ORDER 1. This is an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of C.P.C. by the defendant against the order by which the plaintiffs' application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 for temporary injunction for restraining the appellants/defendants from interfering with their possession over the suit property was allowed. . 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction inter alia on the ground that the plaintiff and late Devi Chandra i.e. husband of appellant No. 1 and father of appellants No.2 to 4 entered into agreement to sell with regard to suit property i.e. a piece of Khasra No. 158/1 area 0.90 hectare (2.24 acre) on 12-4-07, according to which, in the year 2001-02 the plaintiffs have paid entire sale consideration and obtained its possession and sale deed has to be executed after redemption of mortgage of the said land from the State Bank of India (Agricultural Branch), Balod where the same is mortgaged. According to them, the said agreement was also signed by the defendant No. 1 and 4. After the death of said Devi Chandra, when the said land was released by the Bank, the plaintiffs approached the defendants to execute the sale deed in their favour of the said land. Since the sale deed was not executed, the plaintiffs sent notice through their advocate. In its reply, the defendants denied execution of agreement of sale and also denied to execute sale deed, therefore, the plaintiffs instituted the instant suit claiming relief of specific performance of contract and also of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession over the suit property if they deny the execution of the sale deed. They have also preferred an application for grant of temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering in their possession over the suit property as well as restraining them to alienate the suit property pending decision of suit. After service of notice, the defendants filed their reply, denied the execution of agreement to sell, denied their signature over the document and of late Devi Chandra, denied receipt of any consideration and handing over of possession of suit property, also filed their reply to the application for temporary injunction. 3. After service of notice, the defendants filed their reply, denied the execution of agreement to sell, denied their signature over the document and of late Devi Chandra, denied receipt of any consideration and handing over of possession of suit property, also filed their reply to the application for temporary injunction. 3. Learned trial Court recorded a finding that the agreement to sell has been denied by the defendant, therefore, it is a matter of evidence whether or not, the said agreement to sell has been executed by the Devi Chandra but the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land is prima facie proved by the affidavit of plaintiff Dhruv Kumar Sahu, contents of which have been specifically not controverted by the defendants in the affidavit of Smt. Kuntalbai filed by them in support of their reply to the application for temporary injunction; the plaintiffs are entitled to protect their possession under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (briefly, 'the Act'); the defendants are bound to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs in accordance with the agreement to sell executed by late Devi Chandra; earlier late Devi Chandra entered into agreement to sell with the plaintiffs and since the land was mortgaged with the State Bank of India; Balod, therefore, sale deed could not be executed at that time, now since the land is released from mortgage; Devi Chandra has already died and the defendants do not want to execute the sale deed, therefore, the plaintiffs are forced to file the instant suit; thus the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving prima facie case in their favour, the plaintiffs are in possession' of the suit land and they are entitled to protect the same under Section 53 of the Act, therefore, balance of convenience also lies in their favour and if the defendants will not be restrained from interfering with plaintiffs' possession over the suit property then, the plaintiffs are likely to sustain irreparable injury; and granted temporary injunction in plaintiffs' favour. 4. Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the defendants have specifically denied execution of agreement to sell (Ex. 4. Shri P.P. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the defendants have specifically denied execution of agreement to sell (Ex. A2); denied signature of late Devi Chandra and signatures of appellants No. 1 and 2 upon the said agreement; denied receipt of sale consideration and handing over possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs; have clearly controverted handing over possession of suit property to plaintiffs in the affidavit of Smt. Kuntlabai in which it has been stated on oath that "plaintiffs' suit is bogus; the defendants are in possession of the suit property and not the plaintiffs". A bare perusal of the agreement to sell would reveal several suspicious circumstances. In the said agreement to sell, transaction has been shown of the year 2001-02 after paying full consideration but the same was said to be executed in the year 2007. Learned trial Court also recorded a prima facie finding that whether or not, the agreement to sell is executed is a matter of evidence and, therefore, learned trial Court has erred in holding prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs and erred in granting temporary injunction whereas the defendants are in possession of the suit property, the land stands recorded in their names in the revenue record. Shri Sahu further submitted that before granting temporary injunction, it is sine qua non for the trial Court to record a finding based on the material on record with regard to prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury which has not been done by the trial Court, therefore, the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 5. Per contra, Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 would submit that the plaintiffs have obtained possession over the suit property on the basis of agreement to sell, the said agreement to sell has been executed or not certainly would be decided after recording evidence in this behalf but as the said agreement contains recital with regard to receipt of consideration and handing over of possession of the suit property, therefore, learned trial Court has rightly granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs after recording its satisfaction about prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Purpose of grant of temporary injunction is to maintain status quo during pendency of suit and only after recording a prima facie finding, learned trial Court granted injunction in their favour which does not call for any interference. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned and the material placed on record. 7. Unfortunately, the only document in favour of the plaintiffs is agreement to sell based on which they are claiming possession over the suit property which has been categorically denied by the defendants, also signature over it not only of deceased Devi Chandra but also of appellants No. 1 and 2. A careful reading of the agreement to sell would reveal that the sale consideration was received and possession was handed over to the plaintiffs in the year 2001-02, the suit land was under mortgage with the State Bank of India with the consent of purchaser i.e. plaintiffs and, therefore, after redemption of mortgage, sale deed was to be executed by said Devi Chandra. It is not clear in the said agreement to sell as to when the said land was mortgaged with the State Bank of India with the consent of purchaser. The use of word 'purchaser' in the said agreement would reveal that the said land has been mortgaged at least after execution of agreement to sell. Once said Devi Chandra entered into agreement to sell with the plaintiffs and also received full consideration, then where was the occasion to mortgage the said land with the consent of the purchaser. Once vender decides to sell the land and obtains full consideration, then nothing remains to delay execution of sale deed and, therefore, at that stage how a vender can mortgage the land with the bank after handing over its possession to the purchaser. In mortgage, legal possession remains with the bank. More over, it has not been stated by the plaintiff how and in what manner, they are in possession of the suit land. From a bare perusal . of the affidavit filed by Smt. Kuntala Bai, it cannot be said that the defendants have not specifically denied the possession over the suit land. More over, it has not been stated by the plaintiff how and in what manner, they are in possession of the suit land. From a bare perusal . of the affidavit filed by Smt. Kuntala Bai, it cannot be said that the defendants have not specifically denied the possession over the suit land. In view of above facts situation, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is unsafe to hold prima facie case and balance of convenience in plaintiffs' favour and the finding recorded by learned trial Court is in. fact based on no evidence inasmuch 1S at this stage, without recording evidence looking to the nature of contents of the agreement to sell (Ex. A-2), it is very unsafe to hold prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. It is trite law that in order to obtain temporary injunction, the plaintiffs are required to establish prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favour and are also required to establish resultant irreparable injury. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs utterly failed to establish the above referred three ingredients for grant of temporary injunction and learned Court below has erred in holding plaintiffs' prima facie possession over the suit property and granting temporary injunction in their favour. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to balance equities, it is necessary to restrain the appellants from alienating or creating any third party right over the suit property till the decision of the suit. 8. In the result, the order passed by the trial Court is set aside and instead the appellants are restrained from alienating or creating third party right over the suit property during pendency of the suit. It is expected that the trial Court shall decide the suit expeditiously. 9. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. Appeal Partly Allowed.