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2010 DIGILAW 1122 (DEL)

Sunil Kumar Kapur v. Anil Kumar Kapur

2010-10-27

S.RAVINDRA BHAT

body2010
S. Ravindra Bhat, J. 1. This order will dispose of an application, I.A. No. 6229/2010 by the fourth defendant under Section 151 CPC, seeking for the recall of an order dated 12.10.2007, recording a compromise sought for in I.A. Nos. 4286/2007 and 4287/2007. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the suit are that the plaintiff (hereafter referred to as "Sh. Sunil Kapur") had claimed partition of two properties, being S-395, Greater Kailash Part-II, New Delhi (hereafter referred to as "the G.K. property") and 6/92, W.E.A., Karol Bagh, New Delhi (hereafter referred to as "the W.E.A. property"). According to the suit averments, Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur was the father of the plaintiff, Sh. Sunil Kapur, and all the defendants; the plaintiff and first, second, fourth and sixth defendants are the sons of late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur, whereas the third, fifth and seventh defendants are his daughters. The plaintiff claimed that Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur died inte state on 13.03.1994, leaving behind two assets, the partition of which was sought in the proceeding. The suit also averred that the G.K. property was purchased in 1987 by late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur and that similarly the W.E.A. property was his self-acquired property. In the circumstances, the plaintiff, Sh. Sunil Kapur had sought division of the suit properties, claiming one-eighth share. 3. The first defendant, Sh. Anil Kapur denied the suit averments, alleging that late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had left behind a registered Will dated 23.06.1992, bequeathing all his moveable and immoveable property to him, i.e. Sh. Anil Kapur. According to the averments in the written statement, late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had originally settled in Calcutta, and shifted to Delhi in 1965 when he was working in M/s. Napco Bevel Gear of India Ltd; Sh. Anil Kapur alleges that he shifted and started living with his father in 1967 and ever since he was assisting Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur in managing the company. Sh. Anil Kapur alleges that the second defendant was independently engaged in conducting furniture business and that the fourth defendant (the applicant) was living separately in Noida and having his own business of export of chemicals. The sixth defendant, it was alleged, was married and was living in Calcutta; he was engaged in tarpaulin manufacturing and saree business. 4. Sh. Anil Kapur alleges that the second defendant was independently engaged in conducting furniture business and that the fourth defendant (the applicant) was living separately in Noida and having his own business of export of chemicals. The sixth defendant, it was alleged, was married and was living in Calcutta; he was engaged in tarpaulin manufacturing and saree business. 4. The second and sixth defendants, in their common written statement conceded to the suit and endorsed the plaintiff's version that late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had died inte state. Similarly, the third and fifth defendants, in their common written statement did not deny that late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had died inte state. According to them, however, he was only owner of the ground floor of the G.K. property and the entire first floor was owned by the seventh defendant, and the second floor was owned by the fifth defendant. The seventh defendant, in her written statement, denied the suit and submitted that late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had left behind a registered Will dated 23.06.1992. 5. On 07.09.2000, the Court had framed issues and required the parties to submit evidence by filing affidavit. In between, the Court had directed deposit of rents in respect of the W.E.A. properties, which were under tenancy. 6. When the recording of evidence was proceeding, the parties moved applications, being I.A. Nos. 4286/2007 and 4287/2007, stating that they had entered into a compromise, which settled all their disputes. In terms of the settlement, all rights in respect of the G.K. property, consisting of the ground, first and second floor, with rent rights as well as the basement, ground and first floor of the W.E.A. property was conceded to the first defendant. The plaintiff, Sh. Sunil Kapur, on the other hand, was to get the second floor of the W.E.A. property with roof rights. The fifth defendant agreed to settle the amount upon being held entitled to receive `30,00,000/- in lieu of giving-up her claims towards the suit properties. 7. The Court, by its order dated 18.04.2007 recorded as follows and directed the decree to be drawn in terms of the compromise: "XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX IA No. 4286/2007 and 4287/2007 in CS(OS) No. 1411/1997 By the present application the parties wish to have their compromise recorded by the Court. 