ORDER These four cases grounded on simi1ar facts raise the same issue. Hence, this common order. 2. The Machilipatnam Municipality engaged the services of the four writ petitioners as malaria workers/drain cleaner during the years 1990-1993. The character of their engagement is in dispute but the fact remains that the Municipality conceded before the Labour Court, Guntur, that they worked for more than the requisite 240 days during the 12 months prior to their disengagement from service in the year 1993. There is also no dispute that such disengagement was not in compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1947'). These facts stood affirmed by the Labour Court, Guntur, in the separate Awards dated 30.11.2004 passed by it in the individual Industrial Disputes raised by; these petitioners under Section 2-A(2) of the Act of 1947. These LOs. were instituted with delay in the year 1998 and in the case of one petitioner, in 1999. The Labour Court, Guntur, having found in favour of the petitioners on the above facts, directed payment of compensation quantified at three months salary amounting to less than Rs.5,000/- each, being notice pay for one month along with two months pay for 24 months service. The Labour Court further granted interest of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the I.D. and costs of Rupees One thousand. The Labour Court took into account the delay on the part of the petitioners in invoking its jurisdiction and relying upon precedents, it passed Awards as aforestated. Aggrieved by the denial of the reliefs of reinstatement in service with back wages and continuity of service, the petitioners are before this Court. 3. In its counters filed in three out of the four cases, the Machilipatnam Municipality took the stand that the petitioners had only been engaged as badili (substitute) workers in temporary leave vacancies. While admitting the length of service rendered by them, the Municipality stated that pursuant to the instructions of the Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration, Andhra Pradesh, engagement of badili workers was discontinued in the 1993. It stated that two of such disengaged workmen raised industrial disputes - I.D.Nos.281 and 282 of 1996 and ex parte Awards dated 30.10.1997 were passed therein directing their reinstatement in service along with back wages and continuity of service. It stated that two of such disengaged workmen raised industrial disputes - I.D.Nos.281 and 282 of 1996 and ex parte Awards dated 30.10.1997 were passed therein directing their reinstatement in service along with back wages and continuity of service. The Municipality alleged that taking a cue from this, the petitioners in these four cases belatedly sought the same relief before the Labour Court. The Municipality sought to support the Awards passed by the Labour Court directing payment of compensation. It pointed out that there was a long gap of five years after the disengagement of the petitioners from service and therefore, award of compensation was the right relief to be granted. The Municipality further stated that there were no vacancies either in the posts of badili workers or regular public health workers and that it was not in a position to meet· the regular salaries of its existing workers and employees. It accordingly sought dismissal of the writ petitions. 4. Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that once the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petitioners were retrenched from service within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act of 1947 and such retrenchment was in violation of the statutory procedure prescribed under Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, it ought to have followed the normal rule of directing reinstatement in service. He argued that the Municipality had not pleaded any special circumstances warranting deviation from such rule necessitating the award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. He therefore prayed for a direction for reinstatement in service of all the petitioners with consequential benefits. He relied on case law in support of his contention. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the Municipality, on the other hand, relied on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent, Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal v. Santosh Kumar Seal (1) (2010) 6 SCC 773 . He submitted that given the facts of the cases on hand, even if the termination of the petitioners from service was in contravention of the prescribed procedure, compensation, as held by the Labour Court, would meet the ends of justice. 6. It would be apt to trace the evolution of judicial thought in the arena of illegal retrenchment, reinstatement, back wages and payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 7. 6. It would be apt to trace the evolution of judicial thought in the arena of illegal retrenchment, reinstatement, back wages and payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 7. In M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Employees (2) (1979) 2 SCC 80 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed: "9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. ..." 8. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited ETC., v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (3) AIR 1980 SC 1896 , the majority opinion (2 : 1) was to the effect that where the termination from service was illegal, the discretion to deny reinstatement or pare down the quantum of back wages was absent save for exceptional reasons. If the discharge was bad, the majority opined that reinstatement is the rule. The Court was however quick to point out that particular circumstances of each case may induce the modification of the direction as to the quantum of back wages payable as most rules have exceptions wrought by the pressure of life. 9. In Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (4) (1980) 4 SCC 443 , New Delhi, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the earlier view taken by it in M/s. Swadesamitran Limited, Madras v. Workmen ( AIR 1960 SC 762 ) that if the retrenchment was unjustified and improper, ordinarily such a workman would be entitled to claim reinstatement. It was pointed out therein that in a case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement could not be defeated merely because time had lapsed or the employer had engaged fresh hands. The further observations of the Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar Verma (4 supra) are of relevance: "6. ... Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we 'must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted." 10. