Judgment :- The petitioner/defendant has filed these Civil Revision Petitions as against the orders dated 30.10.2008 in I.A.No.2628, 2629, 2630 and 2631 of 2008 in O.S.No.3265 of 2003 passed by the learned VIII Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai in dismissing the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Or.9 R.9 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/defendant, the trial Court has committed a material irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction contrary to law and as a matter of fact, the trial Court should have seen that on the instructions of the learned counsel, the petitioner had filed the original Power of Attorney before the Court and indeed the Trial Court had received the Power of Attorney filed by the petitioner but had not passed necessary orders granting leave to the petitioner to represent the defendant in the suit. .3. It is thefurther contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Trial Court dismissed the application on the ground that the petitioner had not sought the leave of the Court and ingredients of Or.3 R.2 are only a procedural formality and a meritorious case cannot be thrown out on the basis of technicality and in any event, a liberal construction in entertaining the application filed by the petitioner ought to have been taken by the trial Court. 4. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit is one for injunction from recovering the possession till the mortgaged money is repaid, when there was no mortgage at all and that the plaintiff rested her suit on a rental agreement and in any event no substantial injustice would be caused to the plaintiff by allowing the application to set aside the exparte decree and therefore, prays for allowing the Civil Revision Petitions in the interest of justice. 5. It is useful to refer to the order of the trial Court in I.A.No.2628 of 2008 dated 30.10.2008 which runs as follows: "That the petition by the petitioner claiming as Power of attorney of the petitioner has not obtained leave of the court to prosecute the matter at the middle as the power had without leave and the petition filed by requesting him as power agent is untenable. The petitioner could have moved the petition to engage his power agent to conduct the suit. The petitioner could have moved the petition to engage his power agent to conduct the suit. That the non-explaining of the delay of 157 days is appears to be one which is without any justification for condoning the same. Much less as the I.A.No.2629/2008 is dismissed, this I.A. Is also dismissed for the same reasoning for it. Hence petition is dismissed as it is devoid of merits. No costs." 6. Also, it is worthto extract the order of the trial Court in I.A.No.2629 of 2008 dated 30.10.2008 passed by the trial Court which runs as follows: "That the petition by the person claiming Power of Attorney of the petitioner has not obtained the leave of the court to prosecute the matter and at the middle as a power holder. Without leave, the petition filed by representing him as Power of Attorney is untenable. The petitioner ought to have moved an application to grant leave. The other question of condoning the delay of 157 days as stated by the petitioner has not been explained for every days delay as alleged by the respondent. The power agent having failed to become a party as per the orders of the Honble High Court now having knew fully well about the happenings of the matter not justified the delay to excuse. Hence at this both counts, the petition fails and dismissed as it is devoid of merits. No cost." 7. The trial Court since it dismissed I.A.Nos.2628 of 2008 and 2629 of 2008, resultantly dismissed the I.A.No.2630 of 2008 and 2631 of 2008 without costs. .8. Hence at this both counts, the petition fails and dismissed as it is devoid of merits. No cost." 7. The trial Court since it dismissed I.A.Nos.2628 of 2008 and 2629 of 2008, resultantly dismissed the I.A.No.2630 of 2008 and 2631 of 2008 without costs. .8. It is significant to point out that common affidavit in I.A.No.2628 of 2008 to 2631 of 2008, the petitioner/defendant represented through Power Agent as among other things mentioned that he was suffering from henenteric fever and taking treatment and at that time, two applications I.A.Nos.18957 of 2005 and 18958 of 2005 (to condone the delay in filing set side application and to set aside exparte decree) were posted for arguments on the side of the petitioner/defendant but due to his ill-health he could not contact his previous counsel and was of the opinion that his previous counsel would have argued, but his previous counsel had not appeared before the trial Court for arguing the above applications or to get adjournments and on account of non-appearance of the petitioner/defendant and his counsel, the trial Court was pleased to dismiss the aforesaid applications for default on 24.07.2007. 9. Further, for no fault on the side of the petitioner/defendant, he should not be penalised and the restoration applications were filed within 30 days from the date of dismissal of the order dated 24.07.2007 and since the petitioner/defendant was suffering from fever and still was in continuous treatment for his ailment, he could not engage present counsel and since the petitioner/defendant had given Power of Attorney to the defendant of the affidavit, Mr.M.P.Murugesan, the Power of Attorney had engaged the present counsel to file the set aside application for condone delay and therefore, the said delay is neither wilful nor wanton but due to the aforesaid reason by restoring the applications and therefore, prays for allowing the applications. 10. 