7. The Court, by its order dated 18.04.2007 recorded as follows and directed the decree to be drawn in terms of the compromise: "XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX IA No. 4286/2007 and 4287/2007 in CS(OS) No. 1411/1997 By the present application the parties wish to have their compromise recorded by the Court. The present suit was filed by one of the brothers and sisters against the other brothers and sisters, who are defendants No. 1 to 6. Defendant No. 7 the mother of the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 6 has expired during the pendency of the suit. Defendant No. 8, the Indian Bank was impleaded merely on account of its being a tenant of a portion of one of the suit properties, otherwise they have no interest in the disputes between the parties, who are related to each other. I am informed that defendant No. 8 has also in the meantime vacated the premises under their occupation and handed over the keys to defendant No. 1. The application is signed by the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 6 and their respective counsels and is also supported by affidavit of the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 6. The plaintiff is also present in Court, who is also the attorney for defendants No. 2 to 6. Defendant No. 1 is also present in Court. The parties present state that they have entered into compromise without any pressure or coercion. I have gone through the compromise. The same appears to be fair, just and reasonable. I see no impediment in recording the compromise. Accordingly, the compromise is recorded and the present suit is disposed of in terms thereof. The compromise application and application No. 4287/2007 is marked `X' and `Y' the same shall form part of the decree. In terms of the compromise the keys of the Second floor of property bearing No. 6/92 Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, which are placed on record be handed over to the plaintiff today by the Court Master. The same have been handed over in Court. The Registry is directed to prepare a pay order of Rs. 30 lacs in the name of defendant No. 5, Ms. The same have been handed over in Court. The Registry is directed to prepare a pay order of Rs. 30 lacs in the name of defendant No. 5, Ms. Mala Puri from out of the funds lying deposited in this Court in relation to the present suit and the said pay order be delivered to the counsel for the plaintiff for being delivered to defendant No. 5 upon her execution of a gift deed in respect of Second floor of S-395 Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi in favour of defendant No. 1. The balance amount lying deposited in this Court after the release of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 30 lacs, with interest accrued thereon, if any, be released in favour of defendant No. 1. The original title deed of the Karol Bagh property and the original Will of the father of the parties be released to defendant No. 1 upon certified copies being placed on record. The suit is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The parties are left to bear their respective costs. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX" 8. The fourth defendant applicant, in his application seeks recall of the order claiming that he was unaware of the nature of the compromise and became aware of its true meaning and purport after receiving summons in a suit filed by his son, i.e. CS (OS) 176/2008 (Rajiv Kapur v. Chiranjit Kapur) before this Court, claiming that he is a co-parcener. It is submitted that after receiving the paperbook, the fourth defendant enquired from his brothers and sisters and became aware that the plaintiff and the first defendant had misused the papers which had been signed by him, and effected an inequitable partition of the joint family properties. 9. The application averments are that the fourth defendant was not aware as to the terms of the compromise recorded in the application. The material averments in this regard, in support of the claim for setting-aside the order recording compromise are as follows: "XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 10. A perusal of the entire application would show that the entire House No. S-395 Greater Kailash Part II, New Delhi, consisting of Ground Floor, First Floor and Second floor with roof rights and also Basement, Ground Floor and First Floor of Property No. 6/92, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, has been given to Defendant No. 1. A perusal of the entire application would show that the entire House No. S-395 Greater Kailash Part II, New Delhi, consisting of Ground Floor, First Floor and Second floor with roof rights and also Basement, Ground Floor and First Floor of Property No. 6/92, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, has been given to Defendant No. 1. The Plaintiff has been given Second Floor of Property No. 6/92, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, with its roof rights. So far as the Defendant No. 5 is concerned, she has been given a sum of Rs. 30 Lacs in lieu of giving up her rights in the Second Floor of S-395, Greater Kailash Part II, New Delhi, by executing Gift Deed in favor of Defendant No. 1. In nut shell the entire property S-395, Greater Kailash Part II, New Delhi, and the Property No. 6/92, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, except its Second floor and Terrace on the Second Floor have been taken by Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff Sunil Kapur has been given its Second floor with Terrace right in Property No. 6/92, WEA Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The amount of Rs. 30 La also to be paid to Defendant No. 5 out of the amount deposited in Court by the tenants of Property No. 6/92 WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The balance amount of Rs. 51 Lacs from the amount deposited in Court has been given to Defendant No. 1 although the entire amount of Rs. 81 Lacs was of Joint Family. 