JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—These two writ petitions raising similar issues have been heard together and are being decided by this Common judgement. Pleadings in both the writ petitions are complete and with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the writ petitions are being finally decided. 2. We have heard Sri Ashwini Kumar Misra, Advocate for the petitioner in first writ petition and Sri Anoop Trivedi, Advocate has appeared for the petitioner in the second writ petition. Sri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri S.P. Kesharwani has appeared for the State respondents. Dr. Y.K. Srivastava has appeared on behalf of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. 3. For deciding both the writ petitions, it is sufficient to refer the facts and pleadings of the first writ petition i.e. writ petition No. 39850 of 2009 in detail and reference of some facts of second writ petition also. The second writ petition No. (PIL) 47934 of 2008 was filed earlier in point of time on 10.9.2008 praying for quashing the request for proposal for strategic sale of entire equity of the Government of U.P. in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. as issued on 8.9.2008. Prayer for quashing the Government Order dated 4.6.2007 was also made by which the State of U.P. has taken decision for privatisation/sale of units of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. The writ petition was entertained and an order dated 30.9.2008 was passed by which a direction was issued that no third party right shall be created till the next date of listing. During the course of hearing in the said writ petition, the Court was informed that an Ordinance was also issued on 29.9.2008. Subsequently, the petitioner was permitted to challenge the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008 promulgated on 29.9.2008. The said Ordinance was subsequently replaced by U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009. The petitioner was also permitted to amend the writ petition adding the prayer for declaring the Ordinance of 2008 as well as Act of 2009 as ultra-vires. 4. The first writ petition being writ petition No. 39850 of 2009 Chini Mills Karmchari Sangh v. State of U.P. and others has been filed on behalf of Chini Mills Karmchari Sangh, Mohiuddinpur Unit through its President. The petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that petitioner is a workers union duly registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926. 4. The first writ petition being writ petition No. 39850 of 2009 Chini Mills Karmchari Sangh v. State of U.P. and others has been filed on behalf of Chini Mills Karmchari Sangh, Mohiuddinpur Unit through its President. The petitioner’s case in the writ petition is that petitioner is a workers union duly registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926. The petitioner union is directly and adversely affected by privatization policy of the State as the same is prejudicial to the interest of the members of the petitioner union and is a gross infraction of existing and prevalent statutes as well as the Constitution of India. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. was incorporated as Government Company in accordance with the provisions of Section 607 of Companies Act, 1956. U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 was enacted by the State of U.P. to acquire private sugar mills of the State which were creating serious problems for cane growers and labourers. The Act was enacted with the object of renovating and rehabilitating the sugar mills and to carry out the improvements therein. The State of U.P. issued a Government Order dated 4.6.2007 by which a decision was taken to privatize/sale the sugar mills of the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. The Managing Director of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. was asked to submit proposal alongwith recommendation for privatization/sale of the sugar mills of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. After the Government Order dated 4.6.2007, request for proposal for strategic sale of entire equity of Government of U.P. in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. was issued on September 8, 2008. The State Government by a subsequent Government Order dated 14.11.2008 decided not to continue with the disinvestment by sale of its shares and the said process was annulled. An Ordinance was promulgated on 29.9.2008 namely U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008 inserting new Sections 3-A to 3-E in the U.P. Act No. 23 of 1971. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009, which was published in the U.P. Gazette on 20.2.2009 and was enforced with effect from 29.9.2008 the date of issue of Ordinance. 5. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009, which was published in the U.P. Gazette on 20.2.2009 and was enforced with effect from 29.9.2008 the date of issue of Ordinance. 5. After the enforcement of the Amendment Act,2009 an expression cum request for publication was issued by the State of U.P. on 29.6.2009 for sale/privatization of 11 operating units of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. 11 operating units which are proposed to be sold also included Mohiuddinpur unit of which unit the petitioner is workers union. By means of first writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for followings reliefs : “(i) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring the provisions of the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009 as ultra vires the powers and beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature; (ii) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the State Government has no jurisdiction or authority to sell off the units of the U.P. State Sugar Corporation as came to be vested in it pursuant to the provisions of the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971; (iii) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for all records and decisions of the State Government in relation to the slump sale in question and to quash the same; (iv) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the entire bidding process as being conducted pursuant to the Expression of Interest/RFQ issued on 29th June 2009 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition); (v) Pass such other and further order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 6. Sri A.K. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioner in first writ petition in support of the writ petition raises following submissions: (i) U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009 is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature inasmuch as by the amendment Act,2009 the State Legislature has decided to sell the 11 operating sugar mills which entrenches in the legislative field of Parliament under Entry 52 List I of Seventh Schedule. The sugar having been declared controlled industries as specified in First Schedule of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, the field is occupied by the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 denuding the legislative competence of State Legislature to enact the Amendment Act, 2009. (ii) The Amendment Act, 2009 is not a law passed by the State Legislature referable to Entry 42 of List III and the vires of The Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 was upheld by Supreme Court in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1980) 4 SCC 136 relying on entry 43 List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which ground is not available with regard to 2009 Amendment Act. The Amendment Act being not related to acquisition or requisition of the property, whereas the 1971 Act was enacted with the object of renovating and rehabilitating the sugar mills which were not being properly run and managed by owners of the sugar mills. The legislation was prepared to acquire such mills hence, the competence of State Legislature was upheld whereas amendment Act, 2009 has been enacted with object of selling/closing the operating sugar mills which is not the subject matter of acquisition and requisition. The Amendment Act, 2009 is diagonally opposite to the principal Act, 1971. The amendment Act is a colourable exercise of power by the State Legislature. (iii) The Amendment Act, 2009 having been enforced w.e.f. September 29, 2008, the Government Order dated 4.6.2007 cannot be validated by Section 3-D as inserted by Amendment Act, 2009. The Amendment Act,2009 not being a retrospective, the Government Order dated 4.6.2007 could not be validated by Amendment Act, 2009 all subsequent action in pursuance of the Government Order dated 4.6.2007 falls on ground. (iv) Section 3-C of Amendment Act, 2009 which permits change of land use is nothing but a provision enabling the State Government to close the running sugar mills and permit construction of residential colonies or other uses looking to the valuable land which are part of the respective sugar industries. Regulation and control of sugar industries is governed by 1951 Act consequently the State Legislature is denuded of the legislative competence to enact any law under Entry 24 of List II. Regulation and control of sugar industries is governed by 1951 Act consequently the State Legislature is denuded of the legislative competence to enact any law under Entry 24 of List II. Similarly the provisions under Section 3-D inserted by Amendment Act, 2009 permitting the closure of the industries is beyond the legislative competence for the above reason. The decision of the State to close 11 operating sugar mills is not in public interest as thousands of workers are getting livelihood from running of the sugar industries which also feeds thousands of cane growers. By closure of the industries production of the sugar shall be adversely affected which shall not serve any public interest. The State has not taken any efforts to ensure that sugar mills may be run and only intent of the State is to sell/close the sugar mills and to give huge tract of the land on a platter to the purchasers. (v) In the request for proposal for strategic sale of 11 operating units, there are conditions that purchaser is obliged to run the sugar mills only for one year. 7. Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in second writ petition in support of his writ petition contended that Amendment Act, 2009 has been enacted without President’s assent whereas Parent Act, 1971 was enacted with Presidential assent. Relying on Article 31-A of the Constitution of India clause (1) first proviso, it is submitted that Presidential assent was required. 8. Sri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that State Legislature has legislative competence to enact the Amendment Act, 2009. He contended that Amendment Act, 2009 does not entrench on the legislative field of Parliament under Entry 52 List I. He contends that Amendment Act, 2009 does not violate any of the provisions of 1951 Act. It is submitted that the State Legislature has competence under Entry 43 List III to enact the Amendment Act, 2009. Constitutional validity of the Parent Act i.e. 1971 Act having been upheld in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (supra), the Amendment Act 2009 is also within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It is further submitted that the State is not denuded of its power to legislate under Entry 24 List II since the field is not occupied by 1951 Act. It is further submitted that the State is not denuded of its power to legislate under Entry 24 List II since the field is not occupied by 1951 Act. All sugar undertakings vest under Section 3 of 1971 Act in the Sugar Corporation Ltd. and the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. has every right to sell it. The right to acquire the property itself contains the right to transfer. The Board of Directors of U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. have decided to transfer the assets and there were valid reasons for transfer of the sugar undertakings. The sugar mills suffered sustained losses. Problems in sugar undertakings have much grown and there are large number of private sugar industries, which are producing sugar. The earlier decision to sell the entire equity of the State was cancelled by the Government order dated 14.11.2008 and now State has initiated process for sale of 11 operating sugar mills, which are being sold as running mills. There are further 18 non operating mills which are vested in U.P. State Sugar Cane Development Ltd. The Government has initiated Voluntary Retirement Scheme with regard to sugar mills, benefit of which scheme has been taken by majority of the workers. There is nothing in 1971 Act which prohibits the State from transferring the sugar mills. Right to enjoy the property includes right to transfer. The State Government to take out the sugar mills from heavy losses have granted loan to the sugar mills which were transferred as equity. 