ORDER Writ Petition No.3957 of 2006 is filed by Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Ch.Nirmala, V. Swarupa Rani, V. Ramprasad and V. Rajesh and whereas Writ Petition No.24105 of 2006 is filed by Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi, Malladi Seetharamayya, Kanchubatla Manibala, Y. Ravikumar, M. Rama Krishna and Sobha Manikanth. 2. The petitioners in these two writ petitions challenge award No.5 of 2005 dated 5.8.2005 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Sub-Collector, Vijayawada, Krishna District. The writ petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006 are concerned with land admeasuring Ac.15.59 cents comprising Sy.No.60/2 of Kanuru village, Penamaluru Mandal, Krishna District, and whereas petitioners in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 are concerned with land admeasuring Ac.8.37 cents comprising Survey Nos.61 and 63 of Kanuru village, Penamaluru Mandal, Krishna District. 3. Background facts leading to filing of these two writ petitions assailing the award 5 of 2005 so far as it relates to the extents indicated above, in brief, are:- The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (for short, 'the Corporation') intended to establish an Automobile Workshop at Kanuru Village, near Vijayawada. At the request of the Corporation, the District Collector, Krishna-1st respondent published notification proposing to acquire the land admeasuring Acs.148.34 cents comprising R.S.Nos.181, 182, 183, 184 etc. of Kanuru village, Penamaluru Mandal. The said notification came to be quashed by this Court in Writ 255 Petition No.2370 of 1988. Subsequently, the District Collector, Krishna, notified an extent of Ac.152.08 cents comprising R.S.Nos.60/2, 61, 62, 63 etc. of Kanuru village of Penamaluru Mandal. Notification under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, 'the Act') was published in the Gazette on 24.4.1995. The enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with, and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 28.4.1995. Two writ petitions came to be filed questioning the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and Section 6 declaration. One writ petition being W.P.No.10651 of 1995 filed by Malladi Krishna Mohan and another writ petition being W.P.No.10652 of 1995 filed by Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, V.Venkata Rao and Ch. Nirmala. Malladi Krishna Mohan died pending disposal of W.P.No.10651 of 1995. M.V.Rama Devi, M.5itaramayya and Smt. Mani Bala came on record as petitioners 2 to 4. V. Venkat Rao, who is the 2nd petitioner in W.P, No.10652 of 1995 died pending disposal of the said writ petition and his legal representatives came on record as petitioners 4 to 6. Nirmala. Malladi Krishna Mohan died pending disposal of W.P.No.10651 of 1995. M.V.Rama Devi, M.5itaramayya and Smt. Mani Bala came on record as petitioners 2 to 4. V. Venkat Rao, who is the 2nd petitioner in W.P, No.10652 of 1995 died pending disposal of the said writ petition and his legal representatives came on record as petitioners 4 to 6. Both the writ petitions ended in dismissal by a common judgment dated 12.8.2003. The contention advanced by the petitioners that the land proposed to be acquired was not for public purpose came to be negatived by this Court in judgment dated 12.8.2003 passed in the above two writ petitions. For better appreciation, I may refer the relevant portion of the order dated 12.8.2003, which reads as hereunder:- "That takes me to the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel that the land acquisition proceedings lapsed by reason of Section 11 A of the Act. Be it noted, if an award is not passed within a period of two years from the date of two years from the date of last publication of declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings would lapse. In computing the period of two years, the time during which stay granted by this Court operates has to be excluded. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel is that as there is no stay in relation to half of the land comprised in Sy.Nos.61 and.63 and as no award was passed within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6(1), i.e., 28-4-1995, the land acquisition proceedings are lapsed. This is refuted by the learned Govt. Pleader, Sri P. Rajagopala Rao. His contention is that the petitioner's share has not been delineated and that if an award is not passed within two years, the aggrieved person is his brother and, therefore, the contention cannot be entertained at the instance of the person who obtained stay in relation to his undivided half share. Alternatively, he submits that when a notification is issued showing the joint ownership of two brothers, even if there is an order of stay in relation to any portion of the land, the same would operate as stay of the proceedings in relation to other portion of the land. Reliance is placed by the learned Govt. Alternatively, he submits that when a notification is issued showing the joint ownership of two brothers, even if there is an order of stay in relation to any portion of the land, the same would operate as stay of the proceedings in relation to other portion of the land. Reliance is placed by the learned Govt. Pleader on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammaml [AIR 1996 SC 866] and Abhey Ram v. Union of India [ (1997)5 SCC 421 ]. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel cannot be accepted. In the affidavit accompanying W.P.No.10651 of 1995, the petitioner admits that he owns half share in Acs.5.33 cents comprised in Sy.No.61 and half share in Acs.11.42 cents in sy.No.63 of Kanuru village. He also admits that he has an undivided share. Indeed, the notification issued under Section 4(1) by the District Collector would show that in respect of the land comprised in Sy.No.61 as well as Sy.No.63, the 25 name of the petitioner and the name of his brother Malladi Lakshminarayana are shown. There is no sub-division nor there is partition of undivided share. Therefore, there is force in the submission made by Sri P. Rajagopala Rao that when there is joint ownership, stay granted in favour of one joint owner will also operate as stay in respect of other land. In Abhey Ram v. Unian of India (supra), a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring large extent of 50,000 bighas situated in several villages was challenged inter alia on the ground that declaration under Section 6(1) published after three years is barred by law. A Full Bench of Delhi High Court upheld the validity of the notification on the ground that some of the land owners who land also was proposed for acquisition approached the High Court and obtained stay of further proceedings as a consequence of which the period of stay stood excluded by operation of Explanation II to Section 6(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the declaration was upheld. Subsequently, a Division Bench passed an order validating the notification against which an appeal was carried to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the declaration was upheld. Subsequently, a Division Bench passed an order validating the notification against which an appeal was carried to the Supreme Court. Before the apex Court, it was contended that as the appellants had not obtained any stay pending the writ petition qua the appellants, there was no prohibition for the Government to proceed further for publication of declaration under Section 6 and,' therefore, the declaration made after three year, is invalid in law. The Hon'ble apex Court rejected the contention and dismissed the appeal of the land owners. It is apposite to excerpt the following observations on the declaration of law by Supreme Court. ........The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants. We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases, has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [(1991) 4 SCC 5311, Hansraj H.Jain v. State of Maharashtra [ (1993) 3 SCC 634 ], Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [ (1994) 4 SCC 145 ], Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [ (1993) 2 SCC 662 ], G.Naraymzaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka (1991)3SCC 261] and Roshnara Begum v. Union of In dill [(1986) 1 Apex Dee 6]. The words "stay of the action or proceeding" have been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. of Karnataka (1991)3SCC 261] and Roshnara Begum v. Union of In dill [(1986) 1 Apex Dee 6]. The words "stay of the action or proceeding" have been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was properly conducted and the declaration published under Section 6 was valid, if would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who held not obtained stay in that behalf (emphasis supplied) There is yet another reason to reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel on this aspect. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammal (supra), if a large extent of land is acquired and in relation to some extent of the land an award is passed within a period of two years, any delay in passing the award in relation to other land would not render the award invalid. It was held: It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26/9/1986 and for Survey No.2/11 award was made on August 31,1990. Possession having already been undertaken on November 24, 1986, it stands vested in the State under Section 16 of the Act three from all encumbrances and nearby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been made within two years under Section 11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31st August, 1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11 A of the Act. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11 A of the Act. Equally, even if there is all irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and on account thereof, award made under Section 11 does not become invalid. In view of the above, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel is liable to be rejected as without any merit." 4. The petitioners in Writ Petition No.10652 of 1995 carried the matter in appeal by filing Writ Appeal No.1503 of 2003. The said writ appeal came to be dismissed on 8.9.2003. The petitioners in W.P.No.10651 of 1995 also carried the matter in appeal being Writ Appeal 2036 of 2003 and the said appeal came to be dismissed on 7.12.2003. The dust and din of the dispute with regard to the validity of Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration was set at rest with the dismissal of the writ appeals upholding the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act. After dismissal of the writ appeals, the Land Acquisition Officer issued notices under Sections 9(1) and (3) and 10 of the Act. Thereafter, an award being 5 of 2005 came to be passed on 5.8.2005. The said award is under challenge in these two writ petitions. 5. As most of the grounds urged in support of the writ petitions are similar and as in both the petitions the challenge is to the self same award, both the matters are being disposed of by this common order. 