10. Inthe common counter filed by the respondent/plaintiff, it was averred that she was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the suit property as usufructuary mortgage since 15.09.2000 and the petitioner/defendant with ulterior motive to evict her from the suit property had used all sorts of illegal methods without repaying the mortgage money and on 29.09.2003, an exparte decree was passed by the trial Court against the petitioner/defendant and the petitioner/defendant during the operation of the decree sold the suit property to the Power of Attorney agent viz., Mr.M.P.Murugesan on 06.07.2005 when the mortgage was still in existence. 11. Subsequently, the petitioner/defendant filed an application to set aside the exparte decree dated 29.09.2003 with an inordinate delay as per application Nos. 18957 and 18958 of 2005 and he obtained an order of allowing these applications without notice to her but the said suit was taken up wrongly and posted in the special list and thereafter, dismissed for default and these improper and unreasonable procedure was questioned before this Court and the same was rectified by this Court with proper and effective adjudication without valid notice to the petitioner/defendant and ultimately, was ordered in I.A.Nos.18957 and 18958 of 2005. 12. Further, when the matter stood like this, the Power of Attorney agent of the petitioner/defendant M.P.Murugesan filed I.A.No.100 of 2007 praying permission of the Court to implead him as 2nd defendant in the suit based on the claim that he had purchased the suit property and therefore filed counter pleading that there was no cause of action against the subsequent purchaser because of the fact that there was no suit pending and the suit was already decreed and only an application was pending and in the mean while, the trial Court dismissed I.A.No.18957 and 18958 of 2005 for default for non-service of notice to the respondent/plaintiff. Thereafter, the power agent M.P.Murugesan obtained power from the defendant having knowledge about the pendency of the application and also participated in all the proceedings in application stage, now filed the present applications and added further, the present counsel had no authority to represent in this case because he had not filed any proper and acceptable vakalat in the manner known to law to represent on behalf of the defendant. .13. .13. Apart from the above, it is the stand of the respondent/plaintiff that the alleged Power of Attroney earlier filed I.A.No.100 of 2007 seeking permission to implead him as 2nd defendant and since he was the subsequent purchaser, the trial Court was pleased to allow the impleading application by means of an order dated 30.08.2007 at a time when there was no suit pending at all and these questions were raised before this Court in C.R.P.No.3327 of 2007 and the same was allowed by this Court on 012. 2007 by setting aside the order passed in the impleading application and in the Civil Revision Petition. The petitioner/defendant had entered appearance through his counsel Mr.S.Prabakar and participated in the proceedings. When the fact was that his two applications viz., I.A.Nos.18957 and 18958 of 2005 were dismissed for default on 24.07.2007 itself and having failed in the impleading application before this Court, not the petitioner/defendant is claiming right as Power Agent of the defendant and had filed the present affidavit and in fact, the Power Agent had no right to represent the above case itself and the petitioner had not approached this Court with clean hands and therefore, the applications are to be dismissed in the interest of justice. 14. At this stage, it is useful for this Court to refer to Or.3 R.2 of Civil Procedure Code which enjoins as follows: "Rule 2.Recognised agents – The recognised agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are --- .(a) Persons holding powers-of-attorney, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties; .(b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such appearances, applications and acts." 15. Though, a Power of Attorney ought to be strictly construed as giving only such authority as it expressly or by necessary implication creates, a Court of law cannot decline to recognise an implied authority that every agent has to do whatever is necessary or ordinary incidental to the effective execution of the express authority conferred on him by the Power of Attorney as per decision in Madanlal Dhariwal v. Bhorulal AIR 1965 Mys 272. 16. A person who is not an advocate, has no right to make a claim that he can argue for a party. Of course, he may seek and obtain the permission of the Court, for which the motion must come from the party itself. It is left open to the Court to grant or withhold the permission in its discretion. As a matter of fact, the Court may even after grant of permission, withdraw it half way through if the representative proves himself reprehensible. The antecedents, the relationship, the reasons for requisitioning the services of the private person and a variety of other circumstances must be gathered before grant or refusal of permission. 17. It is to be borne in mind that R.16 of the Civil Rules and Practices speaks of a party appearing by agent which runs thus: "16. Party appearing by agent. - (1) When a party appears by an agent other than a pleader or advocate, the agent shall before making or doing any appearance, application, or act, in or to the court, file in court the power of attorney, or written authority, thereunto authorising him, or a properly authenticated copy thereof/or, in the case of an agent carrying on a trade or business on behalf of a party, without a written authority, an affidavit stating the residence of his principal, the trade or business carried on by the agent on his behalf and the connection of the same with the subject matter of the suit and that no other agent is expressly authorised to make or do such appearance, application or act. .