ORDER Dev Darshan Sud, J. 1. The Petitioner challenges his conviction under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Petitioner Ram Asra and one Gurmukh Singh were convicted by the trial Court to undergo sentence of imprisonment for various terms: Convict No. 1 Ram Asra i) He will undergo simple imprisonment for 3 (three) months for the offence punishable under Section 279, IPC. ii) Convict No. 1/Ram Asra shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one and a half (one and half) year for the offence punishable under Section 304-A, IPC along with fine to the sum of Rs. 5,000/- (five thousand only). The above sentences of substantive imprisonment shall run concurrently. Convict No. 2. Gurmukh Singh i) Convict No. 2 shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one and half year along with fine to the sum of Rs. '5,000/- (five thousand only) for the offence-punishable under Section 304-A, IPC. 2. Two appeals were preferred, one by the Petitioner herein and second by the other accused Gurmukh Singh. 3. Learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, acquitted Gurmukh Singh, but convicted the Petitioner and reduced the period of imprisonment to three months. 4. The brief facts, necessary for determination of this petition, are that the Petitioner was driver in HRTC bus which was plying from Nalagarh to Shimla via Chandigarh. When deceased Shounk Ram was alighting from the bus, the driver suddenly started the bus, as a result of which, he fell down and sustained injuries. Firstly, he was taken to hospital at Kandaghat and thereafter was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, where he died on the way. There was only one eye-witness in this case, namely P.W. 1 Ramanand. His examination-in-chief has been reproduced by the learned Presiding Officer in his judgment. He states that on 14-3-2000, he and Shounk Ram went to Solan in connection with an official work and boarded the bus around 8 p.m. from Solan to Vaknaghat, where they reached at about 9 p.m. and the driver stopped the bus a little beyond the bus stop. Firstly Ramanand P.W. 1 alighted from the front door of the bus and thereafter when Shounk Ram was in the process of getting down, the driver suddenly started the bus as a result of which the deceased fell down and despite an alarm having been raised; the Petitioner did not stop the bus. Firstly Ramanand P.W. 1 alighted from the front door of the bus and thereafter when Shounk Ram was in the process of getting down, the driver suddenly started the bus as a result of which the deceased fell down and despite an alarm having been raised; the Petitioner did not stop the bus. He also states that the conductor was also careless as he did not blow the whistle despite an alarm raised by P.W. 1 that Shounk Ram had fallen down. Some people gathered at the spot and the deceased was rushed to hospital at Kandaghat where first aid was given to him and thereafter he was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla where he was declared dead on arrival. Ext. P.W. 3/A is the medical examination certificate of the deceased which says that on the cursory examination of the deceased at Kandaghat the Doctor found swelling on right gluteal region which suspected fracture in the pelvis and in the perineal area i.e. the secroutum, a lacerated tear exposing interneal structures and blood was oozing out. The Doctor also found two more abrasions in the region of loin and another abrasion on the sternum. Ext. P.W. 4/A is the post-mortem report of the deceased which shows that he had died due to haemorrhage and shock secondary to laceration of perineal region. 5. On the entirety of the evidence, the learned trial Court held not only the Petitioner, but also the conductor of the bus guilty and then convicted for the offences as charged. But the conductor has been acquitted by the learned Appellate Court and since no appeal has been filed against his acquittal. I need say anything further, save and except what I find from the judgment of the trial Court that he had been convicted on sound reasoning, but surprisingly no further proceedings were preferred against the acquittal. 6. Adverting to the case of the Petitioner, it is urged by learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the statement of P.W. 1 who is an eye-witness, is contrary to the medical evidence inasmuch as the injuries stated by P.W. 1 are not those which were found by the Doctor. 6. Adverting to the case of the Petitioner, it is urged by learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the statement of P.W. 1 who is an eye-witness, is contrary to the medical evidence inasmuch as the injuries stated by P.W. 1 are not those which were found by the Doctor. This submission required to be rejected outright as when a person is involved in an accident the first priority is that he has to be removed to hospital for medical treatment and it is not posisble to remember the detail of the injuries sustained. 