JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The present writ petition arises out of five suits filed under Sections 229-B and 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act by the petitioner who claims himself as adopted son of Chokhey for declaration and in alternative for possession. Various plots as mentioned and described in the plaints were subject matter of the five suits. The suits were instituted mainly on the pleas that Smt. Phoolmati widow of Chokhey Lal had taken him in adoption as her son on 30.3.1958 and a registered deed of adoption was also excluded by her on 9.4.1958. Adoption ceremony was performed on 30th of March, 1958 and in that ceremony the natural father namely Visheshwar Prasad actually gave the petitioner in adoption to Smt. Phoolmati in the presence of friends, relatives and other villagers. The suits were contested by the respondents herein by denying the adoption of the petitioner by Smt. Phoolmati. 2. The parties led evidence oral and documentary in support of their respective cases. All the suits were dismissed by the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 31st of October, 1972. In appeal by the petitioner being appeal Nos. 34, 38, 35, 36 and 37 of 1972, the First Appellate Court namely Additional Commissioner, Bareilly allowed all the appeals and it consequently decreed the suits by the judgment and order dated 18th of April, 1977. The matter was carried further in second appeals being second appeal Nos. 194 to 198 by the defendant respondents before the Board of Revenue under Section 100 of C.P.C.. All those appeals were allowed by the common judgment dated 18th of December, 1989 impugned in the present writ petition. 3. Sri H.O.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the legality and validity of the judgment of the Board of Revenue, submits that the Board of Revenue committed illegality in allowing the appeals without framing any substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 (4) of C.P.C.. Secondly, the only point mooted in the appeals was whether the petitioner has been validly adopted by Smt. Phoolmati or not. The said point was decided by the First Appellate Court on the basis of appraisal of evidence on record and the finding of the Appellate Court could not have been interfered with by the Board of Revenue in second appeal. The said point was decided by the First Appellate Court on the basis of appraisal of evidence on record and the finding of the Appellate Court could not have been interfered with by the Board of Revenue in second appeal. Thirdly, there is voluminous evidence on record in the shape of registered adoption deed, undisputed Will of Smt. Phoolmati, oral evidence of Pandit who performed the necessary adoption ceremony, the evidence of natural father of the petitioner and other witnesses who were present on the occasion of adoption ceremony to prove the adoption in question. But the Board of Revenue has failed to consider the oral evidence led by the petitioner and as such the judgment of the Board of Revenue, is vitiated. 4. Sri U.S. Awasthi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, submits that the only basis of petitioner’s case is the alleged registered adoption deed. The said adoption deed has not been signed by the natural father of the petitioner and as such the presumption as provided by Section 16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act is not available to the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, has failed to prove his adoption and the writ petition is concluded by findings of fact. 5. Taking the first point first, with regard to the non compliance of Section 100 (4) of C.P.C. Indisputably, no substantial question of law has been framed by the Board of Revenue in the judgment nor it is a case of the respondents that any substantial question of law was proposed by them in the memo of second appeal before the Board of Revenue. Framing of substantial question of law, by a catena of decisions of the Court has been held to be mandatory. A reference can be made to Pawan Kumar v. Board of Revenue, 2007(4) ADJ 617 and Shabbir Khan v. State of U.P., 2001 (3) AWC 2258 . 6. In Ram Phal and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (102) RD 682, the High Court has held that from reading of Sections 331(4) with Section 341 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, framing of substantial questions of law in second appeal is mandatory. The High Court has referred certain decisions given by the Apex Court interpreting the Section 100, C.P.C. (as amended) wherein it has been held that framing of substantial questions of law in second appeal is mandatory. The High Court has referred certain decisions given by the Apex Court interpreting the Section 100, C.P.C. (as amended) wherein it has been held that framing of substantial questions of law in second appeal is mandatory. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents could not say anything to support the impugned judgment. In view of the acknowledged legal position that framing of substantial questions of law in a second appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. is mandatory, the impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the above is well founded and deserves acceptance. This is one of the aspect of the case. 7. Looking to the fact that the dispute between the parties is pending for the last about 40 years. The interest of justice will not be served by remanding the matter back to the Board of Revenue to reconsider the matter afresh after framing substantial questions of law. The learned counsel for the parties jointly agreed that the matter be disposed of finally and they advanced their respective arguments on the merits of the case. The Court, thus, proceeded to examine the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties touching the merit of the case. 8. The next point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that question of adoption of the petitioner on 30th of March, 1958 which was reduced in writing through a registered adoption deed dated 9th of April, 1958 is essentially a question of fact. The finding recorded on the said issue by the First Appellate Court could be interfered with in second appeal by the Board of Revenue on a limited question i.e. the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court is based on no material or on ignorance of some relevant material. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that a second appeal lies on substantial question of law alone. The First Appellate Authority examined the evidence oral and documentary led by the parties and reached to a definite conclusion in favour of the petitioner. The said finding could not have been set aside in second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. by taking a different view of the matter on reappreciation of evidence. The First Appellate Authority examined the evidence oral and documentary led by the parties and reached to a definite conclusion in favour of the petitioner. The said finding could not have been set aside in second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. by taking a different view of the matter on reappreciation of evidence. The Court was taken through the evidence led by the parties on the question of adoption. To establish the adoption, the petitioner besides filing the registered adoption deed executed by the adoptive mother acknowledging the adoption, has also placed reliance upon the original Will dated 25th of May, 1996 Paper No. A-86. By means of the said Will Smt. Phoolmati, the adoptive mother of the petitioner has bequeathed certain movable and immovable properties to her other near relatives. In the said Will, she has acknowledged the adoption of the petitioner as her son and the said Will was acted upon and has not been challenged by any of her relatives near or dear ones. Besides the aforesaid two documents which clinch the issue, other documentary evidence in the form of order passed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. by Criminal Court, School leaving certificate relating to the petitioner, voter lists of the year 1970 and 1975 and Kutum Register were produced by the petitioner. As against the above, not a single documentary evidence was produced by the contesting respondents herein. 9. Now, coming to the oral evidence, it may be noted that the petitioner produced as many as seven witnesses to prove the adoption which includes Chhotey Lal son of Ram Narain PW/1, Pandit who performed the adoption ceremony. He has stated that he knew the parties and he is their family priest since the time of his father. About fourteen to fifteen years ago, Smt. Phoolmati took Rajendra Prasad in adoption and he performed the ceremony in the capacity of Pandit. The adoption ceremony took place at about 7:00 P.M. in the presence of number of persons. After performing the religious rites, Hoam was done and after Hoam, the boy in question was given in the lap of Smt. Phoolmati by Smt. Vidyawati and Bisheswar Prasad (the natural parents of the petitioner). Photography was also done. He was cross examined at great length but he remained firm. After performing the religious rites, Hoam was done and after Hoam, the boy in question was given in the lap of Smt. Phoolmati by Smt. Vidyawati and Bisheswar Prasad (the natural parents of the petitioner). Photography was also done. He was cross examined at great length but he remained firm. He narrated various religious ceremonies including marriages that were got performed by him as priest of family of the family members for a period spreading over twenty five to thirty years. He has given the details of birth of sons and daughters with their ages which took place in the family. He also states that about seventy to eighty persons were present at the time of the adoption ceremony which was performed in the open Courtyard (Angan) and he has acquaintance with various relatives of Smt. Phoolmati and recognized some of them. He was firm in the cross examination and nothing could be pointed out from him to doubt his statement or his presence at the time of adoption ceremony. At least, nothing objectionable could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents from the aforesaid statement of Sri Chhotey Lal son of Ram Narain. The tenor of deposition shows that he being a family priest performed the adoption ceremonies. 