(2) The judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent, is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party, and unless and until the said permission is granted no appearance, application, or act, of the agent shall be recognised by the court." 18. .(2) The judge may thereupon record in writing that the agent, is permitted to appear and act on behalf of the party, and unless and until the said permission is granted no appearance, application, or act, of the agent shall be recognised by the court." 18. A person who is not a counsel cannot be allowed to address the Court on the basis of a Power of Attorney. Or.3 of the Civil Procedure Code subject to the provisions of Sections 32-22 of the Advocates Act 1961 as per decision Hari Om Rajinder Kumar v Chief Rationing Officer AIR 1990 AP 340 . 19. This Court aptly recalls the decision Moulasab v. Mohammad Hasim (deceased by LRS) and others 2003 A I H C 440, wherein it is observed as follows: "The ex parte order only covers the period during which the defendant was actually absent and it did not act as a bar to his resuming appearance in the suit at the stage at which it then was, if he appeared subsequently and wanted to putforward his evidence. That is to say, if the defendant wants to proceed from the stage already reached, he will have an absolute right without obtaining a permission of the Court to take part in the proceedings. Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC does not mean that defendant cannot be allowed to appear at all if he does not show good cause. All it means is that he cannot be relegated to the position he would have occupied if he had appeared. He cannot be stopped from participating simply because he did not appear in the first or some other hearing. He will have to show good cause for his previous absence and get the ex parte order set aside only if he desires to be relegated back to the position in which he would have been put if he had appeared at the previous proceedings so that the proceedings in his absence could be re-opened. In the instant case, the application filed by the legal representatives of the deceased defendant to appear to defend in the case has been allowed by the Court below solely on the ground it would be in the interest of natural justice to permit them to appear in the case. In the instant case, the application filed by the legal representatives of the deceased defendant to appear to defend in the case has been allowed by the Court below solely on the ground it would be in the interest of natural justice to permit them to appear in the case. Order made by the trial Court will not have the effect of relegating back to the position in which they would have been put if they had appeared at the previous hearing so that the proceedings in their absence could be re-opened and it would only permit them to proceed from the stage already reached and they will be allowed to appear and take part in the proceedings from the stage already reached. If they want to be relegated to the previous position, then the Court will have to pass an appropriate order in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC. In the absence of any such order, the Court cannot place them in the position which was earlier to the date on which they appeared before the Court to participate in the proceedings." Moreover, it is also held that as per Or.3 R.2 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Code power to plead on behalf of party in judicial proceedings rests only with pleader and a General Power of Attorney holder cannot have right of audience before Court. 20 .Also, this Court pertinently points out that in the decision Sourendra Nath Mitra and others v. Tarubala Dasi AIR 1930 Privy Council 158, it is held hereunder: "An agreement to compromise a suit must be established by general principles which govern the formation of contracts, though there are special rules governing its enforcement by the Courts which arise out of its intrinsic nature. If the agreement purports to be concluded on behalf of one or both the parties by their respective legal advisers, the first two questions that arise, as on the formation of any contracts by agents, are (1) Had the agent, the actual authority of his principal, express or implied, to conclude the contract? (2) If no actual authority, had he ostensible authority so as to bind his principal against the other party relying on ostensible authority?" .21. (2) If no actual authority, had he ostensible authority so as to bind his principal against the other party relying on ostensible authority?" .21. In Pavithra v. Rahul Raj AIR 2003 Madras 138, it is laid down as follows: "Order 3, Rule 1 of CPC empowers a party in a suit or proceedings to be represented by a pleader, but so far as the proceedings in the family Courts are concerned the right of representation by the pleader does not exist. The operation of Order 3, Rule 1 is subject to any law for the time being in force. In addition to the said exclusion in the Code Section 13 of Family Courts Act prohibits the operation of Order 3, Rule 1 to the extent that the case being represented by the legal practitioner. .The recognised agent can prosecute or defend or represent until Family Courts passes specific order directing the party to appear in person depending upon the facts and stage of the case. Personal appearance of the parties is inevitable to comply with mandatory provisions of the Act. Application filed by the authorised agent seeking permission to defend the case on the ground that defendant was not able to come to India and contest the case would be liable to be rejected." .22. The Honourable Supreme Court in Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 75, 76 has observed among other things as follows: "Any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person sighing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant along with the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the memorandum of appeal or the presentation thereof before the appellate court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected. It is the duty of the office to verify whether the memorandum of appeal was signed by the appellant or his authorised agent or pleader holding appropriate vakalatnama. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected. It is the duty of the office to verify whether the memorandum of appeal was signed by the appellant or his authorised agent or pleader holding appropriate vakalatnama. If the office does not point out such defect and the appeal is accepted and proceeded with, it cannot be rejected at the hearing of the appeal merely by reason of such defect, without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify it. The requirement that the appeal should be signed by the appellant or his pleader (duly authorised by a vakalatnama executed by the appellant) is, no doubt, mandatory. But it does not mean that non-compliance should result in automatic rejection of the appeal without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify the defect. If an when the defect is noticed or pointed out, the court should, either on an application by the appellant or suo motu, permit the appellant to rectify the defect by either signing the memorandum of appeal or by furnishing the vakalatnama. It should also be kept in view that if the pleader signing the memorandum of appeal has appeared for the party in the trial court, then he need not present a fresh vakalatnama along with the memorandum of appeal, as the vakalatnama in his favour filed in the trial court will be sufficient authority to sign and present the memorandum of appeal having regard to Rule 4(2) of Order 3 CPC, read with Explanation (c) thereto. In such an event, a mere memo referring to the authority given to him in the trial court may be sufficient. However, filing a fresh vakalatnama with the memo of appeal will always be convenient to facilitate the processing of the appeal by the office." 23. In another decision Raman Lalji v. Gokul Nathji AIR 1917 Allahabad 90, it is held as follows: "Where authority has been given by the plaintiff to bring suit in some shape or another, and the question is whether the agent has complied with the rules as laid down in the Civil P.C. That is not a question of principle at all; but a question of practice and procedure. It is the first Courts business to see that its own rules are complied with, and it is not right that it should leave the investigation of that question to the appellate Court. A Court ought not to dismiss a suit for a defect in procedure without giving the defaulting party an opportunity of correcting the defects." 24. In Krishnaji Pandharinath v. Anusayabai and another AIR 1959 Bombay 475 (V 46 C 141), it is held as follows: "In S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it stood before it was amended by Act XX of 1929, the expression "active prosecution of any suit or proceeding" was used. That expression has now been omitted, and the Explanation makes it abundantly clear that the lis continues so long as final decree or order has not been obtained and complete satisfaction thereof has not been rendered. If after the dismissal of a suit and before an appeal is presented, the lis continues so as to prevent the defendant from transferring the property to the prejudice of the plaintiff, there is no reason for holding that between the date of dismissal of the suit under O.IX, R.2, of the Civil Procedure Code and the date of its restoration, the lis does not continue." 25. In M. Vairavan v. R.V.Periannan Chettiar and others 2006 (3) CTC 486 , this Court in paragraphs 6 and 7 has observed and held as follows: "6. The Honble Apex Court has also held in Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, 2006 (1) SCC 75 , in the following lines: "Here again it has always been recognized that if a plaint is not signed by the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent due to any bona fide error, the defect can be permitted to be rectified either by the Trial Court at any time before judgment, or even by the Appellate Court by permitting appropriate amendment, when such defect comes to its notice during hearing." 7. Thelearned counsel for the Revision Petitioner submitted that where the procedural defect was not rectified even after it was pointed out and even due opportunity was given for rectifying it, that will be an exception in the general proposition that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat, which could cause injustice. Thelearned counsel for the Revision Petitioner submitted that where the procedural defect was not rectified even after it was pointed out and even due opportunity was given for rectifying it, that will be an exception in the general proposition that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat, which could cause injustice. It was pointed out even at the time of plaint that it was returned for the said purpose and by lapse of time the defect was not rectified in time. But there was not prejudice cause to the other side. It is not as if the further proceedings of the suit was belated on the ground of non-production of the said document Power of Attorney. In fact this is a ground on which the Trial Court has allowed the application." 