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (5) (1981) 3 SCC 225 the Supreme Court held that termination of services without satisfying the pre-conditions under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be ab initio void, invalid and inoperative. In such a case, the Court was of the opinion that there was no cessation of service and a mere declaration would follow that the workman continued to be in service. Accepting that there were judgments which held that before granting reinstatement, the Court must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compensation, the Supreme Court said that the normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice was that where the termination was illegal, especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows to that effect. Stating so, the Supreme Court turned down the request of the management to award compensation instead of directing reinstatement. 11. Stating so, the Supreme Court turned down the request of the management to award compensation instead of directing reinstatement. 11. In Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (6) (1983) 4 SCC 491 , the Supreme Court held against the management for not having got an issue framed before the Tribunal with regard to the gainful employment of the workman during the intervening period and for not adducing necessary evidence in this regard. As such, that plea had been raised for the first time by the management only in the High Court and there was no material on record to indicate the gainful employment of the workman anywhere. That being so, the Court was of the opinion that the workman was not expected to prove the negative. 12. In J.K Synthetics Limited v. K.P.Agrawal (7) 2007 (3) SCJ 792 = 2007 (5) ALT 7.2 (DN SC) = (2007) 2 SCC 433 , the Supreme Court drew a distinction between cases of reinstatement arising out of termination/retrenchment which was held to be illegal for non-compliance with statutory requirements and cases where the reinstatement was owing to exercise of discretion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Having referred to the earlier case law on this aspect, the Supreme Court laid down the law with regard to payment of back wages in cases of the latter type. 13. The decisions relied upon by the Labour Court mostly turned upon facts. No principle was laid down in these decisions to the effect that as a general rule compensation should be substituted for the relief of reinstatement. 14. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Mulu Amra (8) 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 548, the Supreme Court taking into account the lapse of 25 years since the disengagement of the workman directed payment of lump sum compensation quantified to at Rs.75,000/- The case therefore turned on its particular facts. 15. In Rolston John v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court (9) 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 549, the Supreme Court having found that the termination of the workman from service constituted retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act of 1947 held that the same was void and ineffective being in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. (4) SCC 549, the Supreme Court having found that the termination of the workman from service constituted retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act of 1947 held that the same was void and ineffective being in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court did not consider it appropriate to give the relief of reinstatement. This again was a case which turned on its own peculiar facts. 16. In Rattan Singh v. Union of India (10) (1997) 11 SCC 396 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the workman had continuously worked for more than 240 days during the relevant period and was entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The Court further held that the protection under the said provision could not be denied to him on the ground that he was a daily-rated worker. The Supreme Court therefore held that his termination from service could not, be upheld and had to be set aside. However, as nearly 20 years had elapsed since then, the Court was not inclined to direct reinstatement of the appellant, but ordered payment of a consolidated sum of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation in lieu of back wages and reinstatement. 17. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh (11) (1990) 3 SCC 682 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning and scope of 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act of 1947. In that context, it also considered the issue of payment of retrenchment compensation. The said judgment did not deal with payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement, if such retrenchment was held to be illegal. The reliance placed by the Labour Court upon the said judgment is therefore misconceived. 18. The Labour Court also placed reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Arjun Singh v. Labour Court, Jodhpur (12) 2004 (III) LLJ 946 . The said case involved daily wagers whose services were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. Upon challenge, the Labour Court awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Aggrieved thereby, the workmen approached the High Court. The said case involved daily wagers whose services were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. Upon challenge, the Labour Court awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Aggrieved thereby, the workmen approached the High Court. The High Court found on facts that the workmen had not gone through a process of selection when they were appointed on daily wage basis and that the time lag between their termination from service and the award by the Labour Court was substantial. Relying on case law, the High Court upheld the direction of the Labour Court awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The case therefore turned upon the facts obtaining therein. 19. Reference may also be made to the Judgments relied upon by the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar Seal (1 supra). 