10. The petitioner examined another witness of the same name i.e. Chhotey Lal son of Sukhdev PW/2, a neighbour and close associate of Smt. Phoolmati who stated that he has a family relation with the family of Smt. Phoolmati and is a regular visitor of the family, is also one of the witnesses of the adoption ceremony. He stated that Smt. Phoolmati declared that she is taking the present petitioner in adoption who will succeed and inherit the entire property after her death. A photo picture was also taken in his presence and he appears in the photograph. The child in question always remained with Smt. Phoolmati. He was also subjected to a lengthy cross examination. The third witness is Kamta Prasad, PW/3 who is one of relatives of Smt. Phoolmati, an eye witness. He was also present at the time of adoption ceremony and has proved it. Sri Bisheshwar Prasad, the natural father of the petitioner has been examined as PW/5 to prove the adoption. Atalley, PW/4, barber (Nai), was also produced. The third witness is Kamta Prasad, PW/3 who is one of relatives of Smt. Phoolmati, an eye witness. He was also present at the time of adoption ceremony and has proved it. Sri Bisheshwar Prasad, the natural father of the petitioner has been examined as PW/5 to prove the adoption. Atalley, PW/4, barber (Nai), was also produced. He has stated that he performed the function of barber (Nai) at the time of adoption ceremony which was witnessed by him. To prove the adoption deed dated 9th of April, 1958 and the original Will dated 25th of May, 1996 executed by Smt. Phoolmati, the other marginal witness of the adoption deed and scribe of the Will namely Sri Harihar Sahai Vakil was also examined as PW/7. 11. As against the above, the defendants examined five witnesses namely Kailash Narain, DW/1, the Head Clerk of educational institution who was a formal witness. The other witnesses namely Jwala, DW/2 and Hamid Ullah Khan, DW/3 have stated that they have no knowledge about the adoption as they were not invited to witness the function of adoption. Ram Prakash, one of the defendants, has been examined as DW/4 and the last witness is Madan Lal, DW/5. Ram Prakash, DW/4, was in litigation with Shyam Lal and Phoolmati since 1949 and also during the consolidation. The First Appellate Court has rejected their testimony and found that the defendants could not produce any cogent evidence to dispute the adoption. 12. Having noticed the oral depositions produced by the respective parties, it may be noted that the First Appellate Court preferred to believe the oral evidence produced by the petitioner. Sri U. S. Awasthi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents could make no comment with regard to the statements of any of the witnesses during the course of argument. 13. Shockingly, the Board of Revenue while reversing the judgment of the First Appellate Court in second appeal, has very conveniently brushed aside the oral evidence produced by the petitioner by making a passing remark that oral evidence cannot be relied upon in view of the documentary evidence available on the file i.e. the registered adoption deed whereby giving of the child has not been proved as the natural father of Rajendra Prasad has not signed the document himself. Suffice it to say that the said approach of the Board of Revenue is far from satisfactory. Suffice it to say that the said approach of the Board of Revenue is far from satisfactory. In the year 1958 when the adoption in question took place, there was no requirement of registered adoption deed. If for some reason or the other, the adoption deed could not have been relied upon (the question of validity of adoption deed shall be considered in the later part of the judgment), the oral evidence could not have been ignored altogether, specially when the oral evidence filed by the petitioner finds corroboration from the subsequent conduct of the parties and the documents as well. The petitioner produced the priest, Nai, relatives, close associates of the family, the photographer who took the photograph and the natural father to prove the adoption. These witnesses were subjected to long cross examination but they all remained firm. Even the learned counsel for the respondents could not point out anything from their statements to show that the statements is/are doubtful in nature or cannot be relied upon. It is a case where the Second Appellate Court has ignored the vital evidence (oral evidence produced by the petitioner) while recording its finding on the question of adoption. When an adoption is in issue, it has to be proved by evidence oral or documentary, as a fact. The oral evidence, produced by the petitioner remains uncontroverted. 14. It is nobody’s case that no such adoption deed was executed by Smt. Phoolmati. The only defect which could be pointed by the Board of Revenue in the said adoption deed is that it is not signed by Bisheshwar Prasad, the natural father of the petitioner. This is being disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner submits that the deed has been signed by Sri Bisheshwar Prasad also. The original adoption deed is not before me. However, its typed copy has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. This is being disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner submits that the deed has been signed by Sri Bisheshwar Prasad also. The original adoption deed is not before me. However, its typed copy has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The said deed appears to be unilateral document and has been