JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, ACJ.—At the very out set we would like to make the picture clear with regard to connectivity and analogous hearing of the aforesaid matters in order to avoid any confusion in this regard. Initially, when aforesaid First Appeal From Order No. 120 of 2008 was filed as defective [FAFO No. (25) of 2008], a Division Bench of this Court upon hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties on 08th January, 2008 condoned the delay and directed the department to allot regular number of the appeal. It appears that against this order dated 08th January, 2008, M/s. Technology Park Ltd. approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)..CC No. 7154 of 2008 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. Sri Ram Chaudhary and others), wherein Sri Ram Chaudhary (the appellant in FAFO No. 120 of 2008) filed Intervention Application No. 3 of 2008. Ultimately, on 30th June, 2008 the Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petition and I.A. No. 3 of 2008, passed the following order : “Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties in I.A. No. 3/2008, the special leave petition filed by M/s. Technology Park Ltd. is itself taken up for consideration. It appears from the pleadings and from the submissions of the counsel that there are various writ petitions W.P.(C) No. 65654/06, W.P.(C) No. 68436/06 & W.P.(C) No. 4812/07, and also F.A.O. No. 120 of 2008 (defective), pending before the Allahabad High Court. The said First Appeal arises out of a Civil Suit O.S. 456/2007 filed by respondent No. 1 herein for specific performance, pending before the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Gautam Budh Nagar, (U.P.). On consideration of the submissions made, the special leave petition and also I.A.No. 3/2008 filed therein are dismissed with a request to the High Court to dispose of the pending writ petitions, as also the First Appeal, expeditiously, and, if possible, within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order. We also make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion with regard to the subject matter of the pending writ petitions and the First Appeal and the High Court will be at liberty to pass appropriate orders in the said matters. In the meantime, however, no third party rights are to be created in respect of the lands in question.” 2. In the meantime, however, no third party rights are to be created in respect of the lands in question.” 2. Thereafter when the said appeal came up before this Bench with a prayer for analogous hearing, Court required formal assignment to maintain the propriety and on 23rd July, 2008 directed the parties to place the matters before the Hon’ble Chief Justice/ Hon’ble Senior Judge for obtaining appropriate order of assignment. Consequently, when the matters were assigned to the Bench presided over by one of us (Amitava Lala, J.), we directed to list the appeal alongwith Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 65654/2006, 68436/2006 and 4812/2007. Thereafter under the various orders of different Benches of this Court, all the aforesaid matters have been connected for analogous hearing and have been heard accordingly. 3. To understand the real controversy and for effective adjudication of the controversy, it is necessary to narrate the brief facts of the case, which give rise to the aforesaid matters. 4. One Mr. Shaukat Rai Malhotra, an entrepreneur, in or around 1983, conceived a project for setting up technology park and/or electronic city, which would be self contained in themselves, for which he approached the Government of India as well as the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. Initially the Government of India decided that such technology park/ electronic city would be set up in both the States i.e. Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, pursuant whereto the matter was publicised. In order to achieve the said object, Mr. Malhotra incorporated a company, namely, Technology Park Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner company’) under the Companies Act, 1956 with the primary object of setting up Technology Park/ Electronics City and applied to the Department of Industries, Government of U.P. for grant of requisite sanction for land use clearance of 200 acres, which was accorded by the Department of Industries, Government of U.P. vide its letter dated 29th July, 1985. Similarly sanction of no objection certificate was also granted by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad by letter dated 11th December, 1985. Similarly sanction of no objection certificate was also granted by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad by letter dated 11th December, 1985. Since the implementation of said project required the acquisition of land of 200 acres, in view of the restrictions imposed on the right of bhumidhars to transfer the land by way of sale or gift under Section 154 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act’) the petitioner company was required to apply for necessary permission to acquire such land, which was also applied and the State Government by letter dated 19th July, 1986 duly granted such permission with certain conditions, which as per the English version supplied by the petitioner company are as follows : “1. That the inspection of the Technology Park Project shall be conducted by a monitoring committee of which the President will be Principal Secretary (Industry), Chief Secretary, Finance Department, the Secretary, Revenue Department and Coordinator Incharge Secretary/Special Secretary, Electronic Industry. The Committee will try to develop the production area first and thereafter the residential area shall be developed. 2. In the Board of Directors of M/s. Technology Park Limited, an officer from U.P. Electronic Corporation will be nominated. 3. This order has been issued with the consent of the revenue department.” Pursuant to the permission granted, as above, the petitioner company from time to time acquired substantial areas of land in Village Tushiyana (Surajpur), Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh with the consent, concurrence and knowledge of the State Government, but the State Government failed to constitute the aforesaid Monitoring Committee and also did not nominate a Director in the Board of Directors of the petitioner company. However, prior to the petitioner company could complete acquisition of entire 200 acres of land, a notice was issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of U.P, Industries Department, Section-5, Lucknow on 21st November, 1988 requiring the petitioner company to show-cause within fifteen days as to why the permission granted to it under the order dated 19th July, 1986 be not withdrawn for not complying with and for alleged violation of the conditions mentioned in the permission order. The petitioner company submitted its reply to the said show-cause notice on 05th December, 1988. The petitioner company submitted its reply to the said show-cause notice on 05th December, 1988. However, the State Government vide its order dated 20th April, 1989 has decided to cancel the permission and directed the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad to cancel the aforesaid permission dated 19th July, 1986 and to do the needful accordingly. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 20th April, 1989 the petitioner company has filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 (Technology Parks Limited v. State of U.P. and others) praying inter alia as follows : “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 20.4.1989 passed by respondent No. 2 (Annexure No. 11 to the petition); (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order dated 20.4.1989; (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the functioning of the petitioner company in any manner; (iv) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; And (v) Award costs of the petition to the petitioner from the contesting respondents.” 5. In such writ petition initially an interim order was granted by this Court on 12th May, 1989 staying effect and operation of the order dated 20th April, 1989 till further orders. Subsequently, in view of the agreement arrived at by the Special Secretary, Government of U.P., Industries Department before the Director General of Investigation and Registration, New Delhi to appoint a Monitoring Committee when no such Monitoring Committee was constituted, this Court on 15th April, 1991 directed the State Government either to act on the aforesaid mutual agreement or to show-cause by filing counter-affidavit why the relief prayed for be not granted. Subsequently, by a notification dated 17th June, 1991 the State Government constituted a Monitoring Committee to inter alia examine the Technology Park project of the petitioner company. The said Monitoring Committee comprised the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industry, the Secretary of Finance Department, the Secretary of the Revenue Department and the Secretary of the Electronic Department. Subsequently, by a notification dated 17th June, 1991 the State Government constituted a Monitoring Committee to inter alia examine the Technology Park project of the petitioner company. The said Monitoring Committee comprised the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industry, the Secretary of Finance Department, the Secretary of the Revenue Department and the Secretary of the Electronic Department. Consequently, as per the interim direction given by this Court on 17th July, 1991, the Monitoring Committee submitted its report, wherein the petitioner company had been allowed to develop the Electronic City/Technology Park in accordance with the decision of the Monitoring Committee. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Monitoring Committee and specially in view of the fact that the petitioner company had been allowed to develop Electronic City/Technology Park, the said Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 was disposed of by this Court on 09th December, 1991 with the direction to the respondents that they will strictly comply with the decision of the Monitoring committee and will permit the petitioner company to develop Electronic City/Technology Park Scheme in accordance with the decision of Monitoring Committee. 6. By this time the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Greater Noida Authority’) was constituted on 28th January, 1991 under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. Since the Greater Noida Authority was not party in the said writ petition, therefore, on or around 29th July, 1991 it filed an application for impleadment and also filed an application for recalling the order dated 09th December, 1991. On the said recall/restoration application this Court by order dated 21st December, 1991 restrained the petitioner company from making any construction on the land in question till 16th January, 1992. Since then the aforesaid writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 9570 of 1989) is pending before this Court. It is relevant to note that in such writ petition on 19th November, 2007 the petitioner company filed an application, being Civil Misc. Since then the aforesaid writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 9570 of 1989) is pending before this Court. It is relevant to note that in such writ petition on 19th November, 2007 the petitioner company filed an application, being Civil Misc. Application No. 275276 of 2006 praying as under : “(i) grant leave to the applicant/petitioner to file instant application, (ii) issue notice to the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and the Additional Collector, District Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, (iii) pass an order recording the compromise deed dated 9.1.92 entered into between the applicant/petitioner and the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, (iv) pass an order disposing of the impleadment applicant filed by the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, if the same is pending, and vacating any and/or all interim orders that may have been passed therein. (v) pass such other and further orders or directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.” 7. To the aforesaid application, the State authorities and the Greater Noida Authority have filed their counter-affidavit, rejoinder to which have also been filed by the petitioner company. In this writ petition, said Sri Ram Chaudhary (the appellant in F.A.F.O. No. 120 of 2008) has filed an intervening application and thereafter also filed an application seeking recall of the order dated 09th April, 2008. 8. As a result of constitution of the Greater Noida Authority, the lands acquired by the petitioner company were sought to be brought within the jurisdiction of the Greater Noida Authority, thereby making it obligatory on the part of the petitioner to apply for and obtain fresh permission and/or sanction from the Greater Noida Authority, which, according to the petitioner company, was in utter breach and disregard of the valuable right already accrued by the petitioner company. That apart, in view of the stance of the Greater Noida Authority several disputes arose between the Greater Noida Authority and the petitioner company and the Greater Noida Authority instituted several proceedings against the petitioner company before different forums. Hence, the petitioner company challenged the validity of the constitution of the Greater Noida Authority by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18627 of 1991. 9. Hence, the petitioner company challenged the validity of the constitution of the Greater Noida Authority by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18627 of 1991. 9. Subsequently, a compromise was entered into between the Chairman, Greater Noida Authority and the Managing Director of the petitioner company on 09th January, 1992, which (as per the English translation supplied by the petitioner company) is as follows : “Deed of Compromise This deed of compromise (out of Court settlement) is signed this ninth day of January, 1992 between Sri Yogendra Narayan, IAS, Chairman, Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, Main Administrative Building, Sector-6, Noida and Sri Shakat Rai Malhotra, Managing Director, Technology Parks Ltd. (PTL). It now witnesseth as under : 1. Both parties have agreed to resolve the disputes by mutual discussion in pursuance of which Sri Shaukat Rai Malhotra has agreed to withdraw : (a) Writ No. 18627-C of 1991 pending in the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad filed by TPL : against Government of U.P. and others challenging their notification dated 28.1.1991 constituting the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority. 2. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority agrees to : (a) withdraw impleadment application dated 29.07.1991 filed in writ petition No. 9570 of 1989 pending in the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. (b) File compromise in O.S. No. 461/91 in the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad and FAFO No. 586 of 1991 pending in the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in terms of this agreement. (c) File compromise in O.S. No. 613/91 pending in the Court of Munsif, Ghaziabad and Misc. Case No. 106/91 pending in the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad. Parties hereby agree to endeavour to resolve further difference if any through mutual discussions whenever and wherever possible. It is further agreed that TPL shall submit his site/building plan for TPL Complex (comprising Industrial, Residential, Institutional and Business Parks) at Surajpur as per Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority’s Building Directions and Regulations within 03 months from the date of its notification in the official Gazette and that the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority shall consider the same and may approve it with or without modification within a reasonable time. The TPL is permitted to continue constructions of : A. Research and Development Centre. B. Self ware Development Centre. C. Central Teel Room. D. Institute of Higher Learning/Corporate Retreat Centre/Mote. E. World Trade Centre. The TPL is permitted to continue constructions of : A. Research and Development Centre. B. Self ware Development Centre. C. Central Teel Room. D. Institute of Higher Learning/Corporate Retreat Centre/Mote. E. World Trade Centre. F. Roads, Overhead Water Tanks, Electricity Supply, Sewerage etc. According to the map furnished by them to the Authority and annexed to this agreement. 1. That TPL shall not commence any other constructions whether Industrial or Residential except the ones mentioned in the preceding para. However, the TPL or its allottees can commence the development and constructions only after their maps and plans have been approved by the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority. 2. The TPL shall pay all the prescribed charges to the Authority within 03 months of its demand. 3. This agreement is without prejudice to other parties to the litigations mentioned in clause I above.” 10. According to the petitioner company, the compromise is entered into recognizing the subsistence of the permission granted to the petitioner company under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The Greater Noida Authority and the Monitoring Committee have all along proceeded on the basis that the aforesaid permission subsists. Lay out plans have been considered by the Greater Noida Authority for an area far in excess of 12.4 acres even as late as in 2005. In terms of the said compromise, the petitioner company abandoned its challenge to the constitution of the Greater Noida Authority in Writ Petition No. 18627 of 1991 and submitted a plan for approval by the said authority. However, the Greater Noida Authority failed to formally withdraw its impleadment application nor did it file the compromise in terms of the aforesaid compromise deed. Although it took no step for the last 17 years to proceed with the aforesaid impleadment application and the recalling application filed by the Greater Noida Authority but ultimately, at the time of hearing a statement was made by the counsel for the Greater Noida Authority that it was no longer pressing its aforesaid recalling application. In further, in terms of the order dated 09th December, 1991 and the compromise dated 09th January, 1992, a Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011 was approved by the Board of Greater Noida Authority on 04th February, 1992 and the said Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011 recognized and included/ incorporated the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner company that in pursuance of the final order dated 09th December, 1991 and compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 the petitioner company held several meetings with the Monitoring Committee in respect of its proposed technology park project and has from time to time submitted layout plans to the Greater Noida Authority in respect of its proposed technology park project. 11. On or about 23rd February, 1992 said Shaukat Rai Malhotra and his co-promoters of the petitioner company transferred their shareholding to one Prabhjot Singh Sabharwal and his family members. 12. According to the petitioner company, the Greater Noida Authority was not anxious to fulfil the obligation under the compromise and was creating obstructions, thereby delaying proposed technology park project of the petitioner company, therefore, the petitioner company had no option but to file Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993 (Technology Park Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority) in September, 1993 praying inter alia for a mandamus directing the Greater Noida Authority to consider/sanction such layout plan/s of the petitioner company. In such writ petition this Court was pleased to pass an interim order on 26th November, 1993 to the effect that the Greater Noida Authority shall pass appropriate order on the plans submitted by the petitioner company within 15 days without prejudice to the claim of the petitioner company in view of the deed of compromise arrived at between the parties dated 09th January, 1992. Consequently, the Greater Noida Authority passed an order dated 10th December, 1993 rejecting the layout plans of the petitioner company and by such order the petitioner company was given liberty to submit fresh layout plans to the Greater Noida Authority for its consideration and approval. This order was assailed by the petitioner company by way of supplementary affidavit in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993, wherein interim orders were passed by this Court, and correspondence exchanged between the petitioner company and the Greater Noida Authority, including inter alia the submission of fresh layout plans by the petitioner company to the Greater Noida Authority and also submission of title deeds by the petitioner company to the Greater Noida Authority in respect of the land owned by it, were brought on record. In its counter-affidavit filed by the Greater Noida Authority in this writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 35589 of 1993) it was stated that it was interested in permitting the petitioner company to set up its proposed technology park project and has also included the same in its said Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011. 13. In this background, when the Greater Noida Authority was not approving/sanctioning the lay out plan submitted by the petitioner company and was further creating obstructions by not permitting the petitioner company to publish advertisement in the national dailies and to open sale of the remaining area and area available after the refund etc., the petitioner company filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39708 of 1994 (M/s. Technology Parks Limited v. State of U.P. and others) for the following reliefs : “(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner to publish advertisement in the national dailies and open sale of the remaining area and the area available after refund etc. and permit the petitioner to hand over the possession of the Industrial/ Residential/ Business plots according to the petitioner’s plan; (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 to approve and sanction the lay out plan submitted by the petitioner; (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the completion of the project by the petitioner according to the lay out submitted to respondent No. 2; (iv) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; and (v) award cost of the petition to the petitioner from the contesting respondents.” 14. The aforesaid writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 39708 of 1994) was dismissed for non-prosecution on 04th April, 1997. From the record it appears that no application for recalling of the said order has been filed. 15. On 08th February, 1995 the Supreme Court attached the properties of M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited as well as the properties and bank accounts standing in the name of relatives of the Directors of aforesaid M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited. From the record it appears that no application for recalling of the said order has been filed. 15. On 08th February, 1995 the Supreme Court attached the properties of M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited as well as the properties and bank accounts standing in the name of relatives of the Directors of aforesaid M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited. Consequently, the land belonging to the petitioner company (whose shareholders, being the said Prabhjot Singh Group, were alleged to be the relatives of the Directors of M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited), in respect whereof the project had been sanctioned, stood attached. Subsequently, the Supreme Court appointed a one-man Commission of Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.K. Bahri, a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court, for the purposes of making enquiries with regard to the allegations and for submitting a report inter alia with regard to the exact area of land owned by the petitioner company. Such Commission submitted its report on 05th September, 2001 on the basis of available records and evidence and came to the conclusion that the petitioner company had indisputable title in respect of 115.46 acres of land. According to the petitioner, in view of the attachments of the properties as well as seizure of all the papers and the documents of the petitioner company, the petitioner company could not produce the documentary evidences before the said Commission with regard to acquisition of entire 200 acres of land acquired by the petitioner company for the said project. 16. Thereafter, the Greater Noida Authority, despite having full notice and knowledge of the facts as stated above, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner unilaterally by an ex parte order dated 17th August, 1996 cancelled the aforesaid compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 on the alleged ground of non-submission of layout plans and/or title deeds. Such order dated 17th August, 1996, as per the English translation supplied by the petitioner company, is as follows : “Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Bharat Bhushan, General Manager. Letter No. Planning/B.P. 10-A/96/2743 Dated 17.8.1996 To, M/s. Technology Park Limited, 50-51 A Regal Building Parliament Street, New Delhi—11001. Such order dated 17th August, 1996, as per the English translation supplied by the petitioner company, is as follows : “Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Bharat Bhushan, General Manager. Letter No. Planning/B.P. 10-A/96/2743 Dated 17.8.1996 To, M/s. Technology Park Limited, 50-51 A Regal Building Parliament Street, New Delhi—11001. Sir, Kindly take reference of letter No. Planning/B.P. 10-A/96/853 dated 25.7.1996 by which you have been requested to submit your layout plan showing all your land having owner certificate showing in Shajra Map, prepared as per Sub Division Regulations of this Authority; otherwise the compromise dated 9.1.1992 between the authority and Technology Park Limited shall be deemed to be cancelled itself. By completing the above formalities you have not submitted all the papers in the section by 16.8.1996. So the M.O.U. Dated 9.1.1992 between the authority and Technology Park Limited has been cancelled itself. Yours’ faithfully, Sd./- (Bharat Bhusan) dated 17.8.1996.” 17. Challenging the said order dated 17th August, 1996 the petitioner company filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002 (M/s. Technology Parks Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and another) before this Court and also sought relief for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to hand over possession of the plots in question to the purchasers subject to de-attaching the property by the Supreme Court. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 17th April, 2003 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order impugned therein dated 17th August, 1996 with the direction upon the respondents to consider the matter afresh giving personal hearing to the petitioner’s representative and to act in accordance with law. The operative portion of such order dated 17th April, 2003 reads as under : “From the facts of the case it appears that the respondents cancelled the compromise on the ground that there were some defects in the lay out plan and title deed without affording the petitioner opportunity of personal hearing. No doubt rules of natural justice are flexible and on a straight jacket formula and personal hearing is not necessary in every case. It depends on the facts of each case whether personal hearing should be given or not. No doubt rules of natural justice are flexible and on a straight jacket formula and personal hearing is not necessary in every case. It depends on the facts of each case whether personal hearing should be given or not. In the present case since the petitioner had invested huge amount and compromise had been entered into between the parties, in our opinion personal hearing should have been given to the petitioner before cancelling the compromise. The respondents cannot act arbitrarily in the matter as arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . In the present case the respondents have acted arbitrarily in the matter as they have not considered the matter carefully and have not given personal hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner has submitted the title deed of the land and the layout plan and it seems to us that in hot haste the compromise has been cancelled by order dated 17.08.96 Annexure-18 to the writ petition. The petition is, therefore, allowed and the order dated 17.08.96 is quashed. The respondents shall now consider the matter afresh giving personal hearing to the petitioner’s representative and act in accordance with law. As regards the delay in filing the writ petition, the same has been adequately explained in para 35 of the writ petition.” 18. According to the petitioner company, in spite of the direction given by this Court on 17th April, 2003 no step was taken by the respondents for the purpose of complying with the said order until September, 2006. 19. According to the petitioner company, on 09th June, 1997 an order was passed by the Assistant Collector, Dadri under Section 122-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act inter alia directing eviction of the petitioner company from the land of Khasra No. 985, comprising an area of 14,200 square meter and imposing damages of Rs.1,42,00,000/-, against which the petitioner company filed a revision application, which was dismissed on 07th July, 2000. Challenging both the aforesaid orders dated 09th June, 1997 and 07th July, 2000 the petitioner company in September, 2000 filed Civil Misc. Challenging both the aforesaid orders dated 09th June, 1997 and 07th July, 2000 the petitioner company in September, 2000 filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46346 of 2000 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar and others), wherein on 24th October, 2000 an interim order was passed by this Court directing stay of the aforesaid both the orders if the same were not already implemented. However, by this time lands belonging to the petitioner company measuring approximately 1,39,973 square meters were attached (Kurki) for realisation of the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,42,00,000. Thereafter, on an application before this Court, the petitioner company paid Rs.1,42,00,000/- without prejudice to its rights and contentions, and by an order dated 04th August, 2006 this Court was pleased to release the land of the petitioner company from attachment. Such writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46346 of 2000 is still pending adjudication/final disposal. 20. However, the petitioner company with the object of establishing the said project had approached the Supreme Court time to time by way of application/s in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 21000 of 1993 (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another) for detachment of the said land so that the petitioner company could take further steps in terms of the aforesaid compromise deed. The Supreme Court passed an order on 10th March, 2005, relevant portion whereof is as under : “Without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, and on the basis of the compromise decree as stood revived by reason of the order of the Allahabad High Court dated 17th April, 2003 in CMWP No. 14294/2002, M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, M/s. Technology Parks Ltd. will submit any plan that it wishes to obtain sanction in terms of the compromise decree to the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority within a period of four weeks. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority will consider the same and give its response thereto within a period of four weeks thereafter. In the event, the response is in the negative, reasons therefor may be given. The copy of the report of the C.V.C. submitted in a sealed cover be made available to the parties. The objections thereto, if any, within a period of four weeks.” 21. In the event, the response is in the negative, reasons therefor may be given. The copy of the report of the C.V.C. submitted in a sealed cover be made available to the parties. The objections thereto, if any, within a period of four weeks.” 21. According to the petitioner company, it was never submitted by the Greater Noida Authority that any Master Plan, which did not permit the project, was under consideration. 22. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions given by the Supreme Court on 10th March, 2005, the petitioner company on 25th April, 2005 submitted a further layout plan to the Greater Noida Authority alongwith all the relevant papers and documents. However, the Grater Noida Authority, according to the petitioner, without affording any opportunity of personal hearing and without granting any opportunity to amend and cure the alleged defects in the said plan, by its order dated 27th May, 2005 rejected the layout plan submitted by the petitioner company on the following grounds : (a) TPL (the petitioner company) had allegedly not submitted the required documents under the GNIDA Building Regulations; (b) TPL was allegedly not the owner of the entire land (4,02,447.76 square meters) in respect of which it had submitted layout plans inasmuch as 1,39,973 square meters of land allegedly stood vested in the State Government after Kurki; (c) The proposed land use in respect of 2,32,474.76 square meters of land as per the layout plans submitted by TPL would be contrary to the permissible land use as per the Master Plan-2001 and 2021; (d) TPL’s land are scattered. 23. According to the petitioner company, it is for the first time that the existence of such an alleged Master Plan was brought to the notice of the petitioner company. Moreover, the Master Plan-2021 is still under consideration and has not been finalised. This order dated 27th May, 2005 has been challenged by the petitioner company by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) although the writ petition has been filed after a considerable delay of 1 year 95 days. This order dated 27th May, 2005 has been challenged by the petitioner company by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) although the writ petition has been filed after a considerable delay of 1 year 95 days. The reliefs sought for in such writ petition originally and by way of amendment are as under : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 27.5.2005 (Annexure No. 10 to the instant writ petition) passed by the Greater New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, the respondent No. 2 herein; (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 through its employees and agents not to take any step under and/or pursuant to the impugned order dated 27.5.2005; (bb) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 to forthwith consider and to approve the layout plans submited by the petitioner on 25.4.2005 by ignoring the alleged Master Plan 2021, the Building Regulations 1992 and the alleged vesting of the land in the State; (c) To issue such other and further writ, order or direction of suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case; and (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 24. In this writ petition also, an intervening application has been filed by said Sri Ram Chaudhary, to which a counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Greater Noida Authority. Apart from that, affidavits have also been exchanged between the parties in this writ petition. 25. Subsequently, the Supreme Court passed an order dated 08th November, 2005 relating to the aforesaid properties of the petitioner company situated in Greater Noida. The relevant portion of the said order of the Supreme Court is as follows : “The subject matter of all these applications is 1156 plots in Greater Noida. Of the 1156 plot holders who had deposited money with the Technology Park Limited (hereinafter/referred to as to ‘TPL’) before the Bahri Commission, 674 plot holders had asked for refund of the amount deposited and 482 plot holders had persisted with their claims for allotment of plots. Of the 1156 plot holders who had deposited money with the Technology Park Limited (hereinafter/referred to as to ‘TPL’) before the Bahri Commission, 674 plot holders had asked for refund of the amount deposited and 482 plot holders had persisted with their claims for allotment of plots. The master lay out plan which had originally been prepared by the TPL in respect of all the plots has not been wholly agreed to by the Greater Noida Authority. The Greater Noida Authority is unrepresented before us today. The TPL has agreed to refund the deposits made by the 674 plot holders before the Bahri Commission and also to execute sale-deeds in respect of the 482 plots to the plot holders subject to the order of attachment passed by this Court and subject to any dispute of the Greater Noida Authority as to the title. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we dispose of all the applications by the following directions : (1) TLP will deposit the entire principal amount of the deposits due to be refunded to the 674 plot holders in the course of the day. It is recorded that an amount of Rs. 5 crores covered by two Bank Drafts dated 4th August, 2005 and 5th November, 2005 for sums of Rs. 2 crores and 3 crores respectively drawn on the Bank of India (Chandigarh Branch) and the HDFC Bank, New Delhi, K.G. Marg Branch, respectively made out in favour of the Registrar General of this Court have been handed over to this Court. (2) Subject to the encashment of the Bank Drafts so deposited and subject to the deposits of al least a further amount by way of interest at the rate of nine and a half percent simple interest per annum on the principal amount calculated separately in respect of each of the 674 plot holders with effect from the date of their last deposit till today, be deposited with the Registrar General of this Court within a period of four weeks from today and subject to the following directions the attachment in respect of 1156 plots by this Court will stand lifted. (3) The amount deposited on account of interest shall for the time being be on the basis of the TPL’s calculation. (3) The amount deposited on account of interest shall for the time being be on the basis of the TPL’s calculation. However, if it is ultimately found by the claim commission that the amount deposited did not cover the principal and interest due to any one of the 674 depositors, that depositor will be entitled to refund of his/her deposit from TPL calculated together with interest thereon from the date of each deposit at the rate of 12%. It is also made clear that if the amount mentioned in direction (2) above as calculated by TPL is not deposited within the period of four weeks, TPL will not be entitled to the benefit of this order. (4) All the amounts deposited by the TPL shall be kept in a short-term fixed deposit in any Nationalised Bank by the Registrar General pending further orders of this Court. (5) As far as the 482 plot holders are concerned, TPL shall make available a proforma draft sale-deed to the Advocate-on-Record for the plot holders of all these 482 plot holders within a period of 4 weeks for the purpose of approval of the sale-deed. This approval shall take place within a period of two weeks thereafter. If it is not approved, liberty granted to the parties to mention. If the draft sale-deed is approved for the Advocate-on-Record for 482 plot holders, the plot holders shall make available the necessary stamp papers as well as the registration charges within a period of two weeks from the date of such approval. The registration of the sale-deeds shall take place within a period of two weeks thereafter. (6) Each sale-deed must contain a clause to the effect that TPL thereby transfers its entire interest in the plot in question subject to the order of the attachment of this Court and subject to the dispute if any of the Greater Noida Authority. (7) In the event any of the 482 plot holders have not made full payment for their plots, TPL shall intimate the Advocate-on-Record and Association for the plot holders, of the amount due and other particulars within a period of two weeks. The plot holders shall make payment of the balance originally agreed to amounts to the advocate-on-record for TPL within a period of four weeks. The plot holders shall make payment of the balance originally agreed to amounts to the advocate-on-record for TPL within a period of four weeks. It is being made clear that in respect of such plot holders, the period for sending of draft sale-deed, approval, furnishing of stamp duty, registration fees and execution of the sale-deed shall be correspondingly extended from the date of payment by the plot holders.” 26. However, in order to obtain detachment of the properties of petitioner company substantial money was required and the then management of the petitioner company, headed by Sabharwals, was not in a position to mobilize such funds, therefore, the management and control of the petitioner company was agreed to be transferred to the persons presently in control and the funds obtained from them were deposited under the orders passed by the Supreme Court. Further, since the Bahri Commission had reported to the Supreme Court that the petitioner company was the undisputed owner of 115.48 acres of land and the implementation of the project required 200 acres of land, therefore, the petitioner company between November, 2005 and March, 2006 acquired 69 acres of land and entered into agreements to acquire 36 acres of land at Village Tushiyana, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh at the expenses of approximately Rs. 22 crores. According to the petitioner company, in this way it became owner of approximately 200 acres of land, which are earmarked for the said project after making huge investment towards purchase of the aforesaid plots and for constructing the infrastructures i.e. sewerage, roads, street lights and a large number of buildings have also been constructed after investment of huge funds. Subsequently, on 05th May, 2006 the Supreme Court released the land of the petitioner company from attachment subject to certain terms and conditions mentioned in such order. 27. In the meantime, a notification dated 10th April, 2006 was issued by the State Government under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring an area of 379.001 hectares land situated in Village Tusiyana, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar for a public purpose, namely, for the planned industrial development in district Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority. In the said notification it was also provided that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable to said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required for the said purpose and it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, therefore, it was directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply. According to the petitioner company, by such acquisition all the plots in question of the petitioner company approximately 200 acres were sought to be acquired for the benefit of none other than the Greater Noida Authority and further by dispensing the applicability of provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioner company was deprived of its valuable rights to file its objections against the proposed acquisition and to bring to the knowledge of the State Government that in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court the petitioner company has to provide plots to 482 persons who have already submitted their deposits with the petitioner company and in respect of which draft sale-deeds have also been submitted by the petitioner company for approval by the Advocate-on-Record appearing on behalf of the said plot holders. In such circumstances, the petitioner company filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. State of U.P. and another), praying inter alia as under : “(A) An order, direction or writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Notification dated 10.4.2006 issued by the State Government under Section 4 of the Act which has been published in the newspaper on 15.4.2006. (B) An order, direction or writ in the nature of Mandamus restraining the Respondent No. 1 from issuing a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the plots held by the petitioner and further to restrain the respondents from interfering in the possession of the petitioner over the aforesaid plots or from carrying out any development work in any manner whatsoever. (C) Such other and further order, direction or writ of suitable nature which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (C) Such other and further order, direction or writ of suitable nature which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (D) An order awarding cost of this petition to the petitioner.” The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 02nd May, 2006. The operative portion of such order is as follows : “Considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances, which have been summarized and referred in brief and also the fact that notification under Section 6 of the Act has not been issued coupled with the circumstance, even taking into consideration de fecto possession, which took some amount of time, we direct the petitioner to approach the State Government itself by filing objection within two weeks from today and if such objection is filed, the State Government shall consider and decide the same within twelve weeks in accordance with law. We further direct that till objection of the petitioner is considered and decided by a reasoned order, no steps shall be taken to dispossess the petitioner from permanent structures standing on the land in question nor any permanent structures, fixtures etc. The respondents shall not interfere with the possession of the land in question (subject matter of the aforesaid notification under Section 4, Land Acquisition Act) (under possession of the petitioner). It is also open for the petitioner to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised.” 28. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 02nd May, 2006, the petitioner company filed its objection before the State Government on 15th May, 2006 and also requested the State Government to give the petitioner company a personal hearing while deciding the objection. Thereafter again the petitioner company by means of a letter dated 13th July, 2006, submitted on 15th July, 2006, written by its Advocate to the State Government requested to grant an opportunity of personal hearing. According to the petitioner company, despite of the aforesaid, no personal hearing in respect of the aforesaid objection was given to the petitioner company. 29. The petitioner company in terms of the orders dated 08th November, 2005 and 05th May, 2006 passed by the Supreme Court, as referred above, deposited a sum approximately of Rs. According to the petitioner company, despite of the aforesaid, no personal hearing in respect of the aforesaid objection was given to the petitioner company. 29. The petitioner company in terms of the orders dated 08th November, 2005 and 05th May, 2006 passed by the Supreme Court, as referred above, deposited a sum approximately of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- (Rupees ten crores only) and was advised that the said lands having become free, the petitioner company was entitled to take steps for establishing and setting up the said project of Technology Park. According to the petitioner company, while it was contemplating to challenge the order dated 27th May, 2005, against which Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) has been filed before this Court, upon an application being filed by some of the plot holders before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court by an order dated 27th June, 2006 directed continuation of the attachment. 30. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner company that the petitioner company was under the management and control of said Prabhjot Singh Sabharwal and his wife Smt. Madhu Singh until 27th June, 2006, subsequent to which date the management and control of the petitioner company has vested with the Board of Directors presently in-charge thereof and the registered office of the petitioner company has also been duly shifted from 50-51 Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi to A-56, IInd Floor, Kailash Colony, New Delhi-110048. It is also contended that prior to the handing over of charge, said Sabharwal group indulged in diverse wrongful acts including attempting to avoid transfer of the concerned shares to the present management of the company. However, the legal proceedings arising out of such disputes were ultimately resolved and/or culminated in terms of the settlement being taken on record by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by order dated 17th October, 2006 in the matter of Endogram Leasing & Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Prabhjot Singh Sabhrwal and others. Pursuant to such order dated 17th October, 2006 of the Calcutta High Court, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prabir Kumar Majumdar (Redt.) and Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Advocate, have been appointed as Joint Receivers over and in respect of the aforesaid land and are in the process of implementation of the order of the Calcutta High Court. Pursuant to such order dated 17th October, 2006 of the Calcutta High Court, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prabir Kumar Majumdar (Redt.) and Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Advocate, have been appointed as Joint Receivers over and in respect of the aforesaid land and are in the process of implementation of the order of the Calcutta High Court. In the meantime, time to time diverse orders have been passed by the Supreme Court with regard to compliance of various terms and conditions imposed for detachment of the said land of the company, but at all material times the said lands have been under the attachment of the Supreme Court particularly on 10th April, 2006 i.e. the date of purported acquisition notice. According to the petitioner company, time to time it deposited an aggregate sum of Rs.15,30,70,702/- in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court in its endeavour to get the release of the said lands and to establish the Technology Park/Electronics City. 31. However, the State Government by order dated 06th November, 2006 rejected the objection/representation of the petitioner company dated 15th May, 2006 filed pursuant to the order of this Court dated 02nd May, 2006 on the following grounds : (a) C.M.W.P. No. 9570 of 1989 is allegedly pending adjudication before this High Court and consequently, TPL’s ownership of its land is allegedly not clear; (b) TPL’s layout plan had allegedly been legally disposed of vide aforesaid order dated 27th May, 2005; (c) The said compromise deed stood cancelled vide aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006; (d) Master Plan-2021 does not permit TPL’s proposed project; (e) Joint site inspection by the State Government [Senior District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar] and the GNIDA and the report based thereon confirms that no development work has been done on the land in question; and (f) TPL’s land is scattered and not contiguous. 32. According to the petitioner company, it has come to know about the order dated 06th November, 2006 only on 17th November, 2006. Hence, questioning the validity of such order dated 06th November, 2006 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition, being Civil Misc. 32. According to the petitioner company, it has come to know about the order dated 06th November, 2006 only on 17th November, 2006. Hence, questioning the validity of such order dated 06th November, 2006 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), before this Court praying inter alia as follows : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 06.11.2006 passed by Principal Secretary, Department of Industries Development, Government of U.P., Lucknow, respondent No. 1 (Annexure No. 22 to the writ petition) and the impugned notification dated 10.4.2006 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh (Annexure No. 14 to the writ petition). (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in furtherance to the said order dated 06.11.2006 and/or under the impugned notification dated 10.4.2006 including issuance of any Notification under section 6 read with Section 16 of or under any other provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended till date. (c) To issue such other and further writ, order or direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 33. In this writ petition also, an intervening application has been filed by said Sri Ram Chaudhary. Apart from that, affidavits have also been exchanged between the parties in this writ petition. 34. According to the petitioner company, neither any opportunity of hearing was ever given either to the petitioner company or its Counsel nor copy of the order dated 06th November, 2006 was issued to it. The petitioner further contended that it has come to learn that the Greater Noida Authority filed several writings as counter pleadings to the objection/representation of the petitioner company and further the representatives of the Greater Noida Authority held several meetings with the State Government official behind the back of the petitioner company, but neither copy of such counter pleadings was ever made available to the petitioner company nor it was given any opportunity to deal with its adversary’s case. 35. 35. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner company that from a perusal of the order dated 06th November, 2006 the petitioner company for the first time came to know that the Greater Noida Authority had passed an order on 11th October, 2006 in purported compliance of the order dated 17th April, 2003 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002 (M/s. Technology Parks Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and another) rejecting the application of the petitioner company, thereby keeping the order dated 17th August, 1996, which was quashed by this Court on 17th April, 2003, unaltered. According to the petitioner company, the order dated 11th October, 2006 was neither served upon the petitioner company nor its Advocates despite participation of its Advocate in the hearing of the said proceedings and the respondents having full notice and knowledge with regard to name and address of the Advocates of the petitioner company. Further, the Greater Noida Authority has held the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 to be unworkable, inoperative, void and incapable of performance by the Greater Noida Authority on the following grounds : (a) The very foundation of the compromise deed was the permission granted to TPL under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The said permission allegedly stood cancelled and thus the very foundation of the compromise deed ceased to exist; (b) The layout plans submitted by TPL to the GNIDA had been rejected for alleged valid and justifiable reasons by the GNIDA vide its order dated 27th May, 2005 : and (c) Permitting any residential activity as proposed by TPL would run contrary to the land use fixed by the Master Plan-2021 which is institutional and recreational green. 36. According to the petitioner company, a hearing was granted to it on 10th October, 2006 and the same was attended by the Advocate of the petitioner company. However, neither the petitioner company nor its Advocate were made aware prior to and/or during the aforesaid hearing that the aforesaid grounds were going to be used against the petitioner company and were accordingly not given an opportunity to deal with the same. In such circumstances, challenging the order dated 11th October, 2006 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition, being Civil Misc. In such circumstances, challenging the order dated 11th October, 2006 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65656 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), before this Court praying inter alia as under : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 11.10.2006 passed by Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Greater North Okhla Industrial Area Development Authority, respondent No. 2 (Annexure No. 24 to the writ petition); (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 through its employees and agents not to take any step under the impugned order dated 11.10.2006 passed by the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Greater North Okhla Industrial Area Development Authority, respondent No. 2 (Annexure No. 24 to the writ petition). (c) To issue such other and further writ, order or direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 37. In this case also, the affidavits have been filed by the parties. Said Sri Ram Chaudhary has also filed an intervention application, to which counter-affidavit has been filed by the Greater Noida Authority. 38. Subsequently, the Additional District Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar issued 43 notices to the petitioner company, out of which 39 are dated 01st November, 2006 and 4 are dated 11th December, 2006, in Suit Nos. 1 to 43 of 2006 (State v. Technology Parks Ltd. and others) filed under Sections 157 Ka, 157 ka ka, 154 (1), 166/167 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, Village Tushiyana, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar purporting to direct the petitioner company to show-cause as to why the purchase by the petitioner company of 69 acres of land should not be held to be void under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 and said land be not vested in the State of the Uttar Pradesh. One of such notice, as per the English translation supplied by the petitioner company, is being reproduced below : “In the Court of Additional District Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddh Nagar. Suit No. 01/2006 Under Sections 157(A), 157(A)(A), 154(1),166, 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act. One of such notice, as per the English translation supplied by the petitioner company, is being reproduced below : “In the Court of Additional District Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddh Nagar. Suit No. 01/2006 Under Sections 157(A), 157(A)(A), 154(1),166, 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act. Village Tusiyana, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Buddha Nagar. State Versus Technology Parks Limited, New Delhi & Shri Chand son of Buddha and others. SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE 1. M/s. Technology Parks Limited, 60-61, Nehru Place, New Delhi. 2. Shri Chand S/o Shri Buddha and Smt. Shanti Devi, W/o Shri Chand, residents of A-22, Sector-22, NOIDA, District Gautam Buddha Nagar. The undersigned has received an order dated 15.7.2006 passed by the Tehsildar, Dadri wherein he has intimated that M/s. Technology Parks Limited, 60-61, Nehru Place, New Delhi, have purchased lands of Khata No. 62 Khasra No. 959 measuring 0.8580 Hect. from Shri Shri Chand son of Shri Buddha and Smt. Shanti Devi wife of Shri Chand, residents of A-22, Sector-22, NOIDA, District Gautam Buddha Nagar. The sale of lands in question is covered under Section 157(A) and 157(A)(A) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act. You already own more than 12.5 acres land and by purchasing the lands in question, you have violated the provisions of Section 154(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act. In this manner sale of the lands in question is contrary to provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act. In view of the lands having been sold in contravention of law, the same are liable to be vested with the State Government. You are, therefore, given this notice asking you to appear in the office of the undersigned on 11.12.2006 at 11.00 AM and show-cause why proceedings be not initiated against you under Sections 154(1), 157(A), 157(A)(A) and 166/67 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition Act and why the lands in question be not vested with the State Government. If no reply is received from your end within the stipulated date, then it would be presumed that you have nothing to say in this regard and thereafter the proceedings in the above matter will be initiated ex parte. Notice is issued today on 01.11.2006 under my signatures and seal of the Court. Sd./- (Ajay Deep Singh) Addl. District Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddha Nagar.” 39. Notice is issued today on 01.11.2006 under my signatures and seal of the Court. Sd./- (Ajay Deep Singh) Addl. District Collector (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddha Nagar.” 39. Questioning the validity of the aforesaid 43 notices the petitioner company has filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another), inter alia on the grounds that admittedly from the records itself it is evident that the petitioner company has a subsisting permission under Section 154(2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, therefore, such notices are ex facie bad in law and on facts, inasmuch as the petitioner’s purchase of 200 acres including the said 69 acres of land has been duly permitted by the State Government. In such writ petition the following reliefs have been sought for : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the Certiorari quashing the impugned notices dated 1.11.2006 and 11.12.2006 issued by the Additional Collector, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Government of U.P., Lucknow, respondent No. 2 (Annexure No. 24 to the writ petition) and all proceedings in purported Suits Nos. 1 to 43 therebefore; (b) To issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in furtherance to the impugned notice and/or in purported Suits Nos. 1 to 43 of 2006 before the respondent No. 2 and/or under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of the 69 acres of land particularly described in the Schedule filed herewith and marked Annexure-11. (c) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 40. In the aforesaid writ petition interim order was granted. Thereafter, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the State authorities, to which rejoinder has also been filed by the petitioner company. Apart from that, an intervening application has been filed by one Shri Ram Chaudhary. 41. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 40. In the aforesaid writ petition interim order was granted. Thereafter, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the State authorities, to which rejoinder has also been filed by the petitioner company. Apart from that, an intervening application has been filed by one Shri Ram Chaudhary. 41. Subsequently, a notification dated 30th November, 2006 has been issued by the State Government under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in continuation of the aforesaid notification of Section 4 of said Act dated 10th April, 2006 for acquiring 373.218 hectares of land situated in Village Tushiyana, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. including the land of the petitioner’s project for the alleged planned industrial development through the Greater Noida Authority. Challenging such notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 30th November, 2006 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68436 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), for the following reliefs : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice dated 30.11.2006 passed by the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, respondent No. 1 (Annexure No. 25 to the writ petition); (b) To issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in furtherance of the said notice dated 30.11.2006. (c) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 42. In this writ petition also, intervention application has been filed by said Sri Ram Chaudhary, to which also counter-affidavit has been filed by the Greater Noida Authority. That apart, affidavits have been filed by the parties. 43. It is pertinent to record hereunder that one Sri Sudhir Chandra Agarwala, a Senior Advocate practising in the Supreme Court, had filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. That apart, affidavits have been filed by the parties. 43. It is pertinent to record hereunder that one Sri Sudhir Chandra Agarwala, a Senior Advocate practising in the Supreme Court, had filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 69534 of 2006 (Sudhir Chandra Agarwala v. State of U.P. and others), challenging the aforesaid notifications dated 10th April, 2006 and 30th November, 2006 issued by the State Government under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act respectively and also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents, their agents, servants or assignees not to interfere with his possession over Plot No. 160 (area 0.7830 hectare) situated in Village Tushiana, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, which is his farm house purchased by him, as the said plot is also subject matter of acquisition. However, this writ petition has been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by a well considered judgement and order dated 29th February, 2008. 44. According to the petitioner company, despite of the order of status quo passed by this Court in C.M.W.P. No. 65654 of 2006 and despite the order staying proceedings pursuant to aforesaid 43 show-cause notices in C.M.W.P. No. 68439 of 2006 being operative till 06th February, 2007, the petitioner company has been served with seven notices dated 16th January, 2007 issued under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act asking the petitioner company to appear before the Court of Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar on 31st January, 2007. Aggrieved by the aforesaid notices, the petitioner company has filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4812 of 2007 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) praying inter alia as under : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing : (1) the impugned notification dated 10.04.2006; (2) the impugned notification dated 30.11.2006; and (3) dated 16th January, 2007 the impugned Section 9 notices. (b) To issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in relation to the petitioner company’s land (details of which are set out in Annexure No. 13 to this writ petition) in furtherance inter alia of : (1) the impugned notification dated 10.04.2006; (2) the impugned notification dated 30.11.2006; and (3) the impugned Section 9 notices. (c) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner company.” 45. In this writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 4812 of 2007), said Shri Ram Chaudhary has also filed an intervening application dated 25th January, 2008, to which a counter-affidavit has been filed by Greater Noida Authority. On the other hand, another intervening application has also been filed on behalf of M/s. TPL Plot & Flat Allottees Association and two others, in respect of which a short counter-affidavit was filed by the Greater Noida Authority and rejoinder was filed by the intervenors. Ultimately, this intervening application of M/s. TPL Plot & Flat Allottees Association and two others was allowed on 02nd September, 2008. Apart from that, counter-affidavits and rejoinders have been filed by the State respondents, Greater Noida Authority and the petitioner company respectively. 46. According to the petitioner company, it has always been under bona fide belief that petitioner’s technology park project would be executed in terms of the aforesaid compromise dated 09th January, 1992 notwithstanding any Master Plan contrary thereto. However, the Greater Noida Authority has wrongfully and illegally inter alia based its aforesaid orders dated 27th May, 2005 and 11th October, 2006 on the alleged ground that the petitioner’s project is in violation of the aforesaid Master Plan 2001 and the aforesaid alleged Master Plan 2021/draft Master Plan 2021 and the compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 has deliberately not been considered. In such circumstances, aggrieved by the Master Plan 2001 and the alleged Master Plan 2021/draft Master Plan 2021 the petitioner company has filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), questioning the validity and legality of the aforesaid Master Plans. Subsequently, an amendment application was filed by the petitioner company, which was allowed. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others), questioning the validity and legality of the aforesaid Master Plans. Subsequently, an amendment application was filed by the petitioner company, which was allowed. The relief with amendment as sought for in this writ petition is as follows : “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing : (1) the Master Plan 2001 for Greater NOIDA formulated by the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority, the respondent No. 2 herein, to the extent the same is inconsistent with the compromise deed dated 9.01.1992 entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2; and (2) quashing the alleged/draft Master Plan 2021 for Greater NOIDA formulated by the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Authority, the respondent No. 2 herein, to the extent the same is inconsistent with the compromise deed dated 9.01.1992 entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. (b) To issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in relation to the petitioner’s land (details of which are set out in Annexure No. 13 to this writ petition) in furtherance inter alia of the aforesaid Master Plan 2001 and/or alleged/draft Master Plan 2021. (c) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting the respondents from finalising and/or approving and/or giving effect to the alleged/draft Master Plan 2021 in any manner inconsistent with the compromise deed dated 9.01.1992 entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. (cc) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting and/or restraining the respondent authorities from applying the alleged/draft Master Plan 2021 in relation to the Technology Park project of the petitioner and/or the land where such project is being set up in any manner whatsoever. (d) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (e) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 47. (d) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (e) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 47. The aforesaid writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 14213 of 2007) was filed with delay of more than 14 years, as reported by the office, on account of which the petitioner company has filed a supplementary affidavit explaining the cause of delay. In this writ petition also an intervening application was filed by said Shri Ram Chaudhary, to which counter-affidavit has been filed by the Greater Noida Authority. The State respondent and the Greater Noida Authority have filed their respective counter-affidavits, to which rejoinders have been filed by the petitioner. Since no counsel was available to receive notices on behalf of the National Capital Region Planning Board and the National Capital Region Planning Committee (the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 respectively in this writ petition), therefore, the petitioner company was directed to serve them by dasti summons, which was duly served upon them and the petitioner company has also filed an affidavit of service to the effect. After service of notice, Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri J.H. Khan, learned Counsel, appeared for the National Capital Region Planning Board and the National Capital Region Planning Committee and filed a counter-affidavit on their behalf. 48. So far as First Appeal From Order No. 120 of 2008 (Sri Ram Chaudhary v. Technology Park Limited and others) is concerned, this appeal arises out of judgement and order dated 30th August, 2007 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), District Gautam Budh Nagar in Original Suit No. 456 of 2007 (Sri Ram Chaudhary v. Technology Park Limited and others) refusing to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 49. The facts giving rise to the this appeal are that Sri Ram Chaudhary, the appellant herein, filed a suit, being Original Suit No. 456 of 2007, against the defendants-respondents (Technology Park Limited and two others) for specific performance of agreement directing the defendants-respondents to execute sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant with regard to Plot No. 74, Block-D, Residential Park, measuring 239.20 square yards, “India’s First Hi-Tech. Enterprises Zone /Electronic City/Park City Project” situated in Village Tushyana, Block Bisarakh, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (present district Gautam Budh Nagar), or in the event of failure on the part of the defendants-respondents, the sale-deed be got executed through the Court, and for permanent injunction against the defendants-respondents not to execute sale-deed in respect of the said land in favour of any other person and also not to deliver the possession of the said land to anyone else expect the plaintiff-appellant. 50. The case of Sri Ram Chaudhary (the plaintiff) before the Court below was that the defendant No. 1 (Technology Park Limited) executed an agreement to sell in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 (Rajiv Jain and Smt. Chand Jain respectively) on 20th January, 1989 with regard to the land mentioned above @ Rs.400/- per square yard and 40% of the entire sale consideration was given at the time of agreement, whereas, rest 60% was agreed to be paid in three years in 36 equal instalments, which the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 paid accordingly. As per the agreement, sale-deed was to be executed within a stipulated period after demarcating the plot in dispute finally on the spot and after fulfilling the requirements as per the norms. It appears that under some orders of the Supreme Court the said property was attached, which was subsequently released, therefore, there was no embargo on the part of the defendant No. 1 in executing sale-deed in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Subsequently, an agreement to sell was entered between the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and the plaintiff-appellant on 07th February, 2006, whereby the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 transferred the entire obligation and liabilities with regard to the land in dispute for a consideration of Rs. 5,26,240/-, which they communicated to the defendant No. 1 by letter dated 16th February, 2006 and thereby the plaintiff requested the defendant No. 1 to execute sale-deed in respect of the land in question in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff on several occasions approached the defendant No. 1 followed by notice, but the defendant No. 1 is not executing the sale-deed despite being under legal obligation for the same. Thereafter, the plaintiff on several occasions approached the defendant No. 1 followed by notice, but the defendant No. 1 is not executing the sale-deed despite being under legal obligation for the same. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for the reliefs mentioned as above and also filed an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C., to which the defendant No. 1 also filed its detailed counter-affidavit. 51. On 10th July, 2007 the Court below refused to grant an expate injunction and issued notice to the defendants directing them to appear on 30th July, 2007. Against the aforesaid order dated 10th July, 2007 the appellant filed an appeal, being First Appeal From Order No. 951 of 2007, with stay application, wherein defendant No. 1 also filed an application alongwith affidavit. F.A.F.O. No. 951 of 2007 was disposed of by this Court on 31st July, 2007 directing the parties to file their affidavits in connection with the injunction application and the Court below was also directed to hear the said matter on 10th August, 2007. Consequently, the Court below proceeded with the injunction application and dismissed the same vide order dated 30th August, 2007, against which order the present appeal was filed with an application for condonation of delay as well as stay application. On 08th January, 2008 the delay in filing the appeal was condoned. It appears against the order dated 08th January, 2008 the defendant/respondent No. 1 filed Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7154 of 2008 (Technology Park Ltd. v. Sri Ram Chaudhary), wherein the appellant/plaintiff also filed I.A. No. 3 of 2008. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition vide order dated 30th June, 2008, as quoted above, with a request to the High Court Allahabad to dispose of the appeal alongwith certain writ petitions pending before it. 52. To the stay application filed in the said appeal, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner company. 53. Apart from aforesaid proceedings arising out of suit and filing of intervention application in several writ petitions, said Sri Ram Chaudhary has also filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. 52. To the stay application filed in the said appeal, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner company. 53. Apart from aforesaid proceedings arising out of suit and filing of intervention application in several writ petitions, said Sri Ram Chaudhary has also filed a writ petition before this Court, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20756 of 2008 (Sri Ram Chaudhary v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) for the following reliefs : “(a) To grant leave to the petitioner to file this writ petition in a representative capacity on behalf of all persons interested in the subject matter of this writ petition. (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing : (1) the impugned notification dated 10.04.2006; (2) the impugned notification dated 30.11.2006; and (3) the impugned notice/s purportedly issued by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Greater Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (c) To issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents through their employees and agents not to take any step in relation to your petitioner’s land in furtherance of, inter alia, : (1) the impugned notification dated 10.04.2006; (2) the impugned notification dated 30.11.2006; and (3) the impugned notice/s purportedly issued by the Additional District Magistrate (land Acquisition), Greater Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (d) To issue such other and further writ, order of direction in suitable nature, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (e) To award the cost of this writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 54. In such writ petition, it has been stated by Sri Ram Chaudhary that he has come to know about the aforesaid notifications dated 10th April, 2006 and 30th November, 2006 issued under Sections 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act respectively as well as of the notice under Section 9 of the said Act only when the petitioner company filed pleadings in the aforesaid proceedings, subsequent whereto he has also come to learn that petitioner company has been taking steps to challenge the said land acquisition proceedings and his interest was being taken care of by the respondent No. 4 (the petitioner company). He also stated that upon legal advice he has filed intervention applications in the eight writ petitions filed by the petitioner company which were allowed. Subsequently, a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 09th April, 2008 directed the aforesaid eight writ petitions to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for nomination of appropriate Bench to adjudicate upon the same. It is stated by Sri Ram Chaudhary that he is taking steps to file an application for recalling the said order dated 09th April, 2008. He further stated that upon enquiry having been made with the petitioner company, he has come to learn that the State authorities as well as the Greater Noida Authority have taken a stance in the aforesaid proceedings pending before this Court in respect of the said land acquisition proceedings that the petitioner company does not have the locus standi to challenge the aforesaid land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land to be allotted to various plot holders with whom the petitioner company had entered into agreements of sale. It is only thereafter that he (Sri Ram Chaudhary) has been advised to file this writ petition (C.M.W.P. No. 20756 of 2008) before this Court for the relief as quoted above. 55. Apart from aforesaid, M/s. TPL Plot & Flat Allottees Association and two other allottees of different plots have also filed a writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44625 of 2008 (M/s. TPL Plot and Flat Allottees Association and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others) challenging the acquisition proceedings saying that since they are allottees of respective plots/flats and by virtue of the order of the Supreme Court dated 14th July, 2008, whereby the possession was directed to be delivered to the allottees without prejudice to the land acquisition proceedings, they have been advised to file a separate writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings having perfected their right over the plot of land, for which sale-deed stands executed by the petitioner company. However, the relief as sought for in this writ petition is as follows : “(i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 10.4.2006 (Annexure-13 to the instant writ petition) and the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 30.11.2006 (Annexure-15 to the instant writ petition). (ii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from taking possession of the land in dispute pursuant to the impugned land acquisition proceedings and permit the petitioners to enjoy the same without any hindrance. (iii) to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. (iv) to award the costs of this petition to the petitioners.” 56. In this writ petition, affidavits have been filed by the State authorities, Greater Noida Authority and the petitioners to this writ petition. 57. On the basis of the facts and circumstances, as above, few points have been formulated by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner company in the wake of the arguments to be advanced by him. First of such point is with regard to violation of principle of natural justice. 58. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company, has contended that by letters dated 15th May, 2006, by which the petitioner company filed its representation before the State Government, and 13th July, 2006 written on behalf of the petitioner company the State Government was specifically requested to grant a hearing to the petitioner company. However, the State Government not only denied the petitioner company a personal hearing but it heard the Greater Noida Authority ex parte and passed the said order on the basis of statements made and documents filed by the Greater Noida Authority, to which the petitioner company never had the opportunity to deal with. The petitioner company was not a party to nor was it given any notice of the joint site inspection allegedly conducted by the State Government through the Senior District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar and the Greater Noida Authority. Moreover, the petitioner company has also not been given a copy of the site inspection report referred to in the order. He further submitted that the petitioner company was also not aware of the grounds which would be relied upon by the State Government in its said order and consequently, the petitioner company did not have any opportunity to deal with the same including bringing on record relevant records and submissions. He further submitted that the petitioner company was also not aware of the grounds which would be relied upon by the State Government in its said order and consequently, the petitioner company did not have any opportunity to deal with the same including bringing on record relevant records and submissions. It is said that the aforesaid actions of the State Government are in violation of the principles of natural justice of the highest degree, rendering the said order vitiated, null and void. The alleged joint inspection of site by the appropriate authority confirms that no development work has been done on the land in question. According to the petitioner company, firstly, no copy of the inspection report of the alleged site inspection has been given to the petitioner company. The petitioner company has not only undertaken substantial development work on its land but has spent about Rs. 15,00,00,000/- in carrying out the aforesaid work. It has also spent more than Rs.25,00,00,000/- in purchasing the aforesaid land and has deposited approximately Rs.15,30,70,702/- with the Claims Commissioner appointed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 21000 of 1993 (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another). In one of the counter-affidavits filed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993, the Greater Noida Authority already recorded that the petitioner company has carried out development work on its land. It has further been recorded in the order dated 17th April, 2003 passed by this Court that the petitioner company has invested a huge amount in respect of its proposed technology park project. 59. It is further stated on behalf of the petitioner company that the respondent authorities alleged that the lands of the technology park are scattered and not contiguous. According to the petitioner company, it was not a condition of permission granted under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act that the land will have to be contiguous. In any event, a very small portion of land can be treated to be scattered and the same will not hamper setting up of the project. In fact, the layout plan submitted by the petitioner company did take this fact into account. In further, the petitioner company has purchased 69 acres of land subsequent to the order dated 27th May, 2005 in order to make the land contiguous. In fact, the layout plan submitted by the petitioner company did take this fact into account. In further, the petitioner company has purchased 69 acres of land subsequent to the order dated 27th May, 2005 in order to make the land contiguous. Without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the submissions made by the petitioner company, it has been submitted by the petitioner company that if this Court deems it fit and proper that the construction can be made only on a contiguous land, the same will be carried out by it. 60. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner company has jotted down various points and raised before us, which are as follows : 1. (a) Whether the permission dated 19th July, 1986 under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 still subsists or has been cancelled/revoked lawfully? (b) If the permission subsists, whether 43 show-cause notices, being subject matter of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006, are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed? 2. (a) Whether the Master Plan-2021 is valid, effective and enforceable in law? (b) In any event, whether the Greater Noida Authority is obliged to recognise proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in such Master Plan? 3. Whether rejection of layout plan by order dated 27th May, 2005 is bad in law and is liable to be quashed? 4. Whether the order dated 11th October, 2006 holding that the compromise dated 09th January, 1992 has become unworkable, inoperative, void and incapable of performance, is bad in law and liable to be quashed? 5. (a) Whether the order dated 06th November, 2006 is bad in law and liable to be quashed? (b) If so, whether the land of the petitioner company stand outside the purview of the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? Point No. 1 : 61. So far as Point No. 1 is concerned, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that the State Government is contending that Civil Misc. Point No. 1 : 61. So far as Point No. 1 is concerned, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that the State Government is contending that Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 is pending adjudication before this Court inasmuch as the Greater Noida Authority had filed an application for recalling the aforesaid final order dated 09th December, 1991 and the same has allegedly not been disposed of and only an interim order dated 21st December, 1991 was passed on the same inter alia restraining the petitioner company from making any construction on its land till 16th January, 1992. It is pertinent to note that this interim order was never extended and the State Government has not challenged the aforesaid final order dated 09th December, 1991. It is further submitted by the petitioner company that the Greater Noida Authority as well as the State of Uttar Pradesh till recently have never taken the stand that the order dated 20th April, 1989, impugned in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989, has not been set aside by this Court and such writ petition (W.P. No. 9570 of 1989) is pending before this Court, as a result of which the petitioner company cannot be said to be the owner of the land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. Neither the Greater Noida Authority nor the State of U.P. have ever disputed the title of the petitioner company over its land till recently, as is evident from the records of this case, and have always acted on the basis that the permission dated 19th July, 1986 granted to the petitioner company under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act to purchase 200 acres of land is valid and subsisting. Such was the position even as late as on 27th May, 2005 when the Greater Noida Authority rejected the layout plans submitted by the petitioner company. The office memorandum of the Government of the Uttar Pradesh dated 17th June, 1991, in recognition of the permission dated 19th July, 1986, constituted the Monitoring Committee. It is submitted that in fact, the order dated 17th April, 2003 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002, wherein the Greater Noida Authority was the respondent No. 1, inter alia records its undisputed finding “... It is submitted that in fact, the order dated 17th April, 2003 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002, wherein the Greater Noida Authority was the respondent No. 1, inter alia records its undisputed finding “... Hence, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 in this Court against the order dated 20.04.1989 which was disposed of by the judgement dated 09.12.1991 (Annexure No. 21). In that decision it was observed that since the petitioner has been allowed to develop the Electronic City/Technology Part, the respondents would strictly comply with the decision that had been given by the Monitoring Committee and would permit the petitioner to develop the Electronic City in accordance with that decision. Consequent to the said order, a compromise deed was executed (Annexure-13).” He further said that the aforesaid stance of the Greater Noida Authority and the State of U.P. is believed in the report of Bahri Commission filed before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 21000 of 1993. In fact, finding of the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bahri (Retd.) that the petitioner company is owner of approximately 115.48 acres of land is based on the representations of the State of U.P. The stance of the Greater Noida Authority and the State of U.P. is further believed by the fact that in a separate proceeding under the said Act, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh attached (Kurki) 1,39,973 square meters of land of the petitioner company. Attachment of such land by the State Government pre-supposes the ownership of the petitioner company thereof and is accordingly an admission on the part of the State Government. The petitioner company has also received notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of more than 12.5 acres of land, thereby implying that the petitioner company has a valid and subsisting permission under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act to hold more than 12.5 acres of land. Thus, the aforesaid stance of the State Government and the Greater Noida Authority is clearly writ with mala fides and has been adopted for the sole purpose and objective of preventing the petitioner company for completing its technology park project. Thus, the aforesaid stance of the State Government and the Greater Noida Authority is clearly writ with mala fides and has been adopted for the sole purpose and objective of preventing the petitioner company for completing its technology park project. The State Government including the Monitoring Committee and the Greater Noida Authority have all along proceeded on the basis that the petitioner company has a valid and subsisting permission under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act to hold more than 12.5 acres of land and particularly to purchase and hold upto 200 acres of land for the purposes of its proposed technology park project. In recognition and in furtherance of the permission, the Greater Noida Authority and the petitioner company entered into the aforesaid compromise deed. 62. Mr. Shashi Nandan further submitted that the Greater Noida Authority was under an obligation to withdraw its aforesaid impleadment application and is estopped from contending that the same is pending. Such a stance of the Greater Noida Authority is clearly an afterthought for the sole purpose of thwarting the petitioner company’s proposed technology park project. In view of the conduct of Greater Noida Authority, the petitioner company also bona fidely believed that the Greater Noida Authority had abandoned its aforesaid impleadment and recalling applications. The petitioner company has at all times performed its obligation under the said compromise deed and the same has not been disputed by the Greater Noida Authority. 