JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—Heard Sri Aditya Narayan, learned counsel for the respondent and Sri Shreesh Chandra, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant. 2. This is an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to condone the delay of 167 days in filing this first appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. This application is supported with an affidavit. Counter and rejoinder affidavits are available on record. 3. Various reasons have been given in the affidavit for showing sufficient cause in condoning the delay by saying that the certified copy of the judgement and decree dated 18.3.1991 was applied by the appellant through District Government Counsel (Civil), Varanasi on 18.4.1991, which was ready on 26.4.1991 and was delivered to District Government Counsel on 30.4.1991. The District Government Counsel gave his opinion on 1.5.1991 and sent the same to the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, which was received there on 9.5.1991. The Collector, informed the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Jaunpur on 14.5.1991 regarding filing of the appeal, which was received back in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 21.6.1991. A letter was sent alongwith file to the District Magistrate on 22.6.1991 and it was returned after signature of the District Magistrate to the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 25.6.1991. The Special Land Acquisition Officer sent the papers alongwith file to the Joint Secretary, Revenue-13 Department, Lucknow for obtaining instruction for filing the appeal vide letter dated 1.7.1991 and the Joint Secretary, Revenue-13 Department, Lucknow made some queries vide letter dated 31.7.1991, which was received in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 14.8.1991 and were replied by the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 23.8.1991. The Joint Secretary, Revenue-13 Department, Lucknow thereafter sent the file to the Law Department, U.P. Lucknow and the Law Department vide order dated 20.9.1991 granted permission for filing the First Appeal against the judgement and decree dated 18.3.1991. The permission was received by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 15.10.1991, whereafter he required the Executive Engineer, Varanasi to deposit the amount of Court Fee for filing the first appeal. After collecting necessary amount of Court Fee and the records, Sri Mohd. The permission was received by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 15.10.1991, whereafter he required the Executive Engineer, Varanasi to deposit the amount of Court Fee for filing the first appeal. After collecting necessary amount of Court Fee and the records, Sri Mohd. Nadeem Khan posted as Amin in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi was sent on 11.12.1991 to file the appeal and he contacted the office of the Chief Standing Counsel at Allahabad on 12.12.1991. The appeal was drafted and reported on 20.12.1991 and presented on 2.1.1992. 4. In the counter affidavit, the aforesaid reasons have been seriously contested by saying that the file was moving between various offices of the Government, which were not connected with filing of the appeal and even the Court Fee was purchased by the Irrigation Department and not by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 11.12.1991, whereas the official came to file the appeal at Allahabad on 11.12.1991. He states that the aforesaid averments in the affidavit are, therefore, incorrect and no sufficient reasons have been given to condone the delay. 5. In the rejoinder affidavit, the averments have been controverted and it has been stated that the Amin in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer was acquainted with the records of the case as also of the department and he was the best person to file the affidavit for condonation of delay. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Aligarh v. State of U.P. and others, 1995 (25) ALR 24 and has referred to paragraph 3 therein to state that the delay has to be explained and the circumstances under which the various authorities of the State did not deal with the matter expeditiously and were required to keep in mind the statutory limitation for filing an appeal. Paragraph 3 of the said judgement is quoted hereunder. “3. This appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation for which an application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has been filed. The cause of delay explained in paragraph 3 of the affidavit is that the certified copy was obtained on 14.5.1993 well within period of limitation, since the award is dated 18.2.1993. “3. This appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation for which an application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act has been filed. The cause of delay explained in paragraph 3 of the affidavit is that the certified copy was obtained on 14.5.1993 well within period of limitation, since the award is dated 18.2.1993. Thereafter, the Regional Manager sent the award to the Head Office at Lucknow, which was dealt with by the Chief Legal Advisor, Dr. R.K. Saxena, there is no explanation how the matter was dealt with by the Chief Legal Advisor till July, 1993. It is disclosed that in July 1993, Chief Legal Advisor wanted certain clarifications relating to the fate of the writ petition challenging notification under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Only question for consideration of Chief Legal Advisor, was whether compensation determined by respondent is high and whether the same would be assailed in appeal. Be that as it may, on 15.10.1993 Chief Legal Advisor again wanted information about the plot numbers and title of the tenure holders. This could have sought for in month of July itself. In absence of any material explaining the circumstances under which Chief Legal Advisor did not deal with the award from April to July and why piecemeal informations were sought for, we feel that Chief Legal Advisor did not keep the statutory limitation in mind and did not protect interest of the appellant”. 