written by Smt. Phoolmati widow of Chokhey Lal wherein it has been stated that her husband Chokhey Lal has died about twenty years ago without leaving any issue - son or daughter and had intended to take a son in adoption but he could not do so during his life time and he before his death had authorized her to take a suitable son in adoption of the same community in accordance with the existing law so that the adopted son may perform the last rites. Keeping this in view, on 30th of March, 1958 Rajendra (petitioner) son of Bisheshwar Prasad who belongs to the same community aged about eight years was adopted as per Mitakshara Law after performing the due ceremonies and Sanskar. The said Bisheshwar Prasad, the natural father and his wife Vidyawati, willingly out of their own free will gave Rajendra Prasad (petitioner) in adoption to her. By means of the said deed she declared that she has adopted Rajendra Prasad as per wishes of her deceased husband in accordance with law and he is her adopted son from that date and his all relations with his natural parents have ceased. The deed of adoption is being written. The said adoption deed has also been signed by Sri Bisheshwar Prasad besides other persons. The Board of Revenue held that Sri Bisheshwar Prasad had signed the deed not as executant but as a witness. In absence of original or the photocopy of the document, what has been said by the Board of Revenue appears to be correct. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a feeble attempt to establish that Bisheshwar Prasad had signed the deed as executant but on the material as exists on record before me it is difficult to agree with him. Then, it was argued by him that the document is a registered document and in any case it was signed by Bisheshwar Prasad, may be as a witness of the deed. Therefore, a presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is available to the petitioner. Then, it was argued by him that the document is a registered document and in any case it was signed by Bisheshwar Prasad, may be as a witness of the deed. Therefore, a presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is available to the petitioner. 15. Now, the question of drawing presumption of adoption in favour of the petitioner in the light of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is up for consideration. It is not in dispute that the said adoption deed is a registered document executed by Smt. Phoolmati shortly after the adoption dated 30th of March, 1958. The deed is dated 9th of April, 1958. Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is as follows : “Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.” 16. Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act provides presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption. It says that whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 17. Sri U.S. Awasthi, the learned counsel for contesting respondents, submits that the adoption deed having not been signed by the person giving the child in adoption i.e. Sri Bisheshwar Prasad, the said presumption is not available to the petitioner. It has been so held by the Board of Revenue also. 17. Sri U.S. Awasthi, the learned counsel for contesting respondents, submits that the adoption deed having not been signed by the person giving the child in adoption i.e. Sri Bisheshwar Prasad, the said presumption is not available to the petitioner. It has been so held by the Board of Revenue also. Evidently, Section 16 lays down a Rule of presumption as it provides - ‘The Court shall presume that adoption was in compliance with the provisions of the Act, unless and until it is disapproved.’ Here is a case where the natural father of the petitioner has come in the witness box and deposed the giving of the petitioner in adoption to Smt. Phoolmati, who has, admittedly, executed the deed of adoption. In this fact situation even if the adoption deed is not signed by the natural father of the petitioner, it will not make much difference. Section 16 has been enacted for the benefit of the persons giving and taking the child in adoption. There being no challenge by them the plea that no such presumption is available to deed, is not available to the defendant respondents. Since the said Section provides a rule of presumption, the said presumption in absence of a registered document as required under Section 16 of the Act will not exclude the proof of adoption by other evidence, alternatively. The Board of Revenue in my considered opinion committed illegality and proceeded to decide the appeal contrary to law. It after rejecting the registered adoption deed on the ground that the same has not been signed by Sri Bisheshwar Prasad refused to examine the other evidence available on record to prove the adoption of the petitioner i.e. the oral evidence and other documentary evidence on the record. The Board of Revenue has posed a wrong question that after exclusion of registered adoption deed “the oral evidence produced by the plaintiff respondents cannot be relied upon in view of the documentary evidence available on the file that is registered adoption deed wherein the giving has not been proved, as the natural father of Rajendra Prasad has not signed the document himself.” The above approach of the Second Appellate Court (Board of Revenue) is faulty. 