JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. Heard Sri S.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 2. It is claimed that the appellant had taken loan amount of Rs.10,000/- from plaintiff Nanku Lal ( since deceased) on 27.4.92 and as a measure of security of loan a registered agreement of loan for Rs. 80,000/- had been executed in which Rs. 20,000/- was shown as advance money. It is further claimed that the appellant had returned the loan money with interest within a year and that the appellant had again taken loan amount of Rs. 10,000/- from plaintiff Nanku Lal in the year 1993. This time it is alleged that plaintiff Nanku Lal had forcibly obtained the registered agreement to sell from him for sale consideration of Rs. 10,000/- in which an advance of Rs.30,000/- was shown as advance while only Rs. 10,000/- was paid at the time of registration of the agreement. It is alleged that the appellant had again returned the loan amount with interest within expiry of one year, yet the plaintiff Nanku Lal had kept silence about the enforcement of the agreement for about four years and thereafter on 21.4.1997 filed Original Suit No. 221 of 1997 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bareilly for specific performance on the basis of agreement dated 21.4.1993. 3. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant contested the suit and in his written statement denied to have executed the alleged agreement to sell, which is stated to have been forcibly obtained and also that he had returned the loan amount with interest within one year and that the suit had been filed after four years without any prior demand or notice to the appellant and also without showing or establishing his willingness and readiness to perform his part of contract. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance of the contract by judgment and order dated 7.9.1999. 5. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court has not framed proper issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and has not considered the case of the defendant in proper perspective. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance of the contract by judgment and order dated 7.9.1999. 5. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court has not framed proper issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and has not considered the case of the defendant in proper perspective. It is also stated that the plaintiff had advanced money and had got executed similar registered agreement to sell from one Ram Niwas as well as from Suresh Pal Singh during the same period which clearly shows that he used to advance loan and used to get registered agreement to sell in his favour as a matter of routine practice. 6. The lower Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant allegedly without considering the pleadings and evidence on record and without properly adjudicating and deciding the material issues involved in the matter. 7. This second appeal is, therefore, filed by the defendant appellant against the judgment and decree dated 9.2.2010 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Bareilly in Civil Appeal No. 129 of 1999, between Radhey Shyam versus Nanku Lal and others, dismissing the appeal and upholding the judgment and decree dated 7.9.1999 passed by the Additional Judge, Small Causes Court/ Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bareilly in Original Suit no. 221 of 1997, between Nanku Lal versus Radhey Shyam, decreeing the plaintiff's suit for specific performance of the alleged contract dated 21.4.1993. 8. The grounds on which the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below have been challenged by the defendant appellant are that the Courts below have erred in law and on facts and have failed to examine the pleadings and evidence of the parties while recording the findings on the question of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to get the sale-deed executed for a period of four years. It is also stated that from the conduct and intention of the plaintiff it was apparently clear that he was never ready and willing to get the sale-deed executed within a period of one year as per clauses 4 and 6 of the alleged agreement dated 21.4.1993 in which the time was of essence. It is also stated that from the conduct and intention of the plaintiff it was apparently clear that he was never ready and willing to get the sale-deed executed within a period of one year as per clauses 4 and 6 of the alleged agreement dated 21.4.1993 in which the time was of essence. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are based upon assumptions, surmises and conjectures as the appellant had never agreed nor intended to execute the sale-deed of the whole agricultural land of his entire share, which is sole source of his livelihood. 9. It is vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had taken loan of Rs.10,000/- and the alleged agreement to sell dated 21.4.1993 was got executed under pressure saying that the document would remain as a security of loan but the Courts below while decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract have committed an error in law and on facts as they have not considered this aspect of the matter. It is stated that the provisions of Sections 20(b) and (c) of the Specific Relief Act, being discretionary it was the duty of the plaintiff to have proved readiness and willingness to get the sale-deed executed within time which he has failed to prove. It is stated that the plaintiff was a money lender without having any licence for the same and that the appellant had filed documentary evidence showing to be indulged in the business of money lending with several other persons getting similar registered agreement to sell; at most a suit for relief of return of money with interest would have been filed and not specific performance of the contract for the reason that the valuation of the suit was more than Rs.2 lacs at the time of execution of the agreement to sell dated 21.4.l1993 and at present its valuation is more than Rs. 8 lacs, hence the sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- for the said land is in adequate and highly disproportionate to the actual cost of the land. 10. 8 lacs, hence the sale consideration of Rs.80,000/- for the said land is in adequate and highly disproportionate to the actual cost of the land. 10. It is lastly urged that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the execution and the contents of the agreement to sell dated 21.4.1993 to the extent of transaction of payment of Rs.30,000/- as advance money, since only a sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid before the Assistant Registrar but both the Courts below have erroneously held otherwise. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant at length and on perusal of the record the following admitted facts are that- (i) Execution of the agreement dated 21.4.1993 is not denied by the parties, rather both of them have relied upon the said agreement in support of their respective contentions. (ii) The defendant appellant on one hand contends that according to clauses 4 and 6 of the said agreement, time was of essence whereas the plaintiffs respondents' case is that they were always ready and willing to perform their part of contract but the defendant appellant was evading ,hence he had no other remedy except to file suit for specific performance of the contract, which was in fact filed by him within limitation. (iii) It is also an admitted fact that the conduct of the plaintiffs respondents as noticed by the Courts below shows that it is not worthy of much credence. As noted earlier, the defendant appellant claims to have taken loan of Rs. 10,000/- from plaintiff Nanku Lal (since deceased) for the first time on 27.4.1992 and for which an agreement was registered as a measure of security for Rs. 80,000/- and that he had paid off the whole of the amount within a year. It is wholly inexplainable that if the conduct of plaintiff respondent was such that he had got agreement for sale of property executed and registered for Rs.80,000/- by paying Rs.10,000/- only and not returning the registered document to the plaintiff after the whole of the amount of Rs. 80,000/- was paid back by the defendant appellant, why did he again took loan from the same person for Rs.10,000/- in 1993 having allegedly been made a victim of fraud. If he had taken loan of Rs.10,000/- only for the second time also why did he not object before the Registrar that he had not been paid Rs. 80,000/- was paid back by the defendant appellant, why did he again took loan from the same person for Rs.10,000/- in 1993 having allegedly been made a victim of fraud. If he had taken loan of Rs.10,000/- only for the second time also why did he not object before the Registrar that he had not been paid Rs. 30,000/- towards advance for agreement to sell the property. It rather appears from the findings of the Courts below that he had acknowledged before the Registering Authority that he has received Rs.30,000/-as advance to sell his property. He ought to have protested that the document being registered is not being executed for sale but is an agreement for loan. 12. His further stand in the Courts below was that he had repaid the aforesaid amount within a year. If that was the case, it is not expected from a prudent man, who had been victim of fraud, one would fall for the same trick again. He should have been weary of such loan shark , if so is the case. Yet admittedly he again took allegedly loan of Rs.10,000/- on 21.4.1993 by means of registered agreement before the Registrar and now denied that he did not knew about the contents of it. 13. It may be noted here that both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that the agreement to sell dated 21.4.1993 was a registered one. It was an agreement for sale of the property in dispute for Rs.80,000/-. It is also admitted that the Courts below on the basis of the aforesaid document have given a categorical finding of fact that the appellant on being verified and asked by the Registering Authority had acknowledged payment of Rs.30,000/- for execution of the document. According to Section 48 of the Registration Act, what is recited in the registered document has to be accepted as correct, therefore, the stand of the defendant appellant herein above falsified from his own conduct. 14. The next question is whether plaintiff Nanku Lal was a registered money lender or not and the loan agreement alleged to have been granted by him to the plaintiff appellant would nullify the agreement. In this regard two things are to be seen. 14. The next question is whether plaintiff Nanku Lal was a registered money lender or not and the loan agreement alleged to have been granted by him to the plaintiff appellant would nullify the agreement. In this regard two things are to be seen. If a person in a village gives money to a needy fellow villager, he does not carry a business of money lending, is required to be registered as a money lender. Even a money lender can give money to his relatives or purchase his property to bale him out, (as in the present case ) instead of property being sold to a third person. 15. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that the suit for specific performance of the contract was well within time and that the plaintiffs respondents was always ready and willing for performing their part of contract. Concurrent findings of fact have also been recorded by the Courts below that the defendant appellant was in fact evading to perform his part of the contract. The Registrar before registering the agreement to sell make an enquiry regarding terms and conditions of the document being registered and the sale consideration etc. It is borne from the record that the appellant had received an advance of Rs.30,000/- towards sale consideration including Rs. 10,000/-before the Registrar himself. The plaintiffs respondents were always ready and willing and had the money to pay balance sale consideration. He was also requesting the defendant appellant to execute the required documents and had filed sujit on the last day of limitation. In fact, the defendant appellant has failed to prove his case before the Courts below that transaction was for loan amount of Rs.10,000/- and not for advance towards sale consideration of the property as mentioned in the agreement to sell. Learned counsel for the appellant has fairly stated that in fact from the record it appears that the appellant has not been able to prove his case before this Court also. 16. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the property in dispute was the only source of his livelihood, the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that it is not so. 16. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the property in dispute was the only source of his livelihood, the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that it is not so. The appellant in this second appeal is a retired person from the Military and that apart from half of his share in the property which he has sold he is also a pensioner. 17. For all the reasons stated above, no illegality or infirmity has been found in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, rather the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant are found against the record. 18. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.