11. Although it is mentioned in the application for compromise that the Second Floor Terrace shall be sold by the Plaintiff as owner and its sale proceeds shall be shared with Defendants 2 to 4 and 6 as per the arrangement arrived at by the Plaintiff with the said Defendants but till today no such sale has taken place nor any money has been given to the Applicant/Defendant. The Applicant/Defendant understands that even to other Defendants no money has been given by the Plaintiff. 12. A fraud has been played on the Applicant/Defendant and other Defendants by the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 to usurp all the properties which belong to the parties as the properties are Joint Hindu Family properties. The Applicant/Defendant understands that even to other Defendants no money has been given by the Plaintiff. 12. A fraud has been played on the Applicant/Defendant and other Defendants by the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 to usurp all the properties which belong to the parties as the properties are Joint Hindu Family properties. It is the submission of the Applicant/Defendant that he had never intended to execute any General Power of Attorney in favor of the Plaintiff to forego his share in the Joint Hindu Family Properties. As a matter of fact, a perusal of the General Power of Attorney which was executed by the Applicant/Defendant would also show that the Power of Attorney was given so that in case any property is to be sold, the same may be sold and in case it was necessary to have one or two floors f the property No. 6/92, WEA, Karol Bagh, to be transferred, relinquished in favor of the Plaintiff to have better bargaining power. It is also mentioned in the General Power of Attorney that applicant/Defendnat agrees to take his share in the form of cash/cheque out of the sale proceeds under the Settlement. 13. It is also mentioned in the General Power of Attorney that in order to facilitate implementation of the compromise, it would be necessary to relinquish the interest of the Applicant/Defendant in the property in favor of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff was authorized to get requisite documents executed for this purpose. However, no Relinquishment Deed was ever executed by the Applicant/Defendant nor any such deed was prepared by the Plaintiff or Defendant No. 1. Since the General Power of Attorney was executed by the Applicant/Defendant is not a Registered document, no Release Deed can be executed or effected on the basis of the said General Power of Attorney. The terms of the compromise as contained in Clause (c) to the effect that Defendant 2 to 6 have decided not to claim any right in the properties is without any authority. No such authority was given by the Applicant/Defendant in the General Power of Attorney. The signature of the Applicant/Defendant on the application for compromise was obtained by the Plaintiff by playing a fraud and by mis-presentation of facts. 14. No such authority was given by the Applicant/Defendant in the General Power of Attorney. The signature of the Applicant/Defendant on the application for compromise was obtained by the Plaintiff by playing a fraud and by mis-presentation of facts. 14. That even the statement of fact in the application that the parties to the suit i.e. Plaintiff and Defendants 2 to 6 have decided not to contest the Wills of Late Shri Sikander Lal Kapur and Smt. Lajwanti Kapur is without any authority. No such authority was given to the Plaintiff by the Applicant/Defendant. As a matter of fact, the father and mother of the Applicant/Defendant had never executed any such Will. They never mentioned in the family that they had executed the Wills bequeathing both of their properties in favour of Defendant No. 1. After receiving the copies of the documents in the Suit filed by Rajiv Kapur, the Applicant/Defendant has noticed that both the Wills i.e. (i) alleged to be executed by Shri S.L. Kapur; and (ii) alleged to be executed by Smt. Lajwanti Kapur are not legal and valid. It is very strange that although the Plaintiff has himself mentioned in the plaint that their father Shri S.L. Kapur had treated all the children equally yet in order to get advantage, he also connived with Defendant No. 1 and drafted application for compromise in such a way so that validity of the Wills is not questioned. Late Shri S.L. Kapur, father of the Applicant/Defendant always used to sign in English. He could not read or write Hindi Language. It is evident that his signatures have been taken on the Will by undue influence by Defendant No. 1. A perusal of copy of the Will of Late Smt. Lajwanti Kapur would show that it is a forged document and the Will was never signed by Smt. Lajwanti Kapur. The forgery seems to be traced forgery. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX" 10. The applicant contends that the Court has to satisfy itself that the parties to a document, styling itself as a compromise are aware about its contents and had executed it after due deliberation and full knowledge. The forgery seems to be traced forgery. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX" 10. The applicant contends that the Court has to satisfy itself that the parties to a document, styling itself as a compromise are aware about its contents and had executed it after due deliberation and full knowledge. In this case, argues the applicant, the fourth defendant was kept in the dark and made to execute documents at the behest of the plaintiff, who had all along assured that he (the applicant fourth defendant) would be given his due one-eighth share in both the properties. The applicant/fourth defendant submits that on the strength of the plaintiff's assurance, he never filed a separate written statement and had, therefore, left the entire matter to the discretion of the plaintiff, reposing full faith and trust in him. The fourth defendant argues that the plaintiff abused this trust and conceded to false claims of some of the defendants about existence of a registered Will which was neither proved nor duly exhibited by any attesting witnesses. 