JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.—This is defendant’s second appeal. Plaintiff, the adopted son of defendant-appellant filed Original Suit No. 261 of 1970 for prohibitory injunction restraining his mother from interfering in his possession etc. over the disputed property. During the pendency of the suit the mother executed a sale-deed dated 29.9.1970 in favour her daughter Kalawati and Ram Chandra qua the same property. Accordingly an Amendment Application was made and the relief for cancellation of the deed dated 29.9.1970 was added. Kalawati and Ram Chandra were impleaded as defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The Trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 20.8.1975. 2. Not being satisfied the plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1975 which has been allowed vide judgment and order dated 9.12.1976. The suit has been decreed after setting aside the judgment and order of the Trial Court. 3. Hence this second appeal. 4. Following substantial question of law was framed at the time of admission of this second appeal : “Whether the finding recorded by the first appellate Court qua permission having been granted for adoption of a child by the husband to Barfi Devi perverse being based on no evidence.” 5. One Kacheru married twice. The first wife being Bhagwati and other being Barfi Devi. Out of wedlock with both the wives no child was born. Kacheru expired in the year 1948 issue less. 6. Barfi Devi the junior wife (hereinafter referred to as junior widow). Barfi Devi executed a sale-deed in respect of the agricultural land in favour of one Kalawati and Sri Ram Chandra vide registered sale-deed dated 24th April, 1970. Sahab Ram filed Original Suit No. 261 of 1970 for cancellation of the said sale-deed with the averments that Barfi Devi had adopted Sahab Ram as son in the year 1951. The adoption deed was duly registered in the year 1957. With the adoption of a male descendant, he is deemed to be the son of Khacheru and therefore, stood inducted in the family. Accordingly the widow lost the right to transfer the property. 7. The adoption deed was duly registered in the year 1957. With the adoption of a male descendant, he is deemed to be the son of Khacheru and therefore, stood inducted in the family. Accordingly the widow lost the right to transfer the property. 7. The trial Court dismissed the suit after recording that under the Hindu Law, as was applicable in the year 1951 i.e. prior to the enforcement of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, if a male expired leaving behind two widows adoption could be made only under following circumstances : (a) There was an authorization by the husband in favour of the widow for adoption. (b) If the junior widow had to adopt the child, it could only be with the consent of the senior widow or else there should be a separate authorization in favour of the junior widow. 8. The trial Court recorded that absolutely no pleadings have been made in the plaint nor any evidence has been led for establishing that the husband, prior to his death, had authorized the junior widow to adopt a male child, and therefore, in terms of the Hindu Law, as applicable, the adoption claimed by the plaintiff was not in accordance with law. It has been held that the alleged adopted son had no right or title over the property under transfer. For the aforesaid purpose of the trial Court has referred to paragraph 455 of the Commentary on Hindu Law by Mulla. 9. Not being satisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, Sahab Ram filed first appeal before the learned District Judge, being Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1975. The appeal has been allowed by the learned District Judge vide judgment and order dated 9th December, 1976. Hence this second appeal by Barfi Devi. 10. On behalf of the appellant Sri R.N. Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri A.K. Rai, has vehemently contended that the presumption drawn under the impugned order of the District Judge to the fact that, at the time of death of Khacheru since Barfi Devi was at the bed side of her husband, therefore, he must have authorized her to adopt a child, is based on no pleadings and no evidence. It is contended that in absence of pleadings no evidence can be led nor can be referred to for the purpose of granting the relief. It is contended that in absence of pleadings no evidence can be led nor can be referred to for the purpose of granting the relief. He further stated that since there was no valid adoption nor can there have been one in absence of any authorization having been pleaded or established in the alternative without consent of the senior widow the plaintiff has no right in the property under transfer. In accordance with the U.P. Tenancy Act, which was applicable on the date of death of Kacheru, the widows succeeded to the property in absence of any male lineal descendant, therefore, Barfi had the right over the property in question and the sale-deed executed by her qua her share is in accordance with law. 11. The contention so raised in opposed by Sri G.N. Verma, Senior Advocate assisted by Dr. Madhu Tandon, Advocate, Sri M.K. Gupta, Advocate and Sri Sudeep Ojha, Advocate. It is submitted that from the records it is established that