20. In U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey (13) (2006) 1 SCC 479 , the issue before the Supreme Court was whether retrenchment in violation of the prescribed procedure results as a rule in entitlement to back wages. The Court observed that a direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now, with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter was being taken by the Court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it. Stating so, the Court further opined that no precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of entire back wages should be allowed and that, indisputably, it would depend upon 'the facts and circumstances of each case. However, it would not be correct to contend that it is automatic and that it should be granted mechanically only because on technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination is found to be in contravention of the statutory provisions. This Judgment did not turn upon the question as to in what circumstances compensation should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. 21. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C.Joshi (14) (2007) 9 SCC 353 , the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a daily wager who had worked for a short period and was terminated from service without following the due procedure. 21. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C.Joshi (14) (2007) 9 SCC 353 , the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a daily wager who had worked for a short period and was terminated from service without following the due procedure. He raised an industrial dispute with a delay of six years. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that he was entitled to compensation of Rs.75,000/- in lieu of reinstatement with back wages. The Supreme Court observed that it was well settled that the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would not be granted automatically only because it is lawful to do so and that for the said purpose several factors are required to be taken into consideration, one of them being as to whether such an appointment had been made in terms of the statutory rules. Delay in raising an industrial dispute was also said to be a relevant factor. Relevant to note, the decision turned upon the nature and period of the services rendered by the workman in that case, as also the period for which he had worked and the delay of six years on his part in raising the dispute. In those circumstances, the Court was of the opinion that interest of justice would be met by substituting the relief of reinstatement and back wages with the award of compensation of Rs. 75,000/-. 22. In State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma (15) 2007 (1) SCJ 868 = 2007 (3) ALT 23 .4 (DN SC) = (2007) 1 SCC 575, the Supreme Court was dealing with a similar situation involving a daily wager whose appointment was not in terms of the statutory rules. He was terminated from service without following the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1947. Keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court directed payment of a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards compensation in lieu of regularization in service which had been awarded by the Courts below. This Judgment therefore does not lay down any ratio relevant in the context of the present case. 23. Keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court directed payment of a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards compensation in lieu of regularization in service which had been awarded by the Courts below. This Judgment therefore does not lay down any ratio relevant in the context of the present case. 23. In Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban (16) 2007 (8) SCJ 389 = (2007) 9 SCC 748 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the Industrial Court had directed payment of compensation in the backdrop of violation of Section 25-F of the = Act of 1947. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that each case was required to be dealt with in the fact situation obtaining therein and observed that the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Industrial Court, while directing reinstatement with full back wages. The Supreme Court therefore, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, directed payment of Rs. 75,000/- by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 24. In Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (17) 2008 (3) SCJ 112 = 2009 (1) ALT 9.1 (DN SC) = (2008) 5 SCC 75 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the Labour Court had directed reinstatement of the retrenched workmen with 25% back wages. The High Court interfered with the said Award on the ground that the burden of proof had been placed on the management to prove that the workmen had not worked for 240 days during the relevant period. While confirming the settled position that it would be for the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days during the relevant period, the Supreme Court on the facts of that case disagreed with the High Court that the A ward passed by the Labour Court suffered from an error of law. However, keeping in view the period during which the workmen had rendered services and the fact that the management had stopped its operations the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it was not a fit case where reinstatement could be directed. However, keeping in view the period during which the workmen had rendered services and the fact that the management had stopped its operations the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it was not a fit case where reinstatement could be directed. As the very availability of the job was in question, the Court was of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the case warranted payment of Rs.1,00,000/- each to the workmen to meet the ends of justice. 25. In Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai (18) 2007 (2) SCJ 8 = (2006) 11 SCC 684 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the workman was appointed on daily wages and had not completed 240 days during the relevant period. Retrenchment of the said workman therefore did not require compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The only issue before the Court was the alleged violation of the Rule of 'last come first go' under Section 25-G of the Act of 1947. The Court was of the view that even if there was violation of Sections 25-G and H of the Act of 1947, the same would not mean that the Labour Court should pass an Award of reinstatement with entire back wages. The Court pointed out that the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act of 1947 must be judicious. As in that case, the workman had not served the management regularly, his job was not of a perennial nature and his services were dispensed with as long back as in the year 1987, the Court was of the view that interest of justice would be subserved if instead of reinstatement a sum of Rs.75,000/- was awarded to the workman by way of compensation. 