11. The first and fifth defendants, in their reply to the application contend that the suit was ended with a valid and binding compromise. The Court recorded the settlement after being satisfied that the fourth defendant had executed the application as well as the affidavit supporting it. It is argued that the applicant, fourth defendant had never contested the suit, taking and chosen not to take any position/side in support of the Will or that the partition sought was correctly claimed. It is submitted that the applicant's case about being kept in dark and being unaware about the terms of compromise filed before the Court are truly false and concocted. 12. It is submitted that the fourth defendant was all along staying separately from the family and even Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur had nothing to do with the family. The suit properties were self-acquired properties of late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur and the plaintiff and other non-applicant defendants, after contesting the proceedings, decided to end the disputes by accepting the Will and also agreeing on further terms whereby the properties could be divided. Thus, the first defendant gave the second floor and terrace rights of the W.E.A. property to the plaintiff and the other defendants to sell the same and share the proceeds. Thus, the first defendant gave the second floor and terrace rights of the W.E.A. property to the plaintiff and the other defendants to sell the same and share the proceeds. The fourth defendant, who is now seeking for setting-aside the compromise, was also a beneficiary under the settlement. 13. The first and fifth defendants argue that the applicant was fully aware of the registered Will dated 23.06.1992 as well as the previous Will dated 19.05.1992 of his wife, Smt. Lajwanti Kapur, which was accepted by him as well as all the other Class-I heirs. It is submitted that there was no joint family, as is sought ot be made-out by the applicant fourth defendant. The fifth defendant further submits that even though the applicant had appeared before the Court on the first date of hearing, subsequently he neglected to be represented and file any pleadings and was thus set-down ex-parte. He chose not to contest the suit or file any written statement after being a party to the compromise, he is now deliberately seeking recall of the order by falsely alleging fraud. It is contended by both the first and the fifth defendant that the applicant fourth defendant is literate and educated and was fully conscious of the documents which he voluntarily signed, such as the compromise applications and the affidavit affirmed in its support. 14. The Court had required the appearance of the applicant defendant; he presented himself on 08.09.2010, when his statement was recorded. The applicant stated that the G.K. property and the W.E.A. property were purchased by late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur. The G.K. property was purchased in 1987 and the Karol Bagh property was purchased sometime in the 1950s. At the time of his deposition, he was 74 years of age. He also stated awareness about the suit filed by Sh. Sunil Kapur in 1997 and that he had appeared on the first date. He deposed that the plaintiff assured that everything would be distributed equally and that he (the applicant) would be getting his due share. In response to the query whether there was any settlement in the suit, the fourth defendant agreed that he was aware of the compromise since the plaintiff had approached him and got the relevant papers signed. He clarified that he had been approached in the hospital when his sister, Ms. Swaran Obhrai was ill. In response to the query whether there was any settlement in the suit, the fourth defendant agreed that he was aware of the compromise since the plaintiff had approached him and got the relevant papers signed. He clarified that he had been approached in the hospital when his sister, Ms. Swaran Obhrai was ill. He was able to identify the Power of Attorney in I.A. No. 4287/2007, and admitted that he had signed it. Further, he volunteered that he was not aware of its contents. He deposed that he was a B.Com graduate and was engaged in textile trading. He also deposed to being an Income Tax assessee with an annual turn-over of his business of `50,00,000/- and annual income of `3,00,000/-. He stated that he does not sign documents without reading them, but clarified that in this case, he signed the documents in good faith because of the peculiar circumstances, and believed his brother, the plaintiff. He stated that he was not aware of any Will left behind by his father but that he came to know about it after his son filed a suit and criminal complaint. He agreed to having authorized the plaintiff to act as his Power of Attorney holder. According to the fourth defendant, the terms of compromise discussed with him was that the properties would be divided in equal shares. He further stated that his brother, Sh. Ramesh Kumar Kapur and Ms. Mala Puri were present at the time of discussion, which was sometime during March-April 2007. He submitted that he was working since 1957 with his father and that he stopped being part of his father's business in 1992. He also stated that his family had come from Calcutta in the 1960s and that he came to Delhi in 1994. He submitted to having received Rs. 25,00,000/- from the landlords at the time of vacating the premises. He also stated that his son was carrying-on business with him since 1995 and that he had studied their previously. According to him, late Sh. Sikander Lall Kapur, his father had financed his son's education. On being shown I.A. No. 4286/2007, he identified his signatures and also identified his affidavit. Further, he stated that he was not aware about the details of the application. 