Barfi Devi had specifically admitted in her statement that she had adopted the plaintiff, namely Sahab Ram, and in view of the said admission, no further evidence was required to be looked into, inasmuch as admission is the best evidence. It is contended that so far as Northern India is concerned, the law as noticed in paragraph 455 of the book of Mullah on Hindu Law is not applicable and there is no restriction for a son being adopted by a widow. Both the widows had an independent right to take a male child in adoption. They made reference to Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for the purposes of suggesting that once the adoption deed has been registered and it was produced before the Courts below, unless contrary was established, the adoption has to be treated as valid and as per the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The adoption of plaintiff has to be treated as valid in view of declaration made in Section 12 of the said Act of 1956. The adopted son will become a member of the family of Khacheru from the date of his adoption and being a lineal descendant he acquired all the rights and title over the property of Khacheru. The adoption of plaintiff has to be treated as valid in view of declaration made in Section 12 of the said Act of 1956. The adopted son will become a member of the family of Khacheru from the date of his adoption and being a lineal descendant he acquired all the rights and title over the property of Khacheru. Therefore, any sale effected by Barfi Devi was patently illegal, as she was left with no right or title to transfer the same subsequent to the adoption. 12. With reference to various paragraphs of the Mullah’s book on Hindu Law, it has been submitted that the adoption in the facts of the case was not hit by any provisions of Hindu Law and in fact it was admitted by Barfi Devi that plaintiff was her adopted son. He further refers to paragraph 472 of the book by Mullah on Hindu Law for the purposes of suggesting that on adoption of child, the rights of the adopter vested in the son. It is further clarified that in the plaint allegation it was specifically stated that adoption has been effected by Barfi Devi with the consent/permission of her husband and the aforesaid averment made in the plaint allegation stood corroborated from the registered adoption deed, which also contained recital to a similar effect. He, therefore, submits that the plea that the adoption has been effect without consent of the husband or that there was no pleadings of evidence for the purpose is incorrect. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the present second appeal. 14. Before condification of law the authority of the widow governed by Hindu Law to adopt has been explained in the book of Mulla in paragraph 453 to 455. Adoption by a widow was permissible only under an express authority of the husband. The authority may be oral or in writing. If there was two widows then generally the senior widow had a right to adopt at the first instance and second widow could adopt with the consent of senior widow except in a case when there was specific authorization by the husband in favour of the junior widow. 15. The authority may be oral or in writing. If there was two widows then generally the senior widow had a right to adopt at the first instance and second widow could adopt with the consent of senior widow except in a case when there was specific authorization by the husband in favour of the junior widow. 15. The trial Court dismissed the suit after recording that in absence of sufficient pleadings in the plaint filed by the adopted son, such adoption cannot be said to have taken place in accordance with Hindu Law and, therefore, he had no right or title in the property which was transferred by Barfi Devi subsequent to the death of her husband. 16. The trial Court after referring to the law applicable held that the adoption was not established. It proceeded to hold that the widow was full owner of the property and, therefore, the transfer effected by her was valid. It has also been noticed that in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, Barfi Devi being in possession as Sirdar deposited ten times land revenue and became Bhumidhar of the land and, therefore, she had a right to transfer the property. The First Appellate Court framed four points for determination : “1. That the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 2. That Smt. Barfi did not adopt the plaintiff for her Late husband and she had no authority from her husband to adopt and that elder widow Smt. Bhagwati was there and Smt. Barfi could not adopt. 3. That Smt. Barfi is tenant under the statue and her legal tenancy rights are intact. 4. That Smt. Barfi is also the absolute owner of the properties under Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act.” Issue No. 1 has been decided in favour of the plaintiff which has not been further challenged before this Court. 