6. The principle grounds of challenge are: firstly; notices under Sections 9(1) and (3) and 10 were not served on the land owners as contemplated under the provisions of the Act, and secondly; the award is contrary to Section 11-A of the Act and that the entire proceedings lapsed, on account of the failure of the respondents to pass award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Apart from these grounds, certain other grounds also urged. Apart from these grounds, certain other grounds also urged. For better understanding of the grievance of the writ petitioners, I deem it appropriate to refer the relevant portion of the affidavit filed in support of W.P.No.24105 of 2006, which reads as hereunder:- "I submit that we also filed a representation to the Zonal Manager APIIC on 29.1.2005 requesting clarification regarding the Award No.4 of 96, Mutation, Nature of land etc. As there was no response we have filed Writ petition No.3080 of 2005. This Hon’ble Court by order dated 22.2.2005 directed the respondents to pass orders on the representation. The Sub-Collector, Vijayawada by endorsement in RC B1/31889/94, dt.15.7.2005 answered the queries. In this endorsement the Sub Collector has given several details relating to Sec 4(1) notification, Section 6 declaration and also clarified that the Award 4 of 96 dated 23.5.96 does not cover the land of ac.8.37 cents in Sy.Nos.61, 63. I submit that there were no further proceeding with regard to the acquisition of our lands. He has forwarded the copy of the endorsement to all the petitioners and the same was received by the petitioners on 10.9.2005. In this endorsement no reference is made to the award 5 of 2005 though it was dispatched subsequent to 5.8.2005. I submit that while so we received a notice from the Sub Collector under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act stating that an Award bearing No.5/2005 dated 5.8.2005 was passed. This notice was signed on 20.8.2005 and dispatched to us on 9.9.2005 and we received the same on 14.9.2005. After receipt of the said notice we approached the Land Acquisition Officer for issuance of the copy of the Award but he has not granted the copy and therefore we were constrained to file a writ petition in W.P.No.21223/2005 on 28.9.2005. In this writ petition it was specifically stated that the non supply of the Award copy would prove our suspicion that there is something fishy about the Award. This Hon'ble Court by order dated 11.11.2005 allowed the writ petition. Thereafter, enclosing the copy of the judgment approached the Land Acquisition Officer and the Award copy was supplied to us". 7. The respondents in the two writ petitions filed counter affidavits. It is suffice to refer the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent in W.P.No.24105 of 2006. This Hon'ble Court by order dated 11.11.2005 allowed the writ petition. Thereafter, enclosing the copy of the judgment approached the Land Acquisition Officer and the Award copy was supplied to us". 7. The respondents in the two writ petitions filed counter affidavits. It is suffice to refer the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent in W.P.No.24105 of 2006. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the award dated 5.8.2005 has been passed within two years of the date of dismissal of the writ petitions being W.P.Nos.10651 and 10652 of 1995. The period of interim stay is liable to be excluded in computing the period for passing the award under Section 11A of the Act. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that notices under Sections 9(1) (3) and 10 of the Act were published and served as contemplated under the provisions of the Act and that the initial award being 4/96 dated 23.5.1996 in respect of Ac.115.94 cents out of Ac.153.33 cents and the subsequent award dated 05.08.2005 in respect of Ac.36.34 cents is to be treated as supplementary award in which case even if there is any delay in passing the supplementary award, it does not invalidate the supplementary award. Para 14 of the counter needs to be noted and it is thus:- "In answer to the grounds raised in para 6(g) of the petitioners affidavit, it is submitted that the notices U/s 9(1) and 10 of the Act were issued on 2.7.04 and were duly published in the prescribed places strictly as per the provisions of the LA Act. Notices issued U/s 9(3) and 10 of the Act were sought to be served on the tenant of the petitioners as the petitioners were not residing in the village, but the tenant refused to take the notice. The petitioners having not attended the award enquiry cannot blame the respondents at later stage". 8. According to the respondents, after passing the award on 5.8.2005, possession of the land has been delivered to the Dy. Zonal Manager, APIIC, Vijayawada on 13.9.2005 and the APIIC in turn developed the land with basic infrastructure facilities and allotted the plots to different small scale entrepreneurs. 9. The 4th respondent filed counter affidavit. 8. According to the respondents, after passing the award on 5.8.2005, possession of the land has been delivered to the Dy. Zonal Manager, APIIC, Vijayawada on 13.9.2005 and the APIIC in turn developed the land with basic infrastructure facilities and allotted the plots to different small scale entrepreneurs. 9. The 4th respondent filed counter affidavit. The sum and substance of the counter affidavit filed by 4th respondent, in brief, is:- After handing over possession of the land admeasuring Ac.115.94 cents to APIIC, the Zonal Manager, APIIC made an application for sanction of layout and in order to fulfill the conditions stipulated by the Vijayawada-Guntur-Tenali Urban Development Authority, Vijayawada, this respondent entered into an agreement with APIIC for development of the land and for laying of roads and maintaining greenery. It is further stated that the award was passed on 5.8.2005 and possession was taken over on 13.9.05. Under Section 16 of the Act, once possession is taken over after passing of the award, the question of divesting the property to the landowners does not arise. It is further stated that the last date of Section 6 declaration in the locality was given on 25.5.1995. The petitioners obtained stay on 30.5.1995 and it remained in operation till 12.08.2003 and therefore, the award passed on 5.8.2005 is within two years of the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 10. The petitioners filed reply affidavit reiterating the grounds urged by them in the writ affidavits. 