63. He also said that the aforesaid order dated 09th December, 1991 is a final order, which disposed of the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989. The aforesaid order dated 12th May, 1989, whereby this Court directed stay of operation of the order dated 20th April, 1989 till further order orders has not been set aside or modified. The orders dated 20th April, 1989 and 09th December, 1991 cannot coexist or stand together. The first order cancels the permission dated 19th July, 1986 and the second order virtually directs implementation of the aforesaid permission granted to the petitioner company under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The order passed by this Court on 09th December, 1991 must hold the field. 64. The first order cancels the permission dated 19th July, 1986 and the second order virtually directs implementation of the aforesaid permission granted to the petitioner company under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The order passed by this Court on 09th December, 1991 must hold the field. 64. Without prejudice to the foregoing submissions, the petitioner company submitted that the order dated 20th April, 1989 was passed ex parte without giving petitioner company a hearing, and consequently a nullity and void ab initio since the same was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submitted that an order passed ex parte in breach of the principles of natural justice is a nullity. 65. Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that in view of the foregoing submission, the permission dated 19th July, 1986 under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is subsisting and has not been lawfully cancelled/revoked; Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 is not pending adjudication before this Court and consequently, the ownership of the petitioner company of its land is clear and indisputable; in any event in view of the statement made by the learned Counsel appearing for the Greater Noida Authority during the hearing of the matter that it was no longer pressing its application for recalling the order dated 09th December, 1991, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989 cannot be said to be pending. 66. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, he further submitted that 43 show-cause notices, being subject matter of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006, should be quashed since the same are based on erroneous premise that the permission granted to the petitioner company under Section 154 does not subsist. 67. In rebuttal to the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company with regard to Point No. 1, Mr. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Greater Noida Authority, contended that since the order was not quashed, therefore, no such benefit can be claimed by the petitioner company and since the permission stands cancelled, therefore, the petitioner company has no right. 68. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Greater Noida Authority, contended that since the order was not quashed, therefore, no such benefit can be claimed by the petitioner company and since the permission stands cancelled, therefore, the petitioner company has no right. 68. One of the major issues, which have been canvassed before the Court by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, centers round the objection taken by the State Government and the NOIDA authorities that the permission in favour of the petitioner company to acquire the land under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act stood cancelled vide order dated 20th April, 1989 and, therefore, the petitioner company had no land bank available in law for development. It was further submitted on behalf of the State Government that the acquisition proceedings that were undertaken are separate proceedings altogether and in the event the petitioner company does not have the legal authority to proceed to develop the land, the allegation against the State in respect of the acquisition proceedings on the legal issues involved including mala fides becomes totally non-existent. On the other hand, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company contends, that had there been no land presumed to be in the possession of the petitioner company, there was no occasion for proceeding to acquire the same and as such it should be presumed that the impact of the cancellation order dated 20th April, 1989 stood automatically diluted in view of the conduct of the State Government itself. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that once the permission has been granted then the consequences thereof permit the petitioner company to retain the land as a Bhumidhar defined under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and once such rights have been conferred, they cannot be divested through an administrative order of cancellation, that too even on non-existent grounds. It is submitted that there was no fault on the part of the petitioners and it was the State Government that delayed the constitution of the Monitoring Committee, which came to be convened only after a judicial intervention in Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989. It is the State Government which had to nominate its Director and, therefore, even the second condition was to be fulfilled by the State Government. It is the State Government which had to nominate its Director and, therefore, even the second condition was to be fulfilled by the State Government. Hence, in absence of any fault on the part of the petitioner company, there was no occasion or any material available so as to warrant cancellation. A full reply had been given to the State Government to the show-cause notice issued in this regard with a request for oral hearing but the State Government without considering the reply of the petitioner company and without applying its mind to the specific objections taken, proceeded to cancel the permission on mere undiagnosed conclusions without any reasons in support thereof. 69. Learned Counsel further submits that divesting the petitioner company of its rights as Bhumidhar could have been undertaken only under the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, which was not done in accordance therewith and for which there was no plausible reason. The status of a Bhumidhar is defined under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and a Bhumidhar cannot be deprived of his land tenure and holdings except otherwise than in accordance with the provisions given therein. The District Magistrate could have taken any action pursuant to the order of the State Government and, therefore, they deployed the method of malafidely resorting to acquisition proceedings and depriving the petitioner of their valuable rights for no plausible cause or public purpose. In essence, the argument is that no ingredient was available in law so as to cancel the said permission nor even otherwise there is any such power vested in the State Government to cancel the permission. The contention appears to be that once the permission had been granted and the petitioner company became Bhumidhar of certain land by purchase pursuant thereto, the State Government became functus officio and could not have cancelled the said permission. 70. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, a reference to sub-section (2) of Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act would be apt at this juncture, which is as under : “154. 70. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, a reference to sub-section (2) of Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act would be apt at this juncture, which is as under : “154. (2) Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the land tenures for the time being in force, the State Government may, by general or special order, authorise transfer in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that such transfer is in favour of a registered co-operative society or an institution established for a charitable purpose, which does not have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the interest of general public. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression ‘family’ shall mean the transferee, his or her wife or husband (as the case may be) and the minor children and where the transferee is a minor also his or her parents.” 71. The said provision carves out an exception for transfer of land by a Bhumidhar in order to provide the land in excess of 12.5 acres to a person which is otherwise prohibited under sub-section (1) of Section 154. There is a prohibition on transfer of land and in order to waive such prohibition, the State Government has been authorized under the said law to grant permission for transfer of land in excess of 12.5 acres. The nature of the power so conferred under Section 154 is such that it enables a person to acquire Bhumidhari rights in excess of 12.5 acres. The power, which has to be exercised, is either in favour of a charitable institution or a registered co-operative society and the third category is that such transfer is in the interest of general public. 72. In the instant case, the transfer is neither for a co-operative society nor is it for a charitable purpose but is in the interest of general public for setting up of an electronic park. The purpose, therefore, is the development of a Government approved project and the land clearance for acquiring the land is for the said purpose. Permission was granted and the acquisition proceeded by the petitioner company through various sale-deeds. The transfer of land to the extent of the area purchased was therefore made complete. The purpose, therefore, is the development of a Government approved project and the land clearance for acquiring the land is for the said purpose. Permission was granted and the acquisition proceeded by the petitioner company through various sale-deeds. The transfer of land to the extent of the area purchased was therefore made complete. The allegation of the State Government is that the purpose, for which the land had been transferred, was not being fulfilled as per the conditions of the sanction letter and, therefore, it was being cancelled. It is evident from the nature of litigation that certain settlement of residential plots appear to have been undertaken by the petitioner company which, according to the respondents, could not have been done without the guidance of the Monitoring Committee and the production phase of the park has to be developed first, which has not yet been substantially established. There is a development which has taken place in between, namely, that the properties of M/s. Technology Park Limited came to be transferred to M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited and all the properties of M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited came to be attached under the orders of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court after hearing the matters passed interim directions for registration of plots in favour of such claimants, who had allegedly negotiated then with M/s. Technology Park Limited and were claiming rights. It is not disputed that these plots have been registered subject to the directions contained in the orders of the Supreme Court and further subject to the out come of the land acquisition proceedings. Thus, the property, which was acquired after permission under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, has changed hands through judicial intervention. The State of U.P. and the NOIDA authorities were represented before the Apex Court when such directions were issued for registering the said plots in favour of the claimants. The sale-deeds have been consequently executed. In such a situation where judicial interventions have taken place in relation to setting up of the park as also the settlement of residential plots, the matter will have to be examined and dealt with after taking notice of the same and said facts cannot be ignored. 73. The sale-deeds have been consequently executed. In such a situation where judicial interventions have taken place in relation to setting up of the park as also the settlement of residential plots, the matter will have to be examined and dealt with after taking notice of the same and said facts cannot be ignored. 73. In order to assess the impact of the aforesaid transaction once again reference has to be had to the order dated 09th December, 1991, which has become final between the State Government and the petitioner company and the NOIDA authorities, who had filed a recall application, have also submitted to the same as they have not pressed the recall application filed by them. It is true that NOIDA was not a formal party to the said writ petition and, therefore, realizing the impact of the said order they moved a recall application, which has been dismissed as not pressed by them. It is, therefore, clear that the NOIDA authorities have not put any challenge to the order of this Court dated 09th December, 1991 nor have they carried the matter any further. 74. Even otherwise the NOIDA authorities would be bound by the action of the State Government, inasmuch as they do not have any independent right to contest the grant of permission or its cancellation under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. It is true that the order of the State Government dated 20th April, 1989 has not been quashed by this Court but what has been provided in the order dated 09th December, 1991 has definitely diluted the impact of the cancellation. The District Magistrate or any revenue authority could not have proceeded to take possession so long as the said cancellation was not treated to be final. The counter-affidavit, which had been filed in Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989, also indicated that a consequential action by the District Magistrate was yet to be taken. In such a situation the State authorities were bound by the directions issued by this Court to proceed under the directions of the Monitoring Committee. There is nothing to indicate that the Monitoring Committee made any further recommendation for cancellation of the permission. In such a situation the State authorities were bound by the directions issued by this Court to proceed under the directions of the Monitoring Committee. There is nothing to indicate that the Monitoring Committee made any further recommendation for cancellation of the permission. On the contrary, there were differences with regard to the modalities of implementation and no overt or covert action was taken for a long time to dislodge the petitioner company from its land. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government itself did not choose to dislodge the petitioner company and the cancellation order instead of being implemented was shelved, as a result whereof the petitioner company could have proceeded to develop the land keeping in view the directions contained in the judgement dated 09th December, 1991. The development, therefore, could have been undertaken by the petitioner company and the order of cancellation would not be an impediment in such implementation in view of the order dated 09th December, 1991. 75. Apart from this, as noticed above, the land was subsequently transferred under the orders of the Apex Court. It has to be presumed that all such facts between the contesting parties, who were represented before the Apex Court, were discussed and the parties were well aware about the impact of the directions issued by this Court on 09th December, 1991. 76. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid transactions, as are already on record, would indicate that after the order dated 09th December, 1991 there was a settled expectation in favour of the petitioner company. It was not a mere hope but it was founded on an agreement coupled with a judicial intervention to proceed to implement the project. The petitioner company had purchased the land through registered sale-deeds and had acquired rights as a tenure-holder defined under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. This transfer was given effect to in the interest of general public for an industrial development. To begin with there was no objection to the acquisition of land by the petitioner company. The petitioner company had purchased the land through registered sale-deeds and had acquired rights as a tenure-holder defined under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. This transfer was given effect to in the interest of general public for an industrial development. To begin with there was no objection to the acquisition of land by the petitioner company. Later on the State Government has taken a stand that the petitioner company has violated the condition of implementation of the project by proceeding to advertise the land for registration of plots for residential purposes which conversed to the programme chalked out, namely, the production area had to be developed first before any plots to be allotted for residential purposes. The thrust of the State Government is that the primary objective, for which the project was sanctioned, was for setting up a technology park and not to develop a residential area. The residential plots were to be developed as a necessity to the main development work of setting up of the technology park. It was, therefore, the stand of the State Government that the petitioner company had violated the condition by reversing the process and thereby altering the purpose of the project. 77. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the purpose was really altered so as to enable the State Government to initiate action for cancellation. In our opinion, the said action, which was proposed, was on the basis of the initial steps taken by the petitioner company. Later on the intervention of this Court brought about implementation of the agreement between the parties by making the Monitoring Committee operational. It is with this intention that the order was passed on 09th December, 1991, which has become final between the parties. The question as to whether the purpose has been defeated or not, was yet to be determined and processed thereafter, inasmuch as in the event the Monitoring Committee could have succeeded in the implementation of the project, then there was no occasion to have allowed the cancellation of the permission as the purpose of setting up of the technology park would be fulfilled. The aforesaid stage of a total failure on the part of the petitioner company to implement the project had, therefore, not yet arrived and the State Government as well as the petitioner company were still on the negotiating table. The aforesaid stage of a total failure on the part of the petitioner company to implement the project had, therefore, not yet arrived and the State Government as well as the petitioner company were still on the negotiating table. This Court, therefore, under its order dated 09th December, 1991 did not approve the cancellation order and, on the other hand, without quashing the same issued directions for the matter to be further negotiated under the directions of the Monitoring Committee. The cancellation, therefore, was virtually put in abeyance in the expectation of implementation of the project. There was, therefore, a positive approach for the implementation of the project under the order dated 09th December, 1991. 78. The petitioner company had invested a substantial amount in purchase of land and had, therefore, acquired rights of land tenures to a considerable extent. The question would be can such acquisition be divested except otherwise than in accordance with law keeping in view the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 79. In order to assess the aforesaid issue, it will have to be further traversed as to whether the authority which had granted the permission had the power to undo it and as to whether in fact there was material available for the State Government to exercise such power. The action of the State Government as also the conduct of the petitioner company have to be adjudicated on the principles of administrative law applicable to administrative action. In a given case, the State Government after granting permission for public purpose or in the interest of general public, as indicated under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, can control any future action in the event it is found that the land use is being changed for another purpose, which may not be in the interest of general public. For example, the Government exercises its power under the aforesaid provision to provide the land for setting up an industry and an industry is actually set up and operationalised. After running for a few years the industry is dismantled and the land is sought to be settled for a purpose which is divorced to the initial purpose, for which it was permitted to be acquired. After running for a few years the industry is dismantled and the land is sought to be settled for a purpose which is divorced to the initial purpose, for which it was permitted to be acquired. In such a situation, if the act is deliberate and intended with a view to earn profits, then the purpose would cease to be in the interest of general public and the very foundation of the permission would be taken away. On the other hand, there can be a situation where the purpose, for which the permission was granted, is frustrated on account of inaction on the part of the State authorities, then in such an event if the land has to be put to some other use, the same cannot be said to be an intentional or deliberate diversion of purpose. Accordingly, the permission may have to be reviewed in both the situations. This is necessary, inasmuch as the statute will have to be interpreted for the purpose for which it was framed by the Legislature. The statute clearly prescribes that the permission has to be granted in the interest of general public and not for private interest. Literal as well as the purposive interpretation of the aforesaid provision, therefore, would be that permission granted would be to acquire and use the land for the purpose for which it was granted. In the event the purpose is sought to be reviewed for any reason, whether it is deliberate on the part of the grantee or the purpose cannot be fulfilled, then in that event the grantor also has the power to review the earlier position of the permission. In our opinion, the State Government, therefore, does have the power to review the change of use or the change of purpose, for which the permission to acquire the land was granted, and such an authority can be implicitly found under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act itself on the principle that every authority which has power to do a thing, can also undo the same. Administrative actions are not exceptions to this in cases of fraud or misrepresentation as well. However, in the instant case the provisions of Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act empower the State Government to exercise the said power in appropriate cases in the given circumstances of a particular case. Administrative actions are not exceptions to this in cases of fraud or misrepresentation as well. However, in the instant case the provisions of Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act empower the State Government to exercise the said power in appropriate cases in the given circumstances of a particular case. Whether the power was correctly exercised or not, would depend upon the facts of each case and the aforesaid principle cannot be applied generally but in the appropriate cases where the occasion so arises. 80. The other aspect of the matter is that once such acquisition has been made, can such property be divested upon withdrawal of permission. This balance will have to be struck keeping in view the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. There is no provision under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act for cancellation of such permission under Section 154 and the consequences that may follow. In our opinion, where cancellation or withdrawal of permission is not on account of any fault on the part of the grantee, then in such an event the principles of Article 300-A of the Constitution would come into play as the property has been acquired after making payment of consideration and substantial investment. This investment has to be compensated if the grantee cannot for the reasons beyond his control proceed to utilize the fruits of the permission. 81. The provision for declaring an acquisition beyond 12.5 acres to be void is subject to such permission under Section 154. The confiscatory clause would, therefore, become operative only if the acquisition is without permission. There is no provision under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, which may permit confiscation after cancellation or withdrawal of permission as in the present case. However, the impact of such withdrawal would be that the grantee cannot hold the tenure beyond the limit of 12.5 acres. The transactions beyond 12.5 acres would, therefore, fall within the realm of review in such matters. In our opinion, if the grantee is being deprived of the permission, then he cannot be deprived of the investment which has been made pursuant to such permission, provided there is no established default on the part of the grantee. The reason for this is that an expropriatory power can be exercised if it is specifically provided for and not by mere inference. The reason for this is that an expropriatory power can be exercised if it is specifically provided for and not by mere inference. The legislation to confiscate property must exist and only then such confiscation can occur. A statute where such consequences ensue have to be strictly construed under the rules of interpretation. 82. If there is no permission under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and the land is acquired beyond the limit prescribed therein, then the confiscation in favour of the State is automatic. However, if the permission had been granted and there are circumstances indicating diversion of purpose or review of such purpose by the grantor, then in such an event the question of grant of compensation would, in our opinion, arise. The compensation, therefore, has to be in accordance with law as no person can be deprived of his property save by the authority of law as enshrined under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 83. A person, therefore, in our opinion, who is granted permission does not loose his rights to get compensation even if the permission is withdrawn, which may be a result of a fall out from the agreement between the parties to set up a particular project. Merely because the subsequent act was performed earlier, namely, development of residential plots before the development of project itself, would not by itself be a diversion of the purpose in its entirety and, therefore, even if the permission is withdrawn or the land is acquired, the grantee or its subsequent transferees would be entitled for compensation. This, in our opinion, would be a reasonable construction of the power to be exercised by the State Government while proceeding to cancel a permission granted under Section 154 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. However, compensation would not be a matter of absolute right if the grantee is not legally entitled to it or the situation has been brought about on account of his unilateral follies. In the instant case, it is evident that bilateral negotiations were contemplated and the project was to move on under the orders dated 09th December, 1991. However, compensation would not be a matter of absolute right if the grantee is not legally entitled to it or the situation has been brought about on account of his unilateral follies. In the instant case, it is evident that bilateral negotiations were contemplated and the project was to move on under the orders dated 09th December, 1991. Thus, a right to continue with the project did exist and, therefore, a right to property in the land acquired by the petitioner company for the said purpose continues to exist in favour of the petitioner company as a right to property is now acknowledged by the Apex Court not only as a constitutional right but also as a human right. 84. There is another aspect of the matter, which deserves to be taken notice of. The permission was granted subject to two conditions as is evident from the letter dated 19th July, 1986. The said letter did not contemplate any consequence of failure to comply with the said conditions. There was no indication that in the event such conditions are not strictly adhered to, the permission would be cancelled in future. Any minor deviation or unsubstantial diversion of the purpose would not in any way invite the authority to exercise the powers for cancellation. However, the tenor of the order has to be read in the context of the power that can be exercised and, as indicated above, we would prefer to read into the said documents the existence of a power of the State Government to cancel the permission. The Supreme Court in the judgement in Super Agro Tech Limited v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (9) SCC 203 had the occasion to deal with the interpretation of the words “in the interest of general public” as used under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. It was pointed out by the State Government therein that there was a Government order dated 30th May, 1994, which also included the industrial development as being in the interest of general public. It was pointed out by the State Government therein that there was a Government order dated 30th May, 1994, which also included the industrial development as being in the interest of general public. However, the Court also noticed the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 154, quoted in paragraph-9 of the said decision, to indicate that if the land, which has been permitted to be acquired, remains unutilized for the specified industrial purpose for a specified period, then the transfer of land above 12.5 acres would be deemed to have been made in contravention to Section 154. The aforesaid decision, therefore, indicates an element of confiscation in the event the land remains unutilized for the specified industrial purpose for a specified period. The aforesaid issue does not arise in the present case, inasmuch as the grant of permission did not specify the period within which the land was to be utilized. 85. Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006 has been filed questioning the validity of the impugned notices dated 01st November, 2006 and 11th December, 2006 with a prayer for quashing the same and all consequential proceedings arising out there from on the ground that the notices are without jurisdiction, illegal and absolutely unwarranted as such the writ prayed for be granted. 86. The notices, which have been issued, are under Sections 157-A, 157-AA, 154 (1) and Sections 166/167 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. The said notices proceed to call upon the petitioner company to show-cause as to why the land acquired by the petitioner company over and above 12.5 acres be not vested in the State Government under the said provisions keeping in view the ceiling fixed thereunder. 87. The short background of the case in which the said notices have been issued is about the setting up of a Technology part by the petitioner company in village Tulsiyana, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The proposal to set up the said part is stated to have been approved by the State Government to be spread over an area of approximately 200 acres. The proposal to set up the said part is stated to have been approved by the State Government to be spread over an area of approximately 200 acres. In order to establish the said park, area would have to be either acquired or purchased but according to the provisions contained in the land laws applicable in the State of U.P., no person is entitled to have an holding in excess of 12.5 acres under the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act by way of purchase or otherwise. The ceiling in short is that under the said Act no person can purchase more than 12.5 acres of land and have a holding in excess thereof. The aforesaid limit should not be confused with the ceiling limit fixed under the U.P. Land Holdings Act, which is in altogether different legislation. 88. The petitioner company, therefore, accordingly applied before the State Government for permission which was processed and a permission was granted under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act on 19th July, 1986 on certain terms & conditions, a copy of the said permission is Annexure-3 to such writ petition. With the aforesaid authority in hand, the petitioner company proceeded to purchase substantial land in the said village and elsewhere, which was in excess of 12.5 acres. There is a dispute between the petitioner company, the State Government and the NOIDA about the extent of land so purchased by the petitioner company but that would not be relevant for the purposes of present controversy which is limited to the cancellation of the said permission as proposed under the impugned notice. 89. The notice proceeds on the presumption as if the petitioner company had no permission and, therefore, the land in excess of 12.5 acres stood vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It is the aforesaid presumption which has been made the ground of attack in the present writ petition whereas the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, defends the impugned notice on such presumption. The facts leading to the aforesaid issue are that the aforesaid permission which was granted to the petitioner company was cancelled on 20th April, 1989. This cancellation order was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989, which was disposed of finally on 09th December, 1991. The facts leading to the aforesaid issue are that the aforesaid permission which was granted to the petitioner company was cancelled on 20th April, 1989. This cancellation order was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989, which was disposed of finally on 09th December, 1991. The Division Bench, which disposed of the said writ petition, directed that the development of the project by the petitioner company shall be continued strictly in accordance with the directions to be given by the monitoring Committee so constituted. The judgment, however, did not formally quash the order dated 20th April, 1989. It appears that keeping in view the aforesaid position, the impugned notice has been issued. 90. That arguments, therefore, advanced on both the sides is to the effect that the petitioner company proceeded to develop the project on the presumption that it had a subsisting permission whereas the respondents have proceeded to issue the impugned notices treating the said permission to have been cancelled. 91. On a perusal of the pleadings and the records, it is evident that the respondents had acquiesced to the order of this Court dated 09th December, 1991. Not only this, a compromise was thereafter entered into on 09th January, 1992, which was subject matter of consideration in the other connected writ petitions. Nonetheless, the conduct of the respondent-State was to allow the petitioner company to acquire land, to submit its proposal for planned development before the NOIDA and to carry out the development in terms of the directions to be issued by the Monitoring Committee, notice whereof has been taken in the judgement dated 09th December, 1991. Not only this, the respondent-State has proceeded to issue notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the said land. It is, therefore, obvious that had there been no recognition of ownership of the petitioner company as tenure-holder of the said land, there was no occasion for the State Government to have acquired its own land which is claimed to have been vested under the provisions referred to have in the impugned notice. If the argument of the respondents is accepted, then there is no permission subsisting which could allow the project to proceed or the negotiation to proceed. On record, however, things proved to be otherwise. If the argument of the respondents is accepted, then there is no permission subsisting which could allow the project to proceed or the negotiation to proceed. On record, however, things proved to be otherwise. There were negotiations that were continuously going on treating the project to be an alive proposal. Thus, the impact of the judgement dated 09th December, 1991 was to allow the petitioner company to continue to be the tenure-holder of the land already purchased and with a further encouragement to acquire more land to the extent of 200 acres. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government by its own conduct had virtually proceeded not to enforce the order of cancellation dated 20th April, 1989. The combined effect of the judgement dated 09th December, 1991 and the subsequent actions and negotiations including the directions of the Apex Court to allow the registration of such land to be transferred from the petitioner company to 482 plot-holders is a strong and a clear indication of the subsisting permission. In short, for all intents and purposes, the permission continued and the order of cancellation dated 20th April, 1989 was rendered in effective and otiose. It is for this reason that the State Government found it necessary to acquire the land for Greater NOIDA by resorting to the provisions of Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The State Government, even otherwise, could not have played Dr. Jekyll and Hyde by encouraging the negotiations with regard to implementation of the project on the one hand and simultaneously cancelling the permission thereby divesting the petitioner company of whatever rights that were available to it under the permission granted. The petitioner company, in our opinion, cannot be deprived both of its authority to receive compensation of the acquired land and at the same time be an object of title deprivation due to the circumstances which the State Government is seeking to justify on the other hand. Even if the acquisition proceedings are valid, then too even the reason given for treating the permission to have been cancelled does not appear to be sustainable in law. Even if the acquisition proceedings are valid, then too even the reason given for treating the permission to have been cancelled does not appear to be sustainable in law. Once it is held that the order dated 20th April, 1989 has no legal effect and impact in view of the reasons given herein above, there is no occasion for this Court to allow the respondent-State to proceed to divest the petitioner company of the land purchased by it. This would be virtually in violation of Article 300-A as the petitioner company even would have been otherwise, would be loosing its rights to receive compensation if the acquisition proceedings are upheld. To allow the respondent-State to have this say would be a paradox inasmuch as the acquisition has actually been undertaken under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in the year 2006 treating the land to be belonging to the petitioner company. The State Government, therefore, cannot be permitted to turn around and dissolve the effect of the judgement dated 09th December, 1991 and the subsequent conduct of the parties right up to the acquisition proceedings as well as the orders passed by the Supreme Court issuing directions for the registration of the plots in favour of 482 plot-holders. 92. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the impugned notices have been issued dehorsing the aforesaid intervention which deprived the State Government from treating the permission to have been cancelled. Accordingly, any proceedings, which have been initiated under the impugned notices are, therefore, a nullity and cannot be given effect to. We order accordingly. Point No. 2 : 93. On the verge of conclusion of arguments, the Greater Noida Authority was directed by this Court by order dated 06th February, 2009 to file an affidavit in respect of the approval of Master Plan-2021 and its publication. The affidavit filed by the Greater Noida Authority on or around 26th February, 2009 fairly concedes that there has been no publication of the Master Plan-2021 in compliance with Regulation 10 of the New Okhla Industrial Development Area (Preparation and Finalisation of Plan) Regulations, 1991 and such publication can take place only after communication by the National Capital Region Planning Board. The National Capital Region Planning Board in its affidavit affirmed on 28th March, 2009 has also stated that it has not approved the Master Plan-2021 as it is awaiting further response from the Greater Noida Authority to its suggestions. This concession results in the inevitable conclusion that there is no valid, effective and enforceable Master Plan-2021. The aforesaid alleged Master Plans- 2001 and 2021 are the subject matter of challenge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 filed by the petitioner company before this Court. 94. Mr. Shashi Nandan has submitted that vide order dated 27th May, 2005 the Greater Noida Authority, for the first time, sought to rely upon the alleged Master Plan-2021 in respect of the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company and thereby thwart the same. The Greater Noida Authority never brought this alleged fact to the notice of this Court during the course of hearing of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002, wherein by the aforesaid order dated 17th April, 2003 the order dated 17th August, 1996 was rendered null and void. The Greater Noida Authority also did not raise this point before the Supreme Court when the order dated 10th March, 2005 was passed directing the petitioner company to submit its layout plans to the Greater Noida Authority in terms of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992. He further said that this ground was never projected in any form or informed to the petitioner company prior to passing of the order dated 27th May, 2005. The petitioner company was never given an opportunity to meet this ground. The petitioner company, if informed of this, could have brought on record inter alia the aforesaid counter-affidavit filed by the Greater Noida Authority in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993. 95. Notwithstanding the same, Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that the Greater Noida Authority cannot prepare a Master Plan excluding the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company from the same inasmuch as it is estopped from doing so. The Greater Noida Authority is bound to honour its contractual obligation and/or promise in terms of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992. 96. Shashi Nandan submitted that the Greater Noida Authority cannot prepare a Master Plan excluding the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company from the same inasmuch as it is estopped from doing so. The Greater Noida Authority is bound to honour its contractual obligation and/or promise in terms of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992. 96. He also submitted that the petitioner company has made a substantial investment in respect of its proposed technology park project, as stated hereinabove, and the Greater Noida Authority should not be permitted to thwart the same through its malafide, unilateral and illegal actions. The petitioner company has a legitimate expectation of being permitted to complete its technology park project by the Greater Noida Authority and any action taken by the Greater Noida Authority, which is contrary to the same, is unlawful and ought to be quashed. 