26. In the decision AIR 1924 Madras 842 it is held that where a pleader is absent or refuses to appear for him, there is no appearance. 27. In Muthuvel Nainar v. D.A.Hatheeja Beebi 1998 AIHC 805, 807 it is held that "even for filing a suit through Power of Attorney, the suit must be filed in the name of the person entitled to legal character". 28. Earlier, the power agent of the revision petitioner has filed I.A.No.100 of 2007 in O.S.No.3265 of 2003 in his individual capacity under Or.1 R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code on the file of the learned VIII Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai praying permission of the Court to implead him as 2nd defendant in the suit. 29. In the said I.A.No.100 of 2007, the power agent of the revision petitioner/defendant has averred that he is the purchaser of the suit schedule property on 06.07.2005 from the revision petitioner and since he is the title holder of the property, having every right to contest the suit and that he has also filed RCOP No.730 of 2006 for eviction on the ground of wilful default etc. 30. The stand of the power agent of the revision petitioner in I.A.No.100 of 2007 is that the respondent/plaintiff has sought relief only against his vendor (in respect of his property). 31. 30. The stand of the power agent of the revision petitioner in I.A.No.100 of 2007 is that the respondent/plaintiff has sought relief only against his vendor (in respect of his property). 31. In the counter in I.A.No.100 of 2007, the respondent/plaintiff has inter alia mentioned that the mortgage deed was entered into between herself and the revision petitioner/defendant and in the suit O.S.No.3265 of 2003 an exparte decree dated 29.09.2003 was passed but the power agent of the revision petitioner purchased the suit property only 06.07.2005, during the subsistence of the decree and therefore, the petitioner (power agent) of the revision petitioner was not a necessary party for an effective adjudication. 32. The trial Court by its order dated 21.08.2007 has allowed I.A.No.100 of 2007 on the ground that the third party/petitioner was a purchaser of the subject matter of the property in the suit by virtue of a sale deed and therefore, he was ordered to be impleaded as 2nd defendant subject to the payment of cost of Rs.1000/- to be paid in favour of the Secretary, Legal Services Committee, City Civil Court on or before 29.08.2007 and the matter was directed to be called on 30.08.2007. 33. Aggrieved against the order dated 21.08.2007 passed in I.A.No.100 of 2007 by the learned VIII Assistant City Civil Court Judge, the respondent/plaintiff has filed C.R.P.No.3327 of 2007 and this Court on 012. 2007 has allowed the Civil Revision Petition by observing that under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the sale deed dated 06.07.2005 on which reliance was placed by the third party/petitioner in I.A.No.100 of 2007 was hit by lis pendens etc. 34. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner brings it to the notice of this Court that as against the orders passed by this Court in C.R.P.No.3327 of 2007 dated 012. 2007, the power agent (in his individual capacity) has filed a petition for special leave to appeal (civil) No.10402 of 2008 before the Honourable Supreme Court and in that a notice was ordered. 35. Generally speaking, the term sufficient cause is elastic enough to apply to law in a meaningful manner to subserve the ends of justice as per Section 51 of the Limitation Act which enjoins the Court of law to do substantial justice. It is true that a liberal approach should be adopted. 36. 35. Generally speaking, the term sufficient cause is elastic enough to apply to law in a meaningful manner to subserve the ends of justice as per Section 51 of the Limitation Act which enjoins the Court of law to do substantial justice. It is true that a liberal approach should be adopted. 36. As far as the present case is concerned that the power agent of the revision petitioner has filed earlier I.A.No.100 of 2007 (impleading application under Or.1 R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code) in his individual capacity praying permission of the Court to implead him as 2nd defendant, which was initially allowed by the trial Court and later, the said order was set aside by this Court in C.R.P.No.3327 of 2007 on 012. 2007 and as against the said order passed in the Civil Revision Petition, SLP (Civil) No.10402 of 2008 was filed by the power agent of the revision petitioner in his individual capacity (as petitioner) in which notice was ordered by the Honourable Supreme Court. 37. Therefore, on a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case which float on the surface, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner after dismissal of impleading application I.A.No.100 of 2007 endeavours to step into the shoes of his vendor/defendant by means of a power of attorney and since he is a subsequent purchaser who purchased the suit property on 06.07.2005 after the passing of an exparte decree on 29.09.2003 but before the restoration, is clearly hit by principle of lis pendens as per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and moreover, the reasons assigned by the power agent of the revision petitioner in I.A.No.2628 to 2631 of 2008 that he was suffering from henenteric fever and took treatment and therefore, he could not contact his previous counsel due to his ill-health were not a sufficient/good cause and this Court is not inclined to adopt a liberal, elastic and a justice oriented approach overriding technicalities in the present case (based on the facts and circumstances) and viewed in that perspective, these Civil Revision Petitions fail. 38. In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost. There shall be no order as to costs.