26. In Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Ashok Kumar (19) 2008 (2) SCJ 431 = 2008 (6) ALT 20.1 (DN SC) = (2008) 4 SCC 261 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a daily wager whose services were terminated in violation of the prescribed procedure. However, as the post did not exist the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Labour Court should not have directed reinstatement. Further, a long lapse of time also intervened between the date of disengagement and the direction of reinstatement. However, as the post did not exist the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Labour Court should not have directed reinstatement. Further, a long lapse of time also intervened between the date of disengagement and the direction of reinstatement. In such circumstances and in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court directed payment of a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the workman. 27. In Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula (20) 2008 (1) SCJ 204 = 2008 (5) ALT 10.1 (DN SC) = (2008) 1 SCC 575 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a daily wager whose services were terminated on the ground of misconduct but without following the due procedure. In that view of the matter, the argument advanced before the Court was that as the workman had completed 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding his disengagement, the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, akin to Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, ought to have been complied with. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of the said provision although liable to be set aside does not automatically lead to award of reinstatement. The Court observed that the factors which are relevant for determining the issue are: (i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if any, had been complied with; (ii) the period he had worked; (iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and (iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date of termination or passing of the award. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court directed payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by way of damages to the workman in lieu of reinstatement. 28. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board (21) 2009 (8) SCJ 182 = (2009) 15 SCC 327 , the Supreme Court reiterated that an. Award of back wages would not follow automatically pursuant to setting aside of an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The case involved a daily wager whose services were terminated in violation of the prescribed procedure. The Labour Court directed his reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The High Court reversed the said Judgment. The Supreme Court taking note of recent decisions observed: "14. The case involved a daily wager whose services were terminated in violation of the prescribed procedure. The Labour Court directed his reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The High Court reversed the said Judgment. The Supreme Court taking note of recent decisions observed: "14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee." The Court further observed that a host of facts, inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service are relevant while awarding compensation and added that each case would depend upon its own facts and circumstances. In that case, the Court was of the opinion that compensation of Rs.50,000/- would meet the ends of justice. 29. It is on the basis of the above case law that the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar Seal (1 supra) again reiterated that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, although may be set aside, an Award of reinstatement should not however be automatically passed. The Award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman had completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination particularly daily wagers was held to be not proper as Courts would distinguish between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. In the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court, taking note of the fact that the daily wagers had worked hardly for 2 to 3 years about 25 years prior thereto, directed payment of compensation of Rs.40,000/- to each of them. 30. However, in another recent judgment, the Supreme Court took an altogether different view of these issues. In the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court, taking note of the fact that the daily wagers had worked hardly for 2 to 3 years about 25 years prior thereto, directed payment of compensation of Rs.40,000/- to each of them. 30. However, in another recent judgment, the Supreme Court took an altogether different view of these issues. In Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (22) 2010 (2) SCJ 712 = 2010 (1) SCALE 613 = (2010) 3 SCC 192 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the Labour Court directed reinstatement in service after finding that the workman had been terminated from service in violation of Section 25-Gof the Act of 1947. The High Court, having concurred with the factual findings of the Labour Court, set aside the direction of reinstatement and ordered payment of compensation of Rs.87,582/-. The Supreme Court opined that the High Court had failed to keep in view the parameters for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as it had not found any jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the face of the record in the award of the Labour Court. The Supreme Court therefore restored the award passed by the Labour Court. 31. The observations of the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh (22 supra) are of guidance: "23. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare, legislations. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalization are fast becoming the raison d'etre of the judicial process and an impression, has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by-lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. It need no emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer-public or private." 32. Following Harjinder Singh (22 supra), the Supreme Court in Krishan Singh v. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (23) 2010 (4) SCJ 44 = (2010) 3 SCC 637 , while dealing with the case of a daily wager whose services were dispensed with in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, found fault with the High Court for interfering with the Award of the Labour Court directing his reinstatement with continuity of service along with 50% back wages and substituting the same with an award of compensation of Rs.50,000/-. The Court observed: "17. Wide discretion is, therefore, vested in the Labour Court while adjudicating an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman and if the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case to direct reinstatement of a workman with 50% back wages taking into consideration pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the same, except on well-settled principles laid down by this Court for a writ of certiorari against an order passed by a court or a tribunal." 33. Referring to its earlier judgments in Mahboob Deepak (20 supra) and Ghaziabad Development Authority (19 supra), the Court said that the same had no application to the case before it as the respondent had not taken a stand before the Labour Court that the post was not sanctioned or that the engagement was contrary to rules or that the workman was employed elsewhere or that there was no vacancy. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court's order and directed reinstatement in service with 50% back wages. 34. An analysis of the above cases reflects that the thrust of judicial opinion over the years is to the effect that the facts of the individual case would determine as to what should be the relief to be granted. The ordinary and normal rule in a case where the termination from service is held to be illegal for want of compliance with statutory procedure would be reinstatement in service. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh (22 supra), social service legislations such I as the Act of 1947 must be implemented with intent upon the objective underlying such enactments. That being so, there cannot be any straightjacket formula to decide as to in which case compensation, and in which case reinstatement, would be the appropriate relief. 35. However, the pitfalls inherent in a general approach inclining towards substituting 'compensation' for 'reinstatement' are not far to gather in our system, where unholy liaisons between corrupt minions of the management, - in most cases, the State or its instrumentalities, and some unscrupulous workmen cannot be ruled out. Proclivity towards directing lumpsum compensation in such cases may inspire and motivate collusive illegal retrenchments with the active connivance of both parties and the ultimate sufferer would be the exchequer. Directing payment of compensation in such cases would therefore result in mulcting the State/instrumentality with a liability eating into public monies, for appeasing the collusive greed which may be the motive behind the so called illegal retrenchment. There can therefore be no hard and fast rule in this regard. Every case must turn upon its own facts. 36. In the present case, the 'facts indisputably reflect that the petitioners were engaged in service for about three years each and were unceremoniously removed without complying with the provisions of the Act of 1947. There can therefore be no hard and fast rule in this regard. Every case must turn upon its own facts. 36. In the present case, the 'facts indisputably reflect that the petitioners were engaged in service for about three years each and were unceremoniously removed without complying with the provisions of the Act of 1947. The delay on the part of the petitioners in coming to Court would only be an issue to be factored into the relief to be granted to them. It cannot be held against the workman to the extent of non-suiting them altogether (Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum Processing Services Society (24) AIR 1999 SC 1351 ). Further, as pointed out by Sri M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel, having contributed their bit to the Municipality for nearly three years, obviously with the hope of regular employment, the petitioners cannot now be asked to settle for the paltry compensation of three months salary, amounting to less than Rs.5,000/-, doled out to them by the Labour Court. 37. Though the petitioners contend that the Municipality did not assert and prove that it was facing closure or severe financial doldrums or would be placed under an impossible burden by a direction of reinstatement or that the petitioners had secured better employment elsewhere, warranting substitution of compensation as the relief in the place of a direction for reinstatement, the parameters indicated in Mahboob Deepak (20 supra) would have to be taken into consideration. 38. Relevant to note the issues raised by the Municipality in its counters before this Court do not find reflection in its pleadings before the Labour Court. 39. Perusal of the record of the Labour Court in the I.Ds which are the subject matter of W.P.Nos.10608, 10609 and 19051 of 2005 shows that the Municipality took one stand in all the I.Ds. It was its case that the workmen were engaged as substitute/badili workers in the short leave vacancies as and when they arose. However, the particulars of the services rendered by each of the workmen disclosed in those counters demonstrate that in the case of Tallari Subba Rao, the petitioner in W.P.No.19051 of 2005, from January, 1991 to December, 1992 except for December, 1991, when he put in only ten days, the petitioner worked for practically the length of each and every month during the two years. In the case of D.Mariamma, the petitioner in W.P.No.10609 of 2005, from September, 1990 to January, 1993, except for the month of December, 1991, when she put in eight days, she worked for almost the entire duration of each month throughout. Similarly, in the case of P.Pentamma, the petitioner in W.P.No.10608 of 2005, from January, 1991 to September, 1993, except for the months of January, 1991, December, 1991, February, 1993 and March, 1993 when she put in eleven days, nine days, Nil days and five days respectively, she worked for the duration of each month through the rest of the period. 40. These details negate the contention of the Municipality that when the regular health employees joined their respective duties, the substitute/badili workers were terminated from the leave vacancies. Had that been so, the petitioners would not have rendered continuous service as stated above, Further, it was not the case of the Municipality that their disengagement resulted from absence of workload. The Municipality specifically averred that it was only because of the instructions of the Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, that the services of the badili workers were disengaged; the explanation being that the Municipality was bound by the orders of the superior authority. No mention was made in the said counters about any violation of rules in the engagement of the petitioners and on the other hand, the Municipality stated that the petitioners were engaged as per the directions of the Government then in force. The Municipality did however state that it was not in a position to meet the monthly salaries of its employees as a ground to deny entitlement of the petitioners to the claims put forth by them in the I.Ds. No evidence was adduced in this regard however. 