JUDGMENT:-The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.6.2006 passed by the Adhoc Additional District Judge, Pusad in Special Civil Suit No.81 of 2000 whereby the suit was decreed for specific performance of agreement to sell suit plot. 2. Facts briefly are: The plaintiff had instituted a special civil suit to enforce specific performance of agreement to sell a non-agricultural plot no.18 situated in land survey number 88/2, ward no.32 at Vijay Nagar, Pusad admeasuring about 337.50 square meters (described as "suit plot" hereinafter). The plaintiff had agreed to purchase the suit plot situated in Vijay Nagar Layout pursuant to an agreement dated 30.9.1996 at agreed price of Rs. 3,52,384.30. Earnest money in the sum Rs.1,00,000/- was paid to Vithalrao who executed the agreement to sell. The sale deed was agreed to be executed in December, 1997 at the cost of the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff made further payment of Rs. 4,000/- to defendant Dewanji for Vithalrao Patre on 3.8.1997 duly acknowledged. In December, 1997 the plaintiff had met Vithalrao and requested him to execute the sale deed as agreed by the end of December, 1997, but despite the plaintiff remaining present on 31.12.1997 in the office of Sub-Registrar, Pusad, Vithalrao did not turn up on the pretext that his sons were not available to sign. Despite notice dated 25.9.1998 calling upon Vithalrao to attend the office of Sub-Registrar on 15.10.1998 to execute the sale deed. The notice remained unserved. By another notice dated 14.10.1998 Vithalrao was called upon to attend the Office of Sub-Registrar on 29.10.1998, but Vithalrao avoided to execute the sale deed. Vithalrao died on 12.10.2000 leaving behind defendant no.1 widow and defendants no.2 to 7 (sons). Defendant no. 8 was Diwanji of Vithalrao while defendant no.9 is purchaser pendente lite. The legal representatives of late Vithalrao were requested to execute registered sale-deed in respect of the suit plot, but they avoided. 4. Defendants no.1 to 7 had resisted the suit alleging that Vithalrao was addicted to vices like drinking liquor and also denied receipt of Rs.1,04,000/- as consideration from the plaintiff. Validity of the agreement to sell was also challenged. The suit proceeded ex-parte against defendants no.8 and 9. 5. The trial Court found that the agreement to sell was executed by Vithalrao voluntarily and he had received part payment made in total sum of Rs. 1,04,000/-. Validity of the agreement to sell was also challenged. The suit proceeded ex-parte against defendants no.8 and 9. 5. The trial Court found that the agreement to sell was executed by Vithalrao voluntarily and he had received part payment made in total sum of Rs. 1,04,000/-. The trial Court also found it proved that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The trial Court concluded that the suit agreement to sell is specifically enforceable against defendants no. 1 to 7 and 9. Thus, the suit was decreed. 6. Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted in support of the appeal that the plaintiff was not continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and his conduct prior and subsequent to the suit was not fully considered. Reference was made to N. P. Thirugnanam Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan and ors. reported in (1995)5 SCC 115 . Reference is then made to His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji Vs. Sita Ram Thapar reported in (1996)4 SCC 526 to canvas a point that readiness is to be ascertained from conduct of the party and attending circumstances. Financial capacity of the party as well as intention to perform is relevant. In Thiruvengadam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal & anr. reported in (2008) SCC 530, it is held that burden of proof is always upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had executed the agreement and not upon defendant to prove negative. In K.S. Vidyanandam & ors. Vs. Vairavan reported in 1997(2) Mh.L.J. 642 , effect of unreasonable delay due to total inaction on the part of plaintiff was considered to refuse relief of specific performance. In Suman Parmananddas and ors. Vs. Saroj and ors. reported in 1992 Mh.L.J. 1460, averment as to readiness and willingness to perform contract is required to be considered. In H.P. Pyarejan V s. Dasappa and ors. reported in 2006(3) Mh.L.J. 312 , it is held that plaintiff is required to prove that his conduct is blemish less to entitle him claim the relief for specific performance. In Umabai & anr. Vs. Nilkanth and anr. reported in 2005(4) Mh.L.J. 306 , it is held necessary to plead that plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement or that the plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay purchase amount. In Umabai & anr. Vs. Nilkanth and anr. reported in 2005(4) Mh.L.J. 306 , it is held necessary to plead that plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement or that the plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay purchase amount. Last reference is made to Lourdu Mari David and ors. Vs. Louis Chinnaya and ors. reported in (1996)5 SCC 589 to argue that relief to grant decree for specific performance is discretionary. As held in Parakunnan Veetill Vs. Nedumbara and ors. reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 340, motive of the suit is to be taken into account. 7. On the other hand, learned Advocate for respondent no. l placed reliance upon ruling in Prakashchandra Vs. Angadlal reported in AIR 1979 SC 1241 to argue that specific performance is granted as an ordinary rule unless equitable consideration points to its refusal and the circumstances show that damage would constitute an adequate relief. If plaintiff has acted fairly throughout showing his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement of sale and he has not thereby secured any unfair advantage then he is entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale. Reliance is then placed upon ruling in Jugrajsingh & anr. Vs. Labhsingh & ors. reported in 1995(2) SCC 31 in which it is held that the plea that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his pal1 of contract is specifically and personally available to the vendor/defendant and not to the subsequent purchaser who can only defend on the ground that he had no prior knowledge of the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. In other words, subsequent purchaser can plead that he is bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and not about lack of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff/intending purchaser under an agreement of sale. Learned Advocate for the respondent referred to Pirthi @ Sansi Vs. Jatiram reported in AIR 1997 SC 1598 and pointed out that in that case, the petitioner had inducted third-party in possession after the suit was instituted and after an agreement of sale was entered into. The Apex Court held that the contention of subsequent purchasers that they are bonafide purchasers was rightly rejected and the relief of specific performance was rightly granted by the High Court. The Apex Court held that the contention of subsequent purchasers that they are bonafide purchasers was rightly rejected and the relief of specific performance was rightly granted by the High Court. It is contended that relief of specific performance can be granted even in cases wherein suit property has been sold in the absence of proof by the subsequent purchaser that he is bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the defect in the title of the vendor. Reliance is placed upon R. K. Mahmmad Ubaidullah & ors. V s. Haji C. Abdul and ors. reported in 2000(6) SCC 402 . 