Judgment :- 1. There has been repeated attempts to derail the industrial peace in the petitioner-company for quite sometime, since records indicate that these petitions have also arisen the question whether the Government has got power to pass the impugned order and exercise the power u/s 10 (B) and 10 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ID Act). 2. The question raised in the present writ petitions, for the second time, by the petitioner, the Management of Pricol (hereinafter referred to as the company) is nothing but the same question raised by the petitioner in the earlier litigation, which started in this Court under Article 226 in W.P. No.19077/07, which culminated into an order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.777/07, etc. (batch) dated 10th Dec., 2007, has finally reached the Apex Court in SLP (Civil) Nos.10973 & 10974 of 2008 and the same is presently pending for authoritative pronouncement. 3. The very same writ petitioner, the Management of Pricol, has challenged the impugned order passed u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act before this Court by filing a writ petition contending inter alia that the power u/s 10 (B) cannot be exercised by the Government without giving prior notice to the Company since the consequence of the order passed by the Government u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act is directly resulting in grave civil consequences to the company and violation of the order passed by the Government u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act will result in criminal consequence, including imprisonment and, therefore, the principles of audi alteram partem having not complied with by the Government before issuing the order u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act denying the opportunity to the Company to put forth its contentions is violative of principles of natural justice and, hence, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. The other contention raised by the company is that the company being not a public utility service whether it is open to the State Government to pass an order u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act requiring the employer or the workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of employment. 4. These two issues have been more clearly decided by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.777/07 , etc. (batch) dated 10th Dec., 2007. 4. These two issues have been more clearly decided by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.777/07 , etc. (batch) dated 10th Dec., 2007. The Division Bench of this Court, on the above raised questions of law, have analysed almost each and every aspect of the inconvenience faced by the Government, the workers, workers union and the company in which the problem has erupted, and has also analysed the various decisions of different High Courts and also on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, before giving its final conclusion. Therefore, let me deal with briefly, whether the issues raised herein, does once again require elaborate consideration or not. 5. The first question that requires answer is whether the impugned order passed by the Government u/s 10 (B) does require prior notice, if so, whether the petitioner being not a public utility service is also entitled to say that the above ratio cannot be applied to the petitioner company. 6. The petitioner company is manufacturing automatic dash board instruments and ancillaries like sensors, accessories for cars, two wheelers, commercial vehicles and tractors as well as components like oil pumps, chain tensioners, fuel valves, etc., for two wheelers. Besides these, the petitioner company also manufactures several other important accessories, such as, remote keyless entry and immobiliser for cars, road speed limiters and central lubrication system meant for commercial vehicles. Though the company started its manufacturing process in the year 1975, it started its second plant in the year 1988 at Gurgaon in the State of Haryana. Further, in view of important accessories being manufactured by the petitioner company, it had to open up two more units, namely, Plant-III and Plant-IV at Coimbatore alone and Plant-V had also come up in the year 2000 at Pune, Maharashtra. The further expansion of the business of the petitioner company was in the year 2007 at Pantnagar in Uttrakhand and another plant in 2008 was put up in the same place. 7. The further expansion of the business of the petitioner company was in the year 2007 at Pantnagar in Uttrakhand and another plant in 2008 was put up in the same place. 7. The above expansion also indicate that the petitioner company is one of the important units producing several important accessories for cars, two wheelers as well as for commercial vehicles and tractors, which require the petitioner company to engage apprentices, with no previous experience, in some departments of the petitioner company, while the company is also engaging apprentice with previous experience in other divisions in the company, who are called Trainees as envisaged in the Certified Standing Orders. In fact, the apprentices are recruited for an initial period of 12 months and, thereafter, depending upon the performance and seriousness shown by the apprentices, their apprenticeship will be renewed for a period not exceeding two terms of 12 months each. If some of the apprentices prove their excellence and faithful devotion to the work with which they are entrusted by the company, such apprentices were absorbed and, subsequently, regularised even before