41. Thus, no foundation was laid before the Labour Court that the petitioners were not appointed as per applicable rules, that there were no vacancies or that they were gainfully employed elsewhere after their disengagement from its service, warranting award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. No evidence was adduced in this regard however. 41. Thus, no foundation was laid before the Labour Court that the petitioners were not appointed as per applicable rules, that there were no vacancies or that they were gainfully employed elsewhere after their disengagement from its service, warranting award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in FGP Limited, Mumbai v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-III, Hyderabad (25) 2006 (1) ALT 312 = 2006 (1) ALD 512 , wherein the learned Judge held as follows: "It is true that the Labour Court has the power, for just and valid reasons, to award compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The question of granting such a relief of compensation in lieu of reinstatement would only arise where the petitioner has pleaded, and let in evidence in support thereof, regarding circumstances, which necessitates the Labour Court granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement. It is not open to the petitioner management to raise these grounds for the first time before this Court. In the absence of adjudication by the Labour Court in this regard, this question does not call for any further examination by this Court, in certiorari proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 42. Similar being the fact situation on hand, the grounds raised by the Municipality before this Court, having not been urged before the Labour Court, cannot be examined at this stage for the first time. The only ground common to the pleadh1gs before this Court as well as the Labour Court is that the Municipality is not in a position to pay salaries to its employees. This statement remains unsubstantiated. Further, it would not be reason enough to condone or trivialize the illegal and arbitrary treatment of its employees by the Municipality. Being a public service oriented instrumentality of the State with perennial functions, it is not open to the Municipality to cite lack of funds as a ground to deny employment to the petitioners once their entitlement is established otherwise. 43. Relevant to note, the Award in I.D.No.282 of 1996 which is alleged to be the inspiration for the litigation on hand was confirmed with modifications by this Court in W.P.No.9967 of 1998. 43. Relevant to note, the Award in I.D.No.282 of 1996 which is alleged to be the inspiration for the litigation on hand was confirmed with modifications by this Court in W.P.No.9967 of 1998. The order dated 09.09.2002 passed therein reflects that the direction of the Labour Court to reinstate an identically situated workman with continuity of service and back wages was modified to the extent of restricting the back wages to Rs.10,000/-. The direction of reinstatement in service with continuity of service and other incidental benefits was affirmed. As to what happened pursuant to the Award in I.D.No.281 of 1996, neither counsel is in a position to state. 44. In that view of the matter, the Awards of the Labour Court in the cases on hand directing payment of meager amounts to the petitioners and at that, only their retrenchment compensation, suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record. 45. The question that would then arise is as to the relief to be granted to them. 46. As the Municipality failed to adduce evidence before the Labour Court that the petitioners' engagement in service was contrary to rules or that there were no vacancies at that time and on the other hand, the facts disclosed by it clearly indicated the continuous service rendered by the petitioners, these cases would stand on par with the case before the Supreme Court in Krishan Singh (23 supra). Once there is a failure in this regard, as pointed out in FGP Limited, Mumbai (25 supra), such grounds cannot be raised before this Court for the first time. 47. However, it is relevant to note that the petitioners failed to aver in their claim petitions before the Labour Court that they were not gainfully employed after their removal from the service of the Municipality. It is now a well settled proposition after J. K. Synthetics Limited (7 supra) that it is necessary for the workman to at least assert on oath that he was neither employed nor engaged in any gainful business or venture and that he did not have any income. It is only thereafter that the burden would shift on the employer. As the petitioners failed to meet this minimum requirement and considering the delay on their part in approaching the Labour Court, they cannot rightfully maintain a claim for full back wages. 48. It is only thereafter that the burden would shift on the employer. As the petitioners failed to meet this minimum requirement and considering the delay on their part in approaching the Labour Court, they cannot rightfully maintain a claim for full back wages. 48. Relevant to note, in the case of the identically situated workman in W.P.No.9967 of 1998, this Court directed payment of back wages quantified at Rs.10,000/- while affirming the direction of reinstatement in service. Viewed thus, the petitioners herein would be entitled to be treated alike at least to the extent of their reinstatement with partial back wages. However, in the light of the legal position emerging from a conspectus of the precedential law cited supra and the fact that the petitioners rendered less than three years service to the Municipality and at that, nearly 17 years ago, I am not inclined to grant them the relief of continuity of service. All the more so, as their engagement in service was not on a regular basis. 49. The Awards under challenge are accordingly set aside. The Machilipatnam Municipality is directed to reinstate the petitioners in service on par with the petitioner in W.P.No.9967 of 1998, but without continuity of service. The Municipality shall pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) towards back wages to each of the petitioners, which sum shall carry interest at the rate of 6% (six) per annum from the date of filing of the I.Ds. 50. The Writ Petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.