JUDGMENT 1. - Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29-8-2008, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) West Jaipur City, Jaipur, and judgment and decree dated 23-2-2010, passed by Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.3, Jaipur City, Jaipur, the appellant has filed this second appeal before this Court. 2. In a short compass, the facts of the case are that the appellant had filed a civil suit against respondents defendants for declaration and mandatory injunction in relation to a Chabutara (a Platform) measuring 11.9 ft. X 9.9 ft., situated in front of shop No. A-11/1, Chandpole Anaj Mandi, Jaipur. According to the appellant, the said platform was not sold to the respondents. In fact, vide sale-deed dated 19-9-1992, only a shop A-11/1, having an area 29.61 sq. meter, was sold by the appellant to the respondents. However, the respondents have encroached upon the said platform by putting iron- bars and by keeping their articles/ goods on the platform. According to the appellant, the platform is owned by him. Therefore, he prayed that mandatory injunction be issued against respondents not to use the platform.The respondents filed written statement and denied the averments made by the appellant. 3. Learned trial court framed five issues, including the issue of relief. In order to substantiate its case, the appellant examined himself as witness and, exhibited six documents. The respondent No.1 examined himself as a witness. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the appellant. Consequently, the appellant preferred first appeal before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Subsequently, the said appeal was transferred to the court of Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.3, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Learned first appellate court also dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present second appeal before this court. 4. Mr. Sudesh Bansal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that learned courts below have overlooked the fact that according to map given by the Urban Improvement Trust, the platform was bought by the appellant in a auction sale. Moreover, the learned courts below have ignored the fact that the respondents have taken self-contradictory stand before the trial court. On the one hand, they had claimed that the platform was sold to them by the appellant, yet on the other hand, they claimed that the platform was part of Government land. Moreover, the learned courts below have ignored the fact that the respondents have taken self-contradictory stand before the trial court. On the one hand, they had claimed that the platform was sold to them by the appellant, yet on the other hand, they claimed that the platform was part of Government land. Lastly, since the appellant could not produce certain documents before the learned trial court, and the first appellate court, the appellant has moved and application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC for taking those documents on record. According to learned counsel, these documents clearly prove that the platform was sold by the Urban Improvement Trust to the appellant. Moreover, the appellant did not sell the platform to the respondents. Thus, the platform continued to be in the ownership of the appellant. Hence, the respondents were encroachers upon the platform. 5. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, and perused the material available on record. 6. In his application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, the appellant has not given any cogent reason for non-submission of the documents before the learned trial court or the first appellate court. The only excuse offered by the appellant is that although the documents were given to counsel, the counsel did not submit these documents before the court. This is, indeed, a rather flimsy excuse. For, as the documents were readily available with the appellant, he should have insisted with the counsel to produce the same before the trial court. 7. It is, indeed, a settled principle of law that all the documents, on which the plaintiff wants to rely upon in order to establish its case, the entire evidence should be mar-shelled out before the trial court itself. Since the documents were readily available with the appellant, he was duty bound to place these documents before the trial court itself. Moreover, if the appellant was serious in establishing its case, he had ample opportunity to place these documents before the first appellate court. Admittedly, he did not file any application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC before the first appellate court. Therefore, at the belated stage of second appeal, the appellant cannot be permitted to fill in lacunae of his case. Therefore, the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC cannot be accepted. 8. Admittedly, he did not file any application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC before the first appellate court. Therefore, at the belated stage of second appeal, the appellant cannot be permitted to fill in lacunae of his case. Therefore, the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC cannot be accepted. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show any substantial question of law, which is involved in the present appeal. He has merely argued on question of facts the facts which were discussed, debated and adjudged by the learned subordinate courts. Since there is already concurrent finding of the learned subordinate courts, since there is neither any perversity nor any illegality in analysis of the evidence by the learned subordinate courts, this second appeal is devoid of any merit. 9. For the reasons, stated above, the second appeal is, hereby, dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******