JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—Heard Ms. Rashmi Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner has come up for quashing of the order dated 28.9.1994 passed by Regional Deputy Director of Education - Respondent No. 1, whereby a direction was issued to the District Inspector of Schools to cancel the appointment of the petitioner as a class-IV employee in Government High Secondary School, Jasrana, District - Firozabad. 3. The facts shorn of details are that Principal of the institution, which is a Government institution, intimated the vacancy to the District Inspector of Schools. The institution was under the control of the District Inspector of Schools and, accordingly, the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 26.9.1994 appointed the petitioner in the institution as class-IV employee. The said order is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. A copy of the same was also sent to the Respondent No. 1, who in turn, intimated the District Inspector of Schools that the appointing authority is not the District Inspector of Schools and, therefore, the order should be cancelled. It was further narrated in the impugned order that the appointing authority is the Regional Deputy Director of Education i.e. the respondent No. 1. 4. The petitioner, therefore, has challenged the same on the ground that the Rules which have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution namely The Uttar Pradesh Education Department Administration (Delegation of Powers) First Amendment Rules 1973, have been notified on 23.10.1973 and the said Rules authorise the District Inspectress of Girls Schools to make such appointment. It has further been submitted that since there is no such Officer posted in the district, therefore, powers are to be exercised by the District Inspector of Schools, who is duly authorized to do so. 5. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit and have brought on record the provisions of the Education Code. The Education Code is a bunch of executive instructions which have been compiled for the purpose of internal instructions of the education department. 6. Learned Standing Counsel contends that the said Education Code authorizes the Regional Deputy Director of Education and not the District Inspector of Schools. The Education Code is a bunch of executive instructions which have been compiled for the purpose of internal instructions of the education department. 6. Learned Standing Counsel contends that the said Education Code authorizes the Regional Deputy Director of Education and not the District Inspector of Schools. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that the Education Code which applies in such matters, the appointing authority is the Principal of the institution and, therefore, even otherwise the District Inspector of Schools could not have made the appointment. 7. On this, new case is being taken up in the counter-affidavit, a rejoinder-affidavit was filed clearly stating therein that the Education Code does not have statutory force and it does not override the statutory Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. On a direction of this Court, a supplementary- counter-affidavit was filed bringing on record the provisions of the Education Code to which a supplementary-rejoinder- affidavit has been filed in the same terms denying the applicability thereof. 8. The question that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is as to whether the District Inspector of Schools was authorized to make the appointment under the aforesaid Rules which have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution or it is the Principal of the institution, who was authorized to make the appointment under the provisions of the Education Code. 9. The respondent - State has been unable to point out any other Rule apart from the provisions of the Education Code which may empower the Regional Deputy Director of Education to make appointment on the post of class-IV employee in the office subordinate to the same. The impugned order, which recites that the Regional Deputy Director of Education is the authority competent, therefore, has no legs to stand on the own showing of the respondents, who state that it is the Principal of the institution, who is the appointing authority. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.9.1994 deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. 10. Apart from this, once Rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution then in the hierarchy of the legislation, the said Rule will prevail. The Education Code, which has been compiled as an executive instruction, does not have statutory force where the field is already occupied under the Rules. 10. Apart from this, once Rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution then in the hierarchy of the legislation, the said Rule will prevail. The Education Code, which has been compiled as an executive instruction, does not have statutory force where the field is already occupied under the Rules. The Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Magan Ram Yadava v. Deputy Director of Education and others, (1980) UPLBEC 6 (FB), clearly supports the aforesaid conclusion drawn. Learned Standing Counsel has been unable to point out any other Rule which may substantiate the plea taken in the counter-affidavit that the Principal was the appointing authority and not the District Inspector of Schools. In this view of the matter on all counts the order dated 28.9.1994 cannot be sustained. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 28.9.1994 is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits forthwith. The respondents shall carry out the direction herein above within four weeks from today. ————