Judgment F. M. REIS, J.:- The above Appeal filed under Section 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenges the Judgment and Order dated 29th April, 2009, passed by the learned Principal District Judge, South Goa, Margao, in Arbitration Application no. 70/2009 (New) filed by the Respondents under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, came to be allowed whereby, inter alia, the Appellants were restrained from in any manner causing interference with or impediment to the work of the Respondents vis-a-vis the refloatation of the vessel undertaken by them under Agreement dated 5th January, 2007, and/or terminating the same; and from making any demand on Respondents and/or taking away by way of damages or otherwise, taking any action in furtherance of the show cause notice dated 5th June, 2008, and from adopting any measures or steps to award the work to any other person or entity until the refloatation of the vessel in question and pending the determination of the issues arising between the parties which are arbitrable before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Respondents are also secured by an order of mandatory injunction directing the Appellants to reimburse the amount of Rs.5,50,00,000/- having earlier come to a conclusion that the Performance Guarantee was wrongly appropriated by the Appellants in encashing the same. 2. The above Appeal has been placed for hearing before the Division Bench in view of the directions of the Hon'ble Chief Justice by intimation dated 16th July, 2010. 3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the Respondents filed an application for interim orders under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Arbitration Act'), claiming that the Respondent is the contractor appointed under an Agreement dated 5th January, 2007, entered into between the Respondents and the Appellants for the removal of the nuisance caused by the grounded/wrecked vessel 'M. V. River Princess' off Sinquerim beach, Candolim, Goa, on the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon and stipulated in the said Agreement. It is further their case that pursuant to a tender floated by the Appellants to remove the vessel, the Respondents on 27th February, 2006, submitted its bid no.6/2(9)(River Princess)2006-DT/dated 31st Januar), 2006, which was accepted by the Appellants with certain modifications, culminating in the parties entering into a formal Agreement dated 5th January, 2007, whereby the Respondent was to remove the said vessel at its own risk, liability, costs and consequences by refloatation and towing away wholly to an authorised Ship Breaking Yard. It is further their contention that the work allotted to the Respondents was to be carried out within a period of 180 days and the consideration payable to the Respondents was the ownership and title of the wrecked vessel and the sum of Rs.5,50,00,000/- assured to the Respondents through its bankers as a Performance Guarantee favouring the Appellants to be paid by the Appellants to the Respondents within 7 days of floatation and towing away of the remains of the vessel. It is further their contention that pursuant to the said Agreement and in accordance with the Clauses 1, 5, 7 and 9, they were carrying out and were in the process of completing the said work within the time stipulated therein or within such extended time as was mutually agreed between the parties. The Indian Registrar of Shipping was appointed as a Consultant to make and submit regular status reports on the progress of the work from time to time and the Respondents were supposed to carry out the work as per their directives. It is further their case that the Appellants had not provided them with the general arrangements and the particulars of the grounded vessel thereby admitting that the said vessel was embedded in the sand and consequently the Respondents were facing innumerable difficulties in proceeding with the work assigned to them. It is further their contention that they had sought extension vide their letter dated 19th April, 2007 and the Appellants' Consultants had certified the situation at loco but the Appellants have not replied to the said letter and instead issued a notice dated 23rd July, 2007. The Respondents had incurred an expenditure of Rs. It is further their contention that they had sought extension vide their letter dated 19th April, 2007 and the Appellants' Consultants had certified the situation at loco but the Appellants have not replied to the said letter and instead issued a notice dated 23rd July, 2007. The Respondents had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 19,24,50,529/- in their endeavour to refloat the vessel and that there were regular meetings between the representatives of the Appellants including the Consultants, but, despite of repeated assurance, the Appellants did not respond in writing to permit them to carry out the work and had thereby tacitly agreed for the extension of time to complete the said work. A letter was addressed by the Appellants dated 6th February, 2008, to the Chairman of the Mormugao Port Trust, to allow the Respondents to transport the salvage related material via Berth no.7 to help them to complete with the ongoing salvage work. Due to bad weather during the monsoons, the work could not be carried out but, however, the Appellants failed to respond to their request to allow them to compete the work beyond 31st May, 2008. The letter also disclosed an alternative methodology to raise the vessel in keeping with the recommendations of the Consultant. The Respondents contend that they had continued with the salvage work on the basis of the oral assurances by the officers of the Appellants from time to time and no response was received to their request for extension till 31st December, 2008. Despite of the fact that the requests were pending for extension of time, the Respondents were informed by their Banker by letter dated 19th