Judgment :- 1. This writ petition had been examined on 29/10/2010 for admission, even though the matter had come up for orders regarding the tenability or otherwise of the office objections and the following order had come to be passed:- “DVSKJ: WP No.33629/2010 (MV RES) 29/10/2010 Office objections over ruled. Taken up for preliminary hearing at the request of Mr.Palakshaiah, learned Advocate for the petitioner. KSRTC is the writ petitioner, who is complaining before this court that the respondent-authorities are enforcing the provisions of Motor Vehicles Acts and Rules and also the manner of implementation to a Nationalized scheme framed by the Government of Karnataka and therefore, have sought for the following reliefs:- (i) Call for the records pertaining to the complaint as per the Annexure A and B dated 28/8/2010 and 30/8/2010 from respondent No.2 and 4; (ii) Direct the respondents to initiate action against the vehicles and the operators as clearly narrated in Annexure A and B; (iii) The petitioner further seeks to initiate action in terms of Section 53(1) (b) and 192 (A), 207 of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1988; (iv) Further please to direct the respondents to dispose of the representation as per Annexure A and B in accordance with law at an early date; (v) Issue any other writ or direction or pass any other order/s suitable to the facts and circumstances of the case including the costs. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submission of Sri Palakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner is that even when the scheme popularly known as “Dharwad scheme” is total exclusion of private operators on the routes covered by the Dharwad scheme, nevertheless, many private operators are operating on routes overlapping the notified Nationalization scheme and therefore, this Court should issue directions to the respondents to ensure that operation on the routes by the private operators is prevented etc. Dictation of the order is not concluded today. Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to place before the court authorities to support the prayer for issue of a mandamus to respondents 3 and 5 based on the provisions of Section 53(1) (b) read with Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. List for such purpose on 2/11/2010.” 2. Sri Palakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before the court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. List for such purpose on 2/11/2010.” 2. Sri Palakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before the court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State Of Gujarat reported in 1997 SCC (Criminal) 1120 and has drawn my attention specifically to paragraph 22 of the judgment which reads as under:- .“22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issue, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory is the scheme of statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if the “duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a “right”. 3. Based on the observations contained in this paragraph, submission of Sri Palakshaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner is that in terms of the provisions of Section 66 of the Motor vehicles Act, no person is allowed to operate a vehicle in any public place without permit granted or counter signed by the competent regional transport authority and notwithstanding such a prohibition/restriction contained in Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and in spite of many vehicle owners in Udupi and Uttara Kannada District operating with impunity on routes over lapping a notified nationalized routes covered by the ‘Dharwad Scheme’ wherein the petitioners’ operation on the existing route through stage carriages and even when such private transport vehicle owners are operating in contravention of Section 66 of the Act, as well as the “Dharwad Scheme” and in spite of the petitioner having brought such illegal operations to the notice of the regional transport authorities, no action is taken by these authorities either under Section 53 or under Sections 192A and 207 of the Act, which provisions enables them to prevent such illegal operations. The concerned authorities having not taken any action, it has become necessary for the petitioner to approach this Court seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus. 4. Statutory provisions referred to above read as under:- “Section 53 – Suspension of registration: (1) If any registering authority or other prescribed authority has reason to believe that any motor vehicle within its jurisdiction – (a) is in such a condition that is use in a public place would constitute a danger to the public, or that it fails to comply with the requirements of this Act or of the rules made thereunder, or (b) has been, or is being, used for hire or reward without a valid permit being used as such, the authority may, after giving the owner an opportunity of making any representation he may wish to make (by sending to the owner a notice by registered post acknowledgment due at his address entered in the certificate of registration), for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the certificate of registration of the vehicle – (i) In any case falling under clause (a), until the defects are rectified to its satisfaction; and (ii) In any case falling under clause (b), for a period not exceeding four months; (2) An authority other than a registering authority shall when making a suspension order under sub-section (1), initiate in writing the fact of such suspension and the reasons therefore to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the vehicle is at the time of the suspension. (3) Where the registration of a motor vehicle has been suspended under sub-section (1) for a continuous period of not less than one month, the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle was when the registration was suspended, shall, if it is not the original registering authority, inform that authority of the suspension. (4) The owner of a motor vehicle shall, on the demand of a registering authority or other prescribed authority which has suspended the certificate of registration of the vehicle under this section, surrender the certificate of registration. (5) A certificate of registration surrendered under sub-section (4) shall be returned to the owner when the order suspending registration has been rescinded and not before. (5) A certificate of registration surrendered under sub-section (4) shall be returned to the owner when the order suspending registration has been rescinded and not before. Section 192A – Using vehicles without permit: (1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 66 or in contravention of any condition of a permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, shall be punishable for the first offence with a fine which may extend to five thousand rupees but shall not be less than two thousand rupees and for any subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to one year but shall not be less than three months or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees but shall not be less than five thousand rupees or with both: Provided that the court may for reasons to be recorded, impose a lesser punishment. .