the completion of three years of apprenticeship, i.e., training. During the course of apprenticeship training, they are paid fixed stipend and HRA and in the case of apprentices taken as trainees, they are paid remuneration under different heads comprising of stipend, HRA, conveyance allowance, washing allowance and shift allowance by strictly following various labour laws. Though there was no trade union in Plant-I till the year 1989, two long term settlements were made with the representatives of the workmen, one dated 5th March, 1980 and another 6th April, 1985. But in due course, in the year 1989, trade unions had emerged in Plant-I and long term settlements were also made with trade unions affiliated to State-wide Unions on various dates, viz., 7th Aug., 1989, 28th July, 2000 and 29th Sept., 2004. All these settlements were made with the unions u/s 12 (3) of the ID Act. 8. But in due course, in the year 1989, trade unions had emerged in Plant-I and long term settlements were also made with trade unions affiliated to State-wide Unions on various dates, viz., 7th Aug., 1989, 28th July, 2000 and 29th Sept., 2004. All these settlements were made with the unions u/s 12 (3) of the ID Act. 8. When the manufacturing process was going on smoothly without any problem to the industrial peace, in view of the fact that the petitioner company appointing contract labourers as well as apprentices, the unions raised some objection not to recruit any apprentices in the manufacturing process without knowing the fact that the training is basically to provide a familiarity with the work and to get acclimatised to the nature of the work required to be performed by the apprentices and also without realising the fact that the contract workmen are primarily engaged for security service, canteen service, housekeeping, cleaning, loading and unloading, movement of materials and finished products, which are also regulated through proper licence granted by the Government to the petitioner company. 9. In March, 2003, 4 workers from Plant-III and 2 workers from Plant-I were transferred to the petitioners establishment at Uttrakhand. The transfer of the 6 workmen gave rise to an industrial dispute. About 600 workers of Plant-III proceeded on strike followed by 1500 workers of Plant-I, who also proceeded on strike on 5th March, 2007. The parties took up the matter with the Assistant Commissioner of Labour on 7th March, 2007 and 9th March, 2007. Since the petitioner company refused to recall the order of transfer, there was a road blockade agitation on 9th March, 2007, followed by demonstration by about 1000 workers in Plant-I and Plant-III, which, unfortunately, continued till 10th March, 2007. As a result, the Coimbatore-Mettupalayam road was blocked for traffic. Immediately, the officials from the district administration, the Revenue Divisional Officer and Assistant Commissioner of Labour came to the spot to persuade the workers to withdraw the strike. As they refused to accede to the request of the Revenue Divisional Officer and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, on 10th March, 2007, the police arrested 2166 workers, including 500 women. However, they were released on the same day. Though the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, tried to settle the dispute, he could not succeed. As they refused to accede to the request of the Revenue Divisional Officer and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, on 10th March, 2007, the police arrested 2166 workers, including 500 women. However, they were released on the same day. Though the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, tried to settle the dispute, he could not succeed. Therefore, the company demanded that the workers should withdraw the strike and the process proceeded endlessly and the company also declared lockout on 16th March, 2007, in respect of 16 workers of Plant-I and 15 workers of Plant-III. In view of the disturbance created by the striking workers, even several students of the Coimbatore Law College observed fast on 4th April, 2007, along with 80 workers of the company in support of the workers demands. Therefore, on the recommendation of the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, informing that the situation was going from bad to worse, proposal was sent for referring the dispute to the Tribunal and to prohibit strikes and lockouts. In the above said situation, the State Government had to make reference of the dispute u/s 10 (1) (d) by G.O. (D) No.286 dated 10th April, 2007, and further taking into account the situation prevailing then, the State Government also issued prohibitory order u/s 10 (3) in G.O. (D) No.287 dated 10th April, 2007. in view of the prohibitory order, the lockout was withdrawn and the workers also returned for work. In respect of 92 workers of Plant-I and 54 workers of Plant-III, totalling 147 workers, the petitioner company also ordered break-in service. Having noticed the further situation, the Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, requested the Government to issue notification u/s 10 (B), but the company opposed the same by writing letters requesting the Minister of Labour not to pass such orders u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act. 10. In the meanwhile, the company also engaged new workers. This arrangement aggravated the situation and, therefore, the Government of Tamil Nadu having noticed the relevant facts, issued G.O. No.397 dated 24th May, 2007 referring further dispute u/s 10 (1) (d) and another G.O. No.398 dated 24th may, 2007, u/s 10 (B) directing the company and the workers to follow certain norms and also not to give effect to the order of transfer or break-in service. The above said orders were challenged by contending that the power u/s 10 (3) cannot be exercised except in rarest cases, where public interest is involved. It was further contended the State Government cannot avail power u/s 10 (3) since the lockout and strike are matters of adjudication before the Labour Court, since the same are disputes referred before the Labour Court. It was forcibly pressed that the State Government is bound to give opportunity in the form of prior notice to the company before issuance of order u/s 10 (3), failure of which resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. The State Government had no jurisdiction to issue order u/s 10 (B), the company being not a public utility service. 