97. He further submitted that the said Outline Development Plan-2011/ Land Use Plan-2011 was effective for a period till 2011 as specified by the Greater Noida Authority and has become operative. Once such a plan was approved, the Greater Noida Authority could not effect important alterations in the character of the plan or change the extent of the land use and/or in any event, without special notice to the petitioner company. The area where the petitioner company proposes to set up its technology part project forms part of the National Capital Region and accordingly, falls under the jurisdiction of the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. The National Capital Region Planning Board had framed and/or confirmed a Regional Plan under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. In the said plan, the use of the petitioner company’s land had been shown as “Mixed Land Use” i.e. for both residential and industrial development. Thus, the project being set up by the petitioner company and the land use of the concerned area have been approved by the State Government and the same is also consistent with the original plan prepared by the National Capital Region Planning Board. Since the same has also been included in the Development Plan-2011/Greater Noida Land Use Plan-2011 framed by the Greater Noida Authority, the petitioner company’s project is also consistent with the Greater Noida Authority’s aforesaid Development Plan-2011/Greater Noida Land Use Plan/Master Plan. 98. Since the same has also been included in the Development Plan-2011/Greater Noida Land Use Plan-2011 framed by the Greater Noida Authority, the petitioner company’s project is also consistent with the Greater Noida Authority’s aforesaid Development Plan-2011/Greater Noida Land Use Plan/Master Plan. 98. Greater Noida Authority is now asserting that a Master Plan-2021 has been approved by it and such plan does not permit the technology park project of the petitioner company to be set up. In this connection, it is pertinent to mention that the project (a) initially was cleared by the appropriate Government and agencies; (b) received the approval of the State Government granting permission to the petitioner company to acquire the land in excess of the permissible holding under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act in 1986; (c) was recognised in the compromise entered into between the petitioner company and the Greater Noida Authority in January, 1992 which, in turn, recognised the permission; and (d) was accepted in the direction of the Supreme Court in March, 2005. He submitted that such wrongful assertions are to be found in the several orders passed by the Greater Noida Authority and the State Government in their attempts to cancel the permission, the compromise and rejection of layout plans. Such orders are the subject matter of various writ petitions which have been disposed of and/or are pending adjudication before this Court. 99. He further submitted that in any event, the draft Master Plan-2021 has been prepared ignoring the said permission under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as well as the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 and has been prepared malafidely to defeat the technology park project of the petitioner company. The contention of the Greater Noida Authority that it framed Master Plan-2021 in 2001 when the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 stood cancelled and accordingly, it did not include the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in the Master Plan-2021, is tenuous. Cancellation of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 by the Greater Noida Authority was unilateral and unlawful and accordingly non est i.e. the cancellation never existed in the eye of law and the compromise always subsisted even at the time of framing of the alleged Master Plan-2021. Cancellation of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 by the Greater Noida Authority was unilateral and unlawful and accordingly non est i.e. the cancellation never existed in the eye of law and the compromise always subsisted even at the time of framing of the alleged Master Plan-2021. Furthermore, he submitted that the Greater Noida Authority cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrongs following the legal proposition “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” meaning thereby no one can take advantage of his own wrong. 100. Once the order dated 17th April, 2003 held that the cancellation order dated 17th August, 1996 was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the Greater Noida Authority was obliged to include the petitioner company’s proposed technology park project in the Master Plan-2021. The Master Plan-2021 must be subservient to the outcome of the result in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002. The contention of the Greater Noida Authority that it framed Master Plan-2021 in 2001 when the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 stood cancelled and accordingly, it did not include the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in the Master Plan-2021, is an admission on its part that it was bound to include the petitioner company’s proposed technology park project if the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 was subsisting. 101. Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that the contention of the Greater Noida Authority that the Master Plan-2021 was finalised in 2001 is also incorrect. In this regard, firstly, the Greater Noida Authority itself has made several amendments to the same till as recently as 2008 (including on 29th June, 2002, 23rd July, 2002, 25th March, 2003 and 20th March, 2006), and secondly, the Master Plan-2021 has not yet been approved by the National Capital Region Planning Board, which is mandatory in terms of, inter alia, the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. In this regard, the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 of the Greater Noida Authority inter alia states that “... The land use has to be in accordance with the Master Plan which is prepared, inter alia, in consultation with and the approval of the National Capital Region Planning Board as the area of the authority falls under the National Capital Region. .....”. The land use has to be in accordance with the Master Plan which is prepared, inter alia, in consultation with and the approval of the National Capital Region Planning Board as the area of the authority falls under the National Capital Region. .....”. Further, the counter-affidavit filed by the Greater Noida Authority in respect of the amended Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 inter alia states that—”Paragraph-16.- ... The land use as suggested by them is inconsistent with the approved Master Plan 2001 and the Master Plan for 2021 which has been approved by the answering respondent and the State Government and the committee of NCR Board has approved the Master Plan 2021 on its meeting held on 4.09.2006 that is pending final approval by the NCR Planning Board. In respect of this draft Master Plan also, objections were invited vide notice dated 31.03.2001. The petitioner did not submit any objection within the period prescribed for that purpose. This master plan is pending for approval of the NCR Planning Board. ....”. Thirdly, the alleged Master Plan-2021 has not been published by a public notice as required under Regulation 10 of the New Okhla Industrial Development Area (Preparation and Finalisation of Plan) Regulations, 1991 and accordingly, the draft Master Plan-2021 has not yet come into operation. 102. Paragraph-22 of the counter-affidavit filed by the Greater Noida Authority to the amended Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 inter alia demonstrates that : (i) the State of Uttar Pradesh has not yet approved the draft Master Plan-2021 (in this regard the petitioner company relied on Sections 20 and 27 of the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985); and (ii) the draft Master Plan-2021 has not yet been enforced inasmuch as the alleged date of enforcement has been left blank in the said paragraph-22. The averments made by it in paragraphs 9-H and 52-B of the amended Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 in respect of the Master Plan-2021 not having been approved by the NCR Planning Board and the State of Uttar Pradesh as well as there being no public notice of the allegedly finalised Master Plan-2021 having been published in the manner as prescribed in the New Okhla Industrial Development Area (Preparation and Finalisation of Plan) Regulations, 1991, have not been controverted by the Greater Noida Authority in its counter-affidavit (paragraphs 5 and 22 thereof). It is also worthwhile to note that the Regional Plan-2021 framed by the National Capital Region Planning Board, was approved by the NCR Planning Board on 09th July, 2005 and was subsequently notified on 17th September, 2005. In this regard, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner company submitted that a Master Plan framed by the Greater Noida Authority must be in consonance with a Regional Plan framed by the NCR Board and thus, the allegation of the Greater Noida Authority that the Master Plan-2021 was finalised prior to the date of finalisation/notification of the Regional Plan-2021 is wholly untenable. He placed reliance on Section 29 of the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. 103. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner company that it has also come to learn that a Government order has been issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh which makes it mandatory for any Master Plan for an area included within the National Capital Region (within Uttar Pradesh) to obtain the sanction of the National Capital Region Planning Board before attaining finality. The draft Master Plan-2021 was forwarded to the NCR Planning Board by the State Government and the NCR Planning Board raised various objections and/or made various suggestions in respect of the same, and various meetings were held between the representatives/officials of the Greater Noida Authority and the NCR Planning Board. The petitioner company filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the Greater Noida Authority on or around 12th December, 2008 seeking diverse details in respect of the draft Master Plan-2021 including the aforesaid Government Order. However, till date the Greater Noida Authority has mischievously not provided any response/reply in respect of the said application. 104. In view of the foregoing, the Master Plan-2021 is still in a draft stage. He further submitted that a draft Master Plan which has not attained finality cannot be held to be determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties, and can never be implemented. At its draft stage, it is susceptible to change. Therefore, the Greater Noida Authority and the National Capital Region Planning Board be directed to include the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in Master Plan-2021. 105. Without prejudice to what has been stated hereinbefore and is stated hereinafter, Mr. At its draft stage, it is susceptible to change. Therefore, the Greater Noida Authority and the National Capital Region Planning Board be directed to include the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in Master Plan-2021. 105. Without prejudice to what has been stated hereinbefore and is stated hereinafter, Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that the Greater Noida Authority ought to have given the petitioner company a personal notice, in addition to the alleged public notice, in respect of its proposal to draft Master Plan-2021 because of inter alia the special relationship between the parties, the facts and circumstances of the present case and the Greater Noida Authority’s intention to exclude the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company from the same should be following the legal proposition that before finalising the Master Plan, an opportunity of personal hearing should have been given to the petitioner company since it would be adversely affected by the same. 106. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company submitted that no Master Plan can be formulated, which is contrary to the said Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011 and accordingly, the same should be enforced and/or given effect to. The judgement delivered by this Court in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2008 (3) ADJ 289 , records that the State Government has submitted that the Master Plan-2021 was being implemented in two stages i.e. 2011 and 2021. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgement is quoted as below : “...... Shri Zafar Naiyer, Addl. Advocate General submits that Village Tushiana is part of area for GNIDA was constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. It is also covered by Master Plan 2021 (First phase, year 2011, and the second phase, year 2021). The petitioner was told and cautioned by GNIDA on 16.5.2001, when he applied for permission to raise boundary wall by his request dated 4.5.2001, that the land is proposed to be acquired. The General Manager (Planning & Architecture) had submitted a report on 26.6.2001 that Plot No. 160 is also proposed for acquisition in Phase I. ...” 107. Accordingly, he submitted that the first phase of implementation is in accordance with the said Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011. The General Manager (Planning & Architecture) had submitted a report on 26.6.2001 that Plot No. 160 is also proposed for acquisition in Phase I. ...” 107. Accordingly, he submitted that the first phase of implementation is in accordance with the said Development Plan/Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011. However, the Greter Noida Authority is mischievously trying to avoid the said Development Plan/ Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan-2011. The draft Master Plan-2021 is creation of the Greater Noida Authority and this also reflects the mala fide actions of the Greater Noida Authority towards the petitioner company. 108. As regards the alleged Master Plan-2001, the Greater Noida Authority has never disclosed the same till date. The Greater Noida Authority has also not disclosed when the same was formulated, whether the same was finalized and who formulated/drafted the same. In any event, without prejudice, he submitted that the said Development Plan/ Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Land Use Plan- 2011 overrides the alleged Master Plan-2001 and further the alleged Master Plan-2001 cannot be in derogation of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992. 109. In view of the foregoing submissions, he submitted that the Master Plan-2021 is not valid or effective or enforceable in law. In any event, the Greater Noida Authority is obliged to recognise the proposed technology park project of the petitioner company in such Master Plan. Point No. 3 : 110. So far as this point is concerned, it pertains to rejection of the layout plan by order dated 27th May, 2005. The order dated 27th May, 2005 has been passed mainly on the four grounds, as mentioned above. With regard to such grounds for rejection, the petitioner company submitted that the petitioner company had submitted all necessary documents as per the applicable law. In any event, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, the petitioner company has submitted that the failure to submit all documents is a curable defect and the same cannot prevent the petitioner company from submitting fresh layout plans. 111. Mr. Sashi Nandan submitted that the land (measuring 1,39,973 square meters) did not vest in the State Government after attachment (Kurki), but had merely been attached. Attachment of the aforesaid land pre-supposes and expressly recognizes ownership of the petitioner company over the same. 111. Mr. Sashi Nandan submitted that the land (measuring 1,39,973 square meters) did not vest in the State Government after attachment (Kurki), but had merely been attached. Attachment of the aforesaid land pre-supposes and expressly recognizes ownership of the petitioner company over the same. Accordingly, the Greater Noida Authority was incorrect in alleging that the petitioner company was not owner of the entire land. Furthermore, at all material times, the aforesaid attachment was under challenge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46346 of 2000. In any event, the aforesaid attachment has been lifted pursuant to the order of this Court dated 08th August, 2006 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46346 of 2000. 112. With regard to the ground, as taken by the Greater Noida Authority for rejection, that the proposed land use in respect of 2,32,474.76 square meters of land as per the layout plans submitted by the petitioner company would be contrary to the permissible land use as per the Master Plans-2001 and 2021, Mr. Shashi Nandan has reiterated his submissions made in reply to the Point No. 2. 113. In respect of the next ground of lands being scattered, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that a very small portion of land of the petitioner company is scattered. Scattered lands will not hamper the setting up of proposed technology park project of the petitioner company and, in fact, the layout plans submitted by the petitioner company did take this fact into account. In any event, the petitioner company has purchased 69 acres of land subsequent to the order dated 27th may, 2005 in order to make the lands of the petitioner company contiguous. However, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, the petitioner company submitted that if this Court deems it fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, it will construct its proposed technology park project only on contiguous land. 114. In addition to the aforesaid submissions, the petitioner company further submitted that it was not given a personal hearing in respect of the layout plans submitted by it to the Greater Noida Authority for its consideration and that the order dated 27th May, 2005 was passed ex parte. This is in violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, on this ground alone the order dated 27th May, 2005 is liable to be quashed and/or set aside. 115. This is in violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, on this ground alone the order dated 27th May, 2005 is liable to be quashed and/or set aside. 115. In view of the foregoing, he submits that the layout plan of the petitioner company has not been legally disposed of vide order dated 27th May, 2005, which is under challenge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006. Therefore, this point should be answered in favour of the petitioner company. Point No. 4 : 116. With regard to this point i.e. whether the order dated 11th October, 2006 holding that the compromise dated 09th January, 1992 has become unworkable, inoperative, void and incapable of performance is bad in law and liable to be quashed, Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that he has already made submission in this regard also in respect of Point Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 117. In addition to what has been submitted earlier, Mr. Shashi Nandan submitted that the order dated 11th October, 2006 was passed allegedly in compliance with the order dated 17th April, 2003. Consequently, in or around October, 2006, after more than three years since the aforesaid order dated 17th April, 2003 was passed, the petitioner company was surprised to receive a letter from the Greater Noida Authority requesting it to be present for a personal hearing on 10th October, 2006, as and by way of the Greater Noida Authority’s purported compliance of the aforesaid order dated 17th April, 2003. Accordingly, the legal representative of the petitioner company attended the said hearing on 10th October, 2006 and inter alia stated that the grounds relied upon by the Greater Noida Authority in its order dated 17th August, 1996 were false and incorrect and the same had been recorded in the order dated 17th April, 2003 of this Court. 118. Thereafter, on or around 20th November, 2006 the petitioner company obtained a copy of the order dated 06th November, 2006 from the Greater Noida Authority and were shocked to learn from the contents of the same that the Greater Noida Authority had passed an order on 11th October, 2006 holding the same compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 to be unworkable, inoperative, void and incapable of performance. Thereafter, the petitioner company managed to obtain a copy of the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 from the office of the Greater Noida Authority. Thereafter, the petitioner company managed to obtain a copy of the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 from the office of the Greater Noida Authority. The Greater Noida Authority has not formally severed a copy of the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 on the petitioner company till date. 119. The grounds relied upon by the Greater Noida Authority in the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 are different from the grounds relied upon by the Greater Noida Authority in its aforesaid order dated 17th August, 1996. The petitioner company submits that the Greater Noida Authority in its purported reconsideration of the matter ought to have restricted itself to reconsider the same only on the grounds relied upon by it initially in its aforesaid order dated 17th August, 1996. In the alternative, the Greater Noida Authority ought to have given prior notice to the petitioner company of the grounds it proposed to rely upon and in fact mentioned in the order dated 11th October, 2006. 120. Further, the grounds relied upon by the Greater Noida Authority were never made known to the petitioner company before passing of the order dated 11th October, 2006. In fact, the legal representative of the petitioner company was also not made aware of these extraneous grounds during the course of the purported hearing on 10th October, 2006. No show-cause notice had been served upon the petitioner company in respect of the same. Thus, the petitioner company or its legal representative was not aware of the case it had to answer before the Greater Noida Authority and was not given an opportunity to deal with the grounds relied upon by the Greater Noida Authority in the order dated 11th October, 2006. 121. In view of the aforesaid, the hearing granted to the petitioner company on 10th October, 2006 was not an effective hearing but a mere formality and was in clear violation of the principles of natural justice as well as the aforesaid order dated 17th April, 2003 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002. Consequently, the order dated 11th October, 2006 is a nullity and void ab initio since the same was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 122. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002. Consequently, the order dated 11th October, 2006 is a nullity and void ab initio since the same was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 122. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that the Greater Noida Authority cannot be permitted to unilaterally cancel the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992, which is a bilateral agreement/ contract, and/or resile from the same particularly when the petitioner company has performed all its obligations under the same and is still willing to act in terms of the same. 123. He further submitted that the reasons recorded in the order dated 11th October, 2006 are not good and are not sustainable. The question of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 becoming unworkable or incapable of performance does not and cannot arise, inasmuch as the petitioner company has always been willing to, and is still willing to, perform its obligations in terms of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 and set up the proposed technology park project. Similarly, the question of the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 becoming inoperative does not, and cannot, arise nor does the question of said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 being void or becoming void arise and such a contention of the Grater Noida Authority is without any legal basis whatsoever and contrary to the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 124. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, such exercise (namely, the purported reconsideration after giving a purported hearing to the legal representative of the petitioner company in purported compliance of the aforesaid order dated 17th April, 2003 and thereafter cancelling the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 vide the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006) was carried out only to thwart the technology park project of the petitioner company and to ensure that there was no hindrance to the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh at the behest of the Greater Noida Authority, being the requiring authority. Clearly, the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 was proving to be an obstacle to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, while it was considering the representation of the petitioner company to it pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court dated 02nd May, 2006 passed in Civil Misc. Clearly, the said compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 was proving to be an obstacle to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, while it was considering the representation of the petitioner company to it pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court dated 02nd May, 2006 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006, in order to reject the said representation. Thus, the Greater Noida Authority unlawfully unilaterally cancelled the said compromise deed dated 17th January, 1992 for the second time and provided a copy of the said order to the State Government without providing a copy of the same to the petitioner company and/or informing the petitioner company of the same. Thereafter, the State Government rejected the said representation of the petitioner company vide its order dated 06th November, 2006. Ironically, the petitioner company came to learn of the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 while perusing a copy of the order dated 06th November, 2006. 125. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner company submitted that the cancellation of the said compromise deed by the Greater Noida Authority vide its aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 was wrong, unlawful and illegal. In any event, the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 was passed subsequent to this Court’s order dated 02nd May, 2006 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006 pursuant to which the petitioner company submitted its representation dated 15th May, 2006 to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh and accordingly, should not have been relied upon by the State Government. Further, the order dated 11th October, 2006 was passed subsequent to an alleged hearing dated 27th September, 2006, notice of which had allegedly been given to the petitioner company. In any event, the petitioner company was not aware of the aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 till much latter and did not have any opportunity to deal with the contents of the same before the State Government of Uttar Pradesh. Point No. 5 : 126. In respect of this point, Mr. Shashi Nandan has submitted that he has already dealt with the same mostly while making his submissions in respect of Point Nos. 1 to 4. 127. Point No. 5 : 126. In respect of this point, Mr. Shashi Nandan has submitted that he has already dealt with the same mostly while making his submissions in respect of Point Nos. 1 to 4. 127. However, in addition thereto he has submitted that rejection of layout plans cannot be a valid ground for cancellation of representation of the petitioner company dated 15th May, 2006 and is wholly an extraneous consideration and accordingly, the impugned order dated 06th November, 2006 is bad. Cancellation of the said compromise deed by the Greater Noida Authority vide its aforesaid order dated 11th October, 2006 was wrong, unlawful and illegal and ought not to have been relied upon by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh. 128. Mr. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Greater Noida Authority, has submitted before this Court that the Government never invited the petitioner company to install any technology park. The proposal had come from the petitioner company when the Government became interested. Therefore, the element of promise, which rise from the proposal of the Government, is unavailable in this case. Moreso, the land is acquired for the purpose of development by the Greater Noida Authority, therefore, question of promissory estoppel, if any, cannot be applicable against the public purpose or against the statute which requires to be applicable for such public purpose. In support of his contention, he cited a judgement of the Supreme Court in Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corpn. and others, 2007 (6) SCC 143 , where it has been held that if the Development Control Rules have the same force as that of a statute, then no question of promissory estoppel would arise as the principle is well-settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute. Even factually the proposal cannot be acceptable since the petitioner company cannot get the land in one chunk but fragmented, which cannot be suitable for the purpose of formation of the technology park. A city requires all sorts of facilities and in absence of such land within one area viability will be hit and as such, the proposal of the technology park cannot be accepted. The petitioner company is not possessing 200 acres of land. If so, it is not able to produce any document with regard to such land. A city requires all sorts of facilities and in absence of such land within one area viability will be hit and as such, the proposal of the technology park cannot be accepted. The petitioner company is not possessing 200 acres of land. If so, it is not able to produce any document with regard to such land. Upto 08th January, 1992 there was no compromise made by the Greater Noida Authority. Only judicial interventions had taken place. It is only on 09th January, 1992 that a compromise was entered into between the Greater Noida Authority and the petitioner company. On 28th September, 1992 the layout plan was submitted. Therefore, the petitioner company has not satisfied with regard to ownership of the land, if any. It has also violated the terms and conditions arrived at between the parties. It appears that by a letter dated 25th July, 1996 the petitioner company was requested to submit a layout plan of all lands belonging to it having ownership certificate showing sajra map prepared as per the Sub Division Regulations of the authority, otherwise the compromise deed dated 09th January, 1992 between the petitioner company and the Greater Noida Authority shall be deemed to be cancelled. By completing the formalities the petitioner company did not submit all the papers in the section by 16th August, 1996, therefore, memorandum of understanding dated 09th January, 1992 arrived at between the Greater Noida Authority and the petitioner company has been cancelled by such notice itself. By an interim order dated 26th November, 1993 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993 the Greater Noida Authority was directed to pass appropriate order on the plans submitted by the petitioner company within 15 days without prejudice to the petitioner’s claim in view of the deed of compromise arrived at between the parties on 09th January, 1992. It appears from the record that an order was passed by the Greater Noida Authority on 10th December, 1993 on the applications of the petitioner company on their layout plan that for various defects the layout plan submitted is not approved and is rejected. However, the petitioner company was directed to submit fresh layout plan meeting out the points raised in the order of the authority. We also find that in Civil Misc. However, the petitioner company was directed to submit fresh layout plan meeting out the points raised in the order of the authority. We also find that in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35589 of 1993 an affidavit has been filed by the Greater Noida Authority by the pen of the Draftsman duly authorised by the Greater Noida Authority as an agent of it, from which it appears that a Monitoring Committee headed by the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industries, Government of U.P. is still there to monitor the project of the petitioner company. It has been further submitted that by a notification dated 28th January, 1991 the Greater Noida Authority was formed. Before that date the area including the village Tusiyana was notified as regulated area under the U.P. Regulation of Building Operation Act, 1958 vide notification dated 19th September, 1989. Such notification recognised constructions/abadi as existing and entered in the Khatauni on 30th June, 1985. The constructions which came into existence after this date were not recognised. In such affidavit, it has been categorically stated by the deponent on behalf of the Greater Noida Authority in paragraphs 29 to 32 as follows : “29. That, the contents of paragraph No. 40, 41 and 42 of the writ petition are not admitted and denied. However, it is submitted that the agreement dated 9.1.1992 was arrived at and signed between the parties. Till that date the Development Plan and Regulations and the Building Regulations of the answering respondent were not ready. The petitioner undertook some work on R & D Centre, Central Tool Room and Soft ware Centre. The progress of work on these buildings is indicated in preceding paragraphs of this counter-affidavit. It is also important to state here that the answering respondent was and still is interested in the project of the petitioner. Since the agreement was being signed on 9.1.1992 and the petitioner had no lay-out plans ready with the agreement. There was a clear understanding that the petitioner will revise his lay-out according to the Regulations of the answering respondent. The petitioner had not submitted the plans of World Trade Centre at the time of the agreement was signed. The answering respondent did not insist upon the final maps and lay out plans simply because the development plan and Regulations and Building Regulations of the answering respondent were not ready. The petitioner had not submitted the plans of World Trade Centre at the time of the agreement was signed. The answering respondent did not insist upon the final maps and lay out plans simply because the development plan and Regulations and Building Regulations of the answering respondent were not ready. The petitioner revised its plans and filed the same with the answering respondent as is evident from petitioner’s letter dated 28.9.1992. In the revised plan the petitioner proposed 12 metre wide roads in place of 9 metres wide roads. A true copy of the aforesaid letter dated 28.9.92 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure CA-14 to this affidavit. It is further submitted that the petitioner was fully aware that the agreement dated 9.1.1992, in order to have enforceability, must be retified by the Board of Answering Respondent. The Board of the answering respondent has not retified this agreement till this date. The petitioner has admitted this fact in his letter dated 13.11.1992. A true copy of the aforesaid letter dated 13.11.1992 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure-C.A.-15 to this affidavit. It is however submitted that the petitioner revised his plans only after the Development Plan and Sub-Division Regulations were approved by the Board of the Answering respondent on 4.2.1992 though the plan has not been drawn fully keeping into view the requirement of the Sub-Division Regulations. A Photostat copy of the Sub-division Regulation is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure-C.A.-16 to this affidavit. The contrary allegations made by the petitioner in para under reply are not admitted and vehemently denied. 30. That, the contents of paragraph No. 43 of the writ petition is admitted only to the extent that the petitioner is recognised in the map of the Greater Noida Land-use Plan-2011. This fact proves the bonafides of the answering respondent that it was always interested in the development of the project according to the Regulations and Bye-laws. 31. That, the contents of paragraph No. 44 of the writ petition is not admitted and the same is denied. It is however, submitted that the concept of Technology Park Ltd. is recognised in the Development Plan-2011 approved by the Board of the answering respondent on 4.2.1992. The requirements of National Capital Region are manifested in the plan of 2001. 32. That, the contents of paragraph No. 44 of the writ petition is not admitted and the same is denied. It is however, submitted that the concept of Technology Park Ltd. is recognised in the Development Plan-2011 approved by the Board of the answering respondent on 4.2.1992. The requirements of National Capital Region are manifested in the plan of 2001. 32. That, the contents of paragraph No. 45 of the writ petition is not admitted and the same is denied. However, it is submitted that the revised lay-out plans submitted on 28.9.1992 did not confirm to the Sub-Divisional Regulations of the answering respondent. Objections on the plans were communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 16.11.1992. These objections are aimed of preventing the growth of an Industrial slum. The petitioner’s sole aim is to provide narrow lanes in place of roads of different widths raying from 12 metres to 24 metres. No provision for sewerage disposal has been made. A true copy of the aforesaid letter dated 16.11.1992 is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure C.A.-17 to this affidavit.” 129. Mr. Upadhyaya has further contended before this Court that the compromise was treated to be cancelled on 17th August, 1996 and the same was not challenged till 2002. The petitioner company has only challenged such order in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002. However, such writ petition was disposed of by order dated 17th April, 2003 and the operative portion of such order is already quoted as above, which speaks that the title deed of the land and the layout plan have been submitted by the petitioner company and it seemed to the Court that in hot haste the compromise has been cancelled by order dated 17th August, 1996. The writ petition was allowed and the order dated 17th August, 1996 was quashed. Therefore, the petitioner company is entitled for consideration afresh giving personal hearing to the representative of the petitioner company. Revival of such compromise is also reflected from the order dated 10th March, 2005 passed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another (supra). Subsequently, on 08th November, 2005 the Supreme Court has given certain directions to the petitioner company on the basis of the applications made by various plot holders. Revival of such compromise is also reflected from the order dated 10th March, 2005 passed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another (supra). Subsequently, on 08th November, 2005 the Supreme Court has given certain directions to the petitioner company on the basis of the applications made by various plot holders. It has been recorded therein that the master layout plan, which had originally been prepared by the petitioner company in respect of all the plots, has not been wholly agreed to by the Greater Noida Authority. However, the authority did not present the case when such exhaustive order was passed by the Supreme Court. In spite of the same, no hearing was given till September, 2006 when the petitioner company was compelled to file another writ petition, in which fresh direction was given for consideration of cause upon notice but the petitioner company received no notice and the hearing was again given without any intervention whatsoever. Therefore, it has been strongly pointed out by the petitioner company herein that in such circumstances not hearing the petitioner company is clear violation of principle of natural justice. 130. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, 2005 (6) SCC 321 , it has been held by the Supreme Court as under : “8. Natural justice is another name for common-sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 9. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence. 10. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence. 10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of Supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. .....” 131. In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 (3) SCC 259 , a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the principle question is whether the impugned action is violative of principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1969 (2) SCC 262 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative order has gradually become thin. Now it is totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent the miscarriage of justice. In D.K. Yadav (supra) it was held that it is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The test of reason and justice cannot be abstract. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The test of reason and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The procedure prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual. The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. The law must, therefore, be now taken to be well-settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 of the Constitution. In State of U.P. and others v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and others, 1989 (2) SCC 505 , the Supreme Court has held that on a matter of such importance where the stakes are heavy for the lessees who claim to have made large investments on the project and where a number of grounds require the determination of factual matters of some complexity, the statutory authority should have afforded a personal hearing to the lessees. When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant, factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. In Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893 , a five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that an order which has been passed without notice to the party affected by such order, it would be open to the said party to contend that an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is a nullity and its existence should be ignored by the Court of law. In Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. The State of Gujarat, 1974 (2) SCC 121 , it has been held that in Indian Constitutional law, natural justice does not exist as an absolute jural value but is humanistically read by Courts into those great rights enshrined in Part III as the quintessence of reasonableness. We are not unmindful that from Seneca’s Medea, the Magna Carta and Lord Coke to the constitutional norms of modern nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is a deeply rooted principle that “the body of no free man shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor disseised, nor outlawed, nor banished nor destroyed in any way” without opportunity for defence and one of the first principles of this sense of justice is that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side. It has been further held that beyond doubt, an order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity. In M/s. R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another, 1989 (1) SCC 628 , it has also been held by the Supreme Court that an order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is a nullity. It is void or of no value. In Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66 and Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 1 All ER 208, the House of Lords in England has made it clear that breach of natural justice nullifies the order made in breach. 132. To counter the case of the petitioner company, the Greater Noida Authority has cited before us a Supreme Court judgement in Girias Investment Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka and others, 2008 (7) SCC 53 , to establish that only vague allegations of mala fides that too without any basis cannot be a valid ground to challenge the same on the ground of mala fides. There can be two ways by which the case of mala fides can be made out; one that the action which is impugned has been taken with the specific object of damaging the interest of the party and, secondly, such action is aimed at helping some party which results in damage to the party alleging mala fides. There can be two ways by which the case of mala fides can be made out; one that the action which is impugned has been taken with the specific object of damaging the interest of the party and, secondly, such action is aimed at helping some party which results in damage to the party alleging mala fides. Therefore, to establish mala fides much more than a mere allegation is required. The question as to whether an effective personal hearing was given or not, is a question of fact and it is noticed from the perusal of the record that such hearing was indeed given and the aggrieved has exercised his rights thereunder and only after following the procedure order was passed. Therefore, bare allegation of not giving personal hearing cannot substantiate the cause of violation of natural justice. It has to be considered at first, in that way the natural justice has been violated. 133. However, according to us, in the present case factually allegation against the authority concerned for not giving personal hearing is not a bare allegation because it is not once but twice the Courts have directed to consider the cause and not giving hearing will definitely prejudice the interest of the petitioner company, as it has already invested about Rs.15,30,70,702/- in its project. 134. The next dispute as raised by Mr. Upadhyaya is that no development work has been done by the petitioner company on the land in question and the layout plan has been legally disposed of, as the disputed land in question is earmarked as institutional and green area in the Master Plan-2021 of the Greater Noida Authority. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company, contended before this Court that the layout plan cannot be legally disposed of. The Master Plan-2021 of the Greater Noida Authority has not yet got its approval under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 (hereinafter in short called as the “NCR Act”). We have called upon Mr. Shashi Nandan to place such Act to understand the scope and ambit of it, which was done accordingly. The Master Plan-2021 of the Greater Noida Authority has not yet got its approval under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 (hereinafter in short called as the “NCR Act”). We have called upon Mr. Shashi Nandan to place such Act to understand the scope and ambit of it, which was done accordingly. We find the following objects and reasons made available for the purpose of implementing such Act, as under : “An Act to provide for the constitution of a Planning Board for the preparation of a plan for the development of the National Capital Region and for co-ordinating and monitoring the implementation of such plan and for evolving harmonized policies for the control of land-uses and development of infrastructure in the National Capital Region so as to avoid any haphazard development of that region and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” 135. It further appears from the objects and reasons that in pursuance of the provisions of Clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, resolutions have been passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of the States of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh to the effect that the matters aforesaid should be regulated in those States by Parliament by law. Section 2 (d) of such Act defines ‘functional plan’, as follows : “(d) “Functional Plan” means a plan prepared to elaborate one or more elements of the Regional Plan;” NCR Act defines ‘project plan’ under Section 2 (i) as under : “(i) “Project Plan” means a detailed plan prepared to implement one or more elements of the Regional Plan, Sub-Regional Plan or Functional Plan;” Section 2(j) of the NCR Act also defines “regional plan”, which is as follows : “(j) “Regional Plan” means the plan prepared under this Act for the development of the National Capital Region and for the control of land-uses and the development of infrastructure in the National Capital Region;” Under Section 3 of the NCR Act the Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Board to be called the National Capital Region Planning Board. The powers of the Board have been given under Section 8 therein. The powers of the Board have been given under Section 8 therein. Section 8 (b) of the NCR Act provides as follows : “(b) ensure that the preparation, enforcement and implementation of Functional Plan or Sub-Regional Plan, as the case may be, is in conformity with the Regional Plan;” Section 27 of the NCR Act provides an overriding effect, as follows : “27. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act; or in any decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority.” Section 29 of the NCR Act speaks about violation of regional plan, which being necessary for the purpose is set out hereunder : “29. Violation of Regional Plan.—(1) On and from the coming into operation of the finally published Regional Plan, no development shall be made in the region which is inconsistent with the Regional Plan as finally published. (2) Where the Board is satisfied that any participating State or the Union territory has carried out, or is carrying out, any activity which amounts to a violation of the Regional Plan, it may, by a notice in writing, direct the concerned participating State or the Union territory, as the case may be, to stop such violation of the Regional Plan within such time as may be specified in the said notice and in case of any omission or refusal on the part of the concerned participating State or the Union territory to stop such activity, withhold such financial assistance to the concerned participating State or the Union territory, as the Board may consider necessary.” 136. By citing all these sections Mr. Shashi Nandan has contended before this Court that let the records be produced by the authority to show that the Master Plan-2021 has been approved by the National Capital Region Planning Board but the respondent authority in spite of bringing the record failed to establish before the Court that the Master Plan-2021 is approved by the National Capital Region Planning Board. 137. In the course of arguments we have come across various judgements to come to a definite conclusion. Estoppel/ Promissory Estoppel/ Legitimate Expectation 138. 137. In the course of arguments we have come across various judgements to come to a definite conclusion. Estoppel/ Promissory Estoppel/ Legitimate Expectation 138. Estoppel was known to us for the purpose of consideration of cause on the basis of the evidence under Section 115 of the Evidence Act. However, it has proceeded in the arena of natural justice by its exercise to give the equitable relief to the people. This doctrine has been variously called “promissory estoppel”, “equitable estoppel”, “quasi estoppel” and “new estoppel”. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named ‘promissory estoppel’, it is, as we shall presently point out, neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. As per M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1979 (2) SC 409, this doctrine has been followed by Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 256 : 1947 KB 130. However, in India this doctrine had been adopted in its fullness even prior thereto. Firstly this test has been applied by the Calcutta High Court in the judgement in Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Sourujmull, (1880) ILR 5 Cal 669. So far as Bombay High Court is concerned, reference is Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. The Secretary of State, (1905) ILR 29 Bom 580. If we go by the doctrine as formulated by Lord Denning, we shall be able to understand few words, as follows : “that a promise intended to be binding intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply.” 139. Even in America this doctrine has been adopted by saying that “equitable estoppel will be invoked against the State when justified by the facts”. Under our jurisprudence, the Government is not exempted from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen. The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned : the former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. There is only one embargo in a case of promissory estoppel that it cannot be invoked to compel a Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercise of its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Save as above, the gist of equity lies in the fact that one party has by his conduct led the other to alter his position. No distinction can be made between the exercise of a sovereign or Governmental function and a trading or business activity of the Government, so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. 140. Even before, in Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and another v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, AIR 1971 SC 1021 a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice. Ltd., and another v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, AIR 1971 SC 1021 a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex contractu by a person who acts upon the promise : when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation if the contract be not in that form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. In Union of India v. M/s. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., (1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718 , the Supreme Court held that the Government is not exempt from the equity arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying upon the representations as to its future conduct made by the Government. There we find that Lord Denning in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, (1949) 1 KB 227, observed as follows : “The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to better its future executive action.” 141. In U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and another v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd. and others, 2008 (2) SCC 777 , the Supreme Court has held that the Court’s approach in the matter of invoking the principle of promissory estoppel depends on the facts of each case. But the general principle that emerges is that once a representation has been made by one party and the other party acts on that representation and makes investment and thereafter the other party resiles, such act cannot be stated to be fair and reasonable. But the general principle that emerges is that once a representation has been made by one party and the other party acts on that representation and makes investment and thereafter the other party resiles, such act cannot be stated to be fair and reasonable. When the State Government makes a representation and invites the entrepreneurs by showing various benefits for encouraging to make investment by way of industrial development of the backward areas or the hill areas, and thereafter the entrepreneurs on the representation so made bona fide make investment and thereafter if the State Government resiles from such benefits, then it certainly is an act of unfairness and arbitrariness. Consideration of public interest and the fact that there cannot be any estoppel against a statute are exceptions. However, no person can be permitted to misuse the concession or benefit and invoke promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel is not one-sided affair, it is rather two-sided affair. If one party abuses the concession then it is always open to the other party to revoke such concession but if one party avails the benefit and is acting on the same representation made by the other party then the other party who has granted the said benefit cannot revoke the same under the garb of public interest. Therefore, the grounds that revocation notification was issued in public interest and that same has the flavour of the statute, cannot persuade us to uphold it sustained. In State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, Assam, JT 2008 (4) SC 470, it has been held that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must forever be present in the mind of the Court. In Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corpn. In Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corpn. and others, 2007 (6) SCC 143 , on the factual consideration therein and about the statutory enforcement of the development control rules therein, the Supreme Court held that if such Development Control Rules have the same force as of a statute, no question of promissory estoppel will be applicable therein. In M.P. Mathur and others v. D.T.C. and others, AIR 2007 SC 414 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that promissory estoppel is based on equity or obligations. It is not based on vested right. In equity the Court has to strike a balance between individual rights on one hand and the larger public interest on the other hand. Freedom to contract is a common law civil liberty enjoyed by all persons. But when the Government is contracting with private parties, this common law freedom is circumscribed by the principles of administrative law which requires larger public interest to be taken into account. Again in Ganga Retreat & Towers Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, JT 2003 (10) SCC 232, the Supreme Court held that doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available when any action is desired to be taken in contravention of provisions of law. In Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, JT 2003 (4) SC 549, it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows : “12. Doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot come in the way of public interest. Indisputably, public interest has to prevail over private interest. The case at hand shows that a conscious policy decision has been taken and there is no statutory compulsion to act contrary. In that context, it cannot be said that respondents have acquired any right for renewal. The High Court was not justified in observing that the policy decision was contrary to statute and for that reason direction for consideration of the application for renewal was necessary. Had the High Court not recorded any finding on the merits of respective stands, direction for consideration in accordance with law would have been proper and there would not have been any difficulty in accepting the plea of the learned counsel for the respondents. Had the High Court not recorded any finding on the merits of respective stands, direction for consideration in accordance with law would have been proper and there would not have been any difficulty in accepting the plea of the learned counsel for the respondents. But having practically foreclosed any consideration by the findings recorded, consideration of the application would have been mere formality and grant of renewal would have been the inevitable result, though it may be against the policy decision. That renders the High Court judgment indefensible.” 142. In M/s. Sharma Transport. Represented by D.P. Sharma v. Government of A.P. and others, AIR 2002 SC 322 , again it has been held that it is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used compelling the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. Doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. In MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Asstt. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and others, 2006 (8) SCC 702 , the Supreme Court has clarified the view with regard to no estoppel against a statute by saying that verdict of the High Court is erroneous to the extent that no plea of estoppel would lie against a statutory notification. According to the Supreme Court, (a) the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been repeatedly applied by this Court to statutory notifications, and (b) a plea of estoppel is in the nature of an equitable plea and must be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case where it is raised. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETIO and others, 2007 (5) SCC 447 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would undoubtedly be applicable where an entrepreneur alters his position pursuant to or in furtherance of the promise made by a State. In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETIO and others, 2007 (5) SCC 447 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would undoubtedly be applicable where an entrepreneur alters his position pursuant to or in furtherance of the promise made by a State. Unlike an ordinary estoppel, promissory estoppel gives rise to a cause of action. It indisputably creates a right. It also acts on equity. However, its application against constitutional or statutory provisions is impermissible in law. This judgement has also discussed about the legitimate expectation. It has been held that legitimate expectation is now considered to be a part of the principles of natural justice. If by reason of the existing state of affairs, a party is given to understand that the other party shall not take away the benefit without complying with the principles of natural justice, the said doctrine would be applicable. The legislature, indisputably, has the power to legislate but where the law itself recognises existing right and did not take away the same expressly or by necessary implication, the principles of legitimate expectation of a substantive benefit may be held to be applicable. Where the Court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit, which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the Court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the Court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy. In fact such part is reiterated from the case in R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan, 2001 QB 213 : (2000) 3 All ER 850 (CA). From Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. and another, JT 2008 (7) SC 216, we only find that the question of public interest cannot be taken as an exception to grant any such right in favour of anyone. From Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. and another, JT 2008 (7) SC 216, we only find that the question of public interest cannot be taken as an exception to grant any such right in favour of anyone. However, in that case we get reference of Mahabir Vegetable Oils (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Haryana and others, 2006 (3) SCC 620 , wherein in paragraph-25 it has been held that it is beyond any cavil that the doctrine of promissory estoppel operates even in the legislative field. However, it cannot override or run contrary to the public interest. In Rakesh Kumar Sharma and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2004 (3) AWC 2234, a Division Bench of our High Court has held that the Court is to consider whether any exercise of power made by the State Government is purely executive or administrative in nature or it is purely legislative in character. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, 1985 (1) SCC 641, it has been held that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned when it does not conform to the statute or is manifestly arbitrary. In T. Vijayalakshmi and others v. Town Planning Member and another, 2006 (8) SCC 502 , in deciding the question of legitimate expectation the Supreme Court held that right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision, the same cannot be taken away. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. In M.P. Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and others, 1997 (7) SCC 592 , it has been held that the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectation’ operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. In M.P. Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and others, 1997 (7) SCC 592 , it has been held that the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectation’ operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. In Madras City Wine Merchant’s Association and another v. State of T.N. and another, 1994 (5) SCC 509 , following the earlier judgements the Supreme Court has held that ‘legitimate expectation’ is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes its place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and ‘in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionality’. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 2005 (1) SCC 625 , following the earlier judgement of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., 1993 (3) SCC 499 : AIR 1994 SC 988 , the Supreme Court has held as follows : “8. A person may have a “legitimate expectation” of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. A person may have a “legitimate expectation” of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the Court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that “legitimate expectation” gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administration authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person’s legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest.” 143. However, it has further been held therein that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must forever be present in the mind of the Court. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must forever be present in the mind of the Court. Similar view was also reiterated by the Supreme Court in the judgement in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, Assam, AIR 2008 SC 2045 . 144. Promissory estoppel is not the one way traffic but it has to be adjudged rationally taking into account all balancing factors. Hence, factual aspect which supports the cause of promissory estoppel both ways has been taken into account. Natural Justice. 145. In Mangilal v. State of M.P., 2004 (2) SCC 447 , it has been held that where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in the areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The principles of natural justice have many facets. Two of them are : notice of the case to be met, and opportunity to explain. Citi Bank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank and others, 2004 (1) SCC 12 , has been cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner company on the special circumstances of this case. In the way of promissory estoppel it has been argued before us that Greater Noida Authority has already agreed with the petitioner company to do certain things and subsequently withdrawn themselves. Therefore, they are bound by the agreement, if any, by promissory estoppel and if not at least by legitimate expectation by using it as a shed but not as a seal in the present circumstances. To give emphasis on such facts Mr. Therefore, they are bound by the agreement, if any, by promissory estoppel and if not at least by legitimate expectation by using it as a shed but not as a seal in the present circumstances. To give emphasis on such facts Mr. Shashi Nandan has drawn our attention to paragraphs-45, 46 and 47 of such judgement to establish that even in a case of contract, novatio, recession or alteration of it can only be done with the agreement of both the parties of a contract. Both the parties have to agree to substitute the original contract with a new contract or rescind or alter. It cannot be done unilaterally. Therefore, any cancellation of the agreement without any hearing appears to be unilateral action and as such the effect of the same without any hearing appears to be arbitrary, perverse and malicious in nature. In Y.A.J. Noorbhai and another v. S.P.L.K.R. Karuppan Chetty, AIR 1925 PC 232, it has been held by the Privy Council that for the decision of the case there is no need to travel beyond the very elementary proposition of law that a contract is concluded when in the mind of each contracting party there is a consensus ad idem, and that a modification or revocation of the contract requires a like consensus. In Damodar Valley Corporation v. K.K. Kar, 1974 (1) SCC 141 : AIR 1974 SC 158 , it has been held that a contract is the creature of an agreement between the parties. A repudiation by one party alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it. 146. However, it has been further contended by the petitioner company that to avoid all such situations the respective authority wanted to give an explanation by way of an affidavit before the Court, which cannot be done in the manner as proposed following the principle as laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, 1978 (1) SCC 405 . There it has been held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. There it has been held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. In such judgement it was also observed as under : “8. ..... We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji [ AIR 1952 SC 16 ] : Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” This ratio has been followed in Bangalore Development Authority and others v. R. Hanumaiah and others, 2005 (12) SCC 508. It has also been contended by the petitioner company that an order of the statutory authority based on irrelevant considerations is bad. In M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa and others, 1975 (2) SCC 649 a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court has held as under : “The Executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous considerations. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The Courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by Courts by failing to give reasons. Only such a decision will be lawful. The Courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by Courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the Court can direct them to consider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of those reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts.” (Emphasis supplied) 147. Mr. Upadhyaya, on the other hand, has contended before this Court that by virtue of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. M/s. Jesus Sales Corporation, AIR 1996 SC 1509 , when principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing. Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special facts and circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open to such authority to decide the appeal or the application only after affording a personal hearing. But any order passed after taking into consideration the points raised in the appeal or the application shall not be held to be invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been afforded. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to exercise the discretion in connection with statutory appeals (as in the case therein), it shall lead to chaotic conditions. In Union of India and others v. Ex Constable Amrik Singh, AIR 1991 SC 564 , following the earlier judgements, the Supreme Court has held that audi alteram partem rule may, therefore, by the experimental test, be excluded. Mr. Upadhyaya further relied upon this judgement basically to confront with the right of hearing of the petitioner company to establish that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. Mr. Upadhyaya further relied upon this judgement basically to confront with the right of hearing of the petitioner company to establish that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. He further cited Executive Engineer, Bhadrak (R&B) Division, Orissa, and others v. Rangadhar Mallik, JT 1992 (5) SC 364, to establish that in spite of consideration of the cause by the Governor on the representation and furnished document when representation was rejected without giving any personal hearing, it cannot be said that the action taken by the Government was in any manner illegal or against the principles of natural justice. 148. The petitioner company, on the other hand, contended by citing the judgement in M/s. R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nurshing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another, 1989 (1) SCC 628 , that personal hearing is part of principles of natural justice. If any order is passed in violation of such principles of natural justice, it can be treated to be nullity. The act in violation of the principles of natural justice or a quasi judicial act in violation of the principles of natural justice is void or of no value. Relying upon Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66 and Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 1 All ER 208, the Supreme Court held that the House of Lords in England has made it clear that breach of natural justice nullifies the order made in breach. If that is so then the order made in violation of principles of natural justice was of no value. 149. Following the ratio of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, 1997 (7) SCC 463 , held that while examining ‘reasonableness’ of an administrative decision the Court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one while no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one while no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. From Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, 2003 (4) SCC 579 , we get an answer that the Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above : like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether the action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another, 2005 (2) SCC 42 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that personal liberty cannot be taken away except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Personal liberty is a constitutional guarantee. However, Article 21, which guarantees the above right, also contemplates deprivation of personal liberty by procedure established by law. Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P.) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR’s., AIR 1980 SC 1118 , we find that person interested should be given an opportunity to be heard which includes a body, local authority, or a company, for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In any event, here the position is little different so to say that the land has not been acquired by the Government for the purpose of company but the company itself acquired the land for the public purpose or for the benefit of the beneficiaries. However, so far as the natural justice is concerned, both stands on same footing. Malice 150. R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (6) SCC 430 , we can get the brief description what is malice, as follows : “25. The difference in concept of malice in law and malice on fact is well known. Any action resorted to for an unauthorised purpose would construe malice in law. Malice 150. R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (6) SCC 430 , we can get the brief description what is malice, as follows : “25. The difference in concept of malice in law and malice on fact is well known. Any action resorted to for an unauthorised purpose would construe malice in law. [See S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1979 SC 49 ; State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739 ; Chairman & MD, BPL v. S.P. Gururaja, (2003) 8 SCC 567 ; and also Punjab SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh, (2005) 6 SCC 776 .] 26. “Malice” in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed for a wrongful act done intentionally but without just cause or excuse or for one of reasonable or probable cause. The term “malice on fact” would come within the purview of the aforementioned definition. Even, however, in the absence of any malicious intention, the principle of malice in law can be invoked as has been described by Viscount Haldane in Shearer v. Shields, 1913 AC 808, at p. 813 in the following terms : “A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently.” 27. The said principle has been narrated briefly in S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India (supra) in the following terms : (SCC p. 494, para 5) “Thus malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.” 151. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately came to a conclusion that a discretionary power, as is well known, cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner. 152. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately came to a conclusion that a discretionary power, as is well known, cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner. 152. Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh and others, 2005 (6) SCC 776 , we find that even if an order is found to be not vitiated by reason of malice on fact but still can be held to be invalid if the same has been passed for unauthorised purposes, as it would amount to malice in law. Thus, malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. From West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray, AIR 2007 SC 976 , we get the ingredients and meaning of malice. 153. There cannot be any dispute on the proposition that the power of eminent domain of the State to acquire the land is by now well established. The principles enunciated by the House of Lords in the judgement in Burmah Oil Company (Burma Trading), Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1964 (2) All ER 348 and the law laid down by the Apex Court leave no room for doubt that the power of eminent domain vests in the sovereign and one of the caveates for the exercise of such power is that the acquisition should be for a public purpose. The action of acquisition and the decision-making process should reflect that the State has proceeded to acquire the land for a public purpose with a genuine and bonafide intent. Mala fides in the exercise of such power at times do compel the Courts to intervene with the severity as it is necessary to rectify the error through judicial surveillance. 154. Learned Counsel for the petitioner company has relied on primarily two decisions in State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, 1980 (2) SCC 471 and Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, 1985 (3) SCC 1 , to contend that such powers have been exercised by the Apex Court in these cases. Before we embark upon to analyze the law on this issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts of the above noted two cases and compare the same with the facts of the present case. Before we embark upon to analyze the law on this issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts of the above noted two cases and compare the same with the facts of the present case. In the matter relating to Gurdial Singh (supra) a political heavyweight managed to get the premises of a Mandi Samiti deliberately located on a land, which was owned by his political enemy and for which there was no intended public purpose, inasmuch as there was land available for the Mandi Samiti elsewhere. The Court after traversing the facts came to the conclusion that the entire acquisition proceedings were actuated by this political enmity and the project of setting up of Mandi Samiti was highjacked so as to dislodge the tenure-holder of his land without serving any public purpose. This action was termed as a mala fide action of the State and the acquired site was liberated through a judicial intervention. 155. In the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra), Hindi Sahitya Sammelan at Allahabad, with its premises just 100 feet away from the disputed site, objected to the setting up of a cinema hall by the tenure-holder and having failed in its attempt to prevent coming up of the theater, manipulated the acquisition on the alleged need of setting up of a museum for the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. The Apex Court found that Hindi Sahitya Sammelan had quarter of a century ago acquired property and only land was available to it for setting up of a museum but the same was never done. Confronted with this situation, Sahitya Sammelan came with a plea that it had other purpose to fulfill and named it as setting up of a cultural theater and a dancing hall. The Apex Court criticized the aforesaid plea of Sahitya Sammelan and ultimately found that it had no interest in acquiring the land for its purpose but the entire exercise was conducted to deprive the tenure-holder of his right to construct a cinema hall over the said land. 156. The Apex Court criticized the aforesaid plea of Sahitya Sammelan and ultimately found that it had no interest in acquiring the land for its purpose but the entire exercise was conducted to deprive the tenure-holder of his right to construct a cinema hall over the said land. 156. A perusal of the facts of the aforesaid cases would indicate that in both the disputes it was almost the private interest of a political heavyweight in the first case and the private interest of Sahitya Sammelan not to allow to a cinema hall to come up in its vicinity in the second case, that were the guiding factors of the acquisition. The aforesaid intents were, therefore, held not to be a public purpose and rather the acquisitions were vitiated as they were tainted with oblique motive of private interest. 157. In the instant case, the land is being acquired for development of an industrial area spread over about 300 hectares of land in order to encourage foreign and private entrepreneurship in modern technological advancement including information technology. Thus, the purpose of acquisition is clearly for public purpose and which has also been held to be such in the decision of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) relating to the same acquisition. The purpose, therefore, is in contradistinction to the private interest, which was involved in the case of Gurdial Singh (supra) and Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra). The aforesaid two cases, therefore, in our opinion, do not come to the aid of the petitioner company for establishing or supporting the plea of mala fides on the facts that are available in the present case. 158. However, it cannot be denied that the power of judicial review and the Court’s power of judicial surveillance in such matters are available and extend to the decision-making process of the executive authority in proceeding to make acquisitions. Malice in law has been broadly held to be an action which indicates that the power relating to the action has been exercised not for the purpose for which it is assigned. Malice in law has been broadly held to be an action which indicates that the power relating to the action has been exercised not for the purpose for which it is assigned. This principle of legal malice has been enunciated in a large number of cases and one can have the benefit of finding those principles in the following decisions : (1) Shearer and another v. Shields, 1914 Appeal Cases 808; (2) Smt. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India and another, 1979 (2) SCC 491 ; (3) State of A.P. and others v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, 2003 (4) SCC 739 ; (4) Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja and others, 2003 (8) SCC 567 ; (5) Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh and others, 2005 (6) SCC 776 ; and (6) R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (6) SCC 430 . 159. In the event such legal malice can be located, then it can be said that it is a fraud on the power which is being exercised by the authority as it is being done against the proposition of law. The executive action has to be judged by the norms professed by the authority and it should not be actuated by any personal interest or oblique motive or such other factors. The decision-making process should be an action of fair play and the application of mind and the manner by execution of such authority should be such as explained by the Apex Court in the judgement in M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa and others, 1975 (2) SCC 649 (paragraph 11-13). Judging by the said norms the action taken against the petitioner company in the present case has to be assessed. The power of eminent domain of acquisition, therefore, is circumscribed by a reasonableness and fair play in action to the aforesaid extent. This Court will, therefore, have to carefully trace the paths of judicial scrutiny on the lines as laid down by the Apex Court and indicated hereinabove. The exercise of power of acquisition should not be merely erroneous but it should be demonstratively and palpably without reasonable cause so as to render it malafide. For this the facts of this case will have to be traversed. The date of acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is 10th April, 2006. The exercise of power of acquisition should not be merely erroneous but it should be demonstratively and palpably without reasonable cause so as to render it malafide. For this the facts of this case will have to be traversed. The date of acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is 10th April, 2006. The petitioner company has taken the Court to the previous history of the litigation to demonstrate that the land, which was being acquired by the petitioner company for the purpose of setting up of a technology park under the permission of the State Government, faced bad weather when the State Government withdrew the permission and the petitioner company had to punch this into litigation. After having succeeded in bringing the State Government back to the negotiating table, the petitioner company proceeded to obtain formal sanction of plan from the NOIDA authority, which was being scuttled and denied on account of non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions for such development. Not only this, one of the reasons that primarily were indicated in the orders, that are under challenge, is that the petitioner company had failed to acquire the extent of land that was required for the purpose of setting up of technology park to the tune of 200 acres. The petitioner company contends that such reason was self-contradictory, inasmuch as it was the State Government which had created this mess by withdrawing the permission and thereby not allowing the petitioner company to proceed with the project. According to the petitioner company, this acquisition of property had got nothing to do with the acquisition proceedings, which arrived almost 15 years ago of setting up of the project. From the facts that have been brought on record, it appears that the petitioner company get a new lease of life to set up their project after the order dated 09th December, 1991 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9570 of 1989. The land of the petitioner company again fell in the rough weather when the assets of the petitioner company were clubbed with that of M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Ltd. and that litigation received the attention of the Apex Court where directions were issued to transfer the land to the applicants, who had invested their amount for purchase of plots within the area of technology park to be set up by the petitioner company. These circumstances have been pressed into service on factual basis before this Court to contend that all these happened prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, about which the State Government had full and complete knowledge and in spite of the same, the State Government proceeded to acquire the land at the instance of NOIDA authorities, who were also competing as against the petitioner company to develop the area as an industrial and technological area. In the aforesaid background, it is to be seen as to whether the State Government in spite of the aforesaid developments could have proceeded to acquire the land. The petitioner company has also demonstrated that when the Master Plan of 2011 was approved for Greater NOIDA, the same included the site of the petitioner company’s land as the proposed technology park project. On the strength of such facts it is further alleged that the Greater NOIDA authority was fully aware of existence of plan of the petitioner company, yet they surreptitiously with the add of the State Government proposed the acquisition of land of the petitioner company as well in the garb of new Master Plan-2021. It is also the case of the petitioner company that the Master Plan-2021 does not conform to law and as a matter of fact since the area falls within the National Capital Region, the plan cannot be said to be an approved plan as it does not have the sanction of the National Capital Region Board. Even otherwise, it was submitted with the projection by the State Government and by the NOIDA authorities that the petitioner company did not have sufficient land to set up the project and, therefore, its plans were rejected as against the weight of evidence on record, inasmuch as the extent of land which had already been acquired and which was subsequently acquired, was demonstrated before the Apex Court and that also forms part of record in the Bahri Commission’s report, which was a Commission appointed by the Apex Court to verify the properties of M/s. Technology Park Ltd. that had been taken over by M/s. Skipper Construction Company Private Ltd. 160. It is, however, to be noted that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act have been issued after the request of the petitioner company has been rejected by the State Government in respect of approval of the plan for proceeding with the project. Nonetheless this establishes with regard to the extent of holding of the petitioner company and the transfer that were to be made in respect of 482 plots. The aforesaid facts have been taken care of by the Supreme Court in its order dated 08th November, 2005. 161. Another relevant fact, which deserves to be mentioned, is that there had been a compromise, on the basis whereof the NOIDA and the State had proceeded to consider the furtherance of the project of the petitioner company. The said compromise was unilaterally withdrawn on 07th August, 1996, which was challenged before this Court and the said order was quashed on 17th April, 2003. This fact is necessary in order to demonstrate that there was a continuity of the negotiations and this Court had directed the authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Thus, in the aforesaid backdrop the litigation in respect of the acquisition, transfer of property to other hands and also in relation to the rejection of the plan were all pending consideration before this Court and were subject matter of several disputes. The upshot of the aforesaid facts is, therefore, that the State was fully aware of this background before it proceeded to make acquisitions. 162. The question that now arises for determination is as to whether the aforesaid background of the case lends support to the elements of mala fides in relation to the acquisition or not? To our mind, this issue will have to be judged from the angle that fulfillment of the project of petitioner company is one aspect of the matter and the acquisition of land by the State Government is another. The mala fides with relation to the action taken in rejection of the plan may be available to the extent of annulling the orders, which have been passed rejecting the proposal of the petitioner company to set up the project. One such reason, which has been given, is non-availability of full extent of land to the petitioner company. The mala fides with relation to the action taken in rejection of the plan may be available to the extent of annulling the orders, which have been passed rejecting the proposal of the petitioner company to set up the project. One such reason, which has been given, is non-availability of full extent of land to the petitioner company. In the event, it is found that such reason was a valid reason or not, then the action of the State Government to the extent of refusing the permission to go ahead with the project would be invalidated. The malafide, therefore, may be attributed to the power of the State Government exercised while disposing of the proposal for sanction of plan and the other co-related matters. 