7. He has also referred to the Division Bench decision in the case of Adhishashi Abhiyanta and another v. Sheo Dass and others, 1992 RD 219 and has referred to paragraph paragraph 10 therein. According to learned counsel for the respondent in paragraph 10 the Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the various decision of the Supreme Court as also of the High Court and has clearly held that the required action taken should show bona fide and sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Paragraph 10 of the said judgement is quoted hereunder : “10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In State of U.P. v. Surendra (1) in which judgement has been delivered today we have discussed the case of Ram Lal and others v. Rewa Coal Field (2), Kendarnath v. Zumberlal (3), State of U.P. v. Bahadur Singh (4), Bhag Singh and others v. Major Daljit Singh and others (5), Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. In State of U.P. v. Surendra (1) in which judgement has been delivered today we have discussed the case of Ram Lal and others v. Rewa Coal Field (2), Kendarnath v. Zumberlal (3), State of U.P. v. Bahadur Singh (4), Bhag Singh and others v. Major Daljit Singh and others (5), Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and (6) and also the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Phota (7) alongwith three other cases decided on 7.3.91 of G. Rama Gaura v. S.L.A.O. Banglore (8) and Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani (9). After considering all these cases we have summarised the legal position as it emerged from the decision considered by us in the following words : “(i) State and the private individual both stand on the same footing and should be treated alike. In the case of the State however, while construing the cause shown the Court should be alive to the impersonal nature of State machinery loaded as it is with inherited bureocratic methodology inspired with note-making, file-pushing, and passing on the buck ethos. Thus some delay may be inevitable and this should receive a more liberal consideration and is not to be viewed in pendantic manner. (ii) Approach in considering the cause shown should be such which would advance the cause of substantial justice rather than throttle it. (iii) he party which seeks condonation must also bear the burden of showing that despite all necessary steps being taken to file the appeal within time it failed due to cause beyond its control. There must be absence of negligence or inaction and also no lack of bona fide, should be attributable to it. (iv) Only on the crossing these hurdles can an application for condonation succeed. However, each case deserves to be decided on its own facts and circumstances and no straight jacket formula can be prescribed.” 8. He has also referred to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Phota and others, AIR 1991 Alld. 229 and has referred to paragraphs 14 and 32 in support of his submission. Paragraphs 14 and 32 are quoted hereunder: “14. On the third point also the Supreme Court did not intend to lay down anything in absolute terms. 229 and has referred to paragraphs 14 and 32 in support of his submission. Paragraphs 14 and 32 are quoted hereunder: “14. On the third point also the Supreme Court did not intend to lay down anything in absolute terms. Explaining each days delay certainly may not mean every house delay but when an explanation for any delay is offered it sought to be examined in proper perspective. It the applicants allege that the sanction of the Govt. was received after, say, tow months then this statement offers no explanation at all unless it is further pointed out that either due to heavy work or due to any other particular reason the matter could not be dealt with earlier. The explanation which is given must be reasonable and should be supported by evidence, as in the illustration by the affidavit of the concerned authority who should give out the reasons and circumstances why sanction could not be given earlier.” “32. Although it was not necessary for us to go into details about the various averments made in the affidavits but we have done so to show that how the machinery of the Government and its various departments had been moving even in a matter where last date of filing the appeal had log passed. From these facts one thing is very clear that nobody in the department, whether in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer or the railway administration, was in the least bothered or concerned about expediting the matter and they were only hooked to departmental procedures and formalities. Every one seems to have taken the matter casually and at no stage did anyone show the least regard for