9. It is further submitted by Sri Mathur that infact there was no requirement of any legislative sanction for transferring the property of the sugar mills. The legislative sanction was taken for greater transparency. The Amendment Act, 2009 is not a validating Act and it only gives sanction to the previous administrative action. The Legislative competence of Amendment Act, 2009 can also be pressed from Entries 18 and 35 of List II, Entry 6 of List III, Entries 6, 20, and 42 of List III. It is submitted that 1951 Act contains a declaration only to the extent that sugar is a scheduled industry. Licence is in domain of 1951 Act rest is covered by Entry 24 List II. There are various items in the Schedule of 1951 Act on which restriction on sale cannot be read. Section 18A empowers the Central Government to take management or control. Licence is in domain of 1951 Act rest is covered by Entry 24 List II. There are various items in the Schedule of 1951 Act on which restriction on sale cannot be read. Section 18A empowers the Central Government to take management or control. The said provision cannot be read as any restriction on the transfer. It is further submitted by Sri Mathur that only when a notified order is passed under Section 18A, there may be repugnancy with the State Act on transfer but there being no notified order passed by the Central Government under Section 18-A, the question of repugnancy does not arise. Repugnancy has to exist as a fact and mere possibility of repugnancy is not a ground to invalidate a legislative enactment. 10. Replying the submissions of Sri Anoop Trivedi, it is submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that no Presidential assent was required since the enactment of 1951 and Amendment Act, 2009 operate in different fields. 11. Learned Counsel for the parties have referred to and relied on various decisions of the Apex Court which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail. From the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, following issues emerged for consideration in these two writ petitions : I. Whether the State Legislature has legislative competence to enact the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009? Further whether the provisions inserted by Amendment Act, 2009 entrench on the legislative field covered by Parliament under Entry 52 List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution? II. Whether Section 3-C of Amendment Act, 2009 which empowers the State to change the land use and Section 3-D which permits the closure of sugar undertakings or sugar mills of the Corporation is within the legislative competence of the State Legislature? III. Whether the Amendment Act, 2009 is referable to Entry 24 List II or Entry 43 List III? Whether the State of U.P. is empowered to transfer the sugar undertakings without there being any legislative sanction? IV. Whether the power of acquisition of a property which is covered by Entry 43 List III in itself contains the power to transfer all the properties so acquired? Further there is no restraint under 1951 Act or 1971 Act prohibiting the State from transferring the sugar mills? IV. Whether the power of acquisition of a property which is covered by Entry 43 List III in itself contains the power to transfer all the properties so acquired? Further there is no restraint under 1951 Act or 1971 Act prohibiting the State from transferring the sugar mills? V. Whether unless a notified order is passed by the Central Government under 1951 Act, Section 18-A and other sections the question of repugnancy of the State enactment cannot be gone into? Further there being no notified order passed by the Central Government under 1951 Act for taking over the management of the sugar mills there is no restriction on the power of the State Government to transfer the sugar undertakings since inconsistency should arise infact and mere possibility of an inconsistency/repugnancy is not a ground for invalidating State Act? VI. Whether the Presidential assent was necessary to be taken before enacting 2009 Amendment Act under Article 31-A of the Constitution of India? 12. The first four issues as noted above being inter-related relating to legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the Amendment Act, 2009 are being taken together. Part XI Chapter I of the Constitution of India deals with Legislative Relations (Distribution of Legislative powers). Article 246 of the Constitution of India deals with the subject-matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the Legislatures of the States. Article 246 of the Constitution of India is quoted as below : “246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.— (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List”). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State 219 also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State 219 has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State 219 has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included 220 in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” 13. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India as referred to under Article 246 contains List I-Union List, List II-State List and List III-Concurrent List. Each Entry in the three Lists is category or head of the subject matter of legislation and may be construed not in a narrow or restricted sense but as widely as possible so as to to give result which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. Before we proceed to construe the entries in different lists, one principles of interpretation is to be kept in mind i.e. when some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same List may overlap or may appear to be in direct conflict with each other, it is the duty of the Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. This principle was laid down by the Apex Court in M/s Siel Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 3076 , paragraph 11 of which is quoted herein below. “11. Before construing these entries, it is necessary to bear in mind the principle laid down in several decisions of this Court relating to the interpretation of these entries. In the case of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 , this Court has held that when some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same List may overlap or may appear to be in direct conflict with each other, it is the duty of the Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. This Court observed, (at page 1050), “It may, therefore, be taken as a well settled rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory.” 14. The relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule which falls for consideration in this case are; List I Entry 52, List II Entry 24, List III Entry 42, which are being quoted below : List I “52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest” List II “24. Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I.” List III “42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property” 15. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Parliament in exercise of legislative power under Entry 52 List I has enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 for the development and regulation of certain industries, control of which have been taken by the Union. It is submitted that sugar which is included at item No. 25 in the First Schedule of the Act has been taken under control by the Union by declaration hence, the State is denuded of any legislative power with regard to sugar industries under Entry 24 List II. The submission is that 2009 Amendment Act which is an amendment in 1971 Act entrenches on the legislative field of the Parliament in Entry 52. The field of legislation under Entry 24 List II is subject to legislation under Entry 52. Thus, the State Legislature is denuded of its legislative competence in respect of legislative field occupied by a legislation under Entry 52. The submission further is that control and development of sugar industry, which is a scheduled industry having been taken by the 1951 Act, the State cannot legislate in respect of sugar industry. Further submission is that the Amendment Act, 2009 is not an amendment which is referable to Entry 42 of List III so as to be saved rather the amendment Act has been enacted with the object to sell and closure of 11 operating sugar mills which is beyond the legislative competence of the State. Further submission is that the Amendment Act, 2009 is not an amendment which is referable to Entry 42 of List III so as to be saved rather the amendment Act has been enacted with the object to sell and closure of 11 operating sugar mills which is beyond the legislative competence of the State. The above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been refuted by learned Additional Advocate General as noticed above. Learned Counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on several judgments of the Apex Court in support of their respective contentions. 16. Before we proceed to examine the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties any further, it is useful to refer to some decisions of the Apex Court in the above context. In The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and others v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1961 SC 459 , the validity of Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 was challenged in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. One of the contentions raised was that the above Act, 1952 is ultra-vires to the Central Act 53 of 1948 and further it is ultra-vires having regard to Entry 52 List I read with Central Act No. 65 of 1951. The Entry 54 List I which fell for consideration in the above case, provides as under : “Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” 17. Entry 23 of List II provides as follows : “23. Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.” 18. Following was laid down in paragraphs 23 and 24 by the Apex Court. “23............The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union, to the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded. If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union, to the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded. In other words, if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as required by Entry 54, and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra vires, not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law. The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature itself. This position is not in dispute. 24........Therefore, if a Central Act has been passed for the purpose of providing for the conservation and development of minerals, and if it contains the requisite declaration, then it would not be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act in respect of the subject-matter covered by the said declaration. In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act LIII of 1948.” 19. The Apex Court found in the above case that field covered by the Central Act No. 53 of 1948 is substantially the same as the field covered by the impugned Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 but the Act No. 53 of 1948 is not referable to Entry 54 since it cannot be treated to be a legislation made by the Parliament hence, the limitation imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation. Following was laid down in paragraph 34 : 34....... Following was laid down in paragraph 34 : 34....... Therefore, we reach this position that the field covered by Act LIII of 1948 is substantially the same as the field covered by the impugned Act but the declaration made by Section 2 of the said Act does not constitutionally amount to the requisite declaration by Parliament, and so the limitation imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation in the present case.” 20. Again in State of Orissa and another v. M/s M.A. Tulloch & Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 , the Apex Court had occasion to consider the similar submissions with regard to Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 in context to the Mines and Minerals (Regulations and Development) Act, 1957. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that Orissa Act, 1952 had been rendered ineffective after the enactment of Central Act No. 67 of 1957. Following was observed in paragraph 4 : “4. We shall now proceed to set out briefly the grounds upon which the learned Judges of the High Court allowed the petition of the respondents. Stated shortly, the contention which the learned Judges of the High Court accepted was that the Orissa Act had been rendered ineffective or suppressed by a Central enactment - The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. 