11. Heard leaned counsel appearing for the parties. 12. Sri S.R. Ashok, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the award is not passed within two years from the date of Section 6 declaration, and therefore, Award 5 of 05 dated 5.8.05 is non est in law. Learned Senior Counsel refers various endorsements on the note file maintained by the Land Acquisition Officer to buttress his submission that the award is ante dated. Learned senior counsel also contends that the award enquiry notices as contemplated under Sections 9(1) and (3) are not published/served on the interested persons and in which case, the award even if passed on 5.8.05 is vitiated for noncompliance of mandatory provisions of the Act. In support of his contentions, reliance has been placed on certain judgments of this Court as well as the Supreme Court. 13. In support of his contentions, reliance has been placed on certain judgments of this Court as well as the Supreme Court. 13. Sri Ashok Anand Kumar supplementing the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel has raised various large number of issues and made an attempt to challenge the entire acquisition proceedings though the limited prayer of quashing the award No.5 of 2005, dated 05.08.2005 has been sought for in the writ petitions. The learned counsel vehemently argued that the petitioners were not put on notice during award enquiry and proceedings during the award enquiry were conducted behind the back of the petitioners. He would also contend that the Land Acquisition Officer knowing fully well that the petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006 reside in Divya Shakthi Apartments failed to send notice under Section 9(3) to their proper address and that itself is sufficient to conclude that the petitioners were not given proper opportunity to participate in the award enquiry and therefore, the award 5 of 2005 dated 5.8.2005 is liable to be set aside and the proceedings initiated for acquisition of lands under the Act are to be declared as lapsed. A further contention has been advanced that the panchanama dated 13.9.2005 regarding delivery of possession is only a make believe thing and no delivery has been effected in favour of APIIC, and in which case, the contention of APIIC that lands have been developed and subsequently converted into plots and allotted to the members of the 4th respondent does not stand to reason. 14. Sri P. Raja Gopala Rao, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent submits that the petitioners tried their best to delay the completion of the acquisition proceedings by filing series of writ petitions and in all the writ petitions, this Court negatived their contention and that they having failed in their attempts to stall the acquisition proceedings, resorted to filing this batch of writ petitions contending that they are not put on notice in the award enquiry. He would also submit that if the period of stay is excluded, the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is well within time and therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. A further submission has been made that the last publication under Section 6 was dated 25.5.1995. He would also submit that if the period of stay is excluded, the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is well within time and therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. A further submission has been made that the last publication under Section 6 was dated 25.5.1995. The petitioners filed writ petition and obtained interim order on 30.5.1995 and ultimately, the writ petitions ended in dismissal on 12.8.2003. In view of the interim orders passed by this Court in respect of Ac.36-34 cents, award for the remaining extent of Ac.115-94 cents came to be passed on 23.05.1996. If the period during which stay order in operation is excluded as per Explanation to Section 11 A, the award dated 5.8.2005 is well within the period of two years from', the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. He would also contend that the Land Acquisition Officer signed the award on 5.8.2005 and subsequent approval of the award by the Joint Collector is only a ministerial act and the approval dates back to the date of award. 15. Two questions that arise for consideration are:- (1) Whether the award 5 of 2005 dated 5.8.2005 is passed within the period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act? (2) Whether the award enquiry conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer suffers from any infirmities or illegalities? 16. POINT No.1: At the cost of repetition, I may state that the petitioners in earlier round of litigation obtained stay of dispossession on 30.5.1995 and ultimately, the writ petitions ended in dismissal on 12.8.2003. Thereafter, award 5 of 2005 came to be passed in respect of the lands owned by the petitioners on 5.8.2005. 