JUDGEMENT Dipak Misra, J. 1. The present intra-court appeal has been preferred under Clause-X of the Letters Patent assailing the legal substantiality and acceptability of the order dated 21.4.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 6169 of 2009. 2. The facts which are imperative to be adumbrated for disposal of the present appeal are that the respondent no. 14 invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging his removal from the post of Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat Raj, Madhopur bv the State Government in exercise of power under Section 18(5) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (for brevity, the Act). Be it noted, we need not to state what were the grounds for his removal, for the simonpure reason, the matter is still pending for adjudication before the learned Single Judge. 3. After the order of removal came to be passed as per provision contained in the Act, the Up-Mukhiya remained in-charge. In the meantime, the State Election Commission took steps by issuing a notification to hold the election for the post of Mukhiya. An application was filed before this court seeking its interdiction to stay the matter but the learned Single Judge by order dated 8.7.2009 declined to interfere holding, inter alia, that as the election was going to be held for the post of Mukhiya on 9.7.2009, there was no justification or warrant to pass an order of stay. Because of the refusal to pass an order of stay; the election took place and the present appellant was elected as Mukhiya. 4. After the election was over an application for impleadment was filed which was allowed by the learned Single Judge and accordingly the appellant came on record as respondent no. 14 before the writ court. The matter was listed for final hearing on 21.4.2010 and on that day the learned Single Judge has passed the following order: "Having perused the impugned order of the State Government, removing the petitioner in terms of Section 18(5) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 , prima facie, I find it to be perverse. It takes the report of the Block Development Officer as the sacrosanct truth and the order of the Sessions Judge refusing bail order an order of guilt, as if it has convicted the petitioner. It takes the report of the Block Development Officer as the sacrosanct truth and the order of the Sessions Judge refusing bail order an order of guilt, as if it has convicted the petitioner. There is neither consideration of petitioners show cause nor any application of mind. Impugned order is stayed. The consequence would be that there would be no vacancy and consequentially the election of respondent no. 14 and his functioning as such would also remain stayed." 5. The aforesaid order is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the office has raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal as the appeal had been preferred against an interim order. Mr. Suresh Prasad Singh No. 1, learned counsel for the respondent no. 14, has also submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable. Per contra, Mr.Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, would submit that the appeal is maintainable as it has the contour and characteristic of a final order and in such a case a letters patent appeal would lie. 6. First we shall address with regard to the maintainability of the appeal. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent reads as under: "10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court.And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order) made in the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court. Pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine. In the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." 7. In Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 883 , while dealing with the concept of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court their Lordships referred to the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 , and have opined that the matter to be determined is whether an interlocutory order passed by one Judge of the High Court falls within the meaning of judgment for purpose of Letters Patent, the test is whether the order is a final determination affecting the vital and valuable rights and the obligations of the parties concerned and the same has to be ascertained on the facts of each case. Be it noted, in the said case the learned Single Judge had allowed the application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and directed management to pay the workmen full wages last drawn by them on the date of termination of their services. The Division Bench of the High Court had held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. The Apex Court came to the conclusion that the appeal was maintainable and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh adjudication. 8. The Division Bench of the High Court had held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. The Apex Court came to the conclusion that the appeal was maintainable and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh adjudication. 8. In Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1975 , it was held that in certain situations grant of interim relief would tantamount to granting of final relief itself and there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself, for by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. 9. In Liverpool & London S.P. & I. Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success-I, (2004)9 SCC 512 , it has been held as under: "124. Clause. 15 of the Letters Patent is not a special statute. Only in a case where there exists an express prohibition in the matter of maintainability of an intra-court appeal, the same may not be held to be maintainable. But in the event there does not exist any such prohibition and if the order will otherwise be a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an appeal shall be maintainable." 10. In Sublal Paul vs. Maliona Paul, (2003)10 SCC 361 , it has been held as under: "32. While determining the question as regards Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Court is required to see as to whether the order sought to be appealed against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or not. Once it is held that irrespective of the nature of the order, meaning thereby whether interlocutory or final, a judgment has been rendered, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be attracted." 11. In Midnapore Peoples Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Chunilal Nandal, AIR 2006 S.C. 2190 , it has been held thus: "15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversyin the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversyin the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The term judgment occurring in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9). CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43, Rule 1 of CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, judgments for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not judgments for purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent." 12. In Arvind Kumar Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (FB), AIR 2007 MP 276 , the Full Bench after referring to the decisions rendered in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. (supra), Deoraj (supra) and Liverpool & London (supra) has held thus: "26. From the aforesaid enunciation of law there remains no scintilla of doubt that interlocutory orders on certain circumstances, could be appealed against under the Letters Patent. Despite the fact that they are interlocutory in nature they can be put into the compartment of judgment if it affects the merits of the case between the parties by determining some rights or liabilities. There can be three categories of judgments, final judgment, preliminary judgment and intermediary judgment or interlocutory judgment. Despite the fact that they are interlocutory in nature they can be put into the compartment of judgment if it affects the merits of the case between the parties by determining some rights or liabilities. There can be three categories of judgments, final judgment, preliminary judgment and intermediary judgment or interlocutory judgment. If the order finally decides the question and directly affects the decision in the main case or an order which decides the collateral issue or the question which is not the subject matter of the main case or which determines the rights and obligation of the parties in a final way indubitably they are appealable. 