1957 (Act 67 of 1957), hereinafter called the Central Act, which was brought into force as and from June 1, 1958. The Orissa Act had been enacted by virtue of the legislative power conferred by entry 23 of the State Legislative List reading “Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with reference to regulation and development under the control of the Union.” The legislative entry under which the later Central Act was enacted was item 54 of the Union List which ran “Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” The Central Act carried in its second Section a declaration envisaged by the last words of the entry. Based on these facts the argument to which the learned Judges acceded was that on the coming into force of the Central Act the Orissa Act ceased to be operative by reason of the withdrawal of legislative competence by force of the entry in the State List being subject to the parliamentary declaration and the law enacted by Parliament. They held that for this reason the Orissa Act should be deemed to be non-existent as and from June 1, 1958 for every purpose, with the consequence that there was lack of power to enforce and realise the demands for the payment of the fee at the time when the demands were issued and were sought to be enforced. It is the correctness of this judgment that is challenged by the State in these appeals.” 21. After considering the submissions of parties, following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 5 and 6 : “5. Before proceeding further it is necessary to specify briefly the legislative power on the relevant topic, for it is on the precise wording of the entries in the 7th Schedule to the Constitution and the scope, purpose and effect of the State and the Central legislation which we have referred to earlier that the decision of the point turns. Article 246 (1) reads : “Notwithstanding anything in cls. (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘Union List).” and we are concerned in the present case with the State power in the State field. The relevant clause in that context is cl. (3) of the Article which runs : “Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State...... has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).” Coming now to the Seventh Schedule, Entry 23 of the State List vests in the State Legislature power to enact laws on the subject of ‘regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union’. It would be seen that “subject” to the provisions of List I the power of the State to enact Legislation on the topic of “mines and mineral development” is plenary. The relevant provisions in List I is, as already noticed, Entry 54 of the Union List. It may be mentioned that this scheme of the distribution of legislative power between the Centre and the States is not new but is merely a continuation of the State of affairs which prevailed under the Government of India Act, 1935 which included a provision on the lines of entry 54 of the Union List which then bore the number item 36 of the Federal List and an entry corresponding to Entry 23 in the State List which bore the same number in the Provincial Legislative List. There is no controversy that the Central Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the legislative power contained in Entry 54 or as regards the Central Act containing a declaration in terms of what is required by Entry 54 for it enacts by Section 2 : “It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.” “It does not need much argument to realise that to the extent to which the Union Government had taken under “its control” “the regulation and development of minerals” so much was withdrawn from the ambit of the power of the State Legislature under Entry 23 and legislation of the State which had rested on the existence of power under that entry would to the extent of that “control” be superseded or be rendered ineffective for here we have a case not of mere repugnancy between the provisions of the two enactments but of a denudation or deprivation of State legislative power by the declaration which Parliament is empowered to make and has made. 6. It would, however, be apparent that the States would lose legislative competence only to the “extent to which regulation and development under the control of the Union has been declared by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest.” The crucial enquiry has therefore to be directed to ascertain this “extent” for beyond it the legislative power of the State remains unimpaired. As the legislation by the State is in the case before us the earlier one in point of time, it would be logical first to examine and analyse the State Act and determine its purpose, width and scope and the area of its operation and then consider to what “extent” the Central Acts cuts into it or trenches on it.” 22. The next judgment which needs consideration is Baijnath Kedia etc. v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1970 SC 1436 . In the aforesaid case State of Bihar amended the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 by Act No. 4 of 1965, enacting second proviso to Section 10(2) which was to the following effect : “Provided further that the terms and conditions of the said lease in regard to minor minerals as defined in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Act LXVII of 1957), shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the rules made by the State Government under Section 15 of that Act, stand substituted by the corresponding terms and conditions prescribed by those rules and if further ascertainment and settlement of the terms will become necessary then necessary proceedings for that purpose shall be undertaken by the Collector.” 23. Challenge was made to the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature to enact the provision which entrenched the legislative field covered by Parliamentary Act namely Mines and Minerals (Regulations and Development) Act, 1957. Following was laid down in paragraphs 14 and 15 : “14. Although these supplementary arguments were raised it is obvious that they can arise according as the two main arguments are allowed or disallowed. Therefore it is necessary to address ourselves to the first argument that the legislative competence to enact the amendment to Section 10 of the Reforms Acts was wanting. As the amendment was made after Act 67 of 1957 we have to consider the position in relation to it. Entry 54 of the Union List speaks both of Regulation of mines and minerals Development and entry 23 is subject to entry 54. It is open to Parliament to declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the control should rest in Central Government. To what extent such a declaration can go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest. It is open to Parliament to declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the control should rest in Central Government. To what extent such a declaration can go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest. Once this declaration is made and the extent laid down,the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. Any legislation by the State after such declaration and trenching upon the field disclosed in the declaration must necessarily be unconstitutional because that field is abstracted from the legislative competence of the State Legislature. This proposition is also self-evident that no attempt was rightly made to contradict it. There are also two decisions of this Court reported in the Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 459 and State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co., 1964(4) SCR 461 : AIR 1964 SC 1284 in which the matter is discussed. The only dispute, therefore, can be to what extent the declaration by Parliament leaves any scope for legislation by the State Legislature. If the impugned legislation falls within the ambit of such scope it will be valid; if outside it, then it must be declared invalid. 15. The declaration is contained in Section 2 of Act 67 of 1957 and speaks of the taking under the control of the Central Government the regulation of mines and development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act itself. We have thus not to look outside Act 67 of 1957 to determine what is left within the competence of the State Legislature but have to work it out from the terms of that Act. In this connection we may notice what was decided in the two cases of this Court. In the Hingir-Rampur case 1961-2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459 a question had arisen whether the Act of 1948 so completely covered the field of conservation and development of minerals as to leave no room for State Legislation. It was held that the declaration was effective even if the rules contemplated under the Act of 1948 had not been made. It was held that the declaration was effective even if the rules contemplated under the Act of 1948 had not been made. However, considering further whether a declaration made by a Dominion Law could be regarded as a declaration by Parliament for the purpose of entry 54, it was held that it could not and there was thus a lacuna which the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 could not remove. Therefore, it was held that there was room for legislation by the State Legislature.” 24. From the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above cases, it is clear that any legislation by the State after a declaration by Parliament as envisaged in Entry 52 trenching upon the field disclosed by the Parliament, is necessarily unconstitutional because that field is extracted from the legislative competence of the State Legislature. 25. Learned counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1980) 4 SCC 136 . The judgment in the case of Ishwari Khetan is very relevant for the present case since challenge to the legislative competence of the parent Act i.e. 1971 Act in which Act the impugned amendment has been effected by the Amendment Act, 2009 was under consideration. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgement concludes some issues raised in these writ petitions also. Before we proceed to note the law declared by the Apex Court in the said judgment, it is necessary to note certain provisions of the 1971 Act which was under consideration before the Apex Court. 26. U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 was enacted to provide in the interest of the general public, for the acquisition and transfer of certain sugar undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Statements of Objects and Reasons of the said Act were as follows : “Prefatory Note.—Statement of Objects and Reasons.- The owners of certain sugar mills of the State or their lessees had created serious problems for the cane-growers and labour which created an adverse impact on the general economy of the areas, where those mills were situate. The Statements of Objects and Reasons of the said Act were as follows : “Prefatory Note.—Statement of Objects and Reasons.- The owners of certain sugar mills of the State or their lessees had created serious problems for the cane-growers and labour which created an adverse impact on the general economy of the areas, where those mills were situate. The only solution of these problems was for the State Government to take immediate steps to acquire with a view to renovating those and rehabilitating mills mills or carry out improvement therein. 2. Accordingly, a legislation was prepared to acquire such mills, which provided for acquisition of properties and assets pertaining to those mills and for payment of compensation for the same and for the replacement of the dues of cane-growers, labourers and of the Government out of the amount or compensation and for other connected and incidental matters.” 27. The object of the Act as delineated above, was to acquire certain sugar mills of the State which had created serious problems for the cane growers and labourers and the Government decided to acquire the said sugar mills for renovating and rehabilitating those mills. Section 3 provided for vesting, which is to the following effect : “3. Vesting.—On the appointed day, every schedule undertaking shall, by virtue of this Act, stand and be deemed to have stood transferred to and vest and be deemed to have vested in the Corporation free from any debt, mortgage, charge or other encumbrance or lien trust or similar obligation (excepting any lien or other obligation in respect of any advance on the security of any sugar stock or other stock-in-trade) attaching to the undertaking : Provided that any such debt, mortgage, charge or other encumbrance or lien, trust or similar obligation shall attach to the compensation referred to in Section 7 in accordance with the provisions of that section, in substitution for the undertaking : Provided further that a debt, mortgage, charge or other encumbrance or lien, trust or similar obligation created after the scheduled undertaking or any property or asset comprised therein had been attached or a receiver appointed over it, in any proceedings for realisation of any tax or cess or other dues recoverable as arrears of revenue shall be void as against all claims for dues recoverable as arrears of revenue.” 