JUDGMENT S.N. Satyanarayana, J :- This is defendant's appeal challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 03.10.1998 passed in O.S.No.6/1991 on the file of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) & JMFC, Chikkaballapur. 2. The parties herein are referred to by their rank in the Court below for the sake of convenience. 3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as under: Plaintiff case is defendant approached them for credit facility in a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- which was sanctioned on 15.02.1998. In this behalf defendant executed a promote agreeing to repay the loan with interest at 6.5% p.a., over and above the RBI minimum rate at 16.6%, compounded quarterly. The said loan was secured by deposit of title documents pertaining to suit schedule property. The equitable mortgage was created by plaintiff under letter dated 15.02.1988 evidencing deposit of title deeds with list of documents at Schedule "A" and description of the property at schedule "B". The defendant is Managing Director of M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited. The said company had also availed several credit facilities for its business and equitable mortgage was created in respect of said loan also. Since the present loan of Rs. 1,30,000/- was granted to defendant in his individual name, suit is filed against him for recovery of the loan amount on the security of suit schedule property. 4. Though the defendant utilised the entire credit facility, did not repay the loan as agreed. At the time of borrowing, plaintiff had also executed a letter agreeing to clear the loan in thirty-six monthly installment of Rs. 3,600/- and last installment at Rs. 4,000/-. Since the defendant failed to repay any of the installments, plaint if issued legal notice on 20.10.1990 after the said notice defendant attended a meeting convened by plaintiff in its office on 08.11.1990. In the said meeting, he refused to commit himself for repayment of loan and also to execute acknowledgment of debt for outstanding 1011n amount. Hence suit for recovery was filed against him in the Court of Ciyil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and JMFC, Chikkaballapur, for the reason that the mortgaged suit schedule property is situated within the jurisdiction of the said Court. 5. In the suit, defendant was duly served, he filed written statement admitting sanction of loan for Rs. 1,30,000/- and execution of Promissory Note and several other documents in connection with the said loan transaction. 5. In the suit, defendant was duly served, he filed written statement admitting sanction of loan for Rs. 1,30,000/- and execution of Promissory Note and several other documents in connection with the said loan transaction. It is his defence that the documents executed by him are printed forms with several blank space in it, the said blanks were not filed with material details pertaining to loan suit transaction. They were left blank at the time he executed the said documents. They are filled up subsequently by plaintiff’s officers without his knowledge. Therefore they are void and unenforceable documents. Initially in the written statement he admitted delivery of documents to plaintiff and execution of letter describing as the letter evidencing deposit of title deeds. Further, it is also his case that at the time of execution of those documents, Schedule 'A' and 'B', the said letter was blank, which according to him is filled up at a later stage. Hence mortgage is vitiated no consideration was passed on to him under the Demand Promissory Note. He also contended that he has not availed any credit facility in respect of M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited and he is not liable to repay the loan extended to the said Company. He admit having attended the meeting on 08.11.1990 in plaintiff premises, state that he refused to execute acknowledgment of debt, as he is not liable to repay the loan. 6. With this pleading, the Court below framed the following issues: 1. Whether defendant proves that his signatures to suit documents like promote etc., were obtained on blank papers? 2. Whether defendant proves that suit promote was not supported by consideration? 3. Whether plaintiff proves that defendant has mortgaged the suit property to plaintiff? 4. Whether there is cause of action for the suit? 5. Whether plaintiff is entitled to decree for recovery of money as prayed for? 6. Whether plaintiff is entitled to preliminary decree for sale of suit schedule property, if plaintiff should succeed in the suit? 7. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief’s prayed for? 8. To what relief and decree? 7. Subsequently two additional issues were also framed, which are as under: 1. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to try this suit? 2. Is the plaintiff property represented in the suit? 8. Thereafter the matter went into trial. 7. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief’s prayed for? 8. To what relief and decree? 7. Subsequently two additional issues were also framed, which are as under: 1. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to try this suit? 2. Is the plaintiff property represented in the suit? 8. Thereafter the matter went into trial. The bank examined two witnesses, one V. Jaganathan as P.W.1 and Another M.S. Ganeshamurthy as P.W.2. Since P.W. 1 retired from service, he was not available for cross examination, hence his evidence was eschewed. In the Court below, plaintiff produced and marked documents as per Exs.P-1 to P-19. On behalf of the defendant, defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and marked EX.D-1. On behalf of Court, eight documents were marked as Exs.C-1 to C-8. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and also pleadings on record, the Court below answered Issue Nos. 1 and 2 in the negative, Issue Nos.3 to 7 and additional Issue Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative and consequently decreed the suit in terms of Issue No.8 decreeing plaintiffs suit for recovery of Rs. 1,30,000/- with interest at 16.55% with quarterly rests from the date of suit transaction till the date of institution of suit and with simple interest at 20% p.a.. on Rs. 30,000/- from the date of suit till realisation from the defendant personally as well as on the security of mortgaged property. 9. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree, defendant preferred the appeal on hand on the grounds; that the Judgment and Decree passed in the Court below is erroneous, the rate of interest awarded is vague, uncertain and ambiguous and also passed without any basis of agreement or contract. The Demand Promissory Note, Ex.P-1 is void document with vague conditions the same is illegal and inadmissible in evidence. The bank has failed to examine at least one of the attesters of Ex. P-l, there is failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce title deeds of defendant to suit schedule property, which are alleged to be deposited with plaintiff, and claim to be in their custody. The alleged loan amount as agreed was neither paid to him nor released to his account. Hence EX.P-1 is not supported by consideration and that Ex.P-3 letter of confirmation of deposit of title deeds is incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. 10. The alleged loan amount as agreed was neither paid to him nor released to his account. Hence EX.P-1 is not supported by consideration and that Ex.P-3 letter of confirmation of deposit of title deeds is incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. 10. That the Court in which the suit was filed has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Court below has also failed to note that all the installments of loan transaction had not fallen due as on the date of filing of the suit. The statement of accounts maintained and produced by plaintiff at Ex.P5 is illegal, entries made therein are without basis there are illegal debits to his account. Admittedly as per EX.P-19 since the amount of Rs. 1,30,000/was not paid to him, it was paid to the account of M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited. The alleged cause of action, has arisen at the time of execution of Demand Promissory Note, Ex.P-1 at Bangalore, since money due under Ex.P-3, letter depositing title deeds creating mortgage of the property in favour of the bank, the suit should have been filed in Bangalore and not in Chikkaballapur. Therefore there is error in jurisdiction. It is also his case that there cannot be mortgage without existence of debt. Since plaintiff failed to prove sanction of loan of Rs. 1,30,000/- to him, there cannot be claim for mortgage of his property by deposit of title deeds, that the evidence led by plaintiff is contrary to its pleadings and since all the documents on which signatures were taken were blank, he is not liable to pay any amount. 11. In this appeal, notice was duly served on the plaintiff, who is respondent herein and the entire Lower Court Records was secured. On going through the impugned Judgment and the grounds urged in the appeal, the following points arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Court below is justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff awarding interest at 16.55% with quarterly rests from the date of suit till realisation and simple interest at 20% p.a.. 2. Whether the Court below is justified in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to realise the suit schedule claim both personally and as well as against the security of the suit schedule property? 3. What order? 12. Heard the Counsel for appellant and respondents. 2. Whether the Court below is justified in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to realise the suit schedule claim both personally and as well as against the security of the suit schedule property? 3. What order? 12. Heard the Counsel for appellant and respondents. Perused the entire Lower Court Record including the pleadings oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties and also the impugned Judgment. In depreciation of the same, this Court proceed to answer the aforesaid point Nos. 1 and 2 for consideration, in the affirmative, for the following: REASONS 13. The defendant in his written statement has admitted that he has executed an on demand promissory note for a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- in favour of the plaintiff bank which is at Ex.P-1. He also admit having executed Ex. P-3, which is the document reflecting his intention to deposit title deeds of suit schedule property in favour of the bank to provide security for repayment of loan amount. However, the contention of the defendant is that the said documents were blank when he executed the same and as such they are not valid documents and hence it would not endure to the benefit of plaintiff. Such a contention of the defendant is not acceptable. Admittedly, EX.P-1 is executed on 15.02.1988 and Ex.P-3 on 15.02.1988. The suit is filed in the year 1991 nearly after three years. The defendant being a qualified doctor in Medicine and an educated man would know the consequence of affixing his signatures on blank farm and with his experience as a Medical Practitioner for over two decades, his contention that he was not aware of the contents of the said documents and he executed the same in blank is rightly not believed by the Court below. The defence taken by him in the written statement is flimsy, vague and baseless. In his anxiety to get over the liability, he has challenged the authority of the person, who has signed the plaint and also the place where the suit is instituted as not the place having proper jurisdiction. The defence taken by him in the written statement is flimsy, vague and baseless. In his anxiety to get over the liability, he has challenged the authority of the person, who has signed the plaint and also the place where the suit is instituted as not the place having proper jurisdiction. The Court below has rightly held the said issues against the defendant quoting relevant provision of Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the execution and verification of pleadings and also Sections 16 and 20 of Code of Civil Procedure regarding the place of suing in the matters, where suit is based on pronote and mortgage. Admittedly the defendant is resident of Chikkaballapur and that the suit schedule properties are also situated in the said town. Therefore, there is no justification in the defence taken by defendant regarding institution of the suit by plaintiff in the Court at Chikkaballapur. Further, it is also seen that the defendant having executed' Exs.P-1 and P-3 in the year 1988 and having not contended that the signatures taken by him is on the blank forms till the date of filing of his written statement in the year 1995, i.e., nearly after seven years clearly disclose his intention is not to bring to the notice of the Court regarding alleged execution of documents on blank sheets. It is only an attempt to get over his liability to the suit claim. The contention of the defendant that he does not know M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited, in which he is the Managing Director and the said company having all its credit transactions with the plaintiff bank is clearly indicative of the fact that the defence taken