JUDGEMENT 1. This intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna is directed against the order dated 5.5.2006, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C. W. J. C. No.2554 of 2002 (Ganga Prasad Singh V/s. the State of bihar and others), whereby the writ application preferred by the appellant herein, seeking a direction upon the respondents to allow him to continue in service till 30.11.2002, has been rejected. 2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: the writ petitioner joined the services of the Bihar government in the Department of Road Construction (Mechanical wing) on 30.11.1963. He was initially appointed as Senior Mechanic grade-I. A dispute arose about his date of birth appearing in the service records. It may be pointed out here the circle/division in which the service records of the writ petitioner was /were lying caught fire on 18.3.1974, consuming the entire service records. It is the writ petitioners case that the Superintending Engineer (Mechanical), by communication dated 19.5.2000, passed order that his date of birth as appearing in the school leaving certificate was 3.11.1944. It appears that the writ petitioner passed Matriculation examination from Hindi vidyapith, Deoghar. The authorities made enquiries from the vidyapith, whereafter it was revealed that the date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the record of Hindi Vidyapith is 3.1.1942. After having ascertained the date of birth, the authorities by communication dated 31.8.2000 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) directed the authority lower to him to superannuate the petitioner with effect from 31.1.2000. Consequently, order dated 6.9.2000 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) was passed by the respondent Executive Engineer, whereby he was made to retire with effect from 31.1.2000, leading to the present writ petition. The same was considered and dismissed by the learned Single Judge after having held as under: "it is true that when the date of birth has been entered in the service record, the same can only be altered on the basis of mistake and such alteration can only be made within the time limit as mentioned above. In the instant case, there is no question of alteration of the service record to rectify a mistake. The question was to ascertain whether the reconstruction was appropriately made or not. In the instant case, there is no question of alteration of the service record to rectify a mistake. The question was to ascertain whether the reconstruction was appropriately made or not. As aforesaid, in order to support the reconstruction, there should have been at least some document which came into existence before the date of reconstruction and unfortunately, there is no such document supporting the contention of the petitioner that he was born on 3rd November, 1944. The petitioner is relying upon his G. P. F. records which appears to have been opened in 6th January, 1984, after the reconstruction was made. In those circumstances, it would not be possible for me to interfere with the decision impugned in the writ petition. " 3. While assailing the impugned order learned counsel for the appellant submits that the authorities were not justified in reviewing its own order. It is highlighted that in the order contained in annexure-3 the said authority had earlier found and held that the date of birth of the writ petitioner was correctly entered as 3.11.1944, after reconstruction of the service records of the appellant. Subsequently the said authority reviewed the finding and came to the conclusion that his date of birth appearing in the Matriculation certificate issued by the Hindi Vidyapith, Deoghar, was correct date of birth and accordingly he was made to retire with effect from 31.1.2000. Learned counsel further submits that in terms of the order passed by the authorities contained in Annexure-3 to the writ petition, he was allowed to continue in service till the date of order i. e.6.9.2000 (Annexure-1), whereafter he was made to superannuate but the authorities have not paid the salary for the said period ,i. e. from 1.2.2000 to 5.9.2000. 4. We have perused the materials available on record and considered the submissions made on behalf of learned counsel for the appellant. Learned Single Judge on the basis of the materials placed before it by way of writ application and the counter affidavit came to the conclusion that the appellant completely failed to bring on record any document disclosing his date of birth as 3.11.1944, pertaining to the period prior to 18.3.1974, when the entire records concerning the petitioner appear to have been destroyed in fire. Before us also learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to produce any document disclosing his date of birth as 3.11.1944, pertaining to the period prior to 18.3.1974. In that view of the matter, the reliance placed by the authorities on the Matriculation certificate issued by the Hindi vidyapith was got verified and the impugned order was passed. We do not find any justification in interfering with that part of the finding. 5. The second limb of argument relates to power of the administrative authorities to review orders passed on administrative side. The principle that the power of review is a creature of the statute does not apply to administrative orders/functions. Contention of the appellant is thus fit to be rejected. 6. We, however, find substance in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that he was allowed to discharge duties from 1.2.2000 to 5.9.2000, under the orders of the superior authorities as would appear from Annexure-3. We do find from nnexure-3 that on the basis of certain documents made available on record, it was initially found that his date of birth was correctly recorded in the reconstructed service record as 3.11.1944. We accordingly direct the respondents to pay salary to the petitioner for the period 1.2.2000 to 5.9.2000, if not already paid to him, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Let the authorities verify whether or not the appellant actually worked during that period, and thereafter pay the salary. Said period shall, however, not be counted for any other purpose (s ). 7. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.