28. The mills owners whose sugar mills were acquired by the aforesaid Act, filed writ petition in this Court challenging the legislative competence of the State. The Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 3.5.1979 upheld the vires of the Act and dismissed all the writ petitions. Challenging the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, Special Leave Petitions were filed in the Apex Court which were decided by a Constitution Bench in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. (supra). The submissions which were made before the Apex Court by the appellant was that sugar industry being controlled industry under 1951 Act, it goes out of Entry 24 List II hence the U.P. State legislation was denuded of its legislative power to legislate in respect of sugar industry. 29. Learned Additional Advocate General countered the above submissions, relying on power to acquire property derived from Entry 42 in List III. 30. Paragraph 4 of the judgment notices the submissions of the parties which are to the following effect : “4. The main thrust of the attack was that the U.P. Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the impugned Act. There two distinct limbs of this submission which would be examined separately. The first limb of the submission was that in exercise of legislative power flowing from Entry 52, List I the Parliament made the requisite declaration in Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (‘IDR Act’ for short), and in view of placitum 25 of the First Schedule to the IDR Act sugar being a declared industry, that industry goes out of Entry 24, List II, and hence U. P. State legislature was denuded of all legislative power to legislate in respect of sugar industry and as the impugned legislation is in respect of industrial undertaking in sugar industry, the impugned legislation is void on account of legislative incompetence. The learned Attorney General countered it by saying that the power to acquire property derived from Entry 42 in List III is an independent power and the impugned Act being in pith and substance an Act to acquire scheduled undertakings, meaning thereby the properties of the scheduled undertakings, the power of the State legislature to legislate in this behalf is referable to Entry 42 and remains intact irrespective of the fact that sugar is a declared industry, control of which is taken over by the Union Government pursuant to the declaration made under Section 2 of the IDR Act. This necessitates an analytical examination of the relevant entries keeping in view legislative perspective and the historical background through which these entries have passed.” 31. The Apex Court after considering the submissions raised by the parties and relevant Entry 52 List I and Entry 24 of List II held that the State Legislature can be denied legislative power under Entry 24 to the extent the Parliament made declaration under Entry 52. Following was laid down in paragraph 11 : “11........ Now, Parliament made the declaration not in abstract but as part of the IDR Act and the control was in respect of industries specified in the First Schedule appended to the Act itself. Sections 3 to 30 set out various modes and methodology, procedure and power, to effectuate the control which the Union acquired by virtue of the declaration contained in Section 2. Industry as a legislative head finds its place in entry 24, List II. The State legislature can be denied legislative power under entry 24 to the extent Parliament makes declaration under entry 52 and by such declaration Parliament acquires power to legislate only in respect of those industries in respect of which declaration is made and to the extent as manifested by legislation incorporating the declaration and no more. The Act prescribes the extent of control and specifies it. As the declaration trenches upon the State legislative power it has to be construed strictly. The Act prescribes the extent of control and specifies it. As the declaration trenches upon the State legislative power it has to be construed strictly. Therefore, even though the Act enacted under entry 54 which is to some extent in pari materia with entry 52 and in a parallel and cognate statute while making the declaration the Parliament did use the further expression “to the extent herein provided” while assuming control, the absence of such words in the declaration in Section 2 would not lead to the conclusion that the control assumed was to be something in abstract, total and unfettered and not as per various provisions of the IDR Act. The lacuna, if any, is made good by hedging the power of making declaration to be made by law. Legislative intention has to be gathered from the Act as a whole and not by piecemeal examination of its provisions. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that to the extent Union acquired control by virtue of declaration in Section 2 of the IDR Act as amended from time to time the power of the State legislature under entry 24, List II to enact any legislation in respect of declared industry so as to encroach upon the field of control occupied by IDR Act would be taken away. This is clearly borne out not only by the decision in Baijnath Kedia’s case AIR 1970 SC 1436 where undoubtedly while referring to the control assumed by the Union by a declaration made in Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals Act, it was said that to what extent such a declaration would go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest, and once this declaration is made and the extent laid down the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. It is not merely some abstract control but the extent of the control assumed by the Union by the provisions of IDR Act pursuant to declaration made by Parliament that the State Legislature to that extent, that is, to the extent the provisions of IDR Act occupies this field, is denuded of its power to legislate in respect of such declared industry.” 32. The Apex Court after considering the submissions held that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakings. The Apex Court after considering the submissions held that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakings. Following was laid down in paragraph 15 : “15....... A comprehensive examination of all the provisions of the Act indisputably shows that in pith and substance the impugned Act is one for acquisition of scheduled under-takings and such acquisition by transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings to the Corporation would in no way come in conflict with any of the provisions of the IDR Act or would not trench upon any control exercised by the Union under the various provisions of the IDR Act. In fact the IDR Act, generally speaking, does not deal with the ownership of industrial undertakings in declared industries. The Act is primarily concerned with development and regulation of the declared industries. The Central Government has power under Sections 18A and 18 AA of the IDR Act to assume direct management or control of industrial undertakings in certain cases and even after acquisition of scheduled undertakings under the impugned legislation the power of the Central Government under Sections 18A and 18 AA would remain intact. Even Section 18FA provides for taking over management or control of a company which is being wound up with the permission of the High Court and in such a situation the authorised person appointed by the Central Government would be deemed to be Official Liquidator under sub-sec. (4) of Section 18FA. Provision contained in Chapter III-AC of IDR Act enables Central Government to direct sale of the industrial undertakings under certain circumstances and in the situation as set out in Section 18FE (7) to purchase the same. But these powers can be exercised irrespective of the fact who at the relevant time, the owner of the undertaking is. “ 33. Ultimately the Apex Court upheld the legislative competence of the 1971 Act relying on Entry 42 of List III. Following was laid down in paragraphs 24 and 26 : “24. It can, therefore, be said with a measure of confidence that legislative power of the States under entry 24, List II is eroded only to the extent control is assumed by the Union pursuant to a declaration made by the Parliament in respect of declared industry as spelt out by legislative enactment and the filed occupied by such enactment is the measure of erosion. Subject to such erosion, on the remainder the State legislature will have power to legislate in respect of declared industry without in any way trenching upon the occupied filed. State legislature which is otherwise competent to deal with industry under entry 24, List II, can deal with that industry in exercise of other powers enabling it to legislate under different heads set out in Lists II and III and this power cannot be denied to the State. In this connection it would be advantageous to refer to Chanan Mal case. In that case constitutional validity of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, and the two notifications issued thereunder was challenged on the ground that the Act and the notifications issued thereunder were repugnant to the Mines and Minerals Act made by Parliament after making a declaration as contemplated by Entry 54, List I. The challenge was that the State legislature was incompetent to legislate on the topic of mines and minerals under entry 23, List II in view of the declaration made under entry 54, List I and the enactment of Act 67 of 1957 (Mines and Minerals Act) by the Parliament. By the impugned Act and the notifications issued thereunder the State Government of Haryana purported to acquire rights to saltpetre, a minor mineral in the land described in the Schedule appended to the notification and by the second impugned notification the State Government announced to the general public that certain saltpetre bearing areas in the State of Haryana mentioned therein would be auctioned on the dates given there. Repelling the contention regarding legislative incompetence it was observed that it is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied by a Central Act in the same way as it had been in the West Bengal case ( AIR 1963 SC 1241 ) even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State. At least until Parliament has so legislated as it was shown to have done by the statute considered by this Court in the case from West Bengal, the field is free for State legislation falling under the express provisions of entry 42 of List III. It was further observed as under : “It seems difficult to sustain the case that the provisions of the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits are found. It was further observed as under : “It seems difficult to sustain the case that the provisions of the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits are found. We have to judge the character of the Haryana Act by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects behind it. Such statements of reasons are relevant when the object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or uncertain. They can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions. Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A Statement of Objects and Reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no room whatsoever as it does not in the Haryana Act, to doubt what was meant by the legislators. It is not disputed here that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to acquire proprietary right to mineral deposits in ‘land’.” “26. As already pointed out, in pith and substance the impugned legislation is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and that filed of acquisition is not occupied by the IDR Act which deals with control of management, regulation and development of a declared industry and there is no repugnancy between the impugned legislation and the IDR Act. Both can co-exist because the power acquired by the Union under the IDR Act can as well effectively be exercised after the acquisition of the scheduled undertakings as it could be exercised before the acquisition. Therefore, the contention that the State legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the impugned legislation must be negatived.” 34. Sri A.K. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the object of 1971 Act was to acquire the sugar mills for rehabilitating and renovating the said sugar mills and the object and purpose of the 2009 Amendment Act is to sell and close the mills and a legislation for which purpose cannot be said to be referable to Entry 42 of List III and the power of State Legislature under Entry 24 List II being denuded by virtue of 1951 Act, the amendment Act is without legislative competence. To appreciate various submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is relevant to refer to the Amendment Act, 2009. The amendment was effected by the State Legislature to further amend the 1971 Act to provide for disinvestment and sale of the scheduled undertakings and sugar mills of the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and its subsidiaries and matters connected with and incidental thereto. The statements and object of the Amendment Act provide as follows : “Prefatory Note—Statement of Objects and Reasons.