7. Learned Counsel also refers to the evidence of D.W. 1 to urge that bus was not stopped at Vaknaghat. His evidence has been rejected by the two Courts below and rightly because taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this witness is nothing, but a liar who has been procured by the Petitioner to depose falsely before the Court. I do not find anything in the evidence of D.W. 1 which would in any manner disprove the case of the prosecution. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner relies upon two judgments of the Supreme Court. The first judgment referred to is Mohammed Aynuddin alias Miyam v. State of A.P. (2000) 7 SCC 72 : AIR 2000 SC 2511. The Court holds: 5. What is the culpable negligence on the part of the bus driver in the above accident? A passenger might fall down from a moving vehicle due to one of the following causes: it could be accidental; it could be due to the negligence of the passenger himself; it could be due to the negligent taking off the bus by the driver. However, to fasten the liability with the driver for negligent driving in such a situation there should be the evidence that he moved the bus suddenly before the passenger could get into the vehicle or that the driver moved the vehicle even before getting any signal from the rear side. 6. A driver who moves the bus forward can be expected to keep his eyes ahead and possibly on the sides also. A driver can take the reverse motion when that driver assures himself that the vehicle can safely be taken backward. 7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed. 6. A driver who moves the bus forward can be expected to keep his eyes ahead and possibly on the sides also. A driver can take the reverse motion when that driver assures himself that the vehicle can safely be taken backward. 7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption and in such a case the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part. Merely because a passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus, no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. 8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. 9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution, Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty which reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution. (at p. 74-75) In this case, the Court held that the driver was unaware of even the possibility of the accident which had happened and in these circumstances; there was no guilt which could be attributed to him. The second judgment relied upon by learned Counsel is Braham Dass v. State of H. P. (2009) 7 SCC 353 : AIR 2009 SC 3181. In particular, learned Counsel refers to para 8 which reads: 8. The second judgment relied upon by learned Counsel is Braham Dass v. State of H. P. (2009) 7 SCC 353 : AIR 2009 SC 3181. In particular, learned Counsel refers to para 8 which reads: 8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a public way. A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation in accusations under Section 279, IPC is not (sic) negligence. Similarly, in Section 304-A the stress is on causing death by negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of either Section 279 or 304-A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved. (at p. 354) I have gone through both these judgments and I find that they are based on facts as pleaded and proved and cannot be applied to the present case. 9. In the present case, what is obvious and has been proved on record is that when both the passengers namely P.W.1 Ramanand and deceased Shounk Ram were alighting from the front door of the bus, it cannot be said that the driver had not seen the second person and started the bus while he was in process of alighting. Negligence and rashness is writ large and it cannot be said that the Petitioner was not aware about the deceased alighting from the bus. It does not require any imagination to hold that it was the basic duty of the driver to ascertain as to whether any passenger/person was boarding or alighting from the bus. In these circumstances, the revision petition is dismissed. 10. On the question of sentencing, I find that the learned Appellate Court has reduced the sentence of imprisonment of the Petitioner from one and a half year to three months. I do not think that once the sentence has been reduced any interference is required. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 : AIR 2000 SC 1677 the Supreme Court has expressed its agony at the manner in which accidents are occurring. I do not think that once the sentence has been reduced any interference is required. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 : AIR 2000 SC 1677 the Supreme Court has expressed its agony at the manner in which accidents are occurring. The Court holds that such offences should be dealt with sternly. This judgment has been followed by this Court in State of H.P. v. Girdhari Lal 2007 Cri LJ 4347 and State of H.P. v. Mast Ram 2010 (1) SLJ (HP) 246. In these circumstances, I do not find any mitigating circumstance and thus this revisioin petition is accordingly dismissed. The bail bonds furnished by the Petitioners are cancelled. A direction is issued to the learned trial Court to ensure that the sentence imposed upon the Petitioner is executed forthwith.