15. Order XXIII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code") deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Sikander Lall Kapur, his father had financed his son's education. On being shown I.A. No. 4286/2007, he identified his signatures and also identified his affidavit. Further, he stated that he was not aware about the details of the application. 15. Order XXIII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code") deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of which is extracted below: "3. Compromise of suit. -- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject- matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit" In the judgment of the Supreme Court, reported as Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [1988] 2 SCR 401, it was held as follows: "10. Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, an agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing." In the later judgment reported as Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, AIR 2006 SC 2628 : 2006 (89) DRJ 295 , the court analyzed the provision as follows: "14. What is the difference between the first part and the second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. What is the difference between the first part and the second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties. The agreement compromise spells out the agreed terms by which the claim is admitted or adjusted by mutual concessions or promises, so that the parties thereto can be held to their promise/s in future and performance can be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms of it. On the other hand, the second part refers to cases where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or need not be met or performed. It can also be by discharging or performing the required obligation. Where the defendant so `satisfies' the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further remains to be done or enforced and there is no question of any `enforcement' or `execution' of the decree to be passed in terms of it. Let us illustrate with reference to a money-suit filed for recovery of say a sum of Rupees one lakh. Parties may enter into a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by them, agreeing that the defendant will pay the sum of Rupees one lakh within a specified period or specified manner or may agree that only a sum of Rs. 75,000 shall be paid by the defendant in full and final settlement of the claim. Such agreement or compromise will fall under the first Part and if defendant does not fulfil the promise, the plaintiff can enforce it by levying execution. On the other hand, the parties may submit to the court that defendant has already paid a sum of Rupees one lakh or Rs. Such agreement or compromise will fall under the first Part and if defendant does not fulfil the promise, the plaintiff can enforce it by levying execution. On the other hand, the parties may submit to the court that defendant has already paid a sum of Rupees one lakh or Rs. 75,000/- in full and final satisfaction or that the suit claim has been fully settled by the defendant out of court (either by mentioning the amount paid or not mentioning it) or that plaintiff will not press the claim. Here the obligation is already performed by the defendant or plaintiff agrees that he will not enforce performance and nothing remains to be performed by the defendant. As the order that follows merely records the extinguishment or satisfaction of the claim or non- existence of the claim, it is not capable of being `enforced' by levy of execution, as there is no obligation to be performed by the defendant in pursuance of the decree. Such `satisfaction' need not be expressed by an agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties. It can be by a unilateral submission by the plaintiff or his counsel. Such satisfaction will fall under the second part. Of course even when there is such satisfaction of the claim or subject matter of the suit by defendant and the matter falls under the second part, nothing prevents the parties from reducing such satisfaction of the claim/subject matter, into writing and signing the same. The difference between the two parts is this: Where the matter falls under the second part, what is reported is a completed action or settlement out of court putting an end to the dispute, and the resultant decree recording the satisfaction, is not capable of being enforced by levying execution. Where the matter falls under the first part, there is a promise or promises agreed to be performed or executed, and that can be enforced by levying execution. While agreements or compromises falling under the first part, can only be by an instrument or other form of writing signed by the parties, there is no such requirement in regard to settlements or satisfaction falling under the second part. While agreements or compromises falling under the first part, can only be by an instrument or other form of writing signed by the parties, there is no such requirement in regard to settlements or satisfaction falling under the second part. Where the matter falls under second part, it is sufficient if the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel appears before the court and informs the court that the subject matter of the suit has already been settled or satisfied." It has also been held that (in Jineshwardas v. Jagrani, AIR 2003 SC 4596 and Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, AIR 1991 SC 2234 ) that the words `by parties' refer not only to parties in person, but their attorney holders or duly authorized pleaders. 