JUDGMENT Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. 1. In the instant second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Appellant/Defendant/tenant has challenged the judgment and decree dated 18-1-1993 in Civil Appeal No. 14-A/92 passed by the first appellate Court affirming the judgment and decree of eviction dated 21-7-1992 in Civil Suit No. 124-A/91 passed by the trial Court in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff/landlord for Appellant's eviction from the suit premises on grounds covered under Clauses (b) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act, 1961'). 2. The Plaintiff preferred the suit on 7-1 -1991 on the pleadings that the Defendant is his tenant in the shop situated on the front side of his house at Apapura Ward within the area of Durg Municipal Corporation on a monthly rent of Rs. 375/- and is carrying on the business in the name and style of Vishal Footwear. The Defendant has closed the suit shop from the last week of June, 1990 and from 1-7-1990 he has shifted his footwear business to a shop situated at Indira Market, Opposite Kailash Hotel, Hatri Bazar, Durg and, thus, the accommodation has not been used without reasonable cause for which it was let, for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit and for this act of the Defendant, he is liable to be evicted under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. By amending the plaint on 17-7-1991, the Plaintiff raised a ground under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 by raising appeal that the suit shop has been sub-let to one Omprakash without the consent of the Plaintiff and is, thus, liable for eviction under Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. 3. The Appellant/Defendant, in his written statement, stated that the suit shop was obtained on rent for conducting the business of STD, PCO and the Defendant is carrying on the said business and that neither he has stopped using the accommodation for which it was let nor the accommodation has been unlawfully sub-let to any other person. 3. The Appellant/Defendant, in his written statement, stated that the suit shop was obtained on rent for conducting the business of STD, PCO and the Defendant is carrying on the said business and that neither he has stopped using the accommodation for which it was let nor the accommodation has been unlawfully sub-let to any other person. It was stated that the shop at Indira Market, Opposite Kailash Hotel, Hatri Bazar belongs to his elder brother Omprakash and that the suit has been preferred only to harass the Appellant and with a view to obtain increased rent of the premises. 4. The trial Court framed issues No. 1 and 2 regarding non-use of shop for six months and issue No. 3 regarding sub-letting. 5. By judgment and decree dated 21-7-1992, the trial Court decreed the suit. The trial Court, while answering issues No. 1 and 2, has found that the Appellant/Defendant has shifted his footwear business from the suit premises to a premises situated at Indira Market, Opposite Kailash Hotel, Hatri Bazar, Durg and is not using the present accommodation for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the presentation of the suit and also that the accommodation has been illegally sub-let to one Omprakash. The decree was, thus, passed on both the grounds, i.e., covered under Clauses (b) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. 6. The first appeal preferred by the Appellant/Defendant has also been dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on both the grounds. 7. The present second appeal has been admitted by this Court by formulating the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the landlord-Respondent is entitled to a decree Under Section 12(1 )(b) and 12(1)(d) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in rejecting the application filed by the Appellant under Order l3 Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure? 8. To answer the first question of law, this Court is required to refer the provisions contained in Clauses (b) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. The said provisions read thus: Section 12. 8. To answer the first question of law, this Court is required to refer the provisions contained in Clauses (b) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. The said provisions read thus: Section 12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a) xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (b) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, unlawfully sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the accommodation for consideration or otherwise; (c) xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (d) that the accommodation has not been used without reasonable cause for which it was let, for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit for the recovery of possession thereof; xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 9. On a reading of the Clause (b) above, this Court is required to consider two things; firstly that the accommodation has been sub-let to another person or the tenant has parted with possession of the whole or any part of the accommodation and secondly that the sub-letting or parting with possession is unlawful by which it means that the said act of the Defendant is without the written or implied consent of the landlord. The question as to whether the tenant has sub-let the premises to any other person and for that there was no consent of the landlord is essentially a question of fact. Both the Courts below, on the basis of evidence, have found that the Appellant has sub-let the premises to one Omprakash, which is a finding of fact, however, since this Court has framed a question of law as to whether the Courts below are right in passing a decree under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, I shall examine the evidence on record just to assess whether the decree passed by the Courts below on this ground can be sustained or not. 10. From Ex.P-6 dated 4-1-1990, it is clear that the tenancy agreement was between the Appellant and the Respondent. 