ORDER 1. This is defendant's appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (briefly, 'the Code') against the judgment and decree dated 19-72003 passed by 4th Additional District Judge (FTC), Janjgir in Civil Suit No. 6-B/2002 whereby and where under, the respondent's/Life Insurance Corporation of India's suit has been decreed. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under :- 3. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) applied for housing loan under respondent's scheme (Ex. P-2) [Apna Ghar Banao Yojna (M-1)]. The defendant's proposal was accepted by the plaintiff and a loan of Rs. 50,000/- was sanctioned subject to the terms and conditions enumerated in Ex. P-3. The defendant accepted above terms and conditions vide Ex. p. 4, also mortgaged immovable property. 4. The amount was not repaid by the defendant in time. After issuance of notice, plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,86,022/- with a prayer in default of payment, its recovery be permitted by sale of property mortgaged. 5. The defendant in his written statement in nutshell disputed the amount of interest claimed, also prayed for its dismissal as according to him, the suit was time barred. 6. Learned trial Court framed following issues:- 1- ¼v½ D;k oknh }kjk izfroknh dks nh xbZ _.k jkf’k ij izfroknh 17-5 izfr’kr v)Z okf”kZd C;kt dh nj ls le;≤ ij ifjofrZr nj ls C;kt oknh fuxe dks Hkqxrku fd;k tkuk Lohdkj fd;k Fkk \ ¼c½ D;k _.k ds ewy/ku dh fd’r rFkk chek ikfylh izhfe;e dh fd’r dh vnk;xh esa pwd gksus ij fu/kkZfjr C;kt nj ds vfrfjDr 2-5 izfr’kr okf”kZd naM C;kt vnk djuk izfroknh us Lohdkj fd;k Fkk \ 2- ¼v½ D;k oknh izfroknh ls 186022@& ¼,d yk[k fN;klh gtkj ckbl :i;s½ izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ ¼c½ D;k oknh ca/kd laifRr dks fodz; dj jkf’k olwy fd;s tkus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ 3- D;k oknh dk okn vof/k ckg~; gksus ls viks”kxh; gS \ 7. Both the parties have led evidence. 8. The learned Trial Court on a close scrutiny of the evidence led, material placed and submissions made, decreed the plaintiffs' suit in toto rejecting contentions raised by the defendant. Hence this appeal. 9. Shri Malay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the plaintiff has wrongly applied Rs. Both the parties have led evidence. 8. The learned Trial Court on a close scrutiny of the evidence led, material placed and submissions made, decreed the plaintiffs' suit in toto rejecting contentions raised by the defendant. Hence this appeal. 9. Shri Malay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the plaintiff has wrongly applied Rs. 20,000/- paid by the defendant on 23-3-1998 to the amount of interest whereas in law it ought to have been applied to the principal amount of loan and thus the amount of interest claimed in fact was not due for payment. Learned trial Court did not consider this aspect of the matter and thus erred in decreeing the suit in toto. 10. On the other hand, Shri Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent by referring para 6-A of the proposal for loan (Ex. P-3) contended that the amount of interest claimed was as per the agreement entered into between the parties and the same has been rightly allowed by the lower Court. The decree passed deserves to be upheld. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and decree and record of the trial Court, 12. Para 6-A of the proposal for loan (Ex. P-3) referred by learned counsel for the plaintiff reads as follows:- "You will be at liberty to make part payment towards the principal in multiples of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One thousand) at any time after expiry of one year from the date of disbursement of the 1st installment of loan and coinciding with the date of the payment of any half-yearly installment of interest or interest and principal PROVIDED however that all interest due upto the date of such payment shall have been paid first' and PROVIDED further that such payment in anticipation will not interfere with or effect the payment in the due course of the subsequent half-yearly installments of principal." 13. As per above referred clause, on the date of making payment by I the defendant, if payment of interest was also due then the amount of interest has to be paid first. 14. The Supreme Court in case of Industrial Credit & Development Syndicate Vs. Smithaben H. Patell has held in para 9 of its judgment as under:- 9. As per above referred clause, on the date of making payment by I the defendant, if payment of interest was also due then the amount of interest has to be paid first. 14. The Supreme Court in case of Industrial Credit & Development Syndicate Vs. Smithaben H. Patell has held in para 9 of its judgment as under:- 9. We are of the opinion that such a plea is far-fetched and begged only for the purpose of putting an imaginary defence to the claim of the appellant-decree-holder. Section 59 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the application of payment where debt to be discharged is indicated and Section 60 where debt to be discharged is not indicated. The aforesaid Sections 59 and 60 are reproduced below: "59. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is indicated.-Where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation, or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment; if accepted, must be applied accordingly. 60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.-Where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits." A perusal of Section 59 would clearly indicate that it refers to several distinct debts payable by a person and not to the various heads, f one debt. The principal and interest due on a single debt or decree passed on such debt carrying subsequent interest cannot be held to be several distinct debts. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Jia Ram v. Sulakhan Mal (AIR 1941 Lah 386) dealt with the scope of Section 59 to Section 61 of the Indian Contract Act and held : "Sections 59 to 61; Contract Act, embody the general rules as to appropriation of payments in cases where a debtor owes several distinct debts to one person and voluntarily makes payment to him. They do not deal with cases in which principal and interest are due on a single debt, or where a decree has been passed on such a debt, carrying interest on the sum adjudged to be due on the decree'. These sections are based upon the rule of English Law, well settled since Clayton case (AIR 1922 PC 26) that where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him intimating that the payment is to be applied in discharge of particular debt, the creditor, if he accepts the payment, must apply it accordingly. If, however, the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied the creditor may, at his discretion, apply it to any debt actually due and payable to him by the debtor at the time. In case neither party makes the appropriation, the payment is to be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time; and if the debts are of equal standing the payment is made in the discharge of each of them proportionately. It will be seen that these rules have no application to a case in which only one debt is due and at the time of payment, besides the principal sum secured, interest has also accrued due. In such cases, the rule of English Law, laid down as far back as 1702 in Chase v. Box (AIR 1922 PC 233) is that 'if a man is indebted to another for principal and interest and payeth the money generally, it shall be applied in the first place to sink the interest before any part of the principal should be sunk'. In Parr s Banking Co. Ltd. v. Yates (1898) 2 QB 460) Lord Rigby, J. described it as 'the old and well-settled rule' that where both 'principal and interest are due the sums paid on account must be applied first to interest. That rule, where it is applicable is only common justice. To apply the sums paid to principal where interest has accrued upon the debt, and is not paid, would be depriving the creditor of the benefit to which he is entitled under his contract, and would be most unreasonable as against him '. Fisher in his standard work on the Law of Mortgages (Edn. To apply the sums paid to principal where interest has accrued upon the debt, and is not paid, would be depriving the creditor of the benefit to which he is entitled under his contract, and would be most unreasonable as against him '. Fisher in his standard work on the Law of Mortgages (Edn. 7), p. 620, while dealing with the question of appropriation of payments towards a mortgage debt, states the law as follows: 'Where the debtor claims to be discharged by reason of payments which were not specially made in respect either of the principal or the interest of the mortgage, the rule is that a general payment shall be applied in the first place to sink the interest, before any part of the principal is discharged.' " . The judgment of the Lahore High Court is based upon sound principle and has Kept in mind the intention of the legislature in enacting Sections 59 to 61 of the Act. We do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that Section 60 of the Contract Act has to be read independently excluding the provisions of Section 59. Accepting such an argument would amount to doing violence to the language employed in the section and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. Besides, it would also be contradictory in terms. Section 60, if applied independently, cannot be held to be conferring any right upon the judgment-debtor as it confers a discretion in favour of the creditor to apply such deposited amount to any lawful debt actually due and payable by the debtor when such debtor omits to intimate the discharge of the debt in the manner envisaged under Section 59. We are of the opinion that Sections 59 and 60, Contract Act, would be applicable only in pre-decretal stage and not thereafter. Post-decretal payments have to be made either in terms of the decree or in accordance with the agreement arrived at between the parties though on the general principles as mentioned in Sections 59 and 60 of the Contract Act. As and when such an agreement either express or implied is relied upon, the burden of proving it would always be upon its propounder. The judgment-debtors, in the instant case, are proved to have failed in discharging such an onus. As and when such an agreement either express or implied is relied upon, the burden of proving it would always be upon its propounder. The judgment-debtors, in the instant case, are proved to have failed in discharging such an onus. There does not appear to be any obligation on the decree-holder to intimate the judgment-debtor that the amount paid to him had not been accepted in the manner specified by him in the letter accompanying the payment. Insisting upon such a course would result in unnecessary burden upon the financial institutions and conferment of unwanted unilateral discretion in favour of the defaulters. Acceptance of the plea that the amount paid first should be adjusted in the principal amount would not only be against the provision of law but against the public policy as well. To provide security, continuity and certainty in business transaction, the legislature has been making specific provisions in that regard which may be found in various provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or Order 37 Code of Civil Procedure and other statutory provisions. 15. In view of above legal position and in view of Clause 6-A of Ex.P-3, the plaintiff has rightly applied the sum paid by the defendant towards the amount of interest accrued upon the principal sum. 16. For the foregoing, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has erroneously I applied the amount deposited towards the amount of interest accrued. 17. No other points have been raised. 18. In view of the above, I do not find any substance in the appeal preferred by the appellant. 19. The appeal being devoid of substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.