16. The applicant in the present case, concededly was aware of the pendency of the suit; he appeared on the first date of hearing after summons were issued. However, he did not contest the suit, and did not indicate either that the suit properties were impartible, or that the late S.L Kapur had left behind a will. He was set down ex-parte. The record reveals that when the court disposed of the suit, on the basis of a compromise application, the applicant's affidavit in support of the compromise, was on the record; he does not deny it; he does not also deny that he had issued a General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff to enter into the compromise, and sign on his behalf. The order sheet for the day, records that the applicant's counsel was present. The applicant does not say that such counsel was not engaged by him, or was lacking in authority. He also admits having signed the compromise application, and the affidavit in support. Till date, he has not taken steps to repudiate the Power of Attorney. His explanation for moving the court after three years, is that he became aware of the compromise decree and its terms, only after his son filed a suit in 2008. The applicant is an educated man; he states on oath that he does not sign papers, without seeing their contents. By all accounts, he is successful; according to his deposition, he has an annual business turnover of about `50,00,000/-. The reason for seeking recall of the order recording compromise is that he was made to sign the papers, by false representations. By all accounts, he is successful; according to his deposition, he has an annual business turnover of about `50,00,000/-. The reason for seeking recall of the order recording compromise is that he was made to sign the papers, by false representations. In his application, he nowhere mentions the circumstances under which he signed the compromise application; however, in his deposition in court, he submits that he signed it in a hospital, when his sister was unwell. He mentions that according to the terms agreed, all the heirs of S.L. Kapur were to share the suit properties, equally. 17. Although the applicant alleges fraud, against the plaintiff and the first defendant, and seems to suggest at the same time that the said parties did not take steps to implement the compromise, the court has to consider the averments having regard to the overall circumstances. The applicant did not contest the suit; he was set down ex-parte. The rival positions in the suit, were that the late S.L. Kapur had left behind a will. However, the applicant did not indicate his position. Concededly, he signed the papers and affidavit, by which the compromise terms were presented in court, and duly recorded. He even signed the General Power of attorney. It was not indicated during the hearing that such General Power of Attorney was ever repudiated, or that the applicant caused any legal notice to be issued to his brothers and sisters, alleging fraud, as he does today. The applicant does not explain why he has preferred the present application for recall of order, after lapse of two years, from the time he became aware of the suit filed by his son, when, he alleges, he gained knowledge about the true terms of compromise. This lack of explanation for the delay, in this court's opinion, is significant, as is the absence of any step to repudiate the General Power of Attorney. The applicant is an educated and aware man; he also successfully conducts a business, and is fairly affluent. He also admits that he does not sign documents without being aware of their contents. In these circumstances, the court is unpersuaded by his contention that the terms of compromise were unknown to him, or that he was misled into believing them to be something else. 18. He also admits that he does not sign documents without being aware of their contents. In these circumstances, the court is unpersuaded by his contention that the terms of compromise were unknown to him, or that he was misled into believing them to be something else. 18. While fraud is a valid ground to invalidate a compromise decree, the litigant alleging such fraud should make specific pleadings in this regard. Neither in the application nor in the deposition, does the fourth defendant state with any specificity when his sister fell ill, and with what ailment. His version that other defendants were present when something else was held out as the terms of settlement, is not supported by the other parties. Added to all these, the applicant has not sought to give any reasonable explanation, which can be accepted by the court, for the delay in seeking recall of the previous order, recording a compromise. Having regard to these conspectus of facts, the court is of the opinion that the applicant's request for recall of this court's orders, disposing of the suit, on the basis of a compromise, cannot be acceded to. The said application, I.A. No. 6229/2010 is therefore, dismissed.