163. So far as the acquisition is concerned, the same as already indicated above is for an industrial purpose. The purpose, for which the land is being acquired, therefore, is a larger public purpose and all for a larger area than what is owned by the petitioner company. To that extent it cannot be said that the State Government has proceeded to acquire the land of the petitioner company only with a view to dislodge it of its ownership. The malafides, therefore, cannot be attributed to the State so far as the purpose for which the land has been acquired. The reason for acquisition, therefore, is not actuated by a mala fide exercise of power by the State merely because the acquisition is started during the pendency of the litigation and the finalization of the project. This can also be adjudged from another angle. Taking an extreme view, even if the petitioner company had fulfilled its project of setting up of a park 15 years ago itself, can it be said that the State had no power to acquire the said land? It is again to be noted herein that one will have to remind oneself of the power of eminent domain. The sovereign can exercise this power in respect of any property, where it is reasonable to acquire or they are being held for one purpose or the other so long as it is being done for a public purpose. It is again to be noted herein that one will have to remind oneself of the power of eminent domain. The sovereign can exercise this power in respect of any property, where it is reasonable to acquire or they are being held for one purpose or the other so long as it is being done for a public purpose. It is not for this Court to examine as to whether the purpose of the State Government is a better public purpose or the same public purpose, inasmuch as this is not within the realm of judicial review. So long as the purpose is not malafide, it cannot be said that the State Government has proceeded with an ulterior motive only to deprive the petitioner company of its property. After all, acquisition is deprivation but it is coupled with compensation. In the instant case, if the petitioner company is deprived of its land, it has a right to claim compensation in accordance with law, provided the petitioner company is able to establish its title over the land. 164. The malafide, if any, therefore, can be pressed into service in relation to the orders that have been passed by the State Government but conversely, the same cannot be attributed as an element so as to invalidate the acquisition proceedings. The cases cited at the bar on behalf of the petitioner company, therefore, in view of the aforesaid facts do not come to the aid of the petitioner company, as suggested. Acquisition of Land : 165. So far as acquisition is concerned, Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act clearly speaks that a publication of preliminary notification is required to be made by the appropriate Government indicating that the land of any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. A notification to that effect will be published in two daily newspapers, inclusive of one in the regional language, widely circulated in the locality. A notification to that effect will be published in two daily newspapers, inclusive of one in the regional language, widely circulated in the locality. If such notification is issued under Section 4 (1), there is a provision for hearing of objection under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and on the basis of such objection when appropriate Government is satisfied considering the report under Section 5-A(2) that any land in needed for public purpose or for any company, the Government authorises to circulate the orders and different declarations may be made from time to time. Admittedly, in the present case, the land in question needed for the purpose was purchased by the petitioner company for the public purpose by themselves i.e. institutional, industrial and residential. Requiring body i.e. the Greater Noida Authority has been formed subsequent to such acquisition/purchase by the petitioner company. But they have also insisted the Government for making advertisement for public purpose through the Greater Noida Authority. Therefore, the purpose of the Government is not the personal purpose but public purpose. On the other hand, the Government has also notified the property for the public purpose through the requiring body i.e. Greater Noida Authority. Against this factual aspect of the matter, the case is to be considered. The dispute is public purpose both by a company and the Greater Noida Authority. Law says that process of acquisition can be proceeded for public purpose or for a company. Therefore, need of the company is alternative of a public purpose. But when need of the company is for the public purpose similar to Governmental body then the public purpose can be subserved directly through the company by withdrawing notification or by making compromise because both the purposes are made for public. Therefore, the compromise, which was arrived at between the petitioner company and the Greater Noida Authority, was an intelligent administrative work, which cannot be nullified unless, of course, it is seen that the petitioner company’s grievance is not genuine. In the present case, 200 acres of land was needed for the purpose of work but as and when the Bahri Commission’s report was being placed on 05th September, 2001, the petitioner company was having actual right, title and interest for 115.46 acres of land. Therefore, there was a shortfall. This shortfall can be met by the petitioner company on the basis of the understanding and assurance. Therefore, there was a shortfall. This shortfall can be met by the petitioner company on the basis of the understanding and assurance. It is not an easy task for a private company to acquire such vast area of land like the Government. It took little time but by the passage of time from November, 2005 to March, 2006 the petitioner company has purchased the further land of 69 acres and 36 acres respectively. It has spent huge sum of money, as indicated above, about Rs. 15 crores and above. Under no circumstances, this can be construed that the petitioner company had no sufficient land. Therefore, had the petitioner company’s grievance not genuine, there was no occasion to fulfil the condition of having 200 acres of land. Hence, not having 200 acres of land might be a condition, but condition is not such that it can be said to be outcome of falsity. It can be construed as illegality in view of the subsequently efforts made by the petitioner company to regularize the shortfall, if any. Moreover, as and when in the last occasion the Court was pleased to direct the State to consider the cause, the shortfall was ratified by the Division Bench. Hence, no question can be raised with regard to the shortfall. The Court was further pleased to direct the State to hear out the case on the ground that no notice under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was served for a considerable time for acquiring the land and when such order was passed by the State in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same was challenged before the Court by means of a writ petition. A further grievance has been raised that whatever land has been acquired by the petitioner company, that has been acquired in fragmented area which will not suit the public purpose of the petitioner company. However, according to us, how the fragmented land will be utilized or utilization will be made or lastly the structure will be made in composite, that is procedural or regulatory matter, which is incidental to the original action. Under no circumstances, such fragmentation can be treated to be a ground for ignoring the grievance of a company to develop such huge area of the land for public purpose. 166. Mr. Under no circumstances, such fragmentation can be treated to be a ground for ignoring the grievance of a company to develop such huge area of the land for public purpose. 166. Mr. Zafar Naiyar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, has contended before this Court that after the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006 (M/s. Technology Park Limited v. State of U.P. and another) on 02nd May, 2006, there is no scope for the petitioner company to approach the writ Court for the selfsame relief. Either the petitioner company has to approach to the State Government or it can approach to the Supreme Court. There is no scope to reopen the issue before the writ Court. As against the query of the Court that the State will consider the issue on the basis of the general directions, as given by the Court, or under any specific statute, he answered that when the Court observed that notice under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has not been issued, it cannot be construed that it means consideration will be done under Section 48 (1) of the said Act. According to him, save and except Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act there is no scope to consider the cause allegedly for withdrawal of the acquisition. We have further enquired that if the Court directs the petitioner company to approach to the State for withdrawing the acquisition of the land, of which they are in possession, under Section 48 (1) of the said Act, whether the same presupposes the land was in actual possession of the petitioner company or not, to which no answer was available with the State. However, he relied upon various judgements to establish before the Court that challenging the order impugned by way of judicial review is hit by the principle of constructive resjudicata. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Explanation (V) therein clearly bars any relief claim in the plaint (petition herein), which is not expressly granted by the decree (order herein), shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to have been refused. In support of his contention, Mr. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Explanation (V) therein clearly bars any relief claim in the plaint (petition herein), which is not expressly granted by the decree (order herein), shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to have been refused. In support of his contention, Mr. Naiyar relied upon Kumaravelu Chettiar and others v. T.P. Ramaswami Ayyar and others, AIR 1933 PC 183; Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1961 SC 1457 ; Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and others, AIR 1965 SC 1150 ; Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, AIR 1987 SC 88 ; Anand Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 1993 (1) UPLBEC 165 and Purshottam Das Tandon v. Military Estate Officer, AIR 2000 All 127 . We have no quarrel with the proposition of law but, according to us, such proposition of law is inapplicable in this case from the version of the State itself. If the State says that the proceeding initiated by the State is under Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, which has been done allegedly in violation of the principles of natural justice, at least on two grounds i.e. (i) merit, and (ii) violation of principles of natural justice it can be challenged. Hence, we do not find any cause to interfere with such submission. So far as a further fact though not directly involved with the land acquisition of the petitioner company but incidental thereto i.e. reference of the Division Bench judgement of this High Court in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) is concerned, the same cannot also defeat the cause of the petitioner company herein. 167. The land acquisition proceedings, which are under challenge herein, relate to Village Tusiyana, where an area of 373.218 hectares was acquired by the State Government which also includes the land of the petitioner company. The acquisition was challenged by Sudhir Chandra Agarwala, who was holder of a small area of 0.7830 hectares, on the ground that there was no public purpose for acquisition of the land and further even if there was a public purpose, there was no urgent need so as to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The challenge was that the acquisition is a result of mechanical exercise of executive power, which reflects non-application of mind and there was no material to substantiate the invoking of urgency clause. 168. The said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 29th February, 2008 and the special leave petition filed against the said judgement has also been reportedly dismissed by the Apex Court. In the aforesaid background and in view of the fact that the State as well as the NOIDA both have pressed into service the aforesaid decision to defend the acquisition, it is necessary to delve into the impact of the said judgement. 169. We may note at the very outset that the learned Counsel for the petitioner company Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate, has come up with a prayer that since the question of urgency and dispensation of an enquiry under Section 5-A has already been upheld by this Court and the decision has also been approved by the Supreme Court, then in that view of the matter even though such a point has been taken but was not being canvassed as if a reconsideration of the said point is required. The same can only be done by the Apex Court if permissible in law. He, therefore, submits that leaving that issue apart for the time being, the Court may examine as to whether the present petition is bound by the said decision or not. 170. This Court in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) came to the conclusion that there was material before the State Government to record its subjective satisfaction for invoking the urgency clause, inasmuch as several applications had been received by a large number of local and foreign investors to set up their industrial units in the locality in order to contribute to the purpose of planned industrial development as envisaged in the purpose set out by the State Government for acquiring the land. The Court further found that in view of the material, which was available, the question of objectively dealing with the subjective satisfaction of the State Government did not arise in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgement in First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Ganguli and others, 2002 (4) SCC 160 . It was further found that the petitioner therein was holder of a very small portion of land and keeping in view the fact that a large number of tenure-holders had not challenged the acquisition and were only contesting for enhanced compensation, there was no occasion to strike down the acquisition as it did not substantially affect the petitioner. While deciding the said case, reference was also made to the pendency of the writ petitions filed by M/s. Technology Park Limited. On the strength of the aforesaid decision learned Additional Advocate General Sri Zafar Naiyar and learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State as well as Sri V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate for the NOIDA, have urged that the acquisition has been upheld by a coordinate Bench and in the event this Bench forms a different opinion, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench or in the alternative the aforesaid decision is binding as it is a valid precedent and relates to the same acquisition. 171. Sri Shashi Nandan contends that the aforesaid aspect of the matter need not detain this Court for long as the petitioner company’s rights are involved substantially for a fairly very large area as compared to that of the petitioner in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). Secondly, the acquisition in the present proceedings is being challenged on the ground of malafides, which was not the ground taken in the said case, and thirdly, a mere reference to the pendency of the writ petitions filed by the petitioner company cannot amount to an adjudication of rights of the petitioner company. He further submits that every individual tenure-holder has a right to advance his case and the mere dismissal of a writ petition that too even for a negligible small area cannot deprive the petitioner company of its rights to challenge the acquisition proceedings. 172. We have perused the said decision as also the facts of that case and we find that while dismissing the writ petition this Court had made a mere reference to the pendency of the challenge to the proceedings by M/s. Technology Park Limited. In our opinion, every individual tenure-holder has a right to challenge the acquisition proceedings separately and, therefore, the petitioner company cannot be bound by the rejection of the challenge in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra), which was founded on its own facts. In our opinion, every individual tenure-holder has a right to challenge the acquisition proceedings separately and, therefore, the petitioner company cannot be bound by the rejection of the challenge in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra), which was founded on its own facts. At the best, the ratio of the said decision in relation to the availability of the material to invoke the urgency clause can be said to have been decided by this Court and affirmed by the Apex Court upon dismissal of the special leave petition. To that extent only the aforesaid judgement can be read against the petitioner company but there is no occasion for this Court to reject the other contentions raised herein merely because the decision in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) has become final. Apart from this, the background of the present case and the facts, which have given rise to challenge to the proceedings, do not differ on a minor variation but there is a substantial diversion of facts, which makes the present case thoroughly distinguishable from the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). Not only this, several judicial orders have also intervened in the present case prior to dismissal of the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala, which were neither in issue therein nor were subject matter of controversy for adjudication and, as such, the dismissal of the said writ petition cannot in any way automatically deprive the petitioner company of its rights to maintain the present proceedings. Apart from this, the records relating to finalization of Master Plan, Zonal Plan and the decisions of the National Capital Region Board have been examined by us and we find that the entire material, which was placed before us in this regard, was not under consideration nor any decision has been rendered in this aspect in the judgement of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). Accordingly, the objection taken by the State to that extent cannot be accepted. The issue of referring the case to another Bench, therefore, may not arise at all as this case has to be decided on the facts and the materials available on record in this proceeding and cannot be disposed of on the observations made in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). The issue of referring the case to another Bench, therefore, may not arise at all as this case has to be decided on the facts and the materials available on record in this proceeding and cannot be disposed of on the observations made in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). In our opinion, the dismissal of the writ petition of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala cannot deprive the petitioner company to maintain the present writ petition subject to the observations made herein above. 173. So far as that Division Bench judgement is concerned, the same is related to acquisition proceedings of an individual’s land measuring 0.783 hectare comparable to about 2 acres. The Division Bench of this High Court ultimately held that the petitioner would not suffer any hardship if the land purchased by him for small farm measuring 0.783 hectare included in the acquisition of the area of 373.218 hectares is acquired for planned industrial development, a public purpose for which the land is needed. In such case only reference has been made regarding challenge with regard to acquisition of land by such petitioner as well as the petitioner company herein. But the Court was not called upon to decide the case of the petitioner company herein nor the same was contemplated. Only reference of the petitioner company and disposal of some writ petitions in the name of the petitioner company have been incorporated with further reference that the farmers have not received the compensation with a hope to increase of compensation. Such matter reached to the Supreme Court and when the special leave petition is dismissed, it can be construed as final but such finality is reached with regard to the case of the petitioner therein alone. It cannot be said that the order binding upon the petitioner therein will be impliedly binding upon the petitioner company herein. The ultimate order was with regard to no hardship and smallness of the land in question. In such case the State Government had placed the entire records including the recommendations made by the Collector on the request of the Greater Noida Authority and the satisfaction recorded by the State Government of such material in respect of the urgency. The ultimate order was with regard to no hardship and smallness of the land in question. In such case the State Government had placed the entire records including the recommendations made by the Collector on the request of the Greater Noida Authority and the satisfaction recorded by the State Government of such material in respect of the urgency. One of the most vital factual aspect which has been considered by the Division Bench is that the petitioner is living in House No. 355, Sector 15-A, NOIDA and is using the small property for pleasure. Only small portion of land surrounded by 8 feet high boundary wall, a pump house and store, ornamental flowers and fruit bearing trees are available. According to us, such factum under no circumstances can be comparable with the case of the petitioner company herein. There the case is between the pleasure and the public purpose, whereas the instant case is between public purpose and the public purpose by the Greater Noida Authority. Hence, the referred case is factually distinguishable in nature. Mere reference of the name of the petitioner company therein ipso facto cannot be construed as a decision of the case referred herein as a binding decision. 174. Before we take up the issues raised in the present writ petition, it would be appropriate to answer the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents, namely, the NOIDA and the State Government, as to the binding effect of the decision already rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). The notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 17 thereof, which are presently involved, were in issue in the said writ petition as well. We have carefully perused the judgement and we find that the said judgement primarily revolves around the challenge to the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 respectively on the ground of dispensation of the notice under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and the alleged non-existence of the grounds of emergency for invoking the said clause in order to take possession of the land for the purposes of development. The petitioner therein challenged the notifications urging that there was no material before the State Government to arrive at a conclusion so as to warrant dispensation of the notice under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner therein challenged the notifications urging that there was no material before the State Government to arrive at a conclusion so as to warrant dispensation of the notice under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court after deliberation and after having seen the record of the State Government came to the conclusion that there were sufficient materials to invoke the urgency clause and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings were upheld. We are informed that special leave petition against the same has already been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The crucial question is the impact of the aforesaid decision in the present proceedings. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition that if the same acquisition proceedings are under challenge and the Court after examining the record comes to the conclusion that there was material in existence, then the same challenged in another writ petition has to be accepted provided there are reasons not to agree with such decision. In such a situation if a coordinate Bench does not agree with the findings arrived at then the option left is only to refer it to a larger Bench, provided there are grounds existing to do so. It goes without saying that for such purpose the appropriate Court has to keep in mind the principles referring a matter to a larger Bench upon disagreement as held by a Full Bench of our Court in the judgement in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., 1995 ACJ 200. 175. We have considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and we find that the main thrust of the said decision was to the effect that the Court cannot make a scrutiny of the proprietary of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision had been taken by the appropriate authority malafide. To be précised reference may had to be made to paragraph-27 of the said judgement. The factors that were taken into consideration with regard to the sufficiency onwards also dealt with the submissions relating to setting up of the institution by the foreign companies, which had applied for allotments of land. It was held that there was neither any ill-will or motive which would point out for invoking the urgency clause. The factors that were taken into consideration with regard to the sufficiency onwards also dealt with the submissions relating to setting up of the institution by the foreign companies, which had applied for allotments of land. It was held that there was neither any ill-will or motive which would point out for invoking the urgency clause. However, while delivering the judgement in paragraph-27 the Court also referred to the challenge to the notification by the petitioner company-M/s. Technology Park as well. 176. Having considered the aforesaid aspects, it is plain and simple that the said case may have upheld the acquisition under Sections 4 and 6 on the issue raised therein but the facts of the present case and the submissions advanced herein are altogether different, which were no where concerned with the decision that has been rendered in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). Merely because the factum of challenge by the petitioner as had been made therein would not operate as resjudicata or even as a binding precedent, inasmuch as the petitioner company was not a party to the said proceedings. It is a well known principle of law that there cannot be a binding precedent on mere facts. As discussed and elaborated herein above, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate a long battle between the petitioner company on the one side and the Greater NOIDA on the other side pertaining to the allotment of land to the petitioner company and its subsequent acquisition and the cancellation of allotment in favour of the petitioner company. The arguments advanced herein are that there was a non-application of mind to the relevant factors and that the decision given by the State Government and the NOIDA in respect of cancellation of the allotment in favour of the petitioner company were perverse. It has been further submitted that on account of such perversity the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are also vitiated. It has been further submitted that on account of such perversity the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are also vitiated. The question of cancellation of allotment to the petitioner company having been found to be perverse, would have a different bearing on the case and, therefore, such finding relating to cancellation of allotment, sanction of plan and further the judicial interference by this Court for giving a hearing to the petitioner company by the State Government and by the Supreme Court in respect of transfer of the land, were not the factors which were even remotely concerned or raised in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). 177. In our opinion, therefore, the facts of the case and the legal issues involved herein do not relate to the dispensation of the inquiry and challenge to Section 5-A in the same context as was involved in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). As noticed above, in the present case the challenge is that the acquisition is mala fide and so far as question of dispensation of notice under Section 5-A is concerned, that had already been diluted by the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006 dated 02nd May, 2006. Apart from this, the question of sanction of plan by the NOIDA, therefore, was noticed by the Apex Court in its order dated 10th March, 2005 and the NOIDA was directed to consider the question of sanction of plan to the petitioner company. These facts are relevant, inasmuch as according to the record of the case the process undertaken by the NOIDA with the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act had already taken place, even though the formal notification under Section 4 taken place in only 2006. Thus, the decision in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra), which was based on the issue of the dispensation of Section 5-A and the subjective satisfaction of the Government, would in no where disentitle the petitioner company to raise the issue presently involved nor would the said judgement operate as resjudicata. The arguments advanced on behalf of the State as well as NOIDA to that effect is, therefore, to be rejected. Apart from this, no form of estoppel would apply against the petitioner company in raising a challenge to the notification. The arguments advanced on behalf of the State as well as NOIDA to that effect is, therefore, to be rejected. Apart from this, no form of estoppel would apply against the petitioner company in raising a challenge to the notification. Under the land acquisition proceedings every aggrieved person has a right to raise a challenge to the acquisition proceedings and the ground taken by the each individual, who is the affected, may be different. The case, therefore, has to be judged on the basis of the facts involved and the issues raised therein and, therefore, the decision rendered in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) would not squarely apply against the petitioner company. 178. We are conscious of the fact that the acquisition having been upheld by a Division Bench cannot be set aside unless and until we arrive at a different conclusion insofar as the petitioner company is concerned. As noticed above, if the issues involved are identically same and a coordinate Bench comes to a different conclusion, then the matter has to be referred to a larger Bench. However, in the present case not only the facts and issues but the legal grounds raised for challenge to the acquisition proceedings are entirely different and, therefore, in our opinion, it would not be necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Apart from this, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company, has rightly urged that the petitioner company has not come up by way of a challenge on the issue of dispensation of inquiry, inasmuch as in the instant case through a judicial intervention the petitioner company was given an opportunity to raise its objection before the State Government. We are, therefore, of the view that the issue decided in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) would in no where imped the right of the petitioner company in the present case which are sought to be claimed on the basis of almost altogether different grounds which were neither the issues raised or decided in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). The petitioner company, therefore, in our opinion, will have to stand on their own legs and so is the case with the respondents. The judgement rendered in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) does not prevent this coordinate Bench from recording the findings on the issue raised herein. The petitioner company, therefore, in our opinion, will have to stand on their own legs and so is the case with the respondents. The judgement rendered in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) does not prevent this coordinate Bench from recording the findings on the issue raised herein. We, therefore, hold that the present writ petition can proceed independently and is not liable to be dismissed merely on the ground that the acquisition proceedings have been upheld in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). 179. The facts and the law raised herein are neither a new discovery nor any argumentative novelty which may require reconsideration of the judgement of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra). The present writ petitions had already been filed even before the decision rendered in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) and on altogether different facts and grounds available to the petitioner. As such, the criticism of the learned counsel for the respondents that this coordinate Bench may not sit in appeal or judgement over Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra), does not hold any water. 180. A Division Bench judgement of this Court in Manju Lata Agrawal (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(9) ADJ 447 (DB), has been cited before this Court to establish that the Court has a limited power of judicial review on question of “public purpose”. The Court can interfere with determination of ‘public purpose’ only when it finds that exercise of power by authority is a colourable exercise of power. It has been further held that dispensation of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act will be made on the basis of the subjective satisfaction only. We have no quarrel with such proposition of law. We are only concerned that in the factual background whether the exercise of power for acquisition of such land can be said to be free from colourable exercise of power or not. The Government knew before the Greater Noida Authority was formed that there is a proposal of such nature which requires huge amount of land. Such proposal was accepted other than the Governmental functionaries have applied their mind and given certain relaxations. Subsequently, Greater Noida Authority was formed and they wanted to get the land by way of acquisition through the Government for their public purpose. Therefore, both have attempted to get the land for public purpose. Such proposal was accepted other than the Governmental functionaries have applied their mind and given certain relaxations. Subsequently, Greater Noida Authority was formed and they wanted to get the land by way of acquisition through the Government for their public purpose. Therefore, both have attempted to get the land for public purpose. If one public purpose is available, what is the special interest for the Greater Noida Authority to fight it out for the land even after the compromise to enforce their right for public purpose, is unknown to this Court. In the law only alternative to public purpose is to get the land for a company. Therefore, we have to understand what is the legislative intent. Legislative intent is that if a company takes the land, it will do some commercial activities there, which ultimately not only enure the benefit of the locality but public at large. Hence, acquiring the land for the company is a special nature of acquisition than the public purpose but virtually inclusive of public purpose. Against this background, both the parties have proceeded. Hence, it cannot be said that the land which is likely to be acquired by the petitioner company prior to formation of the Greater Noida Authority is contrary to public purpose. The world is changing day by day. India as a country cannot be said to be out of the world. It has also been affected by the market economy like other countries. Everywhere the Government appears to be interested to accept the proposal of the private enterprises or giving liberty to do certain works required to be done by the Government or Governmental agency itself or doing in joint venture. If the circumstances are such, why the development by a company for public purpose will be refused by another Governmental functionary or body made for public purpose, is unknown to this Court. Element of malice cannot be ruled out. From the nature of proceeding requirement of time and diversion steps taken by the Government cannot be said that the element of malice is absent. It appears to us that at the time of making agreement the Greater Noida Authority was much more vocal and also at present on account of refusal it seems to be similarly vocal. 181. From the nature of proceeding requirement of time and diversion steps taken by the Government cannot be said that the element of malice is absent. It appears to us that at the time of making agreement the Greater Noida Authority was much more vocal and also at present on account of refusal it seems to be similarly vocal. 181. So far as the question of planned development through the Greater Noida Authority is concerned, it can be said to be unplanned viz.-a-viz. the company purpose for development, public purpose. It has given a layout plan. No joint inspection was made with the petitioner company but amongst the Government and the Governmental agency. The proposed layout plan was refused on the ground of sanction of plan by the Greater Noida Authority. But so far as the national capital zone is concerned, such plan cannot be construed as final but subject to the satisfaction and approval by the National Capital Region Authority as a condition precedent. Master Plan-2021 is non existent. Therefore, no decision can be taken on that score. In re : Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) it was held that a perusal of the list of industries would show that the GNIDA relied upon names of some of the industries, which have already set up their industrial units in other part of Greater Noida and that there was no foreign companies or institutions, which had proposed to set up an industrial unit in the area. In fact, GNIDA could not demonstrate or give the name of any foreign industry, which may have shown their interest for allotment of land in the Greater Noida. 182. Mr. H.R. Misra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Ram Chanduary, has contended before us that in the corporate sector a company is an individually juristic person. But it involves various persons. Their representatives mean aggrieved persons being assignee to the petitioner company. That apart in the earlier case the records and materials were produced but in this case even after repeated calls the State Government is not in a position to place any record for satisfaction about the urgency regarding acquisition, apart from the question of public purpose. In fact, by an order dated 01st May, 2006 the Supreme Court has directed to execute certain sale-deeds in favour of some of the assignees. 183. In fact, by an order dated 01st May, 2006 the Supreme Court has directed to execute certain sale-deeds in favour of some of the assignees. 183. So far as release of land is concerned, a three Judges’ Bench judgement of the Supreme Court in Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and another etc. v. State of U.P. and others etc., AIR 1990 SC 645 , held that when a portion of the land was in the occupation of the co-operative societies for providing residential accommodation of their members, the Ghaziabad Development Authority constituted by the State of Uttar Pradesh for the same purpose should not have been permitted to acquire the said land to their prejudice and there is no justification for depriving such persons of their right to representation under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. There the Court also found that a master plan was drawn up for the area and some portions have been developed while the lands of five co-operative societies have not yet been improved on account of pendency of group of cases. Therefore, the Court ultimately held that the lands will be released in favour of the co-operative societies, who will form federation for the purpose of ensuring the appropriate development and sharing either in common or by division of extra land, which is directed to be released from acquisition. So far as Uttar Pradesh Residents Employees Co-operative House Building Society and others v. The New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and another, AIR 1990 SC 1325 , is concerned, the Supreme Court has held that the land acquisition for the industrial development by NOIDA under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act will continue but the land acquired by the co-operative society for its members will be given to the society (concerned co-operative society therein) in terms of consensus arrived at. 184. Mr. Zafar Naiyer wanted to submit his case with the support of the judgement in Ved Prakash and others v. Ministry of Industry, Lucknow and another, 2003 (9) SCC 542 . The ratio of the judgement is that the authority has power to acquire the land and give necessary directions or take steps to maintain and regulate the sites in the large area of about few hundred acres of land and building in the area. The ratio of the judgement is that the authority has power to acquire the land and give necessary directions or take steps to maintain and regulate the sites in the large area of about few hundred acres of land and building in the area. The statutory authority has also right to consider the cause of abadi when it is spread in scattered manner over the large area. However, the authority found therein that it is not feasible to release the land to the appellants from acquisition under Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court had passed the order for consideration of the cause, which has been done by the authority. Thereafter, taking an overall view of the matter having regard to the facts of the case and in the light of law applicable therein the High Court has rightly affirmed the order of rejection of representations. We are of the view that ratio of the judgement cannot be applicable herein due to peculiar circumstances of the case herein. We are not concerned about the acquisition only or acquisition for public purpose against any pleasure, but we are considering the cause of public purpose versus public purpose in the given circumstances. He further cited a judgement in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others, 1996 (3) SCC 124, to establish that it is settled law when notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is published in the gazette, any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. It is also settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published. He further cited Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, 1993 (2) SCC 84 , to establish that when large chunk of land has been acquired by the requiring housing board, some of the houses here and there cannot be construed as abadi. In Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, 2004 (8) SCC 453 , it has been held that Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and 5-A of such Act. In Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, 2004 (8) SCC 453 , it has been held that Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and 5-A of such Act. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power, as use of such power deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the land can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the landowners and the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. “Urgency” for invoking of Section 17 of the said Act should be one arising naturally out of circumstances, which exist when the decision to acquire the land is taken and not such, which is the result of serious lapse or gross delay on the part of the acquiring authority. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State administration. Failure to take timely action for acquisition by the authorities cannot be a ground to invoke the urgency clause to the serious detriment of the right of the landowner to raise objections to the acquisition under Section 5-A. However, the position may be different where the delay is caused or occasioned by the landowner himself. From M/s. Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, JT 2008 (7) SC 120, we find that invocation of Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act was approved by the Supreme Court in the factual situation therein. The fact remained that the acquisition was made under the Master Plan prepared by the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and the same got approval of the National Capital Region Planing Board and loan was sanctioned by the Board and a part of which has already been spent. But at the same time the Court has cautioned about invocation of Section 5-A in the following manner : “Right to file objection under Section 5-A is a valuable right and the Governments are not given a free hand to dispense with Section 5-A. Section 5-A is only a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the power by the State. Invocation of such a provision is also sometimes imperative as in order to meet the urgency of the situation it needs to be invoked in public interest. It depends upon case to case where in a given situation Section 5-A has been correctly invoked and the authorities were satisfied in an objective manner.” 185. Invocation of such a provision is also sometimes imperative as in order to meet the urgency of the situation it needs to be invoked in public interest. It depends upon case to case where in a given situation Section 5-A has been correctly invoked and the authorities were satisfied in an objective manner.” 