18. 18. The next legal error committed by the Board of Revenue is that without making an analytical analysis of the defence evidence, has proceeded on the footing that the evidence produced by the defendant establishes that the adoption did not take place. It was influenced by the fact that parentage of Rajendra Prasad continued to be recorded in school papers as son of Bisheshwar Prasad which according to it goes to show that no adoption had taken place and in the photograph filed presence of sacred fire is not depicted. In my considered view both the reasonings given by the Board of Revenue are not sustainable in the eyes of law for the reasons more than one. It is one of the circumstance which has to be considered along with the other circumstances, which are weighty and commands greater confidence. It has ignored the most vital fact that in the Will dated 25th of May, 1966 Exhibit A-86 executed by Smt. Phoolmati, she has acknowledged the factum of adoption of the petitioner as her son. The Second Appellate Court reversed a finding of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court without consideration of the Will dated 25th of May, 1966, the execution thereof has not been challenged even by the defendants at any stage and has been admitted, was totally ignored by it. This is a vital document executed by Smt. Phoolmati and could not have been ignored altogether by the Second Appellate Court. The said document came into existence even before a dispute could arose between the parties. The said document being an admitted document, a heavy weight is attached to it. So far as recording of name of Bisheshwar Prasad as parentage in the school record is concerned, the Second Appellate Court has forgotten the ground realities of the life. The present case comes from a rural background and there is nothing on record that Smt. Phoolmati had gone to get the petitioner admitted in the school. Obviously, it is a case of mistake on the part of the person who secured the admission of the petitioner in the School. The said mistake was rectified as soon as it was transpired in the year 1970 that is even before the start of litigation between the parties. Obviously, it is a case of mistake on the part of the person who secured the admission of the petitioner in the School. The said mistake was rectified as soon as it was transpired in the year 1970 that is even before the start of litigation between the parties. In any case, the said circumstance should be weighed along with the other facts and circumstances of the case such as the registered adoption deed dated 9th of April, 1958, the original Will of Smt. Phoolmati dated 25th of May, 1966. The name of the petitioner was recorded in the Kutumb register and in the voter list also. Therefore, the fact that in the school register the name of parentage of the petitioner was recorded as Bisheshwar Prasad is of little weight. So far as non showing of sacred fire flame (Hoam) in the photograph is concerned, it is also wholly irrelevant circumstance in view of the statement of the Pandit who performed Hawan etc., barber (Nai); and other statements of friends and relatives who were present at the time of adoption ceremony which remained unchallenged, are sufficient to prove the giving and taking of the petitioner in adoption to Smt. Phoolmati. Moreover, as no objection with regard to the admissibility of photograph was raised before the trial Court, the same could not have been raised before the Second Appellate Court for the first time. 19. Will of Smt. Phoolmati is indicative of the fact that the petitioner was adopted by her. In a suit for partition and adoption, a Will was relied upon as the evidence of prior division and adoption in the case of Viraya v. Addena, AIR 1930 PC 18. As discussed herein above, there is voluminous evidence to show that the petitioner was treated as adopted son by Smt. Phoolmati, the burden to dispute the adoption Will lays upon the contesting respondents as held by the Apex Court in the case of Debi Prasad v. Tribeni, AIR 1970 SC 1286 . 20. Section 32 (6) of the Evidence Act is also relevant for consideration in this case. The said clause provides that when statement relating to existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption between the persons deceased, and is made in any Will or deed relating to the affairs of family to which any such deceased person belonged, etc. 20. Section 32 (6) of the Evidence Act is also relevant for consideration in this case. The said clause provides that when statement relating to existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption between the persons deceased, and is made in any Will or deed relating to the affairs of family to which any such deceased person belonged, etc. and when such statement was made before the question in dispute was raised, is relevant. 21. Sri S.C. Sarkar in his Commentary on Evidence Act has noted that it is highly improbable that a person would make any statement in a deed, Will, family portrait or upon tombstone etc. without full knowledge or without being satisfied as to its truth. 22. Therefore, the statement made by Smt. Phoolmati in her Will regarding adoption of the petitioner deserves credence and is a relevant fact, which was ignored by the Board of Revenue. 