(1) Nothing in this section shall apply to the use of a motor vehicle in an emergency for the conveyance of persons suffering from sickness or injury or for the transport of materials for repair or for the transport of food or materials to relieve distress or of medical supplies for a like purpose. Provided that the person using the vehicle reports about the same to the Regional Transport Authority within seven days from the date of such use. .(2) The Court to which an appeal lies from any conviction in respect of an offence of the nature specified in the sub-section (1), may set aside or vary any order made by the court below, notwithstanding that no appeal lies against the conviction in connection with which such order was made. Section 207 – Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration, permit, etc. Section 207 – Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration, permit, etc. (1) Any police officer or other person authorized in this behalf by the State Government may, if he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of section 3 or section 4 or section 39 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the vehicle, in the prescribed manner and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any step he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle: Provided that there any such officer or person has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of section 3 or section 4 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of section 66 he may, instead of seizing the vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle and shall issue an acknowledgment in respect thereof. .(2) Where a motor vehicle has been seized and detained under sub-section (1), the owner or person in charge of the motor vehicle may apply to the transport authority or any officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government together with the relevant documents for the release of the vehicle and such authority or officer may, after verification of such documents, by order, release the vehicle subject to such conditions as the authority or officer may deem fit to impose.” 5. It is true that any transport vehicle owner, desirous of operating on a public road either a goods carriage or a stage carriage has to obtain a permit in terms of the provisions of Section 66 of the Act. It is a provision in the nature of a restriction imposed as a regulating measure and on persons, who seek to operate their vehicles on a public road. 6. It is a provision in the nature of a restriction imposed as a regulating measure and on persons, who seek to operate their vehicles on a public road. 6. While this provision is undoubtedly a regulatory/restrictive provision, it is not one conferring any right on any person and at the best, a provision of this nature may enable a person to seek for grant of a permit assuring that if the permit is granted in his / her favour, will abide by the terms and conditions of the permit. This section is definitely not a provision either enabling a person, who is already operating or who does not like others operating on the particular route or sector, to claim a right in his/her favour for preventing other operators without valid permits, by praying for issue of a writ of mandamus by this court. 7. The observations contained in paragraph 22 of the decision of the Supreme Court cited above does not in any way advance the case of the petitioner, in the present situation, as the Supreme Court has only quoted the celebrated principles for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus, which is only to say that a person having a legal right in his favour if is denied or deprived of that legal right, High Court in exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the public authority to perform a duty imposed on that authority corresponding to a right created in favour of individuals / persons by the statutory provisions and if the inaction on the part of the public authority is affecting exercise of the right by the citizens. Such is not the situation in the present case. Such is not the situation in the present case. While independent of the situation even when other statutory provisions such as Sections 53, 192A and 207 of the Act may enable the law enforcing authorities or regulating authorities to take commensurate action against erring private vehicle owners and prevent them from operating their motor vehicles on public roads without the sanction of a valid permit, a mere possibility of this nature cannot be said to give rise to a right in favour of persons like the petitioner, who is in the position of an ‘existing operator’ in motor vehicle jurisprudence and incidentally if a state owned road transport corporation may also have a scheme notified in its favour for exclusive operation of its vehicles on the notified routes, cannot nevertheless, claim a negative right in its favour to compel public authorities like the respondents to take action against the erring private motor vehicle owners, who may be operating on public roads without valid permits. 8. While it is true that it is always the duty of any public authority to act in accordance with these statutory provisions governing a situation and to follow the rules and procedure, at the same time, it does not mean a writ in rem or a writ in general can be issued for the purpose of compelling the public authority to perform a duty, which does not in any way correlate or is linked to the right of a writ petitioner, to seek for issue of a writ of mandamus. 9. In the present situation, I do not find any right conferred on the petitioner – Corporation, statutorily under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which is in any way denied by the respondent-authority by its inaction. When such is the factual situation, question of issue of a writ of mandamus does not arise. While this writ petition for a mandamus is declined, it is open to the petitioner to work out its rights and remedies elsewhere in accordance with law. Writ petition is dismissed. 10. No specific instances of violations of petitioner’s rights vis-à-vis a private operator is mentioned in the writ petition and assuming that it is so, it is for the petitioner to pursue this matter before the authorities or before any other forum, but a writ of mandamus as sought for by the petitioner cannot be granted.