10. From Ex.P-6 dated 4-1-1990, it is clear that the tenancy agreement was between the Appellant and the Respondent. The Defendant has admitted that in the suit shop, business of STD, PCO is being carried by him, however, the documents Ex.D-1 and D-2 are to the effect that the Defendant's brother Omprakash has shifted his STD, PCO business from the earlier applied place, namely, Hudco Colony, Durg to the present premises, which has been obtained on rent by his brother Suresh Kumar (the Defendant), but since they are jointly residing, he shall carry on the STD, PCO business from the suit premises. The Appellant/Defendant has also communicated the telecommunication department that the suit premises has been obtained on rent in his name and he has no objection if the STD, PCO connection is granted to his brother Omprakash, who shall carry on the business from the suit premises. From these evidence, it is apparent that the STD, PCO business was in the name of Omprakash and he was carrying on the said business from the suit premises. The ground of sub-letting has, thus, been proved and the Courts below have not committed any illegally in granting a decree to the Plaintiff/Respondent under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. 11. With regard to the ground under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, the fact as to whether the accommodation has not been used without reasonable cause for which it was let, for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit, is also a question of fact. Both the Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the suit shop was not used for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit for the purpose for which it was let. Both the Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the suit shop was not used for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit for the purpose for which it was let. The said finding is binding on this Court inasmuch as neither the evidence in this regard can be re-appreciated nor a concurrent finding of fact can be disturbed in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, however, in view of the question of law formulated by this Court, I shall briefly examine as to whether the ingredients of clause(d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 have been proved by the Plaintiff/Respondent or not. 12. The suit was filed on 7-1 -1991. It has been stated in the plaint that the Defendant/tenant has closed the shop and is not using the premises from 1 -7-1990. The period of six months expires on 31 -12-1990. Thus, the non-use for a continuous period of six months has been pleaded in the plaint and from the evidence on record, it would clearly appear that while accepting rent on 5-12-1990 vide EX.P-4A and on 3-1-1991 vide Ex.P-5A the Plaintiff/landlord has endorsed thereon that the shop of Vishal Footwear is closed since 1 -7-1990. A part from these documentary evidence, the oral evidence led by the parties also proved this fact that the shop has been closed for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit. The Courts below have referred to the statement made by P.W.-l Mahavir Singh and P.W.-2 Dinesh Chandra Pandey, who have stated that the shop was closed. Similarly, P. W.-4 M.T. Kundale is the Accountant of the Electricity Board, who has proved that when he went to record the consumption of electricity from the electricity consumption meter of the suit shop on 1 -7-1990 and 8-10-1990, he found that the shop is closed. He further states that from March, 1990 to 1 -1 -1991 the consumption of electricity is only 30 units, whereas from 1-1-1991 to 28-3-1991 the consumption is 280 units. On the basis of these evidence, it is established by the Plaintiff that the shop was closed and that is why there was practically no consumption of electricity between 1-7-1990 to 31-12-1990. On the basis of these evidence, it is established by the Plaintiff that the shop was closed and that is why there was practically no consumption of electricity between 1-7-1990 to 31-12-1990. The finding to this effect that the shop was closed for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of filing of the suit, thus, fully establishes ground under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 and the Courts below have not committed any error in decreeing the suit on this ground. The first question of law is, thus, answered in the affirmative in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff/landlord and against the Appellant/Defendant/tenant. 13. The second question of law is as to whether the lower appellate Court was right in rejecting the application filed by the Appellant under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The first appellate Court, in paragraph 8 of the judgment, has considered the Appellant's application under Order 13 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and has rejected the said application filed by the Appellant. By this application, the Appellant wanted to produce a document dated 11-12-1992 by which the telecommunication department has granted permission to the Appellant/Defendant to establish an STD, PCO in the suit premises in his own name. The present suit was preferred on 7-1-1991. The judgment and decree by the trial Court was passed on 21-7-1992. The first appeal was preferred by the Appellant on 24-8-1992. The document appears to have come in existence after filing of the first appeal, whereas the ground of sub-letting under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 has been pleaded by the Plaintiff on the foundation that the STD business is being run by the Defendant's brother Omprakash on the date of the filing of the suit, therefore, any subsequent permission by the telecommunication department in favour of the Defendant to open STD, PCO in the suit premises would not negate or demolish or defeat the ground which has already been made out by the Plaintiff by way of establishing his case in the trial Court. The application was rightly rejected by the first appellate Court. The application was rightly rejected by the first appellate Court. This Court is of the opinion that even if the application would have been allowed by the first appellate Court, it would not have made any difference because the Plaintiff is required to prove the ground of subletting on the date of filing of the suit and any subsequent permission obtained by the Defendant during pendency of the first appeal shall not defeat the ground already established by the Plaintiff. There is yet another reason why this application will not make any difference in the final outcome of the appeal because while examining the ground under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, this Court has already found that the Plaintiff has proved the ground of non-user of the premises for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the suit and, thus, even if one of the grounds for eviction is proved, the decree shall be maintained. The second question of law is, thus, answered against the Appellant. 14. In view of the aforesaid, since both the questions of law have been answered against the Appellant, the instant second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The Appellant shall bear the cost of the Respondent throughout. 15. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.