16. POINT No.1: At the cost of repetition, I may state that the petitioners in earlier round of litigation obtained stay of dispossession on 30.5.1995 and ultimately, the writ petitions ended in dismissal on 12.8.2003. Thereafter, award 5 of 2005 came to be passed in respect of the lands owned by the petitioners on 5.8.2005. Section 11A of the Act reads as hereunder:- "11A.Period within which an award shall be made: The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse; PROVIDED that in case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement, Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. 17. It is not the case of the petitioners that notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act were not published or given publicity as mandatorily required under law. Even otherwise, all the contentions raised by the petitioners questioning notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act have been turned down by the dismissal of their writ petitions on 12.08.2003 and they unsuccessfully challenged the orders passed in the writ petitions by filing writ appeals W.A.Nos.1503 of 2003 and 2036 of 2003, which were also ended in dismissal on 08.09.2003 and 17.12.2003 respectively. Petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 being the purchasers of the lands under acquisition after initiation of proceedings under the provisions of the Act cannot be permitted to contend that their rights are prejudiced by the award dated 05.8.2005. At the most, they can make a claim for compensation for the lands purchased by them. 18. Petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 being the purchasers of the lands under acquisition after initiation of proceedings under the provisions of the Act cannot be permitted to contend that their rights are prejudiced by the award dated 05.8.2005. At the most, they can make a claim for compensation for the lands purchased by them. 18. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the interim stay of dispossession is not an impediment for the authorities to proceed further in passing the A ward and therefore, the authorities ought to have passed the Award within two years i.e., from 25.05.1995 and the A ward allegedly passed on 05.08.2005 is beyond the period stipulated in the Act. 19. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent submits that taking possession of the land is an integral part of the acquisition proceedings and when once stay of dispossession operates, the period during which stay of dispossession is in force is liable to be excluded. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N, and others (1) (2004).4 SCC 322 and also a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in G.Chenchaiah v. The District Collector, Chittoor and others (2) (W.A.Nos.317, 320, 321, 322, 323 and 325 of 2003, dated 22.12.2006). 20. Indisputably, if the period, during which stay of dispossession is excluded, the award dated 05.08.2005 is well within the period of two years. I do not wish to make the judgment bulky by referring the proposition of law laid down in various judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is suffice to refer M.Ramalinga Thevar's case (1 supra), wherein it has been held that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court, the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award. In G. Chenchaiah's case (2 supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that once there is a stay of dispossession, the period during which the order is in force is liable to be excluded in computing the period of two years as provided under Section 11-A of the Act. 21. In G. Chenchaiah's case (2 supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that once there is a stay of dispossession, the period during which the order is in force is liable to be excluded in computing the period of two years as provided under Section 11-A of the Act. 21. In view of the settled proposition of law that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court, the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the award passed by the 2nd respondent on 05.08.2005 cannot be said to be beyond the two years period. Hence, the contention of the petitioners that the Award dated 05.08.2005 is beyond the period of two years cannot be sustained. Point No.2: 22. Sri Ashok Anand Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the A ward is ante-dated. Actual date of A ward is not 05.08.2005, in which case, the A ward impugned in the writ petitions is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel by referring the Note File maintained by the Land Acquisition Officer 2nd respondent contends that the Note File does not indicate of the award being forwarded to the Joint Collector for approval. 23. I have gone through the Note File maintained by the 2nd respondent. Nothing can be inferred from the Note File that letter addressed to the Joint Collector for approval does not contain enclosure of draft award. It is well settled that date of approval of the award by the Joint Collector relates back to the date of passing the Award by the Land Acquisition Officer. The draft award came to be approved by the Joint Collector on 15.08.2005 and it relates back to the date of signing of the Award. - vide the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ballamma (dead) and others v. Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and others (3) AIR 2006 SC 1132 . 24. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners tries to convince me that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the above referred case is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. I do not find any substance in his contention. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-referred case squarely applies to the facts of the case on hand. 25. I do not find any substance in his contention. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-referred case squarely applies to the facts of the case on hand. 25. Much arguments have been addressed by Sri Ashok Anand Kumar that the petitioners were not put on notice in the award enquiry and therefore, the award dated 5.8.2005 is non est in law and thereby the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on a Division Bench judgments of this Court in- Secretary to Government, Social Welfare Department and others v. Eedara Krishna (4) 2008 (6) ALT 617 (DB) and Managing Director, APSRTC, Hyderabad v. M. Kamalakumari (5) 2002 (2) ALT 180 (DB). In Eedara Krishna's case (4th supra); a Division Bench of this Court after perusing the material brought on record came to the conclusion that there was no service at all in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it is not a case of mere irregularity. Paras 15 and 16 of the cited judgment needs to be noted and it is thus:- "15. Learned Government Pleader relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamilnadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammal [AIR 1996 SC 866] wherein, according to the learned Government Pleader, it was held that any irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act would only be a curable irregularity and on account of the same the award would not become invalid. However, a perusal of the facts of the said case would demonstrate that Sections 9 and 10 notices were alleged to have been served on 120 persons in a single day, including a dead person. The Supreme Court was prepared to overlook any irregularity in such service of notices. In the present case, there was no service at all in accordance with the Act and it is not a case of 'mere irregularity'. Further, there was a stay of dispossession in that case and therefore, the limitation under Section 11-A of the Act did not come into play. The Supreme Court also observed that the possession of the land would be taken only by way of memorandum, Panchanama, which is a legally accepted norm as it would not be possible to take actual physical possession of vacant land. The Supreme Court also observed that the possession of the land would be taken only by way of memorandum, Panchanama, which is a legally accepted norm as it would not be possible to take actual physical possession of vacant land. Further, in that case the issue was with regard to supplemental award being passed in respect of certain portion of land, which had been left out in the first notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that in so far the first notification was concerned, the procedure had been followed strictly, and therefore, the lacuna, if any, in passing of the award pursuant to the second Section 4(1) notification was overlooked. 16. In the case on hand, we have noticed that there is no proof of the land having been taken on 05.07.1992 as alleged by the authorities. There is no panchanama available in the record and there is no proof of notice having been issued under Section 12(2) of the Act. It is also to be noted that in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court observed that if compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party. In the present case, the Respondent did not even have notice that the award had been passed till he filed the writ petition and the same was supplied to him along with the counter-affidavit. According to the authorities, the compensation payable to him was deposited in Court. No details are forthcoming as to when such deposit was made. Without paying compensation to the Respondent, it is not lawful for the authorities to take possession of the land, unless they had sought recourse to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In this regard, Sri G.Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the Respondent, stated that though Section 17 of the Act had been pressed into use when the Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 declaration were issued simultaneously on 27.07.1981, we do not find any mention of the invocation of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act at that point of time, from the record. On the other hand, this Court, while setting aside the Section 6 declaration by its order dated 28.01.1986 in W.P.No.4475 of 1982 directed the authorities to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 5-A of the Act. On the other hand, this Court, while setting aside the Section 6 declaration by its order dated 28.01.1986 in W.P.No.4475 of 1982 directed the authorities to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 5-A of the Act. Had the authorities invoked the urgency provisions of Section 17 of the Act, they were required under Section 17(3-A) of the Act to tender payment 80% of the compensation for the land before taking possession. There is no whisper of any such steps having been initiated by the authorities in this case. Further, as contended by Sri G. Krishna Murthy, the power to take possession of the land, in the absence of the urgency provisions under Section 17, would only arise when the collector makes an award under Section 11 of the Act and takes possession under Section 16 of the Act. In the present case, it is the case of the authorities that award was passed on 22.11.1993 and possession was taken on 05.07.1992. Therefore, there is a clear violation of Section 16 of the Act going by case as put-forth by the authorities themselves". 26. In Kamalakumari's case (5 supra), a Division Bench of this Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 45 of the Act has held affixture of notice on a pole erected in the site does not constitute valid service. It is further observed that what is contemplated under sub-section (3) of Sec 45 of the Act is affixture of notice on the doors of the houses/huts of the land owners. 