April, 2008 that the Appellants had invoked Performance Guarantee and accordingly they had issued demand draft for Rs.5,50,00,000/- in favour of the Appellants by debiting from their Cash Credit Account. It is further their contention that despite of acquiescence to the continued work carried out by the Respondents, the Appellants called upon the Respondents vide notice dated 5th June, 2008, to show cause why an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- should not be recovered as liquidated damages and why the said Agreement should not be terminated. It is the contention of the Respondents that the said notice was misconceived, totally contrary to the letter and spirit and ex-facie bad. It is the contention of the Respondents that the said notice was misconceived, totally contrary to the letter and spirit and ex-facie bad. In view of the Arbitration clause in the Agreement, the dispute had to be resolved by the Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the said Arbitration Act and, as such, it is the contention of the Respondents that they were entitled to seek the preservation and protection of the subject matter of the Arbitration pending its adjudication. It is further their contention that though time was made an essence of the contract, they were entitled for extension and, therefore, the conduct of the Appellants suggest that they had agreed for the extension of time. Accordingly, the said application under Section 9 was filed by the Respondents seeking reliefs to inter alia reimburse the amount collected from the Performance Guarantee as well as for temporary injunction to restrain the Appellants from interfering with the work being carried out under the Agreement or taking any action in furtherance of the show cause notice. 4. The Appellants filed their reply to the said application and stated that the reliefs were not available in law to the Respondents herein. It is further their case that the Agreement had been terminated as the Respondents had failed to remove the vessel within the stipulated period of 180 days time being the essence of the contract. It is further their contention that the said Agreement was not specifically enforceable as compensation was an adequate remedy and the same was running into such minute and numerous details dependent on personal qualifications or expertise could not be enforced specifically. It is further their contention that the said vessel had to be removed at their own risk and liability as to costs and consequences therein and to tow it away wholly to any authorised Ship Breaking Yard and dispose it within 180 days from issuance of the letter time being the essence of the contract. The essential terms were violated by the Respondents as they failed to refloat and tow away the vessel and, accordingly, the Appellants were entitled for an amount of Rs.4,90,00,000/- on the date of the reply for the failure to perform the work assigned to the Respondents. The subsequent notice dated 5th June, 2008 was issued by the next incumbent of the Competent Authority which was superfluous and unnecessary. The subsequent notice dated 5th June, 2008 was issued by the next incumbent of the Competent Authority which was superfluous and unnecessary. It is further their contention that the Appellants had never permitted the continuance of the work after the stipulated period and the Respondents having done so, it was at their own risk and liability as to costs and consequences thereof. Unilaterally, the Respondents had assured the Appellants to remove the vessel by 15th April, 2008, and the letter to Mormugao Port Trust Chairman dated 6th February, 2008, was to enable them to transport the salvaged materials. It is the contention of the Appellants that they were entitled to encash the Performance Guarantee in view of the failure on the part of the Respondents to remove the said vessel followed by the show cause notice dated 5th June, 2008. For other reasons stated in the said reply, it is the contention of the Respondents that the same deserves to be rejected. 5. The learned District Judge, after hearing the parties and perusing the records, allowed the application by Judgment and Order dated 29th April, 2009, filed by the Respondents under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act in terms as stated hereinabove. 6. Being aggrieved by the said Judgment and Order, the Appellants have preferred the present appeal. 7. The learned Advocate General appearing for the Appellants has assailed the impugned Judgment and submitted that the learned District Judge has failed to advert itself to the real point in controversy and decided the matter on extraneous considerations which are not at all relevant for the disposal of the application filed by the Respondents under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. He further submitted that the learned Judge has unnecessarily dwelt into an exercise to ascertain as to whether the time was the essence of the contract or not to come to the conclusion that as time was not the essence of contact, the reliefs of temporary injunction as prayed for by the Respondents, was to be granted. The learned Advocate General has submitted that what the learned Judge has lost sight of is even assuming the contentions of the Respondents are to be accepted, whether Specific Performance of the Agreement invoked by the Respondents can be granted. The learned Advocate General has submitted that what the learned Judge has lost sight of is even assuming the contentions of the Respondents are to be accepted, whether Specific Performance of the Agreement invoked by the Respondents can be granted. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Agreement entered into between the parties is essentially a job contract which cannot be specifically performed under the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He further submitted that in such cases damage is an adequate relief and by no stretch of imagination can the Respondents be entitled for Specific Performance of the Agreement. He further submitted that, in any event, the Agreement is running into such minute and rumerous details depending upon the personal qualifications and expertise which Court cannot supervise and, as such, such Agreements are not forcibly enforceable. He further submitted that the Respondents were unnecessarily making excuses to delay the completion of the salvage operations which were causing irretrievable damage to the interest of the Appellants which forced them to terminate the Agreement in accordance with the terms of the contract. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the Agreement itself was determinable and, as such, the question of granting any Specific Performance of such contract, would not arise at all. The Learned Advocate General further submitted that the Appellants had never acceded to the request of the Respondents for extension of time but the Respondents arbitrary had assured that the work would be completed on or before 31st May, 2008, which was in fact not completed and, in any event, entitle the Appellants to terminate the said Agreement. The learned Advocate General took us through the clauses of the Agreement to demonstrate the obligations which were fixed on the Respondents which they had defaulted and, as such, entitle the Appellants to terminate the said Agreement. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the alternate methodology pre-pounded by the Respondents was only a pretext to dillydally with the matter as such requests were not germane to the terms and conditions of the Agreements. He further submitted that there was no default committed by the Appellants and it was only on account of the defaults committed by the Respondents that the work was not completed. He further submitted that there was no default committed by the Appellants and it was only on account of the defaults committed by the Respondents that the work was not completed. The learned Advocate General after going through the impugned Judgment, pointed out that the learned District Judge has not at all addressed the said contentions raised by the Appellants and brushed them aside at para 55 of the impugned Judgment on the ground that the same were not available to the Appellants without giving any adequate reasons. The learned Advocate General has further pointed out that in view of the impugned Judgment the Appellants are not in a position to remove the wrecked vessel which is a nuisance to the Appellants. The learned Advocate General as such submitted that the learned District Judge has exercised its discretion by disposing of the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act capriciously and with material irregularity which requires interference by this Court. 8. On the other hand, Shri. S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing of the Respondents has supported the impugned Judgment. He, at the outset submitted that this Court should not interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the learned District Judge as the same have been passed after considering the material on record in its proper perspective applying the well settled principles of law which govern the grants of the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. He further submitted that the restraint order is in operation for a long time and considering that the Arbitration Proceedings are already in progress, there is no reason for this Court at this stage to interfere with the impugned order which would allow a change in the status quo as is existing at the site. The learned Counsel further submitted that time was not the essence of the contract considering the fact that the Appellants had allowed the Respondents to continue with the job assigned to them in terms of the said Agreement without any objections and such conduct itself establishes that the Appellants had agreed to extend the time for completing the work assigned to the Respondents. The learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that the Respondents have already spent a sum of over Rs.19,24,50,529/- in carrying out the floatation of the vessel in terms of the said Agreement and nearly 70% of the work had already been completed at the time when the Agreement was sought to be terminated by the Appellants. He as such submitted that his case comes within the proviso of Section 14(3)(c) of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, as such, the Respondents are entitled for the specific performance of the said Agreement. He further submitted that the delay in completion of the work was on account of the high handedness on the part of the Appellants in refusing to take a decision in the alternate methodology suggested by the Respondents which caused unnecessary delay in completing the work. He further submitted that though the Consultants appointed by the Appellants were satisfied with the operation carried out by the Respondents, the Appellants arbitraly and without any justification, sought to enforce the Performance Guarantee and thereby caused irreparable damage to the rights of the Respondents. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the delay is to be attributed solely to the Appellants for their recalcitrant attitude and there was no fault at all on the Respondents in taking necessary steps to complete their work. He further contented that the Respondents had procured air bags from China at considerable expenses for the purpose of carrying out the floatation of the vessel by alternate methods which itself shows the intention of the Respondents to complete the work expeditiously. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there are Public Interest Litigations filed by different citizens wherein they, inter alia, object to the manner in which the Appellants are seeking now to remove the vessel and, as such, in public interest the Respondents should be permitted to complete with the said job as such exercise will be completed within a short period of time. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellants have acted arbitraly in trying to terminate the Agreement without any right or justification which forced the Respondents to file the application for interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to safeguard their rights enshrined in the said Agreement. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellants have acted arbitraly in trying to terminate the Agreement without any right or justification which forced the Respondents to file the application for interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to safeguard their rights enshrined in the said Agreement. He further submitted that the learned District Judge has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and come to the conclusion that as time was not essence of the contract, the Respondents were entitled to continue with the job of floatation of the said vessel. The learned Senior Counsel as such submitted that no interference is called for in the present appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed. 9. After considering the submissions advanced by both the Learned Counsel and on perusal of the record, we find that there is no dispute that as per the Agreement dated 5th January, 2007, the Respondents were appointed as contractors to perform a specific job assigned to them. The recitals of said Agreement contemplate that the competent authority invited on behalf of the Government, sealed bids for the work of removal of the vessel alongwith the contents by refloating and towing it away wholly to any authorised Ship Breaking Yard within a period of 180 days from 1st October, 2006 and, after the bid of Respondents was accepted by negotiations, the said formal Agreement was executed in terms of clause 6 of the conditions of the bid/contract. The said Agreement further contemplates that the contractor shall at his own risk and liability as to the cost and consequences thereof remove the vessel M. Y. River Princess, grounded off Sinquerim Beach, Candolim, by refloating it and towing it away wholly to Ship Breaking Yard within a specified time and that time being the essence of the said contract. The Agreement further stipulated that the Respondents would furnish a Bank Guarantee through. the State Bank of India for a sum of Rs.5,50,00,000/- as a security deposit in favour of the Director of Tourism for the due performance of the said work under the said Agreement and in fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the agreement. The Agreement further stipulated that the Respondents would furnish a Bank Guarantee through. the State Bank of India for a sum of Rs.5,50,00,000/- as a security deposit in favour of the Director of Tourism for the due performance of the said work under the said Agreement and in fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the agreement. It further stipulates that the said guarantee would be valid during the subsistence of the said Agreement and that the Director of Tourism/Competent Authority or the Government would be entitled to invoke/encash the said Bank Guarantee under Clauses 10, 11, 30, 35, 39, 40, 41 and 43 of the said Agreement. It further stipulates that upon completion of the execution of the said work, the Appellants would pay to the Respondents a sum of Rs.5,50,00,000/- within a period of 7 days from the date of refloating and towing away the said vessel wholly to the deep sea. Such removal will not be considered to be completed unless the vessel is removed by refloating and towing it away wholly to the deep seas and further brought and disposed off to any authorised Ship Breaking Yard. It further stipulates that only upon the said vessel being refloated in the manner stipulated in the said Agreement, the full ownership right and title of the said refloated vessel shall stand vested on the Respondents absolutely. The Agreement contemplates that in case of failure on the part of the Respondents to complete the said work within the stipulated period or mutually agreed extension, the Respondents shall pay to the Appellants a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per day subject to a maximum period of 30 days. It further stipulates that on failure on the part of the Respondents to remove the said vessel and on abandonment of the said work midway, the Agreement shall be treated as terminated at the risk of the Respondents and the security deposit shall be forfeited in favour of the Government/Competent Authority and the Government/competent Authority shall be entitled to recover damages from the Respondents and the Government/Competent Authority shall make alternate arrangements for removal of the sea vessel. Clause 35, inter alia, of the said Agreement further contemplates that on the failure on the part of the Respondents to remove the said vessel in the manner and the time specified therein, the Bank Guarantee shall stand forfeited in favour of the Appellants and the Appellants shall be at liberty to carry out the said work and no payment whatsoever on basis of the part performance of the Agreement shall be payable to the Respondents. In such circumstances, the principle of "no cure no pain", which is universally accepted as a part of any salvage Agreement shall be applicable. The Agreement further contemplates at Clause 53 that, in the event of the Respondents during the course of the execution of the said work is of the opinion that refloatation of the vessel as per the plan given in his technical bid is not possible, the contractor shall inform the same to the Appellants and the Appellants after taking opinion from its consultants, shall decide whether to permit the Respondents to resort to an alternate plan and the conditions under which such permission, if any, is to be granted. 