—The serious problems created by owners of certain sugar mills were adversely affecting the producers, labourers and general economy of the areas where they situated. Therefore, with a view to ensuring the running of such mills properly they were vested in the Uttar Pradesh State Sugar Corporation Limited established under Section 617 of the Companies Act,1956 by the State Government by enacting the Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 (U.P. Act No. 23 of 1971). There were 33 units of the said Corporation for the time being which were very old and of less capacity of which many were closed and being of less utility in financial aspect they were not crushing sugarcane. Consequently, they were running in loss. Many efforts were made to bring such sugar mills to run in profit but inspite of such efforts they could not be caused to run properly and continued to run in loss and the possibility of their reform in future was very thin. In view of the above circumstances it was decided to amend the said Act mainly to provide for,— (a) authorising the State Government to divest, sell off, or otherwise part with any of its shares in the Corporation. (b) authorising the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries to sell or transfer any of its assets and liabilities vested in the Corporation, (c) empowering the State Government to change the land use or to issue directions for the change of land use with respect to the land belonging to the scheduled undertakings of the Corporation or to the sugar mills acquired or established by the Corporation or the subsidiaries thereof, (d) validating certain government orders, notifications or policy statements. Since the State Legislature was not in session and immediate legislative action was necessary to implement the aforesaid decision the Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008 (U.P. Ordinance No. 6 of 2008) was promulgated by the Governor on September 29,2008". This Bill is introduced to replace the aforesaid Ordinance.” 35. By Section 2 of the Amendment Act, 2009, Sections 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D and 3-E have been inserted in 1971 Act, which are to the following effect. “3-A. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other provision of this act,the State Government may, if it considers necessary or expedient in public interest, divest, sell off, transfer or otherwise part with all or any of its shares in the Corporation at any time. 3-B. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other provision of this Act, the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries may, in public interest, in public interest, sell or transfer any of its assets and/or liabilities or part thereof which have vested in the Corporation in accordance with the provisions of this Act, of in any other manner. 3-C Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force it shall be lawful for the State Government, if it is satisfied that in the public interest it is necessary to do so, to change the land use of to issue directions for change of land use in relation to the land belonging to the scheduled undertakings of the Corporation or its subsidiaries at any time. 3-D The Government Order No. 1215S.C./18-2-07-56T.C., dated June 4, 2007 and all subsequent Government Orders, notification of policy statements issued and action taken in relation to disinvestment, privatization, sale, transfer in any form or closure of the scheduled undertaking or sugar mills of the Corporation and its subsidiaries or in relation to the Corporation itself shall stand validated. 3-E Power to remove difficulties.- If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provision of this Act, the State Government may, by notified order make provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as may appear to in to be necessary or expedient for removing such difficulty. Provided that no order under this section shall be made after expiration of a period of two years from the commencement of the Utter Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009.” 36. Provided that no order under this section shall be made after expiration of a period of two years from the commencement of the Utter Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 2009.” 36. Learned Counsel for the parties have made submissions on each of the newly inserted sections separately. It is contended that the purpose and reach of each section is different hence, the effect and competence with regard to each section is to be considered separately. Section 3-A provides for divesting, selling off, transferring or otherwise parting with all or any of its shares of shares of the State Government in the Corporation at any time. Section 3-B provides that Corporation or any of its subsidiaries may sell or transfer any of its assets or liabilities or part thereof which have vested in the Corporation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sections 3-A and 3-B thus confine to divest, sell off, transfer of the shares of the State Government as well as of the Corporation. Whether the aforesaid provisions can be legitimately inserted in the Parent Act in exercise of the legislative power of the State under Entry 42 List III, is a question to be answered. Since the Parent Act, 1971 has been upheld as having sufficient legislative competence under Entry 42. List III, the issue to be considered is as to whether the amendments inserted by the Amendment 2009 Act are referable to exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 List III. For answering the aforesaid issue, we proceed to examine each of the amended provisions separately. 37. Section 3-A & Section 3-B of 2009 Act : Section 3-A and Section 3-B provide for divesting, selling off, transferring of shares in the Corporation at any time by the State Government. Section 3-B contains the provisions empowering the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries to sell or transfer any of its assets and/or liabilities or part thereof vested in the Corporation. Both these sections relate to sale, transfer of the shares/assets by the State Government or by the Corporation. Learned Additional Advocate General in his arguments has contended that for transfer/sale of the shares and assets in fact no legislative sanction was required and the State of U.P./Corporation could have effected the transfer of shares/assets in exercise of administrative power. Both these sections relate to sale, transfer of the shares/assets by the State Government or by the Corporation. Learned Additional Advocate General in his arguments has contended that for transfer/sale of the shares and assets in fact no legislative sanction was required and the State of U.P./Corporation could have effected the transfer of shares/assets in exercise of administrative power. He contended that the Legislation was brought into existence by the State Legislature as a measure of transparency. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Balco Union Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and others, JT 2001 (10) SC 466, for the proposition that the Government is free to adopt disinvestment policy which cannot be challenged without showing that it is against any law or malafide. Reliance has further been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in R.K. Garg v. Union of India and others, (1981) 4 SCC 675 , for the proposition that law relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude. There cannot be any dispute to the propositions as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two cases. However, in view of the fact that there is infact a legislative enactment namely; Amendment Act 2009 by which Sections 3-A, 3-B have been inserted, as noted above, it is not necessary to enter into discussions as to whether without there being any legislative sanction, the State could have proceeded to disinvestment/sell or transfer of the shares or assets. Further, more since the Amendment Act, 2009 has been challenged by the petitioners, we have to consider the challenge to the provisions inserted by the Amendment Act,2009 as has been advanced in the present case. 38. The answer to the above issue is to be found in the judgment of the Apex Court in Ishwari Khetain’s case (supra). In Ishwari Khetan’s case, the validity of U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 was questioned. Section 3 of 1971 Act as quoted above, provided that on the appointed day, every schedule undertaking shall, stand and be deemed to have stood transferred to and vest in the Corporation free from any debt, mortgage, charge or other encumbrance or lien. Thus by legal fiction, the scheduled undertakings stood acquired, transferred and vested in the Corporation by the legislative enactment. Thus by legal fiction, the scheduled undertakings stood acquired, transferred and vested in the Corporation by the legislative enactment. The concept of transfer of the undertakings by a legal fiction into Corporation was very much involved therein. In Ishwari Khetan’s case, the Apex Court referred to the principles of pith and substance where legislative competence is under challenge. It was held by the Apex Court that if in pith and substances legislation falls within one entry or the other but some portion of the subject-matter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might enter a field under another list, the Act as a whole would be valid notwithstanding such incidental trenching. Following was laid down in paragraph 13 : “13. When validity of a legislation is challenged on the ground of want of legislative competence and it becomes necessary to ascertain to which entry in the three lists the legislation is referable to, the Court has evolved the theory of pith and substance. If in pith and substance a legislation falls within one entry or the other but some portion of the subject-matter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might enter a field under another List, the Act as a whole would be valid notwithstanding such incidental trenching. This is well established by a catena of decisions (see Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, (1972) 2 SCR 33 : AIR 1972 SC 1061 and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd., (1976) 1 SCR 552 : AIR 1976 SC 1031 . After referring to these decisions in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, (1978) 1 SCR 641 : AIR 1978 SC 215 ) Untwalia, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench has in terms stated that the pith and substance of the Act has to be looked into and an incidental trespass would not invalidate the law. The challenge in that case was to the nationalisation of contract carriages by the Karnataka State, inter alia, on the ground that the statute was invalid as it was a legislation on the subject of inter-State trade and commerce. Repelling this contention the Court unanimously held that in pith and substance the impugned legislation was for acquisition of contract carriages and not an Act which deals with inter-State trade and commerce.” 39. As noted above, the legislative competence of 1971 Act was upheld. Repelling this contention the Court unanimously held that in pith and substance the impugned legislation was for acquisition of contract carriages and not an Act which deals with inter-State trade and commerce.” 39. As noted above, the legislative competence of 1971 Act was upheld. It was further held by the Supreme Court that infact, the 1951 Act does not deal with the ownership of industrial undertakings in declared industries. Following was laid down in paragraph 15 : 14........ A comprehensive examination of all the provisions of the Act indisputably shows that in pith and substance the impugned Act is one for acquisition of scheduled under-takings and such acquisition by transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings to the Corporation would in no way come in conflict with any of the provisions of the IDR Act or would not trench upon any control exercised by the Union under the various provisions of the IDR Act. In fact the IDR Act, generally speaking, does not deal with the ownership of industrial undertakings in declared industries. The Act is primarily concerned with development and regulation of the declared industries. The Central Government has power under Sections 18A and 18 AA of the IDR Act to assume direct management or control of industrial undertakings in certain cases and even after acquisition of scheduled undertakings under the impugned legislation the power of the Central Government under Sections 18A and 18 AA would remain intact. Even Section 18FA provides for taking over management or control of a company which is being wound up with the permission of the High Court and in such a situation the authorised person appointed by the Central Government would be deemed to be Official Liquidator under sub-section (4) of Section 18FA. Provision contained in Chapter III-AC of IDR Act enables Central Government to direct sale of the industrial undertakings under certain circumstances and in the situation as set out in Section 18FE (7) to purchase the same. But these powers can be exercised irrespective of the fact who at the relevant time, the owner of the undertaking is.” 40. Thus, the Apex Court found transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings not trenching upon the provisions of 1951 Act. Learned Additional Advocate General has also placed reliance on judgement of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and another v. Chanan Mal etc., AIR 1976 SC 1654 . Thus, the Apex Court found transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings not trenching upon the provisions of 1951 Act. Learned Additional Advocate General has also placed reliance on judgement of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and another v. Chanan Mal etc., AIR 1976 SC 1654 . In the said case the Constitutional validity of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 was challenged on the ground that State does not have legislative competence to enact the 1973 Act and the the enactment trenches on the field occupied by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The submission on behalf of the State of Haryana was raised before the Apex Court that the relevant entry for exercise of legislative power to acquire property is Entry 42 of List III. The Central Act purports to have been made in exercise of the power under Entry 54 of List I for regulation and development of mines, whereas the Haryana Act operates in the distinct and separate field of acquisition of property. The submissions raised by State of Haryana that acquisition Act does not trenches the field occupied by the Central Act was accepted. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 31 : “31........ It seems difficult to sustain the case that the provisions of the Central act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits are found. We have to judge the character of the Haryana Act by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects behind it. Such statements of reasons are relevant when the object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or uncertain. They can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provision. Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no room whatsoever, as it does not in the Haryana Act, to doubt what was meant by the legislators. It is not disputed here that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to acquire proprietary rights to mineral deposits in “land”. It is not disputed here that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to acquire proprietary rights to mineral deposits in “land”. Its provision, however, do not mention leasehold or licensee rights. Obviously, this is so because these rights are governed by the Central Act 67 of 1957.” 41. Learned Additional Advocate General has also relied on two more judgments i.e. Mst. Bibi Sayeeda and others v. State of Bihar and others, (1996) 9 SCC 516 , in which the Apex Court has considered the word ‘’Vested’. Following was laid down in paragraph 17 : “17. The word ‘’vested’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563 as : “Vested; fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent.” Rights are ‘’vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary, (International Edn.) at p. 1397 ‘’vested’ is defined as: “Law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interests.” 42. Another judgement relied on DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and others, (2003) 5 SCC 622 , wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 36 held as under : “Right of transfer of land is indisputably incidental to the right of ownership. Such a right can be curtailed or taken away only by reason of a statute. An embargo upon the owner of the land to transfer the same in the opinion of this Court should not be readily inferred.” 43. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is held that Sections 3-A and 3-B are intra-vires and the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioners attacking Sections 3-A and 3-B are to be rejected. 44. Sections 3-C and 3-D : Section 3-C starts with non obstante clause. In view of the foregoing discussions, it is held that Sections 3-A and 3-B are intra-vires and the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioners attacking Sections 3-A and 3-B are to be rejected. 44. Sections 3-C and 3-D : Section 3-C starts with non obstante clause. It empowers the State to change the land use or to issue directions for change of land use in relation to the land belonging to the scheduled undertakings of Corporation or in relation to land belonging to any sugar mills notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force. Section 3-D validates the Government order dated 4.6.2007 and subsequent Government orders notifications or policy statements issued and actions taken in relation to disinvestment, privatization, sale, transfer in any form or closure of the scheduled undertakings or sugar mills of the Corporation and its subsidiaries. 45. From the pronouncement of the Apex Court as noticed above, it has been found that the State Legislation can be denied legislative power under Entry 24 to the extent Parliament makes declaration under Entry 52. By a declaration made by Parliament under Entry 52 power to legislate with regard to industries declared thereof vests in the Parliament. There is no dispute that Parliament by declaration as contained in Section 2 of 1951 Act has taken control of the sugar industry. The power of State Legislature under Entry 24 List II to legislate with regard to sugar industry is denuded to that extent. In Ishwari Khetan’s case, 1971 Act was upheld relying on Entry 42 List III. The legal fiction by which the scheduled undertakings were deemed to be transferred and vested in the Corporation by virtue of Section 3 of 1971 Act was upheld on the doctrine of pith and substance. We have also upheld the legislative competence of the State Legislature providing for disinvestment/sell or transfer of the shares or assets by the State/Corporation which does not trench into the field covered by 1951 Act. The question to be considered, while considering the validity of Section 3-C and 3-D is as to whether the state is empowered to direct for change of land use of the land belonging to the sugar undertakings/sugar mills, which power has been assumed under Section 3-C. The change of land use shall automatically without anything more, result in closure/end of the sugar undertakings. Further under Section 3-D, the State has specifically taken power to close the sugar undertakings. Whether the aforesaid provisions trench in the field occupied by 1951 Act, is to be considered, for which it is necessary to refer 1951 Act in some detail. 46. 1951 Act was enacted by Parliament to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. Section 2 of the Act provided as follows : “2. Declaration as to expediency of control by the Union.-It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule.” 47. Section 18-A contains the provisions empowering the Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases. Section 18AA is another provision where the Central Government may take over industrial undertakings without investigation under certain circumstances. Section 18A and Section 18AA are quoted as below : “18-A. Power of Central Government to assume management or control of an industrial undertaking in certain cases.—(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that-(a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of Section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under Section 15 (whether or not any directions have been issued to the undertaking in pursuance of Section 16), is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest, the Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such function of control as may be specified in the order. (2) Any notified order under sub-Section (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order : Provided that if the Central Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the public interest that any such notified order should continue to have effect after the expiry of the period of five years aforesaid. it may from time to time issue direction for such continuance for such period, not exceeding two years at a time, as may be specified in the direction, so however that the total period of such continuance (after the expiry of the said period of five years) does not exceed [twelve years; and where any such direction is issued, a copy thereof shall be laid. as soon as may be. before both Houses of Parliament. Explanation.—The power to authorise a body of persons under this section to take over the management of an industrial undertaking which is a company includes also a power to appoint any individual, firm or company to be the managing agent of the industrial undertaking on such terms and condition as the Central Government may think fit. 18-AA. Power to take over industrial undertaking without investigation under certain circumstances.—(1) Without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, if, from the documentary or other evidence in its possession, the Central Government is satisfied, in relation to an industrial undertaking, that- (a) the persons in charge of such industrial undertaking have, by reckless;, investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation; or (b) it has been closed for a period of not less than three months (whether by reason of the voluntary winding up of the company owning the industrial undertaking or for any other reason) and such closure is prejudicial to the concerned scheduled industry and that the financial condition of the company owning the industrial undertaking and the condition of the plant and machinery of such undertaking are such that it is possible to restart the undertaking and such restarting is necessary in the interests of the general public, it may, by a notified order, authorise any person or body of persons (hereafter referred to as the “authorised person”) to take over the management of the whole or any part of the industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18-A shall, as far as may be, apply to a notified order made under sub-section (1) as they apply to a notified order made under sub-section (1) of Section 18-A. (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall apply to an industrial undertaking owned by a company, which is being wound up by or under the supervision of the Court. (4) Where any notified order has been made under sub-section (1), the person or body of persons having, for the time being, charge of the management or control of the industrial undertaking, whether by or under the orders of any Court or any contract, instrument or otherwise, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in such order, contract, instrument or other arrangement, forthwith make over the charge of management or control, as the case may be, of the industrial undertaking to the authorised person. (5) The provisions of Section 18-B to 18-E (both inclusive) shall, as far as may be, apply to, or in relation to, the industrial undertaking, in respect of which a notified order has been made under sub-section (1), as they apply to an industrial undertaking in relation to which a notified order has been issued under Section 18-A.” 48. Section 18-FD empowers the Central Government to take decision with regard to managed companies. Section 18-FD(1) (a) contains a concept of sale of the undertakings which is not in a position to to meet its current liabilities out of its current assets. The noticeable feature of the provision is that the provisions contemplates sale of the undertakings as a running concern. Section 18-FD(1) is quoted below : “18-FD. Section 18-FD(1) (a) contains a concept of sale of the undertakings which is not in a position to to meet its current liabilities out of its current assets. The noticeable feature of the provision is that the provisions contemplates sale of the undertakings as a running concern. Section 18-FD(1) is quoted below : “18-FD. Decision of Central Government in relation to managed company.