by him is flimsy and without any basis. Even in the cross examination of P.W. 1, who is personally acquainted with the defendant, stated that the defendant is the Managing Director of M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited and he has interacted with the officials of the bank in connection with all the credit facilities of the Company and that with the said personal association with the plaintiff bank, he has approached and persuaded them for sanction of suit loan in his individual name. The letter written by defendant which is at EX.P-15 and signed by himself as Managing Director of the said Company, wherein he state that the said loan under demand promissory note is sanctioned in his name, the same is required for the business of the company. In the said letter he reiterate that the plaintiff being bankers for the company should provide complete need based working capital and also state that the said D.P. loan taken by them is to utilize the same as margin money. The contents of this letter written by defendant as Managing Director of M/s. Adap (Pvt.) Limited strengthen the evidence given by P.W.2, M.S. Ganeshamurthy. It is also seen that the defendant initially having accepted that the entire document of title deed of the suit schedule property was tendered by him to the bank along with the opinion of the bank's advocate, later turned around and say that he has not deposited the documents as security for his loan. Whereas the oral and documentary evidence available on record clearly contradict the statement of defendant and the evidence let in by defendant also does not support his own case. In the light of the above, the Court below has rightly held the issues against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff bank and decreed the suit. 14. The defendant in support of his contention has relied upon the following judgments: i) AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT' 3356 K.P.O. Moideenkutty Hajee, Vs. Pappu Manjooran and another In the said judgment, the defendant has relied upon the ratio laid down by the Apex Court with reference to proving of Promissory Note, which reads as under: "8. It would thus be clear that when the suit is based on pronote, and promissory note is proved to have been executed. Section 118(a) raises the presumption, until the contrary is proved, that the promissory note was made for consideration. That initial presumption raised under Section 118(a) becomes unavailable when the plaintiff himself pleads in the plaint different considerations. If he pleads that the promissory note is supported by a consideration as recited in the negotiable instrument and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the burden is on the defendant to disapprove that the promissory note is not supported by consideration or different consideration other than one recited in the promissory note did pass. If he pleads that the promissory note is supported by a consideration as recited in the negotiable instrument and the evidence adduced in support thereof, the burden is on the defendant to disapprove that the promissory note is not supported by consideration or different consideration other than one recited in the promissory note did pass. If that consideration is not valid in law nor enforceable in law, the Court would consider whether the suit pronote is supported by valid consideration or legally enforceable consideration. Take for instance, a pronote executed for a time-barred debt. It is still a valid consideration. The falsity of the plea of the plaintiff also would be a factor to be considered by the Court. The burden of proof is of academic interest when the evidence was adduced by the parties. The Court is required to examine the evidence and consider whether the suit as pleaded in the plaint has been established and the suit requires to be decreed or dismissed." ii) AIR 1961 SUPREME COURT 1316 Kundan Lal Rallaram Vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay. "5. This section lays down a special rule of evidence applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption is one of law and thereunder a Court shall presume, inter alia, that the negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or endorsed for consideration. In effect it throws the burden of proof of failure of consideration on the maker of the note or the endorser, as the case may be. The question is how the burden can be discharged? The rules of evidence pertaining to burden of proof are embodied in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act. The phrase "burden of proof has two meanings - one the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party: it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. To illustrate how this doctrine works in practice, we may take a suit on a promissory note. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party: it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. To illustrate how this doctrine works in practice, we may take a suit on a promissory note. Under S. 101 of the Evidence Act." Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist". Therefore, the burden initially rests on the plaintiff who has to prove that the promissory note was executed by the defendant. As soon as the execution of the promissory note is proved, the rule of presumption laid down in S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act help him to shift the burden to the other side. The burden of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the plaintiff; but as soon as the execution is proved, S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. This presumption shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant. The defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the promissory note was not supported by consideration, and, if he adduced acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff, and so on. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon presumptions of act, for instance those mentioned in S.114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. Under S.114 of the Evidence Act, "The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely, to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case." Illustration (g) to that section shows that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavorable to the person who withholds it. A plaintiff, who says that he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was executed as consideration for the goods and that he is in possession of the relevant account books to show that he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale was effected for a particular consideration, should produce the said account books, for he is in possession of the same and the defendant certainly cannot be expected to produce his documents. In those circumstances, if such a relevant evidence is withheld by the plaintiff, S. 114 enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect that, if produced, the said accounts would be unfavorable to the plaintiff. This presumption, if raised by a Court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by presumptions of law or fact. We are not concerned here with irrefutable presumptions of law." iii) AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 1008 Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Company Vs. Amin Chand Payrelal. "12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by consideration. Such a presumption is rebut table. The defendant can prove the non-existence of consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who' will be obliged to prove it as a matter of act and upon its failur5' to prove would dis-entitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the nonexistence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The Court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which the Court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its nonexistence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, shall act upon the plea that it did not exist. We find ourselves in the close proximity of the view expressed by the Full Benches of the Rajasthan High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court in this regard." iv) AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 1406 Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. V.C. Shukla and Others. "34. The rationale behind admissibility of parties' books of account as evidence is that the regularity of habit, the difficulty of falsification and the fair certainly of ultimate detection give them in a sufficient degree a probability of trustworthiness (Wig more on evidence 1546). Since, however, an element of self interest and partisanship of the entrant to make a person - behind whose back and without whose knowledge the entry is made liable cannot be ruled out the additional safeguard of insistence upon other independent evidence to fasten him with such liability, has been provided for in Section 34 by incorporating the words 'such statements shall not alone be sufficient to charge any person with liability". "39. "39. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it evident that even correct and authentic entries in books of account cannot without independent evidence of their trustworthiness fix a liability upon a person. Keeping in view the above principles, even if we proceed on the assumption that the entries made in MR. 71/91 are correct and the entries in the other books and loose sheets (which we have already found to be not admissible in evidence under Section 34) are admissible under Section 9 of the Act to support an inference about the formers' correctness still those entries would not be sufficient to charge. Shri Adjani and Shri Shukia with the accusations leveled against them for there is not an iota independent evidence in support thereof. In that view of the matter we need not discuss, delve into or decide upon the contention raised by Mr. Altaf Ahmed in this regard. Suffice it to say that the statements of the four witnesses, who have admitted receipts of the payments as shown against them in MR. 71/91, can at best be proof of reliability of the entries so far they are concerned and not others. In other words, the statements of the above witnesses cannot be independent evidence under Section 34 as against the above two respondents. so far as Shri. Advani is concerned Section 34 would not come in aid of the prosecution for another reason also. According to the prosecution case itself his name finds place only in one of the loose sheets (Sheet No.8) and not in MR.71/91. Resultantly in view of our earlier discussion Section 34 cannot at all be pressed into service against him." 15. In the instant case, defendant in his written statement has clearly admitted the execution of Promissory Note and consideration receipt, though he has stated that some were blank, he has failed to establish the same by adducing acceptable evidence in that behalf. Similarly the defendant also admitted execution of Ex.P-3, letter of deposit of title deeds with an intention to create mortgage of suit schedule property in favour of the bank for the loan that is received by him. Similarly the defendant also admitted execution of Ex.P-3, letter of deposit of title deeds with an intention to create mortgage of suit schedule property in favour of the bank for the loan that is received by him. In the light of this, defendant cannot raise the objection that the suit is based on the document which are not executed by him, and the said documents were executed in blank and that no consideration has passed thereon and also that establishing the correctness or otherwise of the same is on the plaintiff under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, cannot be accepted. Further the aforesaid judgments, wherein the presumption of negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or endorsed for consideration, withholding of relevant evidence by plaintiff, consequence thereof. These judgments does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case, for the reason that the defendant in his written statement has accepted the execution of Ex.P- 1 an on demand promissory note and also consideration receipt. However, he has denied passing of consideration pursuant to that, which is rebutted by plaintiff by providing necessary documents pertaining to that, i.e., Ex.P-5 account extract. In the light of that, the aforesaid judgments have no bearing to the case on hand. 16. The plain reading of the aforesaid judgments would actually support the case of the plaintiff and the same does not endure to the benefit of the defendant herein. Therefore, this Court on re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, available on record, is of the opinion that the defendant has not made out any Sounds to interfere with the well reasoned Judgment and Decree passed by the Court below holding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum ofn,30,000/- from the defendant with interest at 16.55% with quarterly rests from the date of suit transaction till the date of institution of suit and with simple interest at 20% p.a., on Rs. 1,30,000/ - from the date of suit ti1l realisation from the defendant personally as well as on the security of mortgaged property. 17. Accordingly the appeal filed by the defendant is dismissed, without any order as to costs.