27. In the case of W.A. No. 69/2007 [Nav Nirman (Milan) Deria vs. State of M.P.], the Division Bench had taken note of the decision rendered in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) (AIR 1981 SC 1784) and expressed the opinion that the refusal of the interim order had caused serious injustice to the appellants and hence, the appeal was maintainable." 13. In this context, we may refer with profit to the Full Bench decision of this court rendered in State of Bihar vs. Smt. Sharda Devi, 1997(1) PLJR 155(FB), wherein following the decisions rendered in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) it has been held thus: "48. There is another aspect of this matter. This appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court which provides for appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of the Court. The appeal under letters patent is different from ordinary appeals u/s 96 of the CPC. It is clear from Clause 10 that appeal lies from the judgment of the Single Judge. There is no reference to decree in the said clause. We cannot import something which is not in Clause 10. Reference in this connection may be made to the succinct enunciation of the rule in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute at page 21"Object of all interpretations is to discover the intention of the Parliament. The intention of the Parliament must be deduced from the language used. See 1965(2) QB 53. Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Appeal lies to the Division Bench against the judgment of a Single Judge. The intention of the Parliament must be deduced from the language used. See 1965(2) QB 53. Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Appeal lies to the Division Bench against the judgment of a Single Judge. The leading case on the subject is that of Justices of Peace for Calcutta vs. Oriental Gas Co., 1872(8) Ben.L.R. 433 decided by the High Court of Calcutta as back as in 1872. In that case Couch, CJ. said:"We think judgment under clause 15 means a decision which affects, the merits of the question between the parties by determining right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory. The different between them being that final judgment determines the whole issue and preliminary or interlocutory judgment only determines part of it leaving other matters to be determined. As Mulla has observed, "this definition now is of some antiquity and rapidly becoming and, if not already become, almost classical. The definition of Judgment in the case of Justices of Peace in Calcutta (supra) was adopted by the majority of the High Courts in later cases where it was held that appeal lies under this clause against the order passed by the Single Judge of that Court under Order 45 Rule 15 CPC. The Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another reported in AIR 1981 S.C.1786 made following comments on the view of Sir Richard Couch, C.J. in 1872- Beng LR 431 "Although it is true that this decision is practically the locus classicus so far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned and has been consistently followed by later decisions, at the same time it cannot be denied that in a number of cases the conscience of the Judges was so shocked that they tried to whittle down or soften the rigours of this decision so much so that in one case the observations of the Chief Justice were not only not followed but were described as antiquated and in other cases the Judges strongly expressed themselves that the High Court should give up its fondness to stick to the principles laid down by the learned Chief Justice. it is not necessary for us to burden this judgment with later decisions of the Calcutta High Court in trying to comment on the correctness of the principles laid down by Sir Couch, C.J. but a few instances may be quite revealing. 49. It would appear that under Clause 10 appeal lies also against interlocutory order. It cannot be disputed that the decision of learned Single Judge is a judgment and as such appealable under Clause 10." 14. Thus, there can be no scintilla of doubt that an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent would lie against an interlocutory order depending on the nature of order passed and while determining the said aspect the guidelines given by the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. (supra), Liverpool & London (supra), Subal Paul (supra), and Chunnilal Nanda (supra) have to be kept in view. In the case at hand, as is evincible, the writ petitioner was removed and once he was removed, he became unseated. The learned Single Judge had declined to grant stay of the election which was a sequester of his removal and thereafter the election took place and the present appellant after getting elected continued for more than nine months. When the matter was taken up for final hearing, as is evident from the order impugned, the learned Single Judge stayed the order of removal which was passed on 29.4.2009, almost after a span of one year and after the order had already been given effect to as the consequence of the order was not interdicted. By virtue of the order impugned the person, who was removed, assumes office and the person, who was elected by virtue of the second election, after functioning for a period of nine months goes out of the office. Whether the present appellant is a necessary or proper party and has any right to be heard in the lis is totally a different matter altogether. In the ultimate eventuate and the consequent of the order impugned the respondent no.14, who was removed, would assume office. That is the final relief sought in the writ petition. Unless the order of removal is set aside, we are afraid, such an order could not have been passed and that too after expiry of one year. This is putting the clock back which is not permissible in law. That is the final relief sought in the writ petition. Unless the order of removal is set aside, we are afraid, such an order could not have been passed and that too after expiry of one year. This is putting the clock back which is not permissible in law. Thus, the contour and characteristic of the order has the colour of finality and, therefore, we hold that the appeal against such an order is maintainable. 15. Presently, we shall dwell upon whether the learned Single Judge was justified in passing the order. We have already stated in the preceding paragraph that initially there was no prayer for stay of the order of removal. The prayer for stay of election was not granted regard being had to the fact that election was going to take place within 24 hours. Be that as it may, the election was held and the present appellant was elected. The learned Single Judge thereafter by the order impugned referred to the merits in brief and directed stay of the operation of the order which had come into effect a year back and quite apart from that the fall out has been fructified. 16. Thus, in our considered opinion, the order is vulnerable and we are unable to accede to the same. However, regard being had to the fact that the matter relates to removal of the elected Mukhiya under Section 18(5) of the Act, and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that there is no justification for removal of the writ petitioner, we would request the learned Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of four weeks. Learned counsel for the parties have fairly stated that they would not seek any adjournment before the learned Single Judge. 17. Ex consequenti, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the appellant shall be permitted to function, subject to the final order in the writ petition. There shall be no order as to costs.