—(1) If, on receipt of the report submitted by the authorised person, the Central Government is satisfied,— (a) in relation to the company owning the industrial undertaking, which is not being wound up by the High Court, that the financial condition and other circumstances of the company are such that it is not in a position to meet its current liabilities out of its current assets, that Government may, if it considers necessary or expedient in the interests of the general public so to do, by order, decide that the industrial undertaking should be sold as a running concern as provided in Section 18-FE and proceedings should simultaneously be started for the winding up, by the High Court, of the company; (b) in relation to the company, owning the industrial undertaking, which is being wound up by the High Court, that its assets and liabilities are such that in the interests of its creditors and contributories the industrial undertaking should be sold as a running concern as provided in Section 18-FE, it may, by order, decide accordingly.” 49. There are certain other provisions in the Act of 1951 which provide for several kinds of control and several fields in which Central Government can take steps with regard to regulation and management of scheduled undertakings. Section 18FE again contains the concept of sale to the highest bidder as running concern. One more noticeable provision is Section 18FE(7), which provides that where no offer of price is equal to, or more than the reserve price, the industrial undertaking shall be purchased by the Central Government at the reserve price. Section FE (6) (7) and (9) are quoted herein below : “(6) The industrial undertaking shall be sold to the highest bidder as a running concern, only if the price offered by him therefor is not less than the reserve price. Section FE (6) (7) and (9) are quoted herein below : “(6) The industrial undertaking shall be sold to the highest bidder as a running concern, only if the price offered by him therefor is not less than the reserve price. (7) Where no offer of price is equal to, or more than, the reserve price, the industrial undertaking shall be purchased by the Central Government at the reserve price.” “(9) When an industrial undertaking is sold to any person under sub-section (6), or purchased by the Central Government under sub-section (7), there shall be transferred to and vested in the purchaser, free from all encumbrances, all such assets relating to the industrial undertaking as are referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (a)of Section 18-FG and existing at the time of the sale or purchase.” 50. The Act of 1951 deals with development and ‘regulation’ of industries. The word ‘’regulation’ has a wide import. The word ‘regulation’ has been defined in Law Lexicon (P. Ramanatha Aiyer) 1997 Edition as follows : “The word ‘’regulation’ is a broad impact having wide meaning comprehending all facets not only specifically, enumerated in the Act, but also embraces within its fold the power incidental to the regulation envisaged in good faith with an eye to the public welfare. D.K.V. Prasada Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR.1984 AP 75, 86. [Andhra pradesh Cinemas (regulation) Act (4 of 1955)pre].” Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopaedic Edition defines word ‘regulation’ in following manner : “n. 1. The act of regulating, or the state of being regulated 2. A rule prescribed for conduct; army regulations; also used adjectively.” 51. Before we proceed to examine the issue further, it would be relevant to notice the two more principles as laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and others v. State of Orissa and others (supra). The Apex Court was considering the similar issues in context of Entry 54 list I and Entry 23 of List II. The legislative power under Entry 23 list II with regard to mines and minerals was subject to Entry 54 List I as was case with regard to industries in List I and Entry 24 List II. Following was laid down in paragraph 23 : “23......... The legislative power under Entry 23 list II with regard to mines and minerals was subject to Entry 54 List I as was case with regard to industries in List I and Entry 24 List II. Following was laid down in paragraph 23 : “23......... In other words, if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as required by Entry 54, and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra vires, not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law. The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature itself. “ 52. Again in State of Orissa v. M/s M.A. Tuloch and Company (supra) following was laid down in paragraph 15 : “15. But even if the matter was res integra the argument cannot be accepted. Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for, if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. In the present case, having regard to the terms of Section 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession, of the State Act.” 53. In the present case, having regard to the terms of Section 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession, of the State Act.” 53. In the pronouncements by the above two Constitution Benches of this Court, the principle laid down is that inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. One more judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant to be noticed i.e. State of West Bengal v. Union of India and others, AIR 1963 SC 1241 . The Central Legislation enacted an Act namely; Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 for acquisition of coal bearing areas vested in State of West Bengal by Union. In the said case submission was made that parliament has no competence to acquire the land vested in the State. In the above case, while considering the respective submissions following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 68 : “68. It could scarcely be imagined that the Constitution makers while intending to confer an exclusive power to work mines and minerals under the control of the Union, still prevented effective exercise of that power by making it impossible compulsorily to acquire the land vested in the States containing minerals. The effective exercise of the power would depend if such an argument is accepted not upon the exercise of the power to undertake regulation and control by issuing a notification under Entry 54, but upon the will of the State in the territory of which mineral-bearing land is situate. Power to legislate for regulation and development of mines and minerals under the control of the Union, would by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and minerals." 54. Power to legislate for regulation and development of mines and minerals under the control of the Union, would by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and minerals." 54. In the present case, if it is accepted that State Legislature is competent to legislate with regard to scheduled industries for which declaration has been made by Parliament under Entry 52 List I and a legislation has also been made by the Parliament conceding the legislative power of the State which legislation may have effect of making impossible the working of Central Act i.e. 1951 Act, the entrenchment in the occupied filed of Parliament has to be a consequence. Permitting the State to legislate to close the scheduled undertakings and to permit change of land use is nothing but making entrenchment in the field occupied by 1951 Act. This can be explained by taking an illustration. Supposing the State Legislature due to increase of number of diabetic patients in the State of U.P. decides that all sugar industries be closed and marketing complexes be constructed there on, whether such legislative enactment of the State to close all the sugar undertakings shall not entrench the field covered by the 1951 Act? The answer has to be that State cannot be conceded such legislative power which may have the effect of closure of sugar industries. 55. The 1951 Act was enacted with the object of development and regulation of a number of important industries, the activities of which affect the country as a whole and the development of which must be governed by economic factors of all-India import. It is common knowledge that there are certain scheduled industries which are located in one particular State or in few particular States but they cater the entire country for example industries relating to fuels. If it is conceded that State Legislature is empowered to close all such industries in particular State, the purpose and object of 1951 Act shall be frustrated making the development and regulation of industries under 1951 Act impossible. Such construction thus has to be rejected. In Ishwari Khetan’s case the issues pertaining to closure of industries or change of land use had not arisen nor closure or change of land use can be said to incidental to the legislative power of acquisition and requisition. Such construction thus has to be rejected. In Ishwari Khetan’s case the issues pertaining to closure of industries or change of land use had not arisen nor closure or change of land use can be said to incidental to the legislative power of acquisition and requisition. Any legislation pertaining to closure and change of land use, cannot be held to fall under legislative power of the State under Entry 42 List III. 56. In view of the foregoing discussions, section 3-C and 3-D to the extent providing for “closure of the scheduled undertakings or sugar mills of the Corporation and its subsidiaries” cannot be said to be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. 57. One more submission of learned Additional Advocate General trying to save the impugned amendment is to be noticed. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that Legislation in question is also referable to Entry 18 List II which is to the following effect : “18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.” 58. The legislation in question cannot be said to be legislation pertaining to the land. The legislation is with regard to scheduled industries as declared under 1951 Act. In this context, reference is made of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Baijnath Kedia etc. v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1970 SC 1436 . In the said case the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 second proviso to section 10(2) was under challenge on the ground that the said provision entrenches on the field covered by the Parliamentary enactment Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The second proviso provided terms and conditions of lease in regard to mines minerals as defined under 1957 Act shall, insofar as they are inconsistent with the rules made by the State Government under section 15 of 1957 Act stand substituted by the corresponding terms and conditions prescribed by those rules and if further ascertainment and settlement of the terms will become necessary then necessary proceedings for that purpose shall be undertaken by the Collector. One of the submissions raised to defend the legislative competence of the second provisio to section 10 (2) was that the legislation falls under Entry 18 List II. One of the submissions raised to defend the legislative competence of the second provisio to section 10 (2) was that the legislation falls under Entry 18 List II. The said submission was rejected by the Apex Court and following was laid down in paragraph 19 by the Constitution Bench. “19. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha argued that the topic of legislation concerns land and therefore falls under entry 18 of the State List and he drew our attention to other provisions on the subject of mines in the Land Reforms Act as originally passed. The abolition of the rights of intermediaries in the mines and vesting these rights as lessors in the State Government was a topic connected with land and land tenures. But after the mining leases stood between the State Government and the lessees, any attempt to regulate those mining leases will fall not in entry 18 but in entry 23 even though the regulation incidentally touches land. The pith and substance of the amendment to Section 10 of the Reforms Act falls within entry 23 although it incidentally touches land and not vice versa. Therefore, this amendment was subject to the overriding power to Parliament as declared in Act 67 of 1957 in Section 15. Entry 18 of the State list, therefore, is of no help.” 59. Thus, the submission of learned Additional Advocate General that the legislation falls under Entry 18 List II cannot be accepted. 60. Section 3-E : Section 3-E empowers the State Government to issue removal of difficulties Order with regard to which no exception can be taken. No submission has been raised challenging the validity of the aforesaid provision. Section 3-E is thus, held to be within the legislative competence of the State. 