185. We do not find any reason to cite the judgements in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another, 1995 (3) SCC 507 and Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and another, 1996 (4) SCC 622 , on the part of the State. Possibly the State wanted to establish before the Court credential of the company, namely, M/s. Skipper Construction since in the instant case it has been said that M/s. Skipper Construction taken over or merged with the company in view of the decision on the basis of the order of the Calcutta High Court. By citing Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others, 1998 (4) SCC 387 , Mr. Naiyar wanted to establish that as because the State proceeded for due consideration of the cause pursuant to the direction of the Court only as per Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, no notice is required to be given to the owner to withdraw from the acquisition and the State Government is at liberty to do so. In holding such principle the Court considered that the notifications were issued both under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and further held that much has been done towards the acquisition process and that process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding those notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which, after withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation due for any damage suffered by the owner during the course of acquisition proceedings is determined and given to him. It has further been held that the petitioner cannot sit on the fence and allow the State to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis of that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notifications on the grounds which were available to him at the time when these were published as otherwise it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. We are of the view that this case is distinguishable in the available circumstances herein. We are of the view that this case is distinguishable in the available circumstances herein. Here the Court was pleased to direct to consider the cause without making any reference to any section under the Land Acquisition Act with an observation that such direction for consideration is made because no notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued. Hence, neither it can be said that there is delay on the part of the petitioner company nor it can be said that it should not get any opportunity of hearing. Had it been the case that the State has withdrawn from the acquisition, the situation would have been different but the position is other way round i.e. refusal to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings. In the judgement in State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees Association v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2001 SC 437 , we get that a beneficiary has a right to be heard before a notification under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act withdrawing from acquisition is issued. This right is not limited to acquisition for companies under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 48 does not in terms exclude the principles of natural justice. However, the section has been construed to exclude the owner’s right to be heard before acquisition is withdrawn. This is because the owner’s grievances are redressable under Section 48 (2). No irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land and, if at all the owner has suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto, he will be paid compensation under Section 48(2) of the Act. But as far as the beneficiary of the acquisition is concerned, there is no similar statutory provision. In contrast with the owners position the beneficiary of the acquisition may by withdrawal from the acquisition suffer substantial loss without redress particularly when it may have deposited compensation money towards the cost of the acquisition and the steps for acquisition under the Act have substantially been proceeded with. An opportunity of being heard may allow the beneficiary not only to counten the basis for withdrawal, but also, if the circumstances permitted, to cure any defect or shortcoming and fill any lacuna. This is a question of natural justice, which cannot be excluded. An opportunity of being heard may allow the beneficiary not only to counten the basis for withdrawal, but also, if the circumstances permitted, to cure any defect or shortcoming and fill any lacuna. This is a question of natural justice, which cannot be excluded. According to us, in this case the only loophole is that the petitioner company itself acquired the land prior to formation of the requiring body and even thereafter to discharge the same function as would be done by the requiring body for the public purpose. Therefore, their right is not akin to owners but a beneficiary which can be sorted out by curing any defect or shortcoming and filling any lacuna. Hence, two principles are evolved from this discussion i.e. not giving any opportunity to such company is in violation of the principles of natural justice and having no proper layout plan or no total area of land at the relevant point of time or any further query in connection thereto is defective or lacunic in nature, which are mere irregularities and as such, those can be rectified if opportunity is being given. There the question arose with regard to acquisition made for the company or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act , 1860. The Court held that proceedings under Section 4 (1) for public purpose and for the benefit of the registered society or co-operative society etc. are distinct and different. The view of the Government that the land is needed either for public purpose or for a company may be based either on independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the Government or even from an application by the company concerned. are distinct and different. The view of the Government that the land is needed either for public purpose or for a company may be based either on independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the Government or even from an application by the company concerned. It is indeed important in this connection to say that the expression ‘company’ as per Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act means : “(i) a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), other than a Government company referred to in clause (cc); (ii) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, other than a society referred to in clause (cc); (iii) a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, other than a co-operative society referred to in clause (cc);” 186. Babu v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (5) ADJ 171 (DB), we find that if any company or corporation finds at a later point of time, for any reason whatsoever, that it does not require such land or required lesser area, in that case the land or part of land may be released from acquisition, but, this discretion is available only so long as the land has not vested in the Government. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, 2005 (7) SCC 627 , it has been held that it is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, it has been held to be akin to fundamental right. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, it has been held to be akin to fundamental right. In State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, 1980 (2) SCC 471 : AIR 1980 SC 319 both on account of malice and satisfaction with regard to public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act the Supreme Court separated the necessity of natural justice by its own language on the factual situation therein and held as follows : “9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power — sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated : “I repeat . . . that all power is a trust — that we are accountable for its exercise — that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act. 10. By these canons it is easy to hold that where one of the requisites of Sections 4 or 6, viz., that the particular land is needed for the public purpose in view, is shown to be not the goal pursued but the private satisfaction of wreaking vengeance, if the moving consideration in the selection of the land is an extraneous one, the law is derailed and the exercise is bad. Not that this land is needed for the mandi, in the judgment of Government, but that the mandi need is hijacked to reach the private destination of depriving an enemy of his land through back-seat driving of the statutory engine! To reach this conclusion, there is a big ‘if’ to be proved— if the real object is the illegitimate one of taking away the lands of respondents 1 to 21 to vent the hostility of respondent 22, under the mask of acquisition for the mandi.” 187. In Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, 1985 (3) SCC 1 : AIR 1985 SC 1622 , the Supreme Court again followed such judgement in re : Gurdial Singh (supra) and held on a different factual situation whether installation of a cinema theatre is public purpose or not. However, the Court ultimately held that to come to an appropriate conclusion in this regard the power must be exercised reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose. From MANU/SC/1248/2008 (Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Distt. and others) factually we find that as per the industrial policy of the State a decision was taken to construct an information technology park on the land, which was required. From MANU/SC/1248/2008 (Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Distt. and others) factually we find that as per the industrial policy of the State a decision was taken to construct an information technology park on the land, which was required. It was for the fulfilment of the industrial policy and completion of several projects that notifications under the Land Acquisition Act were issued by the State. The High Court was satisfied about the public purpose and hence, rejected the ground put forward by the land owners that the acquisition was not for public purpose. According to the High Court, however, the procedure laid down under the Land Acquisition Act was required to be followed by issuing notices under Section 5-A and the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act could not be invoked. In several cases awards were made and possession of the land was also taken over. In some other cases, the award is not passed and the land is still in possession of the land owners. That, however, does not mean that the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were illegal or unlawful. Against this background, several questions arose, one of which is question of ‘eminent domain’. The Court held that the power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant. It is inherent and exists in every sovereign State without any recognition thereof in the Constitution or in any statute. It is founded on the law of necessity. The power is inalienable. No legislature can bind itself or its successors not to exercise this power when public necessity demands it nor it can be abridged or restricted by agreement or contract. It has been further contended by Mr. Shashi Nandan in support of the petitioner company that even if the power of the State not to give a personal hearing is a discretionary power on the part of the State but such power cannot be misused. We also find on the basis of the analysis of the earlier judgements that discretion, if any, cannot be said to be unfettered. We also find on the basis of the analysis of the earlier judgements that discretion, if any, cannot be said to be unfettered. Meaning of ‘discretion’ as held by the Supreme Court in Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India and others, 2006 (10) SCC 1 , is as follows : “Though the word, “discretion” literally means and denotes an uncontrolled power of disposal, yet in law, the meaning given to this word appears to be a power to decide within the limits allowed by positive rules of law as to the punishments, remedies or costs. This would mean that even if a person has a discretion to do something the said discretion has to be exercised within the limits allowed by positive rule of law. The legal meaning of the word “discretion” therefore, unmistakably avoids untrammelled or uncontrolled choice and more positively points out at there being a positive control of some judicial principles. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution; nice discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection : deliberate judgment; soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will and private affections of persons. The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care, therefore, where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility.” According to us, in a case of judicial review the Court must remember that whether the authority while exercising the power, if any, even if it is discretionary in nature, remembered at least following five points or not : (i) Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? (ii) Whether committed an error of law? (iii) Whether committed a breach of the rules of natural justice? (iv) Whether reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached? (v) Whether abused its powers? (ii) Whether committed an error of law? (iii) Whether committed a breach of the rules of natural justice? (iv) Whether reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached? (v) Whether abused its powers? If any of such mistakes is committed by the authority, it will become vulnerable and the Court will obviously interfere with it. 188. In State of Maharashtra v. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and others, 1990 (3) SCC 579 , a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court has held that besides, the question as to whether a particular scheme framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of the public. In Daulat Singh Surana and others v. First Land Acquisition Collector and others, 2007 (1) SCC 641 , the Supreme Court has discussed with regard to element of public purpose and its utilization towards the need of the society. Public purpose will include a purpose in which the general interest of community as opposed to the interest of an individual is directly or indirectly involved. Individual interest must give way to public interest as far as public purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned. Public purpose is bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the community or locality and, therefore, the legislature has left it to the State to decide what is public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. Ambiguity, indefiniteness and vagueness of public purpose are usually the grounds on which the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act are assailed. 189. Ambiguity, indefiniteness and vagueness of public purpose are usually the grounds on which the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act are assailed. 189. In Nirodhi Prakash Ganguli (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that question of urgency of an acquisition under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter, when the Government takes a decision taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under such sub-sections of the said Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision taken by the appropriate authority is malafide. When the Court is called upon to examine the question as to whether the acquisition is mala fide or not, what is necessary to be enquired into and found out is, whether the purpose for which the acquisition is going to be made, is a real purpose or a camouflage. In Nandeshwar Prasad and others v. U.P. Government and others etc., 1964 (3) SCR 425 : AIR 1964 SC 1217 , it has been held that right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act is a substantial right when a person’s property is being threatened with acquisition and we cannot accept that that right can be taken away as if by a side-wind. In Munshi Singh and others v. Union of India, 1973 (2) SCC 337 , it has been held as follows : “We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that Section 5-A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that Section 5-A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of Section 5-A the position has completely changed and it cannot be said that the owner’s wishes are not relevant and that he does not need an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a view would render Section 5-A otios. If it has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to submit his objections and that he can only in the notification under Section 4(1) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under Section 5-A which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under Sections 4(1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the master plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question, the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under Section 5-A of the Acquisition Act.” 190. In view of the judgement in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of T.N. and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533 , the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. In view of the judgement in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of T.N. and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533 , the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. As per Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, 2004 (8) SCC 14 , it is contemplated that the appropriate Government on the basis of certain basis can dispense with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of Section 5-A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Sections 17 (1) and (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 17 itself indicates that the Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply which makes it clear that not in every case where the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there is urgency and under sub-section (1) or unforeseen emergency under sub-section (2) of Section 17, the Government will ipso facto have to direct the dispensation of the inquiry. The limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. Right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A is a very valuable right of a person, whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Therefore, if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on material on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A. In Kashama Sahakari Awas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(7) ADJ 133 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court has also taken similar view with regard to minimal right. In Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Salfs Cooperative Society Ltd. and others v. Secretary (Food and Agriculture) Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1977(4) SCC 337 , it has been held that the minimal requirement of issuance of notice can on no account be dispensed with by relying upon the principle of absence of prejudice or imputation of certain knowledge to the party against whom action is sought for. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, 2000 (7) SCC 296 , it has been held that if objection under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act is filed, it can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose, (ii) that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer, or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and objection (iii) is personal to the objector. A Division Bench of the High Court in Vinod Kumar Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1990 (2) UPLBEC 866, held that in spite of earlier notification when the notification under Section 6 has not been issued after long lapse of time, this itself prima facie establishes that there is no existence of urgency. In Om Prakash and another, etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1998 SC 2504 the Supreme Court has also held that long lapse of proceeding about nine months from the date of issuance of notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act gives an impression that dispensation of notice under Section 5-A cannot be made on account of urgency. 191. It is the right of the State or those, to whom the power has been lawfully delegated, to condemn private property for public use and to appropriate the ownership and possession of such property for such use, upon paying the owner a due compensation to be ascertained according to law. 191. It is the right of the State or those, to whom the power has been lawfully delegated, to condemn private property for public use and to appropriate the ownership and possession of such property for such use, upon paying the owner a due compensation to be ascertained according to law. The sovereign power vested in the State to take private property for the public use, providing first a just compensation therefor. We are not of the view that this power is not with the State, but by the insertion of Section 11-A under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24th September, 1984, they made our own limitation. 192. So far as the question of eminent domain is concerned, a very important judgement is required to be considered in this context as reported in 545 U.S. 469, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (Susette Kelo, et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al.), where, in the nine Judges’ Bench, five Judges held in one side when other four Judges dissented. But interestingly no body therein held that eminent domain cannot be said to be inapplicable. It has been held on the factual context therein that the Government could take private property for only “public use” and the “economic development” in question qualified as a valid public use under the Federal and State law therein. We are also of the similar opinion but the division of the Bench therein was on a different point as to whether development can be attributed to any private party or it will be done by the State itself. The minority view, under the banner of economic development, was that all private property was vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as the property might be “upgraded”—given to an owner who would use it in a way that the legislature deemed more beneficial to the public—in the process, and the reasoning that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property rendered economic-development takings “for public use”, washed out any distinction between private and public use of property and thereby effectively deleted the words “for public use” from the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution therein. A view has been expressed that if such economic-development takings as the one in question were for a public use, than any taking was for public use and the Supreme Court had erased the public use clause from the Constitution, and the case in hand was one of a string of the Court’s cases that had strayed from the public use clause’s original meaning and ought to be reconsidered. But the majority view held that meaning of “public use” is increase in jobs, revenue and revitalization from a distressed condition of the city and/or town. The development plan served the public purpose where : (1) the city’s plans for the development included (a) a hotel, (b) restaurants, (c) retail and office spaces, (d) marinas for both recreational and commercial uses, (e) a pedestrian riverwalk, (f) new residences, (g) a museum, and (h) parking spaces; (2) the city had carefully formulated a plan that it believed would provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue; (3) as with other exercises in urban planning and development, the city was endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that these uses would form a whole greater than the sum of its parts; (4) to effectuate the plan, the city had invoked a state statute that specifically authorized the use of eminent domain to promote economic development; and (5) given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that had preceded the plan’s adoption, and the limited scope of the United States Supreme Court’s review, it was appropriate for the Court to resolve the challenges of the individual private owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Kennedy, J. in concurrence expressed the view that a Court applying rational basis review under the respective amendments public use clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favour a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual benefits; where the purpose of a taking is economic development and that development is to be carried out by private parties or private parties will benefit, a Court must decide if the stated public purpose is incidental to the benefits to private parties; and the Court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favouritism to private parties should review the record to see if the objection has merit, though with the presumption that the Government’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose. 193. Here in this case, the petitioner company wants to get hold of the property to discharge the pubic duty but the State wanted to acquire the land for the same purpose. In such circumstances if the acquisition in the name of eminent domain is allowed, then it will frustrate the better public purpose only on the name of private party. Against this background, we have to hold and say that the eminent domain power of the State cannot be affected but its action herein appears to be questionable particularly in view of the aforesaid nine Judges’ Bench judgement in Susette Kelo (supra). Lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 11-A : 194. The instant proceedings raising the plea of the lapse of the entire acquisition process were brought about after the judgement was reserved on 30th March, 2009 upon conclusion of the arguments when the judgement in the case was about to be delivered. The issue raised through an amendment application dated 10th August, 2009 is that the proceedings of acquisition will be presumed to have lapsed in law as per the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, which is quoted herein below : “[11A. The issue raised through an amendment application dated 10th August, 2009 is that the proceedings of acquisition will be presumed to have lapsed in law as per the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, which is quoted herein below : “[11A. Period within which an award shall be made.—(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.” Explanation.—In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.] 195. For this, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner company, has pointed out that the notification under Section 4 was issued way back on 10th April, 2006 and the provisions of Section 17 had also been invoked. At the stage of Section 4, the petitioner company filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006 praying for quashing of the same which was disposed of on 02nd May, 2006 observing as follows : “The record, before us, shows that there has been a prolonged exercise at the behest of M/s. Technology Park Ltd./petitioner. We find that the petitioner had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. Greater NOIDA and another). The said petition was decided vide judgment and order dated 17th April, 2003. We find that the petitioner had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14294 of 2002 (M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. Greater NOIDA and another). The said petition was decided vide judgment and order dated 17th April, 2003. This judgment shows that the petitioner company had submitted certain proposals, for developing a Technology Park; the Government of India, Department of Electronic recommended its project for being established vide letter dated 25.3.1995, the U.P. Government agreed to grant 200 Acres of land for this purpose and approved the project submitted by the petitioner vide letter dated 29th July, 1985, petitioner was required to submit lay out plan, which was submitted on 23.2.1995; meanwhile there were certain proceedings initiated in the Apex Court in respect to this very subject matter; there was some dispute regarding failure on the part of the petitioner in not submitting sub-division plan on the basis of certain compromise deed with regard to the allotment of land in the name of different persons, the said compromise was cancelled and being aggrieved the petitioner had filed the above writ petition wherein this Court directed that the respondent shall consider the matter afresh after giving personal hearing to the petitioners’ representative in accordance with law. The petitioner has also filed copy of the Apex Court order as Annexure-18 to the writ petition, which shows that Apex Court is also seized of certain land which is subject matter of the present land acquisition proceedings as well as certain directions have also been issued for allotment of plots as well as 482 plot holders, who did not make full payment to the petitioner (T.P.L.). In para 34 of the petition, the petitioner himself states that greater NOIDA vide its order dated 27th May 2005 has rejected the lay out plan submitted by the petitioner in respect of which separate legal proceedings are being drawn but the same has no relevance. It is stated only on behalf of the petitioner that due to rejection of plan, large number of constructions have already been raised on the land in question. It is stated only on behalf of the petitioner that due to rejection of plan, large number of constructions have already been raised on the land in question. Considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances, which have been summarized and referred in brief and also the fact that notification under Section 6 of the Act has not been issued coupled with the circumstance, even taking into consideration defect possession, which took some amount of time, we direct the petitioner to approach the State Government itself by filing objection within two weeks from today and if such objection is filed, the State Government shall consider and decide the same within twelve weeks in accordance with law. We further direct that till objection of the petitioner is considered and decided by a reasoned order, no steps shall be taken to dispossess the petitioner from permanent structures standing on the land in question nor any permanent structures, fixtures etc. The respondents shall not interfere with the possession of the land in question (subject matter of the aforesaid notification under Section 4, Land Acquisition Act) (Under possession of the petitioner). It is also open for the petitioner to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised. This petition is finally disposed of subject to the above conditions.” 196. Pursuant to the said direction issued, the State Government passed an order on 06th November, 2006 rejecting the representation filed by the petitioner company and immediately thereafter the notification under Section 6 was issued on 30th November, 2006. The petitioner company filed Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 assailing the notification under Section 6 and the order of the State Government was challenged in Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006. An interim order was passed on 08th December, 2006 itself in Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 directing the parties to maintain status-quo till 16th January, 2007 which order is quoted herein below : “Sri C.B. Yadav, the Chief Standing Counsel, who represents the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and Sri Pradeep Kumar who represents the respondent No. 2 are directed to file counter-affidavit by 8.1.2007. Rejoinder-affidavit, if any, may be filed within one week thereafter. List on 16.1.2007. As there was interim protection granted by this Court vide judgment and order dated 2.5.2006 while disposing of Civil Misc. 1 and 3 and Sri Pradeep Kumar who represents the respondent No. 2 are directed to file counter-affidavit by 8.1.2007. Rejoinder-affidavit, if any, may be filed within one week thereafter. List on 16.1.2007. As there was interim protection granted by this Court vide judgment and order dated 2.5.2006 while disposing of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23277 of 2006 filed by the petitioner, directing the petitioner to file its objections’ representation deem it fit and proper to direct that the status quo, as of today, be maintained by the respective parties in respect of the land in dispute till 16.1.2007. Sd/- Hon. R.K. Agrawal, J Sd/- Hon. Vikram Nath, J Dt. 8.12.2006" An interim order was passed in Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006 as well which is to the following effect : “Shri C.B. Yadav, learned Chief Standing Counsel, who represents both the respondents prays for and is granted three weeks time to file counter-affidavit. Rejoinder-affidavit may be filed within one week thereafter. List on 16th January, 2007 before the appropriate Court alongwith Writ Petition No. 65654 of 65656 of 2006. Till then, further proceedings pending before the Court of Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition, Gautam Budh Nagar, pursuant to the notice dated 1.11.2006 filed as Annexure No. 24 shall remain stayed. Sd/- Hon. R.K. Agrawal, J Sd/- Hon. Vikram Nath, J Dt. 15.12.2006" The interim order was further extended in both the writ petitions and the connected writ petitions in which the challenge was to the cancellation of the map by the NOIDA authorities and all the writ petitions were clubbed together which came up before the Court on 01st May, 2007. The following order was passed on 01st May, 2007 in the writ petitions including Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 which is to the following effect : “Counter-affidavit to the amended writ petition may be filed by Shri Pradeep Kumar appearing for the Greater NOID and Shri C.B. Yadav, Chief Standing Counsel within three weeks. Rejoinder-affidavit, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter. List the matter for final hearing on 6.7.2007. Till then, interim order, if any, passed earlier is extended. Sd/- Hon.Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J Sd/- Hon. Rajes Kumar Dt. 1.5.2007" The matter was listed thereafter but the order-sheet does not indicate that the stay order was extended thereafter. In the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State through Manmohan Chaudhary, Addl. Till then, interim order, if any, passed earlier is extended. Sd/- Hon.Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J Sd/- Hon. Rajes Kumar Dt. 1.5.2007" The matter was listed thereafter but the order-sheet does not indicate that the stay order was extended thereafter. In the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State through Manmohan Chaudhary, Addl. District Magistrate, Greater NOIDA, G.B. Nagar and in the IInd Supplementary-counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3, it has been stated that the same acquisition and the same notification were challenged in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 (Smt. Sheesh Kaur v. State of U.P. and others) and an interim order was passed therein on 09th February, 2007, which is to the following effect : “Sri Pradeep Kumar, who represents the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 prays for and is granted a month’s time to file counter-affidavit, two weeks for rejoinder-affidavit. List before the appropriate Court on 19th of March 2007. If the possession of the land under acquisition has not been taken by the Greater NOIDA authority, the same shall not be taken till the next date of listing. Sd/- Hon. R.K. Agrawal, J Sd/- Pankaj Mithal, J Dt. 9.2.2007" 197. During the course of submissions and after having heard Sri V.B. Upadhyay, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and Sri Zafar Naiyer, learned Addl. Advocate General, for the State of U.P., we had summoned the cause list from the office to provide information as to whether the said writ petition, namely, Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 had been listed thereafter or not. From the records of the High Court and the daily cause list maintained and published under the Authority of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, we find that the said writ petition had been listed on 24th April, 2007 in the Court of Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Hon.Mr.Justice Prakash Krishna at serial No. 89. 198. On the basis of the aforesaid facts as emerge from the records, Sri Shashi Nandan contends that the interim order in the present matter continued only till 06th July, 2007 and was never extended thereafter and the interim order in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 stood exhausted upon the matter having been listed on 24th April, 2007 where after the interim order was not extended. At this stage, it would be relevant to point out that Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, the learned counsel for Greater NOIDA assisting Sri V.B. Upadhyay, made a statement before the Court that upon inspection, he did not find any order having been passed in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 apart from the interim order quoted herein above. This, we have put on record in order to avoid any confusion on facts. Sri Shashi Nandan urged that the matter was not heard thereafter and it was after a very long time that in the month of August, 2008 that the hearing in all these matters commenced before this Bench and since hearing could not be concluded due to one reason or the other, the matter ultimately came to be heard on 30th March, 2009 when the judgement was reserved. He contends that before the judgement could be delivered a period of more than two years had already elapsed and, therefore, there being no impediment by this Court, the respondent-State and the NOIDA authorities having not taken possession, the proceedings would lapse under Section 11-A. He contends that excluding the period in which the stay order aforesaid was operating, the period of two years stood lapsed in July, 2009 itself and in view of the admitted position that no award has been pronounced and further that the petitioner company has not been dispossessed, there should be a declaration by this Court in favour of the petitioner company in accordance with Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Sri Shashi Nandan contends that on the facts of this case, the legal position stands answered in favour of the petitioner company keeping in view the law laid down in the following cases : (i) Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and another, 1991 (4) SCC 531 ; (ii) Ashok Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2007 (3) SCC 470 ; (iii) Lok Sewa Shikshan Mandal v. A.R. Mundhada Charitable Trust and others, 2007 (9) SCC 779 ; (iv) Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia and others. 2008 (8) SCC 348 ; and (v) State of U.P. and others v. Committee of Management, D.A.V. Inter College, Mahoba and another, 2009 (6) ADJ 243 (DB). 199. 2008 (8) SCC 348 ; and (v) State of U.P. and others v. Committee of Management, D.A.V. Inter College, Mahoba and another, 2009 (6) ADJ 243 (DB). 199. Sri Shashi Nandan rounded off his submissions by submitting that in view of the law as indicated in the aforesaid decisions, there was no extension of the interim order in the case of the petitioner company beyond 06th July, 2009 and there was no interim order in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 operating after 24th February, 2007 and, as such, after excluding the period of operation of the interim order, there was no impediment much less a legal impediment for the respondents preventing them from either pronouncing the award or taking possession. Having not done so, the respondents now, can neither pronounce the award nor can they take possession and the entire proceedings in relation to the petitioner company would stand lapsed. On the contrary, the possession of the petitioner company has been acknowledged by the respondents and the fact that the petitioner company has not been dispossessed till date is not disputed. 200. Sri Zafar Naiyer, learned Additional Advocate General, contends that the interim order dated 01st May, 2007, quoted above, co-relates the observation of the Court to the final hearing of the matter and, therefore, the said interim order, according to him, continued till the final hearing concluded on 30th March, 2009. It is urged that the Court clearly meant to continue the interim order till the matter was finally disposed of and was not time bound as urged on behalf of the petitioner company. He further submits that in view of the doctrine of lis pendens and in view of the fact that propriety also demanded, the respondents authorities did not take any action as the hearing was continuing and the authorities could not have ventured to include upon the proceedings of this Court when the acquisition proceedings were under jeopardy. Sri Naiyer relied on the decision in Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Mr. Zachilhu and others, AIR 1993 SC 412 (paragraph No. 51) for the said proposition. He further submits that once the provisions of Section 17 have been invoked, the provisions of Section 11-A stood automatically excluded and there was no occasion for the proceedings to have lapsed. Sri Naiyer relied on the decision in Shri Kihota Hollohon v. Mr. Zachilhu and others, AIR 1993 SC 412 (paragraph No. 51) for the said proposition. He further submits that once the provisions of Section 17 have been invoked, the provisions of Section 11-A stood automatically excluded and there was no occasion for the proceedings to have lapsed. He contends that the petitioner company did not get their stay order extended and, therefore, they cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own default. He further relies on paragraph No. 24 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in response to the main counter-affidavit in the present writ petition wherein the petitioner company itself has alleged that the interim order still continues to be in force and it is in possession. 201. Sri V.B. Upadhyay for the Greater NOIDA contends that the petitioner company cannot be permitted to take recourse to such a plea once they themselves have expressed their intention that the interim order was continuing and for this, Sri Upadhyay pointed out that such intention has been expressed by the petitioner company itself in paragraph No. 29 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007, M/s. Technology Park Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, which is quoted below : “I deny and dispute that the said interim order has lapsed, as alleged or at all.” 202. He further submits that there is no question of the entire proceedings having lapsed and the Collector could not have pronounced only part of the award. He further submits that the possession could not be taken on account of the pendency of this litigation and further the interim order either in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 or in the present proceedings cannot be deemed to have been vacated. He further contends that there is no order in either of these writ petitions vacating, modifying or rescinding the interim order. He has further submitted that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner company do not come to their aid and keeping in view the surrounding circumstances and the nature of the litigation which has prolonged for a fairly long time, the only presumption that can be drawn is that on account of this, the possession could not be taken. He further contends that a delayed amendment application has been filed on an issue, which on facts does not arise, and the submissions advanced should be rejected. He has further explained the stand of the NOIDA with the aid of the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1993 SC 2517 and has submitted that the acquisition would not lapse as the Act does not contemplate the lapse of such proceedings which have already been finalised where possession has been taken. He contends that merely because the award has not been pronounced that by itself would not create any right in favour of the petitioner company so as to claim the benefit of Section 11-A. 203. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records as also the affidavits that have been exchanged on the amendment sought on behalf of the petitioner company. The amendment application had been allowed which has been incorporated and the affidavits to the amended part of the petition have been brought on record in support of the rival contentions. We had also permitted the learned counsels to inspect the records which were available in Court and to also furnish any material that they would prefer to produce in support of the contentions advanced. The respondent-State had produced the records pertaining to the acquisition in relation to the correspondence of the notification under Section 6 which have also been perused by us. The learned counsel for the petitioners were also permitted to inspect the same under the orders of the Court where after the arguments were concluded and judgment was reserved. 204. In order to appreciate the controversy, we may, at the out set, record that there is no dispute about the fact that neither the award has been pronounced till date nor the petitioner company has been actually dispossessed. The petitioner company continued to retain its physical possession which is evident from the perusal of the pleadings between the parties. The question that arises for our consideration is as to whether there was an interim order existing preventing the respondents from either pronouncing the award or taking actual physical possession and as a consequence thereof whether the proceedings in relation to the land of the petitioner company would stand lapsed under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. 205. The question that arises for our consideration is as to whether there was an interim order existing preventing the respondents from either pronouncing the award or taking actual physical possession and as a consequence thereof whether the proceedings in relation to the land of the petitioner company would stand lapsed under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. 205. The facts, that are necessary to appreciate the aforesaid issues raised, are that the interim order in the present proceedings was last extended on 01st May, 2007. The interim order in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007, which was filed by a different tenure-holder, was passed till the next date of listing and the case was listed in the cause list on 24th April, 2007. According to respondents themselves, no orders have been passed thereafter in respect of the said writ petition. 206. The question is as to whether the interim order will be deemed to have been continuing or not. The words used in the interim order dated 01st May, 2007 are that the matter shall be listed for final hearing on 06th July, 2007. This order is in relation to the proceedings of the writ petition on merits. It appears that the matter could not be heard on 06th July, 2007. The Court had, in unequivocal terms, extended the interim order by using the specific phrase “till then”. The said words “till then” are a prefix to the words “interim order” and form the subject of the sentence which relates to the interim order only. The sentence in relation to the interim order is a complete sentence and has been recorded separately. The words “till then”, therefore, qualify the interim order in relation to the listing of the case on 06th July, 2007. The intent and purpose of the interim order is clearly qualified by the words “till then” and is, therefore, in our opinion, time bound. The same does not say and cannot mean that if the hearing does not take place on 06th July, 2007, it would automatically stand extended. The words “till then” in our opinion, do not limit the interim order till the stage of final hearing or the final disposal of the matter as urged by Sri Naiyer and Sri Upadhyay on behalf of the respondents. The words “till then” in our opinion, do not limit the interim order till the stage of final hearing or the final disposal of the matter as urged by Sri Naiyer and Sri Upadhyay on behalf of the respondents. On facts and after having perused the records pertaining to the controversy and the affidavits filed, we do not find any extension of the interim order beyond 06th July, 2007. We are fortified in our view by the law laid down by the Division Bench decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Committee of Management (supra), which in turn follows the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar (supra). To our mind, learned counsel for the petitioner company has rightly placed reliance on the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions, which clearly support his contention that the interim order had not been extended. 