the period of limitation as prescribed. What could this be called? Is it not negligence? Will it not be inaction? If not, what else could be called negligence and inaction? Even if we try to give the most liberal interpretation to the expression ‘sufficient cause’ we still find ourselves unable to classify this attitude and actions as any thing other than negligence and inaction. Howsoever we may try to find even an iota of explanation for the delay, we fail to do so every time. Even if we try to give the most liberal interpretation to the expression ‘sufficient cause’ we still find ourselves unable to classify this attitude and actions as any thing other than negligence and inaction. Howsoever we may try to find even an iota of explanation for the delay, we fail to do so every time. At no point during this entire period, the railway administration or the Special Land Acquisition Officer display any anxiety on their part to expedite the procedure although each of them must be aware that the last date of limitation had expired long time ago. In fact the sanction itself had been received from the Government after the last date of limitation. This fact alone should have spurred the officers to take prompt and expeditious action in filing the appeal without much loss of time thereafter. We regret to say that this effort is not visible anywhere. As the Supreme Court has said that no negligence or inaction ought to be imputable to the party which seeks Condonation of delay. We find in this case that at every stage the Government officials have been negligent and guilty of inaction and, therefore, in our opinion the State is not entitled to any relief in this matter”. 9. Sri Shreesh Chandra, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant has referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, AIR 1996 SC 1623 and has referred to paragraph 10 therein. He states that Supreme Court has clearly held that when the State is seeking condonation of delay, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible since the State is an impersonal machinery. Paragraph 10 of the said judgement is quoted below : “10. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 percent of the cases filed in this Court—be it by private party or the State—are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making file-pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.” 10. Learned Standing Counsel has also referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Perumon Bhagvanthy Devaswom Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, 2008 (3) AWC 3009 and has referred to paragraph 6 which is quoted hereunder : “What should be the approach of Courts while considering applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has been indicated in several decisions. It may be sufficient to refer to two of them. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , this Court reiterated the following classic statement from Krishna v. Chathappan, 1890 ILR 13 Mad 269: “...Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.” In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) SCC 123 : 1999 (1) AWC 15 (SC), this Court held: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of explanation.” 11. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of explanation.” 11. From the aforesaid averments made in their respective affidavits as also the law cited by learned counsel for the parties, it appears that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to by learned counsel would apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, more particularly when such decisions were not taken into account by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Aligarh (Supra) as also in the case of Adhishashi Abhiyanta and another v. Sheo Dass and others (Supra).There is no doubt that when the delay is to be explained each days delay in preferring the appeal is required to be explained and in the absence of sufficient cause in the explanation, the explanation cannot be considered sufficient nor the delay can be condoned. 12. In the present case, the appellant has given various dates when the file pertaining to filing of the appeal was sent from one official to another official in different departments of the State. It cannot be denied that the State and its officials are an impersonal machinery and the decision are taken at slow pace. The averments in the affidavit supporting the condonation of delay application has explained the delay by referring to specific dates when the file was sent to various officials and necessary expenses for filing the appeal including Court Fee were secured. 