suitable multiplier or the value of the building is the proper method of valuation. In this case, since the land is separately valued, the building cannot be again separately assessed and compensation awarded except the value of debris.” The apex Court refused to interfere with the market value assessed for the land and building as assessed by the High Court in the absence of appeal by the State. 9. In the present case, as stated above, both the Collector, Land Acquisition as well as the learned Additional District Judge has assessed the value of the building and land separately. Such valuation in terms of the ratio laid down by the apex Court is bad and cannot be sustained.” 10. The decision in Ratan Kumar Tandon and others versus State of U.P., (1997) 2 Supreme Court Cases 161, which decision was relied upon by the Division Bench in the above case, shows that the following observations were made by their Lordships in para 9: “When land and building are acquired by a notification, the claimant is not entitled to separate valuation of the building and the land. They are entitled to compensation on either of the two methods but not both. If the building is assessed, it is settled law that the measure of assessment be based on either the rent received from the property with suitable multiplier or the value of the building is the proper method of valuation. In this case, since the land was separately valued, the building cannot be again separately assessed and compensation awarded except the value of debris.” 11. It is clear that this question was considered by their Lordships in the above decision and it was held that the value of the land and building cannot be assessed separately and either of the two methods i.e. rent received from the property with suitable multiplier or the value of the building is the proper method of valuation. 12. Therefore, it follows form above discussion that the appellant was not entitled to the value of the building and the land separately and, thus, no infirmity could be pointed in the final findings recorded by the learned District Judge, which findings are liable to be affirmed. 13. In view of the above discussion, I hold that there is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellant which is dismissed accordingly.