JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.K. Arora, J.—Heard Dr. L.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite parties. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 25.5.1988 by which her services were terminated by the opposite party No. 2. The petitioner challenged the impugned order basically on the ground that the same is stigmatic and punitive in character and has also been passed in utter violation of principles of natural justice. 3. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was selected as lady worker under the scheme known as “Angan Bari Scheme” through a regularly constituted Selection Committee. The petitioner after her selection was required to undergo the requisite training and after completion of training, the petitioner was appointed as lady worker and posted at Kamolia Centre. After working for sometime, the petitioner was transferred to Chilwaria Centre, which is adjoining to village Bhadauli, the village of the petitioner. 4. The main work of lady worker, engaged under the Scheme of Angan Bari is to look after the child development of the children of the concerned centre and to impart necessary education as well as to give food etc. The opposite party No. 5 who was working as Supervisor (Mukhya Sevika) desired the petitioner to lift only a portion of the material earmarked for the purpose of the children belonging to the circle under the control of the petitioner and to leave 50% of the material for the personal use of the opposite party No. 5. It was seriously objected by the petitioner, which resulted annoyance of the opposite party No. 5 and she became seriously prejudiced against the petitioner. The opposite party No. 5 sent a complaint to the opposite party No. 2 making certain allegations against the petitioner and on the basis of said complaint the opposite party No. 2 passed the impugned order without affording any opportunity of hearing. 5. It is very emphatically asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the opposite party No. 2 before passing the impugned stigmatic and punitive order did not issue any show cause notice requiring the petitioner to submit her explanation nor any enquiry was conducted. 5. It is very emphatically asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the opposite party No. 2 before passing the impugned stigmatic and punitive order did not issue any show cause notice requiring the petitioner to submit her explanation nor any enquiry was conducted. The petitioner after passing of the impugned order moved an application dated 27.7.1988 before the opposite party No. 4 bringing to his notice the entire facts and circumstances. The opposite party No. 4 asked for a report from the opposite party No. 3 and the opposite party No. 3 clearly reported that the opposite party No. 2 has no jurisdiction and authority to terminate the services of the petitioner and in case the work of the petitioner was not satisfactory or there was any complaint against the petitioner then the explanation ought to have been sought from the petitioner. It was also mentioned that according to the report of village Pradhan the work of the petitioner was satisfactory. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under the oral direction of the opposite parties No. 3 and 4 the petitioner continued to discharge her duties till the end of August, 1988 but the opposite parties No. 2 and 5 were creating hindrance in her functioning. Though the petitioner worked upto September, 1988, but her salary was not paid since May, 1988. It is also pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that as per report submitted by the District Harijan and Social Welfare Officer, the opposite party No. 3, who is the District Level Controlling authority and also supervises control over the opposite party No. 2, found that the order passed by the opposite party No. 2 is patently illegal. After passing of the impugned order, beneficiaries of the Angan Bari Scheme also moved application before the opposite party No. 4 praying that the petitioner be allowed to continue in service in the interest of the beneficiaries and be not subjected to high handedness. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that large number of persons appointed as lady workers in Angan Bari Scheme subsequent to the appointment of the petitioner in the year 1985 and onwards are being retained in service whereas a discriminatory treatment has been given to the petitioner. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that large number of persons appointed as lady workers in Angan Bari Scheme subsequent to the appointment of the petitioner in the year 1985 and onwards are being retained in service whereas a discriminatory treatment has been given to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission placed reliance on paras-10 and 13 of the judgment of this Court in Raghav Prasad Pathak v. Commissioner/Administrator, Sharda Sahayak Command Area and Development Project, Lucknow and others, 2004 (22) LCD 706. Paras-10 and 13 read as under : “10. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and others, 2000 (3) SCC 239 , in paragraph 7 of which it has been held that probationer like the temporary servant is also entitled to certain protections and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily nor can his services be terminated in punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court given in the case of Javed Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, 1999 (17) LCD 8, in which it has been held in para 13 that my means of the interim order dated 14.9.1986 operation of the impugned order was stayed that the petitioners have been on the strength of the interim order as well as are holding the posts in question and have been discharging their duties for about 13 years continuously in my opinion it is not equitable to permit the respondents to disturb the status-quo and proceed further against the petitioners. 11. ..................................... 12. ..................................... 13. In my opinion the case law laid down in the State of U.P. and others v. Smt. Kamla Devi and another (supra) is not applicable in the instant case as I have gone through the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, from which it is clear that the impugned order of termination of the petitioner has been passed due to misconduct and negligence in performance of duties, which casts stigma, for which opportunity of hearing is necessarily required. Hence, the impugned order has been passed against the principles of natural justice as admittedly neither any departmental inquiry was conducted nor any opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner.” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment in Shashi Bala Sinha and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2002 (20) LCD 33. Paras-6 and 7 read as under : “6............. The impugned termination orders were stayed by this Court and till date the petitioners are working on the post on the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court. There is also no dispute that the names of the petitioners were mentioned in the tentative seniority list from serial Nos. 6 to 16 and 29 persons junior the petitioners were retained in service when the impugned termination orders were passed. The impugned termination orders were passed by the Director of Employment & Training, U.P. without affording any opportunity to the petitioners as they were working on their respective post since August, 1983. The impugned termination orders are violative of the principle of natural justice as the petitioners have worked for more than three years when the impugned termination orders were passed. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (supra) has held as under : “The mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termination of the services of a probationer or of an ad hoc appointee is a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms of the appointment without attaching any stigma to the employee concerned. It is the substance of the order i.e. the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration. When an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the Court to lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of in order to determine whether the order was made on ground of misconduct and inefficiency or not.” 7. In the present case, juniors to the petitioners were retained and regularized in service when the impugned termination orders were passed against the petitioners and as such it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The arguments of the learned Standing Counsel that the appointments of the petitioners were made without following the prescribed procedure cannot be accepted as the petitioners were given appointment letters after the written test and interview. The petitioners are working till date on the strength of the interim orders passed by this Court and now more than 14 years have elapsed and all the petitioners have become over age for other services.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment in Jitendra Srivastava v. Union of India, (2002) 2 UPLBEC 1453 . Para-7 of the same reads as under : “7. Ordinarily when a minor punishment is sought to be imposed, no personal opportunity of hearing need be given to the employee and only a snow cause notice can be given and on the basis of his reply the order of punishment can be passed. However when a major punishment like termination on the basis of misconduct is proposed to be imposed, then it necessary to hold a full-fledged enquiry after giving a charge-sheet and fixing the date, time and place of enquiry. The charge-sheet should intimate to the petitioner that he can present his witnesses and cross-examine the witnesses against him. As stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the supplementary affidavit neither any charge-sheet was given to the petitioner nor any enquiry was held. Hence we hold that the impugned termination order dated 30/31.8.2001 is illegal.” 8. The learned Standing Counsel while opposing the writ petition submitted that the opposite party No. 5 called explanation of the petitioner on various occasions and also directed to improve her work and on the basis of report of the opposite party No. 5, on inspection, opposite party No. 2 found irregularities against the petitioner and doing work in her own manner. The opposite party No. 2 has full authority to terminate the services of the petitioner, and as such, order passed by the opposite party No. 2 is perfectly legal and justified. 9. The opposite party No. 2 has full authority to terminate the services of the petitioner, and as such, order passed by the opposite party No. 2 is perfectly legal and justified. 9. It is also submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that since the work of the petitioner was not found satisfactory and the petitioner is a resident of village Bhadauli, Payagpur Block Development and not the resident of block development of Chittaura and therefore in pursuance of the Government Order dated 5.2.1988 being the resident of outside the block she could not have been continued in service. Further, the petitioner is not a government servant and no provisions of the Constitution of India has been violated. 10. I have considered the arguments of learned counsel for the respective parties and gone through the record. 11. This Court by means of order dated 22.9.1988 stayed the operation of the impugned termination order dated 25.5.1988 and recorded finding that the impugned order is stigmatic and appears to have been passed without holding domestic enquiry and while appreciating the arguments of learned Standing Counsel to the effect that the order may have been passed after holding domestic enquiry, the Court further clarified that if the order has been passed after holding domestic enquiry, the interim order shall not be available to the petitioner and directed the opposite parties to take or not to take work from the petitioner but the petitioner will be paid salary in accordance with directions. 12. From perusal of the counter-affidavit, it is evident that there are pleadings to the effect that the opposite party No. 5 vide different letter sought explanation from the petitioner and also directed to improve her working but none of the letters by which explanation was called, has been annexed with the counter-affidavit. The pleadings of the counter-affidavit further strengthens the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the opposite party No. 5 was prejudiced against the petitioner and it is on her complaint the opposite party No. 2 passed the impugned order. The language of the impugned order dated 25.5.1988 is stigmatic as well as punitive in nature. Thus, admitted position is that before passing the impugned order, the opposite party No. 2 has not given any opportunity to the petitioner and apparently placed reliance on the complaint of the opposite party No. 5. The language of the impugned order dated 25.5.1988 is stigmatic as well as punitive in nature. Thus, admitted position is that before passing the impugned order, the opposite party No. 2 has not given any opportunity to the petitioner and apparently placed reliance on the complaint of the opposite party No. 5. It is also admitted position that the impugned order has been passed in utter violation of principles of natural justice and apart from being stigmatic and punitive, the same deserves to be quashed. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that the impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and also stigmatic and punitive in nature. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 25.5.1988 is hereby quashed. The opposite parties are directed to pay all the consequential benefits to the petitioner, as admissible under law. 15. There shall be no order as to costs. ————