13. One of the objections of the respondent is that Court fee was purchased on 12.11.1991 and the appeal was filed more than one month thereafter. Insofar as the explanation given by the appellant in the affidavit supporting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, the same indicates that the certified copy of the judgement and decree was ready on 26.4.1991 and was delivered to the Government Counsel on 30.4.1991. Insofar as the explanation given by the appellant in the affidavit supporting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, the same indicates that the certified copy of the judgement and decree was ready on 26.4.1991 and was delivered to the Government Counsel on 30.4.1991. The opinion of the Government Counsel was given on 1.5.1991 and was received in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 9.5.1991, the file continued to occupy the attention of various officers of the department and ultimately on 1.7.1991, the file was received by the Joint Secretary, Revenue-13 Department, Lucknow. Till this date the limitation for filing the appeal was subsisting since it was up to 6.7.1991. After this the file moved from the office of the Joint Secretary of the State for queries and after queries were answered and official was sent to Allahabad on 11.12.1991 with the expenses and Court Fee etc. for filing the appeal. In the office of the Chief Standing Counsel the appeal was received on 12.12.1991 and it was prepared and got reported by the Stamp Reporter on 20.12.2991. It appears that after 20.12.1991, the winter vacation intervened and the appeal was filed on 2.1.1992 on the first date of opening of the office of the High Court. The aforesaid explanation is a day to day explanation. 14. From the aforesaid submissions and the averments made in the respective affidavit as also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it appears that the sufficient cause for condonation of delay shown by the State, which is the appellant is to be considered in view of the fact that the Government is an impersonal machinery and decisions are taken at a slow pace and certain amount of latitude is not impermissible while considering the condonation of delay application made by the State. In so far as sufficient cause is concerned the same requires to be ad-judged from the averments made by the applicant. 15. There is a difference between negligence and red-tapism in Government working where red tapism is now an established and embedded culture of Government working. Any number of rejection of insufficient causes shown by the State for condoning the delay would in the opinion of this Court not help, in any manner, in compelling the State officials to shed their red tape work culture. Any number of rejection of insufficient causes shown by the State for condoning the delay would in the opinion of this Court not help, in any manner, in compelling the State officials to shed their red tape work culture. A person who is really asleep can be woken up but a person who is pretending sleep cannot be woken up since any effort that is made will produce no effect upon him if he is merely pretending sleep. The bureaucracy of the State is well staffed. They have all facilities for efficient working, but yet the way of working is usually slow paced for no apparent reason. Being an impersonal machinery its officials are really not interested in keeping time, so what if there is a statue on limitation. The provisions of the Indian Limitation Act and rules of Limitation, for them appears to consist of only Section 5, because it is under this section that they explain and bask in the glory of their work culture known as red-tapism. Keeping files on their desks, tables and adopting a work methodology that is the best way to delay progress of important Court files is explained in reasons given for sufficient cause as if they are working efficiently. If the observation is true that most of the filing in Courts by the State, in actions or appeals is beyond the time allowed by Courts or in statute, then the State should identify its officials who are inefficient in dealing with Court cases. It is then that the State can over come its bureaucratic red-tapism. As has been rightly observed by the father of the nation, who died 61 years ago “the useful and the useless must, like good and evil generally, go on together, and man must make his choice”. (Mahatma Gandhi). 16. In these circumstances, since the Court has to take a liberal view for the delay due to red tapism in the Government working and has in view of public interest considered it to be in the interest of justice to condone the delay, the negligence committed on behalf of officials cannot be ignored. Particularly when if the appeal brought by the State is dismissed on the ground of delay alone no official is individually affected but ultimately it is a public interest which could suffer. Particularly when if the appeal brought by the State is dismissed on the ground of delay alone no official is individually affected but ultimately it is a public interest which could suffer. Therefore, while condoning the delay of 167 days in filing this appeal it would be appropriate that the State Government should take remedial action against the official or officials concerned by identifying such official or officials and recover from him/them the cost, which is being imposed by this Court as a condition for allowing the application for condonation of delay in filing this appeal. Such details of recovery be brought on record by the appellant. 17. In view of the aforesaid circumstances and considering the nature of the dispute between the parties and that the State of U.P. is the appellant, this Court finds it is appropriate to impose cost of Rs. 10,000/- which should be deposited by the State before the Registrar General of this Court within two months. Only upon deposit of the amount within the said period this appeal would be listed under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. and the amount so deposited may be given to the U.P. Legal Aid Services Authority. Office is directed to give a regular number to this appeal upon deposit of the said amount of cost. 18. This application stands allowed accordingly. —————