27. The petitioners in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 are six in number. Petitioners 1 to 3, namely, Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi, Malladi Seetharamayya and Kanchubatla Manibala are the owners of the land admeasuring Ac.8.37 cents comprising Survey Nos.63 and 61 of Kanur village. Petitioner Nos 4 to 6, namely, Y.Ravi Kumar, M. Rama Krishna and Sobha Manikanth are the subsequent purchasers. For clarity, I may state that petitioners 4 to 6 are purchasers subsequent to Section 6 declaration. It is well settled that as soon as Section 6 declaration is made, land vests with the Government free from encumbrances. The subsequent purchasers are only entitled to claim compensation and they have no right to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings. I may refer some decisions on this aspect and they are: (1) Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others (6) (1996) 11 SCC 698 . The subsequent purchasers are only entitled to claim compensation and they have no right to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings. I may refer some decisions on this aspect and they are: (1) Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others (6) (1996) 11 SCC 698 . (2) Yadu Nandan Garg. v. State of Rajasthan (7) AIR 1996 SC 520 (3) Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India (8) (1996) 10 SCC 721 . (4) U.P.Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. M/s. Karla Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow (9) AIR 1996 SC 1170 . (5) Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (10) (2008) 9 SCC 177 . 28. In view of the propositions of law laid down in the above-referred cases, the respondents 4 to 6 cannot be permitted to contend that the award dated 5.8.2005 is void on the ground of non-service of notice on them as provided under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act. 29. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that the award 5 of 2005 dated 5.8.2005 is ante-dated and therefore, it is non est in law, in which case, the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act stand vitiated. Learned counsel by referring the reply received to the representation submitted by them contends that had there been any notices issued under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act, the same should have been stated in the reply and so also passing of the award. I do not see any substance in his contention since the reply to the representations is dated 15.7.2005 and whereas the award came to be passed on 5.8.2005. 30. I have perused the record placed before me. The award dated 5.8.2005 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer came to be approved by the Joint Collector on 15.8.2005. The endorsement dated 15.8.2005 of the Joint Collector on the draft award reads as hereunder:- "Draft supplementary award approved for an amount of 97,02,000/- (Rupees ninety seven lakhs two thousand only) Joint Collector, Krishna 0t.15.8.2005 31. The Land Acquisition Officer addressed letter dated 20th August 2005 to the Mandal Revenue Officer for effecting service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act on the landowners. The Land Acquisition Officer addressed letter dated 20th August 2005 to the Mandal Revenue Officer for effecting service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act on the landowners. The material placed before me indicates that the Land Acquisition Officer passed supplementary award on 5.8.2005 and the same came to approved by the Joint Collector on 15.8.2005 and thereupon, the Land Acquisition Officer sent notices under Section 12(2) of the Act for service on the land owners through Mandal Revenue Officer, Penamaluru. 32. It is pertinent to note that the total extent of Ac.153.33 was sought to be acquired for extension of Jawaharnagar Auto Road, Vijayawada. Because of certain land owners approaching this Court and obtaining stay of dispossession in respect of land admeasuring Ac.36.14 cents, an award being 4 of 1996 came to be passed for the remaining extent of Ac.115.94 cents. APIIC, the requisitioning department collected development charges from the beneficiaries and laid roads. The total amount collected by APIIC towards development charges was about Rs. 3.35 crores. Respondent No.4 being association of the beneficiaries paid the said amount. In Award No.4 of 1996, compensation at the rate of Rs. 3 lakhs per acre came to be granted to the land owners. The petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 purchased the lands in the year 2004 at the rate of Rs.5 lakhs per acre from petitioners 1 to 3. By the time respondents 4 to 6 purchased the property, efforts made by petitioners 1 to 3 to stall the acquisition proceedings proved to be futile. It can be said without any fear of contradiction that petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 purchased the property with full knowledge about the finality of Section 6 declaration. With regard to petitioners 1 to 3, the material brought on record discloses that Section 9(1) notice has been widely published in the village and notice under Section 9(3) came to be served by way of affixture as they were stated to be not residing in the village. Even otherwise, any irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act does not vitiate the proceedings as held by the Supreme Court in May George v. Special Tahsildar and others (11) 2010 (6) SCALE 71. 33. Even otherwise, any irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act does not vitiate the proceedings as held by the Supreme Court in May George v. Special Tahsildar and others (11) 2010 (6) SCALE 71. 33. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the petitioners are still in possession of the properties, and therefore, the alleged panchanamas, whereunder possession has been delivered to the requisitioning department and thereafter beneficiaries, are non est in the eye of law. The contention appears to be sound on the first blush, but on close scrutiny of the material brought on record and in view of the proposition of law laid down in various judgments of the Supreme Court, I do not detain myself long to reject the same. There can be no question of taking symbolic possession in the sense understood by judicial decision under the Code of Civil Procedure nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend upon the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking possession of the land. It is now well settled legal position that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum of panchanama by the Land Acquisition Officer in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land and it would be impossible to take physical possession of the land. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchanama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. It is also clear that one of the methods of taking possession and handing it over to the beneficiary department is the recording of panchanama, which can itself constitute evidence of the fact that the possession has been taken and the land had vested absolutely in the Government. 34. It is also clear that one of the methods of taking possession and handing it over to the beneficiary department is the recording of panchanama, which can itself constitute evidence of the fact that the possession has been taken and the land had vested absolutely in the Government. 34. Sri Rajagopala Rao, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent submits that Section 9 of the Act provides an opportunity to the person interested to file a claim petition with documentary evidence for determining the market value of the land and in case a person does not file claim even after receiving the notice, he still has a right to make an application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the scheme of the Act is such that it does not cause any prejudicial consequence in case notice under Section 9(3) is not served upon the person interested. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in J.Rajyalakshmi and others v. Land Acquisition Officer, HUDA, Hyd. (12) 1998 (6) ALT 140 = 1998 (5) ALD 644 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in May George case (11 supra). The question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court is whether the provisions of Section 9(3) are mandatory in nature and non-compliance thereof, would vitiate the A ward and subsequent proceedings under the Act. The Supreme Court, after thorough survey of the proposition of law laid down in the earlier decisions has observed as hereunder:- "12. The only question remains for our consideration is as to whether the provisions of Section 9(3) are mandatory in nature and noncompliance thereof, would vitiate the Award and subsequent proceedings under the Act. Section 4 Notification manifests the tentative opinion of the Authority to acquire the land. However, Section 6 Declaration is a conclusive proof thereof. The Land Acquisition Collector acts as Representative of the State, while holding proceedings under the Act, he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. Therefore, he determines the preexisting right which is recognized by the Collector and guided by the findings arrived in determining the objections etc., and he quantifies the amount of compensation to be placed as an offer on behalf of the appropriate government to the person interested. It is for the tenure holder/person interested to accept it or not. Therefore, he determines the preexisting right which is recognized by the Collector and guided by the findings arrived in determining the objections etc., and he quantifies the amount of compensation to be placed as an offer on behalf of the appropriate government to the person interested. It is for the tenure holder/person interested to accept it or not. In case, it is not acceptable to him, person interested has a right to ask the Collector to make a reference to the Tribunal". 35. In view of the settled proposition of law that failure to issue notices under Section 9(3) of the Act would not adversely affect the subsequent proceedings including the Award and title of the Government in the acquired land. The contention advanced by the petitioner that acquisition proceedings are bad for non-service of notice under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act has no substance. The note file maintained by the Land Acquisition Officer indicates that notices under Sections 9(1) and 10 of the Act have been directed to be issued on 26.6.2004 and draft letter to M.R.O., Penamaluru came to be approved on .2.7.2004. The material placed on record indicates that the Land Acquisition Officer complied the provisions of Sections 9(1) and (3) and 10 of the Act in conducting the Award enquiry. Indeed, one of the land owners, namely, Malladi Lakshmi Narayana of Kama village appeared during award enquiry and filed objections. In view of the above discussion, I find that there is no irregularity in conducting the award enquiry. 36. Accordingly, these two writ petitions are devoid of merits and they are hereby dismissed. The interim order dated 27.7.2006 passed in W.P.M.P.No.4937 of 2006 in W.P.No.3957 of 2006 is hereby vacated and W.V.M.P.No.2059 of 2006 and W.V.M.P. No.90 of 2007 are allowed. No order as to costs.