10. On perusal of said relevant Clauses of the said Agreement, we find that it is manifestly clear that the Respondents were appointed merely as a Contractor for the purpose of reflotation and towing away the wrecked vessel M. V. River Princess. The relationship of the parties disclose from the Agreement that the work to be undertaken by the Respondents is under the control and supervision of the Appellants in respect of the details of the work. The consideration stipulated in the said Agreement is inter alia the vesting of the title of the wrecked vessel unto the Respondent only after its retloatation and towing away towards the deep sea to an authorised Ship Breaking Yard besides the said payments. Such Agreements are essentially job contracts wherein a person is engaged to carry out some specific assignments. 11. Considering the nature of the said Agreement, we will now ascertain as to whether an Agreement of such a nature can be specifically enforced. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under : "l4. Such Agreements are essentially job contracts wherein a person is engaged to carry out some specific assignments. 11. Considering the nature of the said Agreement, we will now ascertain as to whether an Agreement of such a nature can be specifically enforced. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under : "l4. Contracts not specifically enforceable.- (1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely :- (a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief; (b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms; (c) a contract which is in its nature determinable; (d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the Court cannot supervise. (2) Save as provided by the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), no contract to refer present or future differences to arbitration shall be specifically enforced; but if any person who has made such a contract (other than an arbitration agreement to which the provisions of the said Act apply) and has refused to perform it, sues in respect of any subject which he has contracted to refer, the existence of such contract shall bar the suit. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of subsection (1), the court may enforce specific performance in the following cases :- (a) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract,- (i) to execute a mortgage or furnish any other security for securing the repayment of any loan which the borrower is not willing to repay at once: Provided that where only a part of the loan has been advanced the lender is willing to advance the remaining part of the loan in terms of the contract; or (ii) to take up and pay for any debentures of a company; (b) where the suit is for,- (i) the execution of a formal deed of partnership, the parties having commenced to carryon the business of the partnership; or (ii) the purchase of a share of a partner in a firm; (c) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract for the construction of any building or the execution of any other work on land : Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely :- (i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building or work; (ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is of such a nature that the compensation in money for nonperformance of the contract is not an adequate relief; and (iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed. Persons for or again whom contracts may be specifically enforced." 12. Considering the said provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, we find that the Agreement executed between the Appellants and the Respondents being a job contract, cannot be specifically enforced and in cases of breach of such contracts, compensation in money is an adequate relief. The law is well settled that such contracts cannot be specifically enforced and considering the terms and conditions of the Agreement between the parties herein, it is obvious that the services of the Respondents were engaged to perform a particular nature of job to remove the wrecked vessel. 13. The law is well settled that such contracts cannot be specifically enforced and considering the terms and conditions of the Agreement between the parties herein, it is obvious that the services of the Respondents were engaged to perform a particular nature of job to remove the wrecked vessel. 13. As per the terms of the said agreement, what the Respondents would ultimately get if the work assigned to them was completed, is the wrecked vessel which is a moveable property. A person is not entitled for Specific Performance of an Agreement for moveable property unless specific exceptions as contemplated in Section 10 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 are attracted. Section 10 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 inter alia, provides that Specific Performance of any contract may be in the discretion of the Court, be enforced when there exists no standard for ascertaining damage caused for non performance of the act agreed to be done or for the act agreed to be done compensation in money for its nonperformance would not afford an adequate relief. The explanation therein provides that unless an until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immoveable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money and that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in specific cases where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable. The case of the Respondents in the application is not that the wrecked vessel comes within the exceptions contemplated in the said explanation to Section 10 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 or was any submission with that regard advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents. 14. In AIR 1999 DELHI 117 in the case of B.S.M. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajasthan State Bridge and Construction Corporation Ltd. and anr., it has been held in para 9 thereof as thus : "On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that a building contract of the instant nature cannot be specifically enforced by granting interim relief under Section 9 of the Act. If there is a breach of such a contract, the appropriate remedy is to compensate the party damnified in damages. If there is a breach of such a contract, the appropriate remedy is to compensate the party damnified in damages. That apart, the granting of an injunction in favour of the petitioner will further delay the construction work considered very urgently by the respondent no.3. Thus, the balance of convenience also swings against the grant of injunction sought by the petitioner." 15. As such, the said Agreement is pertaining to a vessel which is a moveable property, naturally such an Agreement can be adequately relieved by compensation. The Respondents have themselves stated that they have incurred an expenditure to the tune of Rs.19,24,50,529/- at the time when the Appellants sought to terminate the Agreement. Apart from that, the Respondents have the requisite material to value the said wrecked vessel as they were associated with the said vessel for quite sometime in the course of works allegedly done by them. In any case, the Respondents can if they are so advised, file an appropriate application to the Arbitrator for the purpose of appointing a commissioner to value the said wrecked vessel and place such report in his records so as to enable the Arbitrator to pass appropriate orders at the time of the final disposal of the Arbitral Proceedings. This would safeguard the interest of the Respondents as far as carrying out the valuation of the wrecked vessel, in case they succeed in establishing their contention. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to decree Specific Performance of contract is that award of damages does not afford the aggrieved party a complete remedy and put him in the situation as beneficial as if the contract is specifically enforceable. If damages is an adequate remedy, Specific Performance of the contract cannot be decreed. 16. The learned Advocate General was right in contending that the Agreement between the parties cannot be specifically performed and damages was an adequate relief. Naturally, even assuming that the case of the Respondents is accepted to the effect that time was the essence of the contract and that the Appellants are at fault, at the highest, the Respondents would be entitled only for damages and not for the Specific Performance of the said Agreement. 17. The learned Senior Counsel Shri S. Lotlikar, appearing for the Respondents, tried to contend that the case of the Respondents comes within the exception of section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 17. The learned Senior Counsel Shri S. Lotlikar, appearing for the Respondents, tried to contend that the case of the Respondents comes within the exception of section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The said provision inter alia stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the Court may enforce Specific Performance when the suit is for enforcement of a contract for construction of any building or the execution of any other work on land. On the face of it, the said provision does not help the case of the Respondents. The Agreement between the parties is not to execute any work on land but it is merely an Agreement for refloatation and towing away of a wrecked vessel grounded off Sinquerim Beach at Candolim, which is not an exercise which is to be carried out on land and, as such, the said provisions cannot assist the case of the Respondents to contend that Specific Performance of such an Agreement can be granted. 18. Apart from that, the present contract also involves the performance of a continuous duty which the Court cannot supervise. The enormous nature of the work which was expected to be completed by the Respondents would require quick decisions about the modalities of complying with the terms of the Agreement. One will also have to continuously decide the manner in which such exercise would have to be completed then, obviously, the Court cannot supervise such activities and, as such, the Agreement of such a nature cannot be Specific Performance. 19. Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, provides that an injunction has to be refused to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. In the present case, as the said Agreement cannot be specifically enforced considering the nature thereof, no injunction can be granted to prevent such a breach. The learned District Judge has totally mis-directed in appreciating the matter in controversy and has exercised its discretion contrary to the well settled principles of law. Instead of considering as to whether the Agreement between the parties can be specifically enforced, the learned District Judge embarked into an investigation as to whether the time was an essence of the contract or not. Instead of considering as to whether the Agreement between the parties can be specifically enforced, the learned District Judge embarked into an investigation as to whether the time was an essence of the contract or not. Such exercise is immaterial considering that even assuming that time is essence of contract on perusal of the terms of the Agreement, such an Agreement cannot be specifically enforced considering the nature thereof. Once such an Agreement cannot be specifically enforced, naturally, the Respondents would not be entitled for an injunction as prayed for. 20. As far as the findings of the learned District Judge about the fact as to whether time was essence of contract or not, the same shall have to be decided by the Arbitrator after the evidence is adduced by the parties. The findings on that aspect would be material to ascertain as to whether there was a breach on the part of the Appellants or on the Respondents in complying with the terms of the said Agreement. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents had tried to contend that the delay was attributed to the Appellants essentially on the ground that the alternate methodology suggested by the Respondents was not acceded to by the Appellants which caused the delay. His further contention was that in view of the fact that such permission was not granted and such modalities were not accepted by the Appellants, the Respondents were forced to seek extension to complete the work. However, on perusal of the correspondence between the parties, we find that in the letter dated 9th April, 2007, whilst seeking extension of time, the Respondents, inter alia, contended that on account of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control and of knowledge, the work of refloatation was delayed and sought for extension till 1st October, 2007. There is no complaint therein about non-acceptance of alternate methodology. Whilst replying to the notice addressed by the Appellants, the Respondents by reply dated 13th June, 2007, contend that the reason for the delay is the one mentioned in the said letter dated 19th April, 2007, which the Appellants allege to have received after issuance of the said notice. Here also, no whisper is made about non-acceptance of any such alternate methodology. Here also, no whisper is made about non-acceptance of any such alternate methodology. In the letter dated 23rd April, 2008, the Respondents contend that they have been seeking extension of time on ground of various force majeure situations that they have been facing in the course of their work and that such situations were beyond their control, on account of which, they have not been able to complete the work. Here also, there is no reference to any such alternate methodology. In the letter dated 31st March, 2008, the Respondents contend that they are in the process of importing air bags from China, which for reasons beyond their control, have not been delivered yet. This discloses that even on 31st March, 2008, no such air bags were procured by the Respondents to implement the alternate methodology. All these facts show that at the relevant time, there was no grievance raised by the Respondents about non-acceptance of any such alternate methodology. This, prima facie, discloses that the Respondents have been raising excuses only to delay the completion of the work. But, however, these aspects will have to be considered by the Arbitrator after both the parties are given an opportunity to lead evidence in accordance with the legal provisions on its own merits. These facts have not been considered by the learned District Judge whilst passing the impugned Order and as we find that the learned District Judge has committed a serious error in appreciating the evidence on record and coming to the conclusion that the Appellants were entitled for the reliefs sought in the said application. 21. On perusal of the reliefs sought for by the Respondents in the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, we find that there was no relief sought by the Respondents to refund the amount of Rs.5,50,00,000/- received by the Appellants by encashing the Performance Guarantee. The learned District Judge has totally misdirected in granting such a relief which was not even prayed for by the Respondents. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents in fact conceded that there was no such prayer made by the Respondents in the application but he submitted that the prayer was to keep the Performance Guarantee alive. The consequences of passing of the impugned Order would result in the Respondents being permitted to carry out the job without any Performance Guarantee in favour of the Appellants. The consequences of passing of the impugned Order would result in the Respondents being permitted to carry out the job without any Performance Guarantee in favour of the Appellants. This shows that the learned District Judge has committed an error in passing the impugned Order and directing the Appellants to refund the sum of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- received by them. 22. The Apex Court in the Judgment reported in 2007(7) SCC 125 : [2007 ALL SCR 2524], in the case of Adhunik Steels Ltd. Vs. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd., it has been held at paras 11 and 16 as under : "11. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the court by way of an interim measure passing an order for protection, for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient. The grant of an interim prohibitory injunction or an interim mandatory injunction are governed by well-known rules and it is difficult to imagine that the legislature while enacting Section 9 of the Act intended to make a provision which was dehors the accepted principles that governed the grant of an interim injunction. Same is the position regarding the appointment of a receiver since the section itself brings in the concept of "just and convenient" while speaking of passing any interim measure of protection. The concluding words of the section, "and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it" also suggest that the normal rules that govern the court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. Moreover, when a party is given a right to approach an ordinary court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act. 12....... 13....... 14....... 15....... 16. Injunction is a form of specific relief. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act. 12....... 13....... 14....... 15....... 