17. With regard to issue No. 2 it has been held that the plaintiff was taken on adoption by Barfi Devi in the year 1951 and a duly registered deed of adoption was executed for the purpose by her on 20.3.1957. The Court also noticed the recital in the plaint wherein it was stated that the plaintiff was validly adopted son of Barfi Devi and such adoption has been effected after following the lawful procedure. The Court also noticed the recital in the plaint wherein it was stated that the plaintiff was validly adopted son of Barfi Devi and such adoption has been effected after following the lawful procedure. Reference was also made to the recital in the registered adoption deed which mentioned that such adoption has been undertaken by the widow with the express consent of her husband. It has, therefor, been held that the plaintiff was the adopted son of Barfi Devi. Recital in the written statement made by Barfi Devi as well as statement made by her on oath before Consolidation Officer qua adoption of the plaintiff have also been relied upon for arriving at the same conclusion. 18. With regards to consent of the husband, it has been held that since Barfi Devi was at the death bed side of her husband at the time of death, there is every probability that Khacheru would have authorized Barfi Devi to adopt the son for him. The appellate Court thereafter proceeded to hold that mere Bhumidhari entry does not confer any tenancy right on any of the parties and that under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act Bhumidhari rights can be conferred on a person who had certain possessory tenure rights over the land from before. Since Barfi Devi had no tenancy rights, she will not acquired Transferable Bhumidhari Rights merely because of deposit of 10 times revenue. The possession of Barfi Devi over the property has not been found to be just and legal on the date of enforcement of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and it has been held that she is not the owner of the property. 19. Having examined the judgment of the Courts below and the evidence on record, this Court finds that the findings recorded by the first appellate Court to the effect that Barfi Devi was at the bed side of her dying husband and in all probabilities consent has been given to adopt a son is based on mere surmises and conjunctures of the first appellate Court. Neither there is any such pleadings in the plaint nor any such evidence worth its name was led. On the contrary Barfi Devi had taken a categorical stand that she was an illiterate lady. The father of the plaintiff was doing pairvi on her behalf in various cases. The father had manipulated documents for suggesting adoption. 20. Neither there is any such pleadings in the plaint nor any such evidence worth its name was led. On the contrary Barfi Devi had taken a categorical stand that she was an illiterate lady. The father of the plaintiff was doing pairvi on her behalf in various cases. The father had manipulated documents for suggesting adoption. 20. In the aforesaid factual background the first appellate Court in absence of any pleading of material facts to establish the authorization by the husband as per Hindu Law then applicable could not have reversed the findings recorded by the trial Court qua the adoption set up by the plaintiff without authority of law. 21. There is another reason for coming to the same conclusion namely; according to the case set up by the plaintiff himself and as stated in the adoption deed the authorization by the husband if any, was for adopting a son from his own family, the crucial word being “Mere Khandan Se Yogya Ladke Ko Goad Lekar”. 22. As per paragraph 454 of the Hindu Law by Mulla, the authority conferred upon the widow to adopt must be strictly obeyed. To similar effect is the judgment in Sundarasivudu v. Adinayana, AIR (1940) Mad 233. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he was the son of one of the family members of the husband of Barfi Devi. 23. Therefore, even accepting for a moment that Barfi Devi had any right to adopt the son because of the authorization by her husband, the consent as recorded in the deed was specifically to the effect that the son to be adopted must be from the family of the husband only. There is absolutely no pleadings nor any evidence to establish that the plaintiff was family member of the husband of Barfi Devi. 24. Therefore, this Court holds that the trial Court rightly held that the plaintiff had not been able to establish that his adoption was in accordance with the Hindu law as then applicable. 25. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been able to establish a valid adoption, what logically follows is that he rendered an outsider viz. a viz. the properties which were inherited by Barfi Devi after the death of her husband and are subject matter of transfer vide sale-deed under challenge. 25. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been able to establish a valid adoption, what logically follows is that he rendered an outsider viz. a viz. the properties which were inherited by Barfi Devi after the death of her husband and are subject matter of transfer vide sale-deed under challenge. Under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act read with the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, she became absolute owner of the properties in question on deposit of 10 times the land revenue. The transfer by sale in respect of such property could be validly effected by her. 26. The substantial question of law as framed is answered in favour of the appellant. 27. In view of the aforesaid this second appeal is allowed. ————