61. Now comes the fifth issues as noted above. The submission raised by learned Additional Advocate General is that unless a notified order is issued by the Central Government under 1951 Act as contemplated under section 18A and 18AA and other provisions, no question of repugnancy with the State enactment shall arise or can be gone into. It is contended that no notified order has actually been issued by the Central Government with regard to scheduled industries in question. It is submitted that inconsistency should arise in fact and mere possibility of an inconsistency/repugnancy is not a ground for invalidating the State Act. It is contended that no notified order has actually been issued by the Central Government with regard to scheduled industries in question. It is submitted that inconsistency should arise in fact and mere possibility of an inconsistency/repugnancy is not a ground for invalidating the State Act. The submission is to the effect that unless the Central Government exercises its power under 1951 Act with regard to taking over management of industrial undertakings for regulation by a notified order, the field is not occupied and is open for legislation by the State Government. In this context reliance has been placed on the judgment in the case of M/s. Siel Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1998 SC 3076 . In the said case, the validity of U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam (Molasses Control) Act, 1964 was under challenge and it was contended that in view of 1951 Act, the field was occupied and State had no legislative competence to enact the impugned Act. Section 18-G of 1951 Act was relied for challenging the State Legislation. It is relevant to quote section 18-G of the 1951 Act, which is to the following effect : “Section 18-G : Power to control supply, distribution, price etc., of certain articles.— (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, by notified order, provide for regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) to (5).............. " 62. The U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam (Molasses Control) Act, 1964 was enacted by the State pertaining to trade and commerce of molasses. Relying on two more judgments, following was laid down in paragraph 20 : “20. In this connection our attention was drawn to the observations of this Court in Ch. Tika Ramji’s case AIR 1956 SC 676 (supra). The Court in that case was concerned with the legislative competence of the State Government to legislate in respect of sugarcane in the light of Section 18-G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. This Court observed (at page 432 of 1956 SCR 393 ) : (at Pp. Tika Ramji’s case AIR 1956 SC 676 (supra). The Court in that case was concerned with the legislative competence of the State Government to legislate in respect of sugarcane in the light of Section 18-G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. This Court observed (at page 432 of 1956 SCR 393 ) : (at Pp. 762-63 of AIR 1956 SC 676 ) that even assuming that sugarcane was an article relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of Section 18-G, no order had been issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under that section. Hence no question of repugnancy would arise. Repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend merely on a possibility. Ch. Tika Ramji’s case (supra) has been cited with approval in the more recent case of Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Karnataka Electricity Board, (1992) 3 SCC 580 : 1992 AIR SCW 2551 where this Court again held that in the absence of any notification under Section 18-G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act there was no question of any repugnancy on the score of tariff of electricity fixed by the State Amending Act. Section 18-G per se did not take away the State’s right also to legislate under Entry 33 of List III. This Court also noted the provisions of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution in this connection.” 63. In Ch. Tika Ramji and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1956 SC 676 which was relied in the above case, the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 was impugned. The Apex Court upheld the legislative competence of the said Act under Entry 33 List III. Entry 33 List III is to the following effect : “33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of,— (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; (c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and (e) raw jute. 33A. Weights and measures except establishment of standards.” 64. 33A. Weights and measures except establishment of standards.” 64. In M/s Siel India Ltd. also the legislative competence of Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam was upheld under Entry 33 List III. The observations which were made by the Apex Court in paragraph 20 quoted above, was in that context when both Parliament and State legislature was empowered under Entry 33 with regard to regulations of trade and commerce, the repugnancy has to exist in facts but present is not a case where Parliament and State Legislature exercise the legislative power under concurrent List, which field is open for both the Legislatures but present is a case where Parliament exercises legislative competence under Entry 52 List I and State under Entry 24 List II is denuded of the legislative competence to the extent the field is occupied by Parliamentary legislation. In this context, the judgements of the Apex Court in Hingir Rampur Coal Co. and State of Orissa and another v. M/s M.A. Tulloch & Co. (supra) are relevant to be referred to. In Hingir Rampur Coal Co., the validity of Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 was challenged on the ground that field is occupied by The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act LIII of 1948). Arguments were raised that under section 5 of the 1948 Act, the Central Government is empowered to make rules by notification for regulating the grant of mining leases or for prohibiting the grant of such mining leases in respect of any mineral or in any area, and no rule having been framed, the field is not occupied and the State Legislature was fully empowered to legislate. Repelling the submissions following was laid down by the Constitution Bench in paragraph 24: “24..... Therefore, if a Central Act has been passed for the purpose of providing for the conservation and development of minerals, and if it contains the requisite declaration, then it would not be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act in respect of the subject-matter covered by the said declaration. In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act LIII of 1948.” 65. Again in State of Orissa and another v. M/s M.A. Tulloch & Co. (supra), a similar submission was raised in the context of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952. It was submitted that section 18 of 1957 Act merely lays a duty on the Central Government to take all such steps for ensuring the conservation and development of the mineral resources of the country and since no rule had been framed by the Central, the Act could not be said to have covered the field and Orissa Act could continue to operate in full force. The said submission was considered and rejected by the Apex Court in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 are quoted herein below : “13. The second point urged by the appellant is based on the fact that Section 18(1) of the Central Act merely lays a duty on the Central Government to “take steps” for ensuring the conservation and development of the mineral resources of the country and in that sense is not self-acting. The submission is that even assuming that under the power conferred thereunder read in conjunction with Section 13 and the other provision in the Act, it would be competent for the Central Government to frame rules on the lines of the Orissa Act i.e., for the development of “mining areas” and for that purpose to provide for the imposition of fees and for the constitution of a fund made up of these monies, still no such rules had been framed and until such rules were made or such steps taken, the Central Act would not cover the field so that the Orissa Act would continue to operate in full force. In support of this submission reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Ch. In support of this submission reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., 1956 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676 and in particular on a passage at p. 432 (of SCR) : (at p. 703 of AIR) reading : “Even assuming that sugarcane was an article or class of articles relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of Section 18-G of Act LXV of 1951, it is to be noted that no order was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under that Section and no question of repugnancy could ever arise because, as has been noted above, repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend merely on a possibility. The possibility of an order under Section 18-G being issued by the Central Government would not be enough. The existence of such an order would be the essential prerequisite before any repugnancy could ever arise.” 14. We consider that this submission in relation to the Act before us is without force besides being based on misapprehension of the true legal position. In the first place the point is concluded by the earlier decision of this Court in 1961(2) SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459 where this Court said : “In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced. All that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not.” 15. But even if the matter was res integra the argument cannot be accepted. Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for, if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. In the present case, having regard to the terms of Section 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession, of the State Act.” 66. In view of the foregoing discussions, the submission of learned Additional Advocate General that unless a notified order is issued under section 18A or 18AA or any step for regulation and development of scheduled undertakings is taken by Central Government the field is unoccupied and the State Legislature is competent to legislate, cannot be accepted. 67. Now remains the submissions raised by Sri Anoop Trivedi in second writ petition that under Article 31A of the Constitution of India the Presidential assent was necessary for Amendment Act, 2009. Article 31A(1) proviso has been relied in support of the above proposition, which is to the following effect : “31A. 67. Now remains the submissions raised by Sri Anoop Trivedi in second writ petition that under Article 31A of the Constitution of India the Presidential assent was necessary for Amendment Act, 2009. Article 31A(1) proviso has been relied in support of the above proposition, which is to the following effect : “31A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for- (a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or (b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property, or (c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, or (d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or (e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19: Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent : Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.” 68. Thus, the provision of Article 31-A saves the attack based on Articles 14 and 19 with regard to legislation as enumerated therein. Proviso to the said Article 31-A (1) provides that where such law is made by legislature of a State, the provision of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. The proviso is to the effect that protection of sub-article (1) shall not be available unless the presidential assent is obtained with regard to State Legislation. The said proviso cannot mean that without Presidential assent, the State cannot legislate with regard to acquisition of any estate. Thus, the submission of the petitioner that Presidential assent was necessary for enactment of Amending Act, cannot be accepted. 69. In both the writ petitions, the challenge to Expression of Interest dated 29.6.2009 has also been made and different clauses of the said Expression of Interest have been referred to. We having found that the Amendment Act, 2009 in so far as it inserts Sections 3-C, 3-D to the extent indicated above, is beyond the legislative competence of the State of U.P. other consequential actions relating to the aforesaid two sections have also to be held invalid to that extent. 70. In the result both the writ petitions are partly allowed. Section 3-C and Section 3-D to the extent it provides “closure of the scheduled undertakings or sugar mills of the Corporation and its subsidiaries or in relation to the Corporation itself” is struck down as lacking legislative competence. All consequential actions to the above extent shall automatically fall on the ground. The other provisions of the Amendment Act, 2009 and the actions taken therein are held to be intra-vires. The parties shall bear their own costs. ————