23. The Apex Court in the case of Kashi Nath (dead) v. Jagannath, 2003 (53) ALR 826 has held that whether there was adoption or not is essentially a question of fact depending upon appreciation of evidence on record. No exception is possible to well-merited finding recorded by the Court below. The Second Appellate Court, therefore, was not justified to reverse the said finding of fact by the impugned judgment. 24. In the case of Baru (dead) and others v. Deshpal and others, 1998 (32) ALR 389 it has been held that where adoption deed is a registered document and its due execution and registration is proved it cannot be challenged on the ground of absence of requisite ceremonies. 25. In civil litigation, as held by the Apex Court in R.V.F. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, JT 2005 (11) SC 574 that plaintiff can not be expected to prove the title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of the First Appellate Court the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and, therefore, the burden of proof which lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged. In the opinion of the First Appellate Court the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and, therefore, the burden of proof which lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged. In this very case it has been held that the High Court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C., ought not to have entered into the evaluation of evidence afresh. From this case the following observation is reproduced below : “....In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title. In the present case, the trial Court and the first appellate Court have noted that the plaintiff has not been able to produce any deed of title directly lending support to his claim for title and at the same time the defendant too has no proof of his title much less even an insignia of title. Being a civil case, the plaintiff cannot be expected to prove his title beyond any reasonable doubt, a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of the two Courts below, the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and, therefore, the burden of proof which lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged. The High Court, in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, ought not to have entered into the evaluation of evidence afresh. The High Court has interfered with a pure and simple finding of fact based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence which the High Court ought not to have done.” 26. In such matters, an intelligent and pragmatic approach needs to be adopted. The High Court has interfered with a pure and simple finding of fact based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence which the High Court ought not to have done.” 26. In such matters, an intelligent and pragmatic approach needs to be adopted. Most importantly, Courts are meant to segregate irrelevant considerations from relevant ones as chaff is separated from wheat, in order to infer right conclusions and to decide such matters judiciously. 27. In view of the above discussions, the impugned judgment and order of the Second Appellate Court cannot be allowed to stand for the following reasons : 1. The Board of Revenue has decided the second appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. without framing substantial question of law as required by Section 100 (4) of C.P.C. 2. A well-merited finding of adoption was recorded by the First Appellate Court which was essentially a finding of fact and no question of law was involved in the second appeal before the Board of Revenue and it committed illegality in entering into the realm of appreciation of evidence. 3. The Second Appellate Court while reversing the finding of fact as was recorded by the Court below to it has failed to consider the Will dated 25th of May, 1966 wherein the factum of adoption is admitted. The said document is an admitted document. 4. Due importance and weight has not been given by it to the registered adoption deed dated 9th of April, 1958 which was executed by the adoptive mother Smt. Phoolmati and has been witnessed by the natural father. 5. The Second Appellate Court has been swayed by the irrelevant consideration that in the school register in the parentage of petitioner name of Sri Bisheshwar Prasad, the natural father, was recorded and that in the photographs presence of sacred fire is not shown. 6. The oral evidence while reversing the finding of the First Appellate Court led by the plaintiff petitioner was brushed aside without making its analytical analysis on untenable grounds that the presumption which may be available under a registered document is not available in the present case to the petitioner. 28. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with cost of Rs. 10,000/- jointly and severally payable by the respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9 to the petitioner. 28. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with cost of Rs. 10,000/- jointly and severally payable by the respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9 to the petitioner. All the five suits (for declaration of plaintiff petitioner’s right over the disputed land) being Original Suit Nos. 127/23, 128/22, 129/21, 130/26 and 131/18 stand decreed with cost throughout. ————