8. From the evidence led in the case in hand, it appears that the plaintiff had sent notices dated 25.9.1998 and 14.10.1998 to the defendant calling upon them for specific performance of agreement which were returned to sendor. The plaintiff had also attended the Office of Sub-Registrar on 29.10.1998 to get the sale deed executed pursuant to the agreement to sell the suit property. Under these circumstances, the defendants ought not to have entered into another transaction with defendant no.9. Subsequent purchaser who is bound by the decree that may be passed in such suit upon principle of lis pendence vide Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Vendor or any person claiming under him cannot be allowed to deprive the plaintiff of the legitimate benefit of an agreement for sale by entering into malafide subsequent sale transaction with third party. Subsequent purchaser is required to make inquiry into sale transaction; nature of possession; title or further interest at the time when the subsequent sale transaction was entered into. Learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that relief of specific performance can be granted in favour of vendee in original agreement for sale as against vendor and persons who acquired title on the basis of collusive transactions entered into with vendor. Learned Advocate made reference to ruling in Tekchand & ors. Vs. Dipchand & ors. reported in 2001(4) SCC 488 . It is further argued with reference to Aniglase Yohnnan Vs. Ramlatha & ors. Learned Advocate made reference to ruling in Tekchand & ors. Vs. Dipchand & ors. reported in 2001(4) SCC 488 . It is further argued with reference to Aniglase Yohnnan Vs. Ramlatha & ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 3503 that the language in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act does not require any specific phraseology in exact words of the Statute, but an averment that the plaintiff seeking specific performance of agreement for sale has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for a mechanical production of exact words of a Statute, is to insist for a form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded. If the pleadings manifest the conduct of the plaintiff of readiness and willingness to perform his part of agreement, that entitles him to get the relief. The plaintiff should not be denied the relief once he has substantiated such pleas by evidence. 9. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that Vithalrao (vendor) had no right to enter into an agreement of sale, because he was addicted to drinks. It is contended in the alternative that Vithalrao was not the sole owner of suit property and had no exclusive right to sell it without concurrence of co-sharers. It is next contended that the trial Court erred to hold that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement for sale and, therefore, specific relief as prayed could not have been granted by the Court below. 10. Learned Advocate for respondent no.1 opposed these contentions on the ground that injoint Hindu family, karta or Manager of the family has power to alienate the property for any legal necessity and to bind the family. There was admission in evidence that Vithalrao was looking after the business of family till his death. Reference is made to document at exhibit 149 to submit that series of transactions was entered into by Vithal Patre as many plots were sold. It is also submitted that "readiness and willingness" by the plaintiff was established on record by him and his Joint Hindu Family. Reference is made to document at exhibit 149 to submit that series of transactions was entered into by Vithal Patre as many plots were sold. It is also submitted that "readiness and willingness" by the plaintiff was established on record by him and his Joint Hindu Family. The submissions advanced on behalf of the respondent in support of impugned judgment are convincing and acceptable. 11. The trial Court upon evidence led, found that Vithal is predecessor-in-title of defendants no. 1 to 7 and had voluntarily executed and signed exhibit 43 (Agreement for Sale) and accepted part payments made in the sum of Rs.1,04,000/- and further that the plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, ordered defendants no. 1 to 7 and 9 for specific performance of the suit agreement. Learned trial Judge has considered and appreciated pleadings and evidence led, both oral and documentary on record and passed a well-reasoned judgment. The trial Court had advantage to see the witnesses deposing from the witness box in order to appreciate their evidence in the light of document at exhibit 43, an agreement for sale; part payments made pursuant thereto in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- on 30.9.1996 and Rs. 4,000/- on 3.8.1997 to Vitthal Patre as part performed by the plaintiff and there was evidence that the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. 12. There were transactions in evidence in the form of extracts from Index-II Register at exhibit 139 collectively showing that there was joint Hindu family of Vithalrao, his wife and son and they had entered into transactions of sale etc. with respect to their other plots as well. Such transactions would not have occurred had Vithalrao Patre had lost his mental balance due to alleged vices to drinking. Family members would not have joined with him for selling their other plots to various purchasers. Under these circumstances, learned trial Judge has rightly exercised the discretion to grant specific performance of suit agreement. Defendant no.9, a subsequent purchaser who had opportunity to defend and contest the suit, did not come forward to establish that he is a bonafide purchaser. Subsequent purchaser could not have deprived the plaintiff of the legitimate benefit of suit agreement without leading any evidence to the contrary in the suit. Defendant no.9, a subsequent purchaser who had opportunity to defend and contest the suit, did not come forward to establish that he is a bonafide purchaser. Subsequent purchaser could not have deprived the plaintiff of the legitimate benefit of suit agreement without leading any evidence to the contrary in the suit. The trial Court had justification to draw adverse inference against subsequent purchaser who remained absent at the trial. The conclusions were based upon oral as well as documentary evidence led on record as also questions of law raised by the parties. I do not find any valid ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. 13. In the result, the appeal is found without merit and stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.