207. The submission on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner company had itself stated in the affidavits that the interim order was continuing would be an admission on facts and, therefore, such a plea cannot be accepted, does not commend acceptance. The reason for this is that it might be an understanding of the petitioner expressed on oath about the status of the interim order, but the same would not act as an estoppel when it comes to interpreting the order by this Court. The Court is not prevented from taking a stand which appears to it to be correct in law merely because a party has made an admission. Even presuming that such a statement was made on behalf of the petitioner on an earlier occasion, the position of law will not stand altered keeping in view the decisions which have been referred to herein above. On the other hand, the respondents have disputed this position and have also nowhere accepted by way of any statement in their affidavits that an order had been passed by this Court extending the interim order. As a matter of fact, the respondents also sail in the same boat about the correct legal position in respect of the status of the interim order as referred to herein above. 208. The other contention, which was raised vehemently by Mr. As a matter of fact, the respondents also sail in the same boat about the correct legal position in respect of the status of the interim order as referred to herein above. 208. The other contention, which was raised vehemently by Mr. Upadhyay that no order had been passed vacating the interim orders nor any order is available on the order sheet to that effect would, in our opinion, not enure to the benefit of the respondents. The respondents were fully aware of the aforesaid position and the facts that emerge clearly indicate that at least there was no order operating which would strictly prohibit the respondents from taking any further proceedings. 209. There is yet another submission founded on the doctrine of lis pendens, propriety and apprehension in the mind of the respondents which according to them was a clear legal impediment in their way to either pronounce the award or take possession. The question of propriety may arise in a case where there is some proximity with the interim order having expired and the matter being taken up within a short span of time. In the instant case, the said interim order was to continue till 01st July, 2007 and according to respondents themselves, the matter was not taken up for almost more than a year till August, 2008 when the hearing commenced, that too even before a different Bench. There is no explanation on behalf of the respondents as to why they did not deem it proper to proceed with the pronouncement of the award or taking of possession except for the plea that the interim order was to continue till the next date of hearing. According to paragraph No. 11 of the counter-affidavit of the respondent State itself, the following facts emerge : “11. That, thereafter the case was listed on 16th January, 2007 and the Court has extended the interim order time to time and on 1st May, 2007 passed an order to list the matter for final hearing on 6th July, 2007 till then the interim order, if any, passed earlier is extended. Meaning thereby the interim order granted on 8.12.2006 by which the earlier order dated 2nd May, 2006 was given effect has continued till the date of final hearing and the date for final hearing was fixed date 13th August, 2008. Meaning thereby the interim order granted on 8.12.2006 by which the earlier order dated 2nd May, 2006 was given effect has continued till the date of final hearing and the date for final hearing was fixed date 13th August, 2008. The hearing of the case has continued on different dates i.e. 20.8.2008, 2.9.2008, 3.9.2008, 4.9.2008, 17.9.2008, 18.9.2008, 19.9.2008, 17.10.2008, 18.11.2008, 19.11.2008, 21.11.2008, 4.12.2008, 15.1.2009, 5.2.2009, 6.2.2009, 26.2.2009 and 17.3.2009 and ultimately on 30.3.2009 the hearing of the case was concluded and the judgment has been reserved.” 210. A perusal of the said paragraph would demonstrate that there is no explanation about the period between 01st July, 2007 and 13th August, 2008 when the hearing actually commenced before this Bench. As concluded herein above, we have clearly found that the interim order had not been extended and, as such, there was no element of propriety which prevented the respondents from proceeding to take any precipitate action. To our mind, the reliance placed on paragraph No. 51 of the decision in the case of Shri Kihota Hollohon (supra) is misplaced and does not remotely apply on the facts of the present case at all. There the Supreme Court held that in an area of sensitive relationship between the legislature and the Courts, there was an element of self restraint which was required to be observed so that the proceedings did not become infructuous by any “unilateral overt act” by one side or the other during the pendency of the proceedings. The Constitution Bench was dealing with a matter pertaining to the action taken by the Speaker of the Assembly in relation to the membership of the House of Legislature and during the interlocutory stage, certain orders had been passed, the contempt whereof had been alleged. The jurisdiction of the Court itself was under question and in such a situation, it was observed that no landslide changes should have been allowed to occur rending the proceedings ineffective. 211. In the instant case, the State had proceeded to make an acquisition under the Statute exercising its power of eminent domain and it was not a case of landslide changes inasmuch as it was only the pronouncement of the award and action taken for possession which was required to be done. 211. In the instant case, the State had proceeded to make an acquisition under the Statute exercising its power of eminent domain and it was not a case of landslide changes inasmuch as it was only the pronouncement of the award and action taken for possession which was required to be done. The other proceedings related to the acquisition had already been completed except for the aforesaid two contingencies, therefore, in our opinion the issue of propriety was not even remotely attracted insofar as the present peculiar set of facts and circumstances are concerned. 212. Learned counsel for the respondents particularly the learned Addl. Advocate General, urged that the doctrine of lis pendens also compelled the respondents to refrain from taking any action in relation to possession or pronouncement of the award. The doctrine of lis pendens does not automatically prohibit the taking of an action where a judicial intervention has taken place. In the instant matter, a conscious interim order was passed by the Court to protect the interest of the parties pending litigation. The said interim order, as held by us herein above, was not extended beyond a particular period. In such a situation, the matter stands expressly concluded so far as maintaining the issue of status-quo is concerned. The said status was expressly provided for till a particular date and not beyond that. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the general principles of lis pendens might govern the case upon a final determination of the matter but once the interim order has not been extended, then the said doctrine cannot be presumed to have prohibited the respondents from taking any action. We, therefore, reject this contention on behalf of the respondents as well. 213. Coming to the main contention in respect of the provisions of Section 11-A, the respondents have failed to demonstrate that any award has been made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector has made no award till date. The position in such a situation was explained by the Apex Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra), where the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 held as follows : “14. The Collector has made no award till date. The position in such a situation was explained by the Apex Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra), where the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 held as follows : “14. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect hereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17 (1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17 (1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. 15. Further, Section 17 (3-A) postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it under Section 17 (1). Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation.” 214. Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation.” 214. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would indicate that where possession has been taken, then keeping in view the provisions of Section 17 (1) it is evident that non-making of the award within two years of the publication of Section 6 would not result in the lapse of the acquisition proceedings. It is the twin conditions of possession not having been taken and award not having been made that shall bring about the application of Section 11-A of the Act. 215. Further in order to understand the correct import of the provisions one will have to refer to the explanation appended to Section 11-A where the computation period of two years referred to in the section excludes the period during which no action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of the Court. 216. The aforesaid language employed in the explanation was consciously included by the legislature keeping in view the fact that the acquisition proceedings are ordinarily challenged in a Court of law and there are other cases instituted in Courts of law that impede the acquisition proceedings. The legislature, therefore, thought it proper to exclude the period of any stay orders so that such period may not enure to the benefit of any tenure-holder whose land has been acquired. The said explanation was incorporated keeping in mind that whenever a challenge to acquisition proceedings is brought about in a Court of law or whenever the authority is prevented from taking any action or proceedings pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 within two years of its publication, then such orders preventing action by the State authorities would not be to the disadvantage of the State. 217. A tenure-holder normally questions the validity of acquisition proceedings from the threat of being dispossessed on grounds that are available in law. It is the threat of dispossession that brings a tenure-holder to a Court of law and the Courts exercise their discretion to pass interim orders in such a given situation. 217. A tenure-holder normally questions the validity of acquisition proceedings from the threat of being dispossessed on grounds that are available in law. It is the threat of dispossession that brings a tenure-holder to a Court of law and the Courts exercise their discretion to pass interim orders in such a given situation. It is the dispossession of the tenure-holder which is protected during the pendency of the proceedings, as has happened in the present case as well. The contention of Sri Zafar Naiyer on behalf of the State is that the dispossession upon invoking of Section 17 of the Act and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A bring about automatic dispossession. We are unable to agree to this wide proposition inasmuch as the Land Acquisition Act provides for the method of dispossession and the taking over of actual physical possession. We do not find any help or aid from the decisions relied upon by Sri Naiyer to demonstrate that there is an automatic dispossession. The provisions of Section 17 do confer powers on the Government to take possession of any land even though no award has been made in cases of special urgency. Even then, the State has to demonstrate that it has taken possession. In the instant case, the State admits that possession could not be taken insofar as the land of the petitioner company is concerned. To further explain the position, we may refer to para 8 of the decision in the case of Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya (supra), which is quoted below : “8.The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment. 218. A perusal of the said ratio which has been followed later on in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, clearly demonstrates that the benefit of Section 11-A would be available not only in cases covered by Section 17 but also otherwise. This, therefore, is sufficient to reject the argument on behalf of the State that the dispossession is automatic so as to exclude the applicability of Section 11-A. In our opinion, if such an interpretation is accepted, then in that event in any case in which Section 17 is invoked, the provisions of Section 11-A would be redundant. The submission of Sri Naiyer that the aforesaid observation in paragraph No. 8 are obiter is a submission which deserves to be negated out right as it does not conform to any logic or legal sense. The ratio as recited in the aforesaid paragraph was on the basis of the arguments advanced and the finding was returned by the Court clearly explaining the law as applicable. 219. The ratio as recited in the aforesaid paragraph was on the basis of the arguments advanced and the finding was returned by the Court clearly explaining the law as applicable. 219. The aforesaid decision in Yusufbhai’s case (supra) has been followed and again reiterated in the decision of Lok Sewa Shikshan Mandal (supra). 220. It is further to be noted that the Supreme Court in the case of Lok Sewa Shikshan Mandal (supra) held that Section 11-A is a self operating process and will come into operation only when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. It was clarified that if there is any stay order regarding any of the actions being taken pursuant to the declaration then the consequences of lapse would not happen. The Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bailamma (Smt.) Alias Doddabailamma (Dead) and others v. Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and others, 2006 (2) SCC 416 . 221. Another aspect which has to be kept in mind is about the existence of any other order which may have otherwise prevented the State Government from proceeding to take possession. This aspect has also been dealt with in paragraph Nos. 21 to 24 of the decision in Lok Sewa Shikshan Mandal’s case (supra). In this regard, we may again put on record that apart from the interim order passed in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007, no other order of any Court was pointed out or placed before us in support of the aforesaid proposition on behalf of the respondents. The position relating to the interim order in Writ Petition No. 5039 of 2007 has already been explained by us herein above and it is evident that the interim order in the said writ petition was not extended in spite the matter having been listed on 24th April, 2007. Sri Upadhyay for the NOIDA authority contended that it is quite possible that the Court was not available on that date and it is not known as to why the matter was not taken up and orders passed on 24th April, 2007. He, therefore, contends that in such a situation unless and until an inquiry is launched to find out the said facts, it cannot be conclusively and clinchingly held that the interim order has not been extended. He, therefore, contends that in such a situation unless and until an inquiry is launched to find out the said facts, it cannot be conclusively and clinchingly held that the interim order has not been extended. As urged by him earlier, the order-sheet of the said writ petition does not indicate the passing of any order subsequent to 24th April, 2007. The aforesaid submission of Sri Upadhyay has only to be noted for being rejected inasmuch as this Court will go by the record as it exists and there is no occasion to launch an inquiry in view of the affidavit filed on behalf of NOIDA authorities to the amendment application in the present proceedings. The counter-affidavit and supplementary-counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the said respondents, nowhere even state about the listing of the matter on 24th April, 2007 which this Court had to find out from its own sources namely the records of the office which maintain the cause list published under the orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Sri Upadhyay could not dispute the fact of the listing of the case on 24th April, 2007 and we find the affidavit filed on behalf of the Greater NOIDA authority to be thoroughly deficient on this score. In such a situation, there is no reason to entertain such a submission on behalf of the Greater NOIDA authority. 222. Having traversed the facts in relation to the issue raised and having considered the law laid down in the decisions that were cited at the Bar, we have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the respondents, for reasons best known to them, allowed the period of two years to lapse after excluding the period of the stay order referred to herein above during the pendency of the present proceedings and having failed to pronounce the award or take possession from the petitioner company, the benefit of Section 11-A, in our opinion, would stand extended to the petitioner company and the proceedings would stand lapsed. 223. Sri Upadhyay re-emphasising his arguments contended that if the words of Section 11-A (1) are construed strictly then the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse and according to his submission, if such an interpretation is given, then the entire notification pertaining to the whole area involved in the acquisition would be rendered a nullity. 223. Sri Upadhyay re-emphasising his arguments contended that if the words of Section 11-A (1) are construed strictly then the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse and according to his submission, if such an interpretation is given, then the entire notification pertaining to the whole area involved in the acquisition would be rendered a nullity. This, in his submission, is not the intention of the legislature and, therefore, such an interpretation should be avoided. He submitted that the words entire proceedings would mean that if the provisions of Section 11-A are invoked, then there is a direct threat of the entire acquisition falling through. We have carefully perused the words used in Section 11-A and we find that the words “entire proceedings” relate to the acquisition of “the land”. This clearly signifies that the land which is subject matter of an acquisition if not included in an award or possession taken would be the subject of benefit under Section 11-A. In our opinion, it is not the entire land covered under the notification, but the land to the extent for which no award has been made and possession taken that would be affected. It is for this reason that the legislature made a provision in the explanation which reflects the possibilities of litigative pursuits by any tenure-holder that may prevent taking of possession during such proceedings which may be covered under Section 11-A. It is quite possible that a large number of tenure-holders may not contest the acquisition and may receive the compensation but there might be some tenure-holders like the petitioners who would contest the same and it is for this reason that the explanation was appended to Section 11-A. This clearly indicates that the land covered by such contingencies have been contemplated under Section 11-A. 224. As a corollary to the aforesaid submission, Sri Upadhyay further contended that no partial award is contemplated under Section 11-A of the Act and, therefore, there has to be a composite award for the entire acquisition. Sri Upadhyay contends that in such a situation there being no partial process contemplated under the Act, the non-pronouncement of the award would be of no significance where the provisions of Section 17 had been invoked. Sri Upadhyay contends that in such a situation there being no partial process contemplated under the Act, the non-pronouncement of the award would be of no significance where the provisions of Section 17 had been invoked. We have considered the aforesaid submission and we find that the same is also untenable in law inasmuch as, as held earlier, it is the twin conditions of an award not being made and possession not being taken that would bring about the consideration of a matter within the four corners of Section 11-A of the Act. The mere non-making of an award where the provisions of Section 17 have been invoked, would not be material unless and until it can be shown that the possession had already been taken. Viewed from that angle as well, the present case, in our opinion, falls within the precincts of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 225. Having held so, we, accordingly, hold that the proceedings insofar as the petitioner company is concerned relating to its land under acquisition, would stand lapsed and the petitioner company is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. Urban Planning 226. Factually, in the case in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Delhi Auto & General Finance Pvt. Ltd. and others, JT 1994 (3) SC 275, the master plan was prepared under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 showing the use of land as ‘recreational’. The area comprised of certain lands of two private colonisers. They have applied to the Ghaziabad Development Authority constituted under the said Act, for permission to develop and construct on their lands according to their layout plan in accordance with Section 15 of the said Act. The plan submitted was granted conditional permission. The application of other coloniser was found defective and returned for correction and the same was again presented after removal of the defects. It appeared that by a notification the Government of U.P. had amended the land use of the area indicated originally in the master plan for ‘recreational’ use and converted it to ‘residential’ use. The application of other coloniser was found defective and returned for correction and the same was again presented after removal of the defects. It appeared that by a notification the Government of U.P. had amended the land use of the area indicated originally in the master plan for ‘recreational’ use and converted it to ‘residential’ use. National Capital Region Planning Board constituted under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 declined to approve the change of land use of that area from ‘recreational’ to ‘residential’ made by the State Government, on the ground that it was not in conformity with the policy decision of the State Government. We have no need to go into the factual assertions any more but to hold that this judgement refers that ultimately the authority to take decision is the Board under such Act within the national capital region. Paragraph-15 of such judgement is important for the purpose of reference, as follows : “15. Some provisions of The National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred as “NCR Act”) may now be referred. The enactment is to provide for the constitution of a Planning Board for the preparation of a plan for the development of the National Capital Region and for co-ordinating and monitoring the implementation of such plan and for evolving harmonized policies for the control of land-uses and development of infrastructure in the National Capital Region so as to avoid any haphazard development of that region and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2 contains the definitions. Clause (j) therein defines “Regional Plan” to mean the plan prepared under this Act for the development of the National Capital Region and for the control of land-uses etc. Clause (m) defines “Sub-Regional Plan” to mean a plan prepared for a sub-region. Section 3 provides for constitution by the Central Government of the National Capital Region Planning Board, in the manner provided therein. Section 7 specifies the functions of the Board which include preparation of Sub-Regional Plans and Project Plans by each of the participating States. Section 10 indicates the contents of the Regional Plan which include the manner in which the land in National Capital Region shall be used and the policy in relation to land use and the allocation of the land for different uses. Section 10 indicates the contents of the Regional Plan which include the manner in which the land in National Capital Region shall be used and the policy in relation to land use and the allocation of the land for different uses. Section 14 deals with modification of the Regional Plan and Section 15 provides for review and revision of the Regional Plan. Section 17 requires each participating State to prepare a sub-regional plan for the sub-region within that State. It has also to indicate the specified elements including the reservation of areas for specified land-uses. Section 19 requires that before publishing any Sub-Regional Plan, each participating State shall refer such plan to the Board to enable the Board to ensure that such plan is in conformity with the Regional Plan. Section 20 lays down the obligation of each participating State for the implementation of the Sub-regional plan, as finalised. Section 27 provides for the overriding effect of this Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law, instrument, decree or order etc. Section 28 empowers the Central Government to give directions to the board for the efficient administration of the Act, which the Board is bound to carry out. Section 29 expressly provides that on coming into operation of the finally published Regional Plan, no development shall be made in the region which is inconsistent with the Regional Plan as finally published. Thus the overriding effect of the Act by virtue of Section 27 and total prohibition of any activity of development in violation of the finally published Regional Plan provided in Section 29 of the Act is sufficient to indicate that any claim inconsistent with the finally published Regional Plan in the area cannot be sustained on any ground.” 227. In T. Vijayalakshmi (supra) it has been held that town planning legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation. In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and others, 2007 (8) SCC 705 , it has been held that Town Planning and Development Act being regulatory in nature as by reason thereof the right of an owner of the property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and others, 2007 (8) SCC 705 , it has been held that Town Planning and Development Act being regulatory in nature as by reason thereof the right of an owner of the property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose unless there exists certain regulation in a statute or a statutory rules. Regulations contained in such statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere with the right of property of the owner of such land. Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such restrictions, indisputably, must be reasonable ones. The statutory scheme contemplates that a person and owner of the land should not ordinarily be deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation or designation. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right. Property, while ceasing to be a fundamental right would, however, be given express recognition as a legal right, provisions being made that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. A draft development plan, which has not attained finality, cannot be held to be determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties and, thus, it can never be implemented. A development plan even in ordinary parlance can be implemented only when it is final and not when it is at the draft stage i.e. susceptible to changes. Not only land use may make geographical change, the other details may also undergo a change. The objections and suggestions invited from the general public as also the persons affected may be accepted. There may be realignment. It may undergo serious modifications. It would also, therefore, follow that what is contemplated is the final development plan and not a draft development plan, since until the development plan is finalized, it would have no statutory or legal force and the land use as existing prior thereto with the rights of usage of the land arising therefrom would continue. The principle as laid down in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in M. Naga Venkata Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam Municipal Corpn. and another, 2007 (8) SCC 748 . The principle as laid down in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in M. Naga Venkata Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam Municipal Corpn. and another, 2007 (8) SCC 748 . However, it is further added therein that before making the zonal plan and the master plan, the authority is required to give an opportunity of hearing to the persons who may be affected thereby. 228. The petitioner company has contradicted the statement of learned Additional Advocate General made in the case of Sudhir Chandra Agarwala (supra) that village Tushiyana is part of area of Greater Noida Authority constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and covered by Master Plan-2021, and said that the Master Plan-2021 has not seen the light of the day as yet since the same has not been finally approved by the National Capital Region Board. Factually, in such case, when an application for raising boundary wall was made by the petitioner therein, he was cautioned by the authority that the land is proposed to be acquired. The petitioner therein voluntarily accepted the condition giving unconditional undertaking not to insist and claim any compensation if Greater Noida Authority ever acquires the land. The permission was granted on the basis of such undertaking of the petitioner therein. Section 154 (2) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 229. In conformity with the acquisition proceedings but not in derogation thereto, we have to see certain other materials. Factually we find that a permission was sought for by the petitioner company to hold the excess land under Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act which was granted by the State. Therefore, the State acted on the basis of the proposal of the petitioner company. This transfer is made for the general public since the permission has been granted by the State to that extent. It can be safely presumed that the State was subjectively satisfied with regard to transfer of such excess land in favour of the petitioner company in the interest of the general public. Therefore, public purpose cannot be said to be obliterated on the part of the petitioner company. Hence, once again a special circumstance is prevailing in the field that it is a dispute about the public purpose between the private party and the agency of the State. Therefore, public purpose cannot be said to be obliterated on the part of the petitioner company. Hence, once again a special circumstance is prevailing in the field that it is a dispute about the public purpose between the private party and the agency of the State. Public purpose cannot be said to be absent at all. In support of such contentions we have gone through the ratio of the judgement in Super Agrotech Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (9) SCC 203 . The relevant portion is quoted hereunder : “7. .... Section 154(2) clearly shows that the permission could be granted in case the State Government came to the conclusion that such transfer was in favour of (1) a registered cooperative society, or (2) an institution established for a charitable purpose, or (3) that the transfer was in the interest of the general public. The third clause did not qualify the first two clauses. The word “or” must be read as used consistently in the section disjunctively. The phrase “public interest” had been clarified by the State Government itself in its Government Order dated 30-5-1994 as including industrial development. The State Government was competent to do this and its action was wrongly held by the High Court to have been beyond Section 154 (2) of the Act.” 230. Hence, under no circumstances public interest or public purpose on the part of the petitioner company can be said to be absent to destroy. However, the respondent-State contended that Section 154 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act has no manner of application to a society but to an individual tenure-holder as held by a Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgement dated 16th March, 1989 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7111 of 1988 (Kasturi Sanyukt Sahkari Krishi Samiti Ltd. Sultanpur v. State of U.P. and others), which has also been relied in Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner Administration, Bareilly and others, 2001 (2) JCLR 790 (All) and Kendriya Karmchari Sehkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2003 (6) AWC 4622. Writ Petition No. 7111 of 1988 (Kasturi Sanyukt Sahkari Krishi Samiti Ltd. Sultanpur v. State of U.P. and others), which has also been relied in Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner Administration, Bareilly and others, 2001 (2) JCLR 790 (All) and Kendriya Karmchari Sehkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2003 (6) AWC 4622. Having recorded the observations in relation to all the connected matters herein above, our conclusions are as follows : (i) The proceedings arising out of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 10th April, 2006 and 30th November, 2006 having not been followed by pronouncement of any award and possession not having been taken after the expiry of the stay order within two years thereafter, the entire acquisition proceedings stand lapsed in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. (ii) The permission granted by the State Government for purchase of land under Section 154 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act vide sanction of the State Government dated 19th July, 1986, which was cancelled by the order dated 20th April, 1989, continues to subsist and the impact of the cancellation order stood wiped out on account of the subsequent conduct of the respondents by continuing with the project of the petitioner company and acquisition of land, and also keeping in view the directions of the Supreme Court dated 08th November, 2005 given in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 21000 of 1993 (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another), quoted herein above. We may add that there would have been no occasion for the State Government to have proceeded with the acquisition, had the petitioner company been not the valid tenure-holders, which by itself is indication of their continued possession and ownership acknowledged by the respondents. (iii) In view of our conclusions drawn herein above that the proceedings of acquisition has lapsed, the question relating to invoking the urgency clause or otherwise does not survive. (iv) The State Government has the power of eminent domain to proceed with the acquisition afresh and in view of our observations in relation to such power being available coupled with the fact that the proceedings have lapsed, the question of mala fides does not require any further opinion. (iv) The State Government has the power of eminent domain to proceed with the acquisition afresh and in view of our observations in relation to such power being available coupled with the fact that the proceedings have lapsed, the question of mala fides does not require any further opinion. The presence of alleged mala fides has been noted by us but we refrain from giving any final opinion on the said issue as the validity of the acquisition does not survive. (v) The State Government has proceeded to consider the development by the petitioner company even after the NOIDA had intervened in relation to the sanction of the lay out plan and, therefore, the State Government having permitted the petitioner company to make investment may be estopped from resiling back on the principles of promissory estoppel. (vi) The question relating to the approval of Master Plan-2021 being still under consideration by the National Capital Region Board under the N.C.R. Act being pending would not by itself be sufficient to invalidate the lay out plan of the petitioner company and may require a reconsideration by the authorities. (vii) The State Government while proceeding to reject the representations of the petitioner company has not considered the impact of the judicial intervention by the Apex Court issuing directions of the registration of the plots in question vide order dated 08th November, 2005 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 21000 of 1993 (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another) and their development and hence, the orders passed by the State Government to that extent are unsustainable. (viii) The State Government, while proceeding to hear the objections that were permitted under the directions of this Court, has decided by inviting material from the NOIDA and their comments, about which the petitioner company was not given a fair opportunity. In view of the observations made and conclusions drawn herein above, now we proceed to pass the orders in the appeal and respective writ petitions. Order First Appeal From Order No. 120 of 2008 : 231. In view of the observations made and conclusions drawn herein above, now we proceed to pass the orders in the appeal and respective writ petitions. Order First Appeal From Order No. 120 of 2008 : 231. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant-Sri Ram Chaudhary against M/s. Technology Park alleging that the defendant No. 1(M/s. Technology Park Limited) had entered into an agreement for sale of the land in dispute in the suit and, therefore, a decree be issued compelling the defendant No. 1 through an injunction not to dispose of the land in dispute in favour of any third party except the plaintiff and be further restrained from altering the possession of the land. 232. An application for interim relief was moved and the same was rejected on 30th August, 2007 giving rise to present appeal. 233. The trial Court found that the appellant did not have any prima facie case nor was there any balance of convenience nor did the facts pleaded indicate any irreparable injury so as to warrant the exercise of discretion for grant of an interim injunction. 234. We have heard Sri H.R. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 1-M/s. Technology Park Ltd. This Court had entertained the appeal but an order was passed on 08th January, 2008 condoning the delay in filing the appeal, against which order the defendant-M/s. Technology Park Ltd. filed special leave to appeal before the Apex Court in which orders were passed on 30th June, 2008 dismissing the said special leave petition with an observation that the appeal as well as all the connected writ petitions in relation to the acquisition proceedings be heard together. We have already quoted the said order passed by the Apex Court in this judgement itself. The Apex Court had directed that no third party rights were to be created in respect of the land in question. 235. We, therefore, dispose of the appeal with the liberty to the parties to approach the trial Court for disposal of the suit on its merits and in view of the developments that have taken place due to the consequences arising out of our judgement, the parties shall be at liberty to file an appropriate application before the Court below for necessary orders, if so required. No order is passed as to costs. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65654 of 2006 : 236. The basic challenge in this writ petition is to the order passed by the State Government dated 06th November, 2006, which order was passed in pursuance of the directions of this Court dated 02nd May, 2006 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23677 of 2006. We have given detailed reasons and held that the order dated 06th November, 2006 has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and without taking the relevant materials into account. Apart from this, the question relating to land acquisition has also been dealt with by us. Accordingly, the order dated 06th November, 2006 is unsustainable and is hereby quashed. In view of the fact that the acquisition proceedings have been treated by us to have lapsed, the further relief claimed in the writ petition also stands disposed of. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, however, without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65656 of 2006 : 237. This writ petition questions the validity of the order dated 11th October, 2006 passed by the Chairman, Greater NOIDA, whereby the representation of the petitioner company has been rejected after a direction was issued on 17th April, 2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14249 of 2002. The order records several facts relating to the petitioner company not possessing the requisite land, the petitioner company not complying with the Master Plan-2021 and withdrawal of the permission of the State Government in relation to the permission for acquiring the land. All these aspects have been dealt with by us in this judgement and in view of the conclusions drawn herein above, the order dated 11th October, 2006 is unsustainable. Accordingly, the order dated 11th October, 2006 is quashed with liberty to the authority concerned to pass a fresh order in the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner company. Thus, this writ petition is allowed, however, without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006 : 238. Accordingly, the order dated 11th October, 2006 is quashed with liberty to the authority concerned to pass a fresh order in the matter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner company. Thus, this writ petition is allowed, however, without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 65658 of 2006 : 238. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 27th May, 2005 passed by the Greater NOIDA authority, whereby a conclusion has been drawn that the plan of the petitioner company does not conform to the Master Plan-2021 and further that the petitioner company is not owner of the entire land projected to it as most of the land had been subjected to proceedings of attachment. In view of our conclusions drawn in this judgement, the matter will require reconsideration by the Greater NOIDA authority. Hence, the order dated 27th May, 2005 is quashed leaving it open to the authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68436 of 2006 : 239. This writ petition raises a challenge to the notification dated 30th November, 2006 issued under the Land Acquisition Act. For the reasons given herein above in this judgement, this writ petition also stands disposed of without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68439 of 2006 : 240. Challenge in this writ petition is to the impugned notices dated 01st November, 2006 and 11th December, 2006 issued by the Additional Collector, Gautam Buddha Nagar calling upon the petitioner company to show-cause as to why the land be not treated to have vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh as the holding of the petitioner company is in violation of Section 154 (1) read with Sections 157(A), 157(AA), 166 and 167 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. In view of our conclusions drawn in the judgement treating the permission granted to the petitioner company under Section 154 (2) of the said Act to be subsisting and continuing, the Additional Collector shall not proceed any further pursuant to the impugned notices against the petitioner company. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of without any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4812 of 2007 : 241. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of without any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4812 of 2007 : 241. The challenge in this writ petition is to the impugned notifications dated 10th April, 2006 and 30th November, 2006 as well as the consequential notices issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We have already held that the acquisition has lapsed under the provisions of Section 11-A of the said Act. In view of the reasons given herein above in this judgement, the writ petition also stands disposed of accordingly, however, without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14213 of 2007 : 242. This writ petition also stands disposed of with liberty to the Greater NOIDA authority to pass a fresh order in relation to the objections raised by the petitioner company to the Master Plan in view of the conclusions drawn above in the judgement. No order is passed as to costs. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20756 of 2008 : 243. The challenge in this writ petition is by Sri Ram Chaudhary, who claims himself to be an interested person for challenging the acquisition proceedings and the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is no longer necessary to entertain the said plea in view of the fact that we have already held that the proceedings of acquisition have lapsed under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of without imposing any cost. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44625 of 2008 : 244. The petitioners in this writ petition claim themselves to be the Plot and Flat Allottees Association, who contend that they are purchasers and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings directly affect them. We had heard Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri M.K. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, and in view of our conclusions drawn herein above that the proceedings of acquisition have lapsed, this writ petition also stands disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. ————