16. Injunction is a form of specific relief. It is an order of a court requiring a party either to do a specific act or acts or to refrain from doing a specific act or acts either for a limited period or without limit of time. In relation to a breach of contract, the proper remedy against a defendant who acts in breach of his obligations under a contract, is either damages or specific relief. The two principal varieties of specific relief are, decree of specific performance and the injunction (See David Bean on Injunctions). The Specific Relief Act, 1963 was intended to be "an Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific reliefs". Specific relief is relief in specie. It is a remedy which aims at the exact fullfillment of an obligation. According to Dr. Banerjee in his Tagore Law Lectures on Specific Relief, the remedy for the non-performance of a duty are (1) compensatory, (2) specific. In the former, the court awards damages for breach of the obligation. In the latter, it directs the party in default to do or forbear from doing the very thing, which he is bound to do or forbear from doing. The law of specific relief is said to be, in its essence, a part of the law of procedure, for, specific relief is a form of judicial redress. Thus, the Specific Relief Act, 1963 purports to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific reliefs obtainable in civil courts. It does not deal with the remedies connected with compensatory reliefs except as incidental and to a limited extent. The right to relief of injunctions is contained in Part III of the Specific Relief Act. Section 36 provides that preventive relief may be granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. Section 38 indicates when perpetual injunctions are granted and Section 39 indicates when mandatory injunctions are granted. Section 40 provides that damages may be awarded either in lieu of or in addition to injunctions. Section 41 provides for contingencies when an injunction cannot be granted. Section 38 indicates when perpetual injunctions are granted and Section 39 indicates when mandatory injunctions are granted. Section 40 provides that damages may be awarded either in lieu of or in addition to injunctions. Section 41 provides for contingencies when an injunction cannot be granted. Section 42 enables, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 41, particularly Clause (e) providing that no injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced, the granting of an injunction to perform a negative covenant. Thus, the power to grant injunctions by way of specific relief is covered by the Specific Relief Act, 1963." 23. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel that no interference is called for in the discretionary Order passed by the learned District Judge, cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. As stated herein above, the learned District Judge has totally misdirected in appreciating the controversy in passing the impugned Order of injunction against the Appellants without considering the provisions of Specific Relief Act, which establish that the Agreement sought to be invoked by the Respondents is not specifically enforceable. Allowing such an Order to continue would result in a delay in removing the grounded vessel which is stated may result to a natural calamity affecting the environment on account of such nuisance. The next contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents that the Appellants are in the process of now breaking the wrecked vessel at the site in the course of its removal and as such the Appellants should be restrained from carrying out the said exercise, cannot be considered in the present Appeal. The dispute with that regard will be decided while disposing off the Public Interest Litigation which are fixed for final disposal. The nature of such dispute is not germane to the facts in controversy in the present Appeal. The dispute in the present Appeal is only with regard to the contractual obligations between the parties hereto and such extraneous aspects will have to be considered in its proper perspective in the Writ Petitions which are pending for final hearing. As such, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel with that regard cannot be accepted. 24. The dispute in the present Appeal is only with regard to the contractual obligations between the parties hereto and such extraneous aspects will have to be considered in its proper perspective in the Writ Petitions which are pending for final hearing. As such, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel with that regard cannot be accepted. 24. In view of the above, we find that the learned District Judge appears to have exercised its discretion capriciously without considering the nature of the Agreement sought to be specifically enforced by the Respondents and came to an erroneous conclusion that the Respondents were entitled for a restraint order as granted in the impugned Order. As such, for the reasons already stated herein above, the impugned Order passed by the learned District Judge, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 25. It is made clear that the above findings are arrived at only for the purpose of disposing the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act for interim reliefs as prayed for by the Respondents. All the contentions raised by the parties are left open to be adjudicated on its own merits by the Arbitral Tribunal, without being influenced with above findings. 26. In view of the above, we pass the following : ORDER (i) The above Appeal is allowed. (ii) The impugned Order dated 29th April, 2009, passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Margao, is quashed and set aside. The application tiled by the Respondents under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act stands dismissed. (iii) The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly with costs. 27. At this stage, after passing the above Judgment, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents prayed for interim protection for a period of four weeks. Learned Advocate General appearing for the Appellants has opposed such request. 28. Whilst disposing of the above Appeal, we had held that even assuming the contentions of the Respondents are to be accepted, the Respondents are not entitled for Specific Performance of the Agreement. Hence, the prayer stands rejected. Appeal allowed.