11. Learned single Judge granted an order of interim stay insofar as G.O. (D) No.397 dated 24th May, 2007 except clause 7 (b). The matter was taken up in appeal before the Division Bench in W.A. No.777/07, etc. (Batch). The Division Bench of this Court has finally held, after taking support from various Supreme Court judgments, including Basti Sugar Mills Company Ltd. - Vs – State of U.P. ( 1978 (2) LLJ 412 ) that the power u/s 10 (B) is also an administrative order and, thereby, do not call for prior notice or hearing before passing such order. In respect of the contention that the company being not a public utility service, the Honble Division Bench has further held that for the purpose of securing public safety or maintaining of public order, or for industrial peace in the establishment, it is always open to the State Government to pass order u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act requiring the employee or the workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order irrespective of the fact whether it is a public utility service or not. Therefore, the question raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition has already been answered by this Court in the above Division Bench judgment, which has also now become the subject matter of Civil Appeal pending before the Supreme Court. 12. Therefore, the question raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition has already been answered by this Court in the above Division Bench judgment, which has also now become the subject matter of Civil Appeal pending before the Supreme Court. 12. In this background, since the petitioner company has once again given rise to an industrial dispute, in order to secure public safety and to maintain public order and also to secure industrial peace in the establishment, the State Government thought it fit to pass an order u/s 10 (B) and 10 (1) (c) and 10 (1) (d) of the ID Act in G.O. Nos.393 and 394 dated 29th June, 2009. When a similar dispute is pending between the company and its workmen before the Supreme Court for authoritative pronouncement, in view of the fact that the petitioner company started recruiting apprentices under the Apprentice Act as well as contract labour under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, the respondent employees union strongly objected the petitioner company not to engage apprentice in direct production activities since the action of the company in recruiting outsiders as contract labourers and apprentices are directly resulting the risk of retrenchment of the existing permanent workers, the same has given rise to industrial disputes and as a result of that the Government, in exercise of power u/s 10 (B) and 10 (1) (c) and 10 (1) (d) has passed the above Government Orders. Therefore, once again the company has challenged the said order on the same grounds. 13. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No.13764 & 13765 of 2009, strenuously contended that the petitioner company has got every right to recruit apprentices for the purpose of giving them training, which cannot be objected by the respondent-employees union. Further, it was also contended that the Certified Standing Orders of the establishment allows the petitioner company to engage apprentices for a period of three years and their subsequent appointment would definitely result in more production in the company, since they learn the work by working on machines along with permanent workmen. Therefore, on the job training given to the apprentices would have no bearing on the wages paid to the permanent workmen. Therefore, on the job training given to the apprentices would have no bearing on the wages paid to the permanent workmen. Whileso, the Government, merely, taking into account the scene deliberately created by few workmen, once again resorted to exercise the power u/s 10 (B) directing the company to pay interim relief of Rs.500/= to the workmen of Plant-I and Rs.400/= to the workmen of Plant-III. There is no specific reason given as to why the company should pay the above said amounts to the concerned workmen when they are being paid emoluments in terms with the settlement covering them. It was further contended that there is nothing on the record to show that there was any industrial unrest in the establishment. The alleged wage strike said to have been carried out by 29 workmen in the union office cannot be a ground at all to say that there was industrial unrest in the establishment engaging 1800 workmen. The order passed by the Government u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act has denied an opportunity to the company to put forth its explanation and non-performance of the same would result in serious criminal consequences. Therefore, the impugned order passed, without notice, u/s 10 (B) is in violation of principles of natural justice. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel for the petitioner relied upon decision of learned single Judge reported in (2003 (1) LLJ 993); another Division Bench Judgment of the Karnataka High Court in ( 2003 (2) LLN 999 ) and also a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in (2009 (2) CTC 663). 14. Mr.Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 17348 & 17362 of 2009 submits that the contract labourers engaged by the petitioner company are made only in terms with the registration certificate issued to them as early as in the year 2001. When the petitioner company has been engaging contract labourers in terms with the certificate of registration issued by the competent authority, the impugned order alleging that the petitioner company is engaging contract labour in direct production activities is not only baseless, but totally contrary to their own stand for the simple reason that from the year 2001 till now, the competent authorities are regularly, after issuing licence for recruiting/engaging contract labourers, renewing the same licence in terms with the Act. Therefore, neither the Unions nor the Government can validly be allowed to say that the engagement of contract labour by the company in direct production activities are contrary to the certificate issued to the petitioner company. Even if the company is engaging contract labour contrary to the certificate issued to it, admittedly till now, the Government has not taken any action against the company in terms of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. Therefore, the stand taken by the Government for issuance of the impugned order u/s 10 (B) and 10 (1) (c) and 10 (1) (d) that the company is engaging contract labour in direct production activity is baseless and, therefore, the impugned order issued without prior notice is contrary to all the basic cannons of law and on that basis prayed for quashing the impugned orders. Mr.R.Yashod Varadhan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.15844 of 2009, while adopting the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel, Mr.Somayaji, further urged that the condition imposed in the impugned order clearly shows wrongful exercise of power given u/s 10 (B) of the ID Act since the same would have a very adverse effect on the life of about 1000 apprentices and contract workmen engaged by the company. The apprentices and contract workmen are fully dependent on the company for their sustenance. If their continuance is not allowed, since they have been appointed in terms with the provisions of the Apprentice Act and Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, they would not find employment or source of income at this juncture and on that basis prayed for quashing the impugned order relating to G.O. (D) Nos.393 & 394 dated 29th June, 2009. 15. Refuting the contentions raised by the petitioner company, Mr.Kumarasamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent employees union submitted that in view of the settled legal position, in terms of the order of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.777/07, etc., (batch) dated 10th Dec., 2007, that any order passed by the Government u/s 10 (3) and 10 (B) are being one and the same and being twin order, this Court having held that it is only an administrative order, the same do not call for prior notice or hearing before passing such an order. Further, learned counsel also would rely upon the reasoning of the Division Bench by arguing that the Government is the final authority to decide on the subjective satisfaction of the prevailing situation and in this case the inspection was conducted after the strike announced by the workers and the workers also subsequently went on fast unto death and after the completion of the inspection it was reported that there was engagement of contract labourers in production activity and, thereby, denying opportunity for the permanent employees to work and get wages. Therefore, the Government, after having satisfied the fact and the need to pass an order to further arrest industrial unrest, the present impugned orders have been passed and, therefore, the same cannot be questioned. Further, as per the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, it was categorically held that the two orders being administrative in nature, no prior notice or opportunity of hearing need be given and on that basis prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. Further request was also made that in the event of dismissal of the writ petition, a mention may be made stating that the period of stay granted against the reference be excluded so that the matter would be properly dealt with by the Labour Court without insisting on the point of limitation. 16. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record and the judgments referred to by the parties. 17. As already mentioned above, the two points urged by the parties to the present lis are once again stressed below at the cost of repetition :- Whether the Government has got power u/s 10 (B) and 10 (3) to issue the present impugned order without prior notice. 18. It is useful to refer to Section 10 (3), 10 (1) (c), 10 (1) (d) and 10 (B), as extracted hereunder :- “10. 18. It is useful to refer to Section 10 (3), 10 (1) (c), 10 (1) (d) and 10 (B), as extracted hereunder :- “10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals (c) refer the dispute or any other matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: (3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference.” “10-B. Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement of disputes.- (1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to a Labour Court or a Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 10 and if, in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment concerning which such reference has been made, they may, by general or special order, make provision - (a) for requiring employers or workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order or as may be determined in accordance with the order, including payment of money by the employer to any person who is or has been a workman. (b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain closed and to work or continue to work on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the order; and (c) for any incidental or supplementary matter which appears to them to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of the order.” 19. (b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain closed and to work or continue to work on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the order; and (c) for any incidental or supplementary matter which appears to them to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of the order.” 19. There are two ingredients to be satisfied before issuance of an order u/s 10 (3) as held by this Court in W.A. No.777/07, etc., (batch), which is extracted hereunder for useful reference:- “It is not in dispute that the State Government is empowered to refer any dispute for adjudication u/s 10 (1), if in its opinion a dispute exists or is apprehended. Under Section 10 (3), the appropriate Government may also prohibit continuance of any strike or lockout in connection with dispute already referred, as evident from the said provision and quoted hereunder :- 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals (3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference. From the aforesaid provision it will be evident that there are two ingredients to be satisfied before issuance of order u/s 10 (3), i.e., a) an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication; and b) there is a strike or lockout in existence on the date of reference in connection with such dispute.” The Division Bench, to answer the query raised by both sides, have referred to the case of Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd. - Vs – State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1953 Raj 188 :: (1953) II LLJ 214 (Raj) :: Manu/RH/0067/1953., and held that the discretion of the Government to exercise its power in making an order of prohibition was found to be beyond the scope of Section 10 (3). The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Eenadu Press Workers Union & Anr. - Vs – Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in 1979 (1) LLJ 391, has held that the State Government was entitled to issue prohibitory orders u/s 10 (3) of the Act. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Eenadu Press Workers Union & Anr. - Vs – Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in 1979 (1) LLJ 391, has held that the State Government was entitled to issue prohibitory orders u/s 10 (3) of the Act. While noticing the fact that the strike was in connection with a dispute relating to claim for wages and DA, it was further held that it is not necessary for the State Government to issue a show cause notice to the parties before issuance of order u/s 10 (3). At the same time, it was also held that though right to strike is a valuable right in the hands of the employees, but that is not a fundamental right. After discussing the various judgments of different High Courts, finally the Division Bench found further support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration – Vs – Workmen of Edward Eventers & Anr. reported in 1978 (II) LLJ 209 (SC) and held that two conditions are necessary to make Section 10 (3) applicable. There must be an industrial dispute existing and such existing dispute must have been referred to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this Section, namely, Section 10 (1). Section 10 stands as a self-contained code as it were so far as this subject matter is concerned. The prohibitory power springs into existence only when such dispute has been made the subject matter of reference u/s 10 (1). This means, there must be an industrial dispute in existence and such dispute must have already been referred for adjudication. 20. Therefore, in the light of the various decisions referred to above, from a bare reading of Section 10 (3), on the basis of the observation made by different High Courts and the Supreme Court, it will be evident that the State Government has power to invoke Section 10 (3), if an industrial dispute has been referred and in connection with the referred dispute, a strike or lockout is in existence on the date of reference. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in the above said judgment holding that if the competent Government feels necessity to prohibit a strike or lockout for maintaining industrial peace and for proper adjudication of the dispute, it could do so on deliberation of merits of such disputed demand, but such order being administrative in nature, no prior notice is called for before issuance of such order u/s 10 (3) of the Act. So far as the impugned order passed by the respondent u/s 10 (B) is concerned, the Division Bench of this Court has already held in W.A. No.777/07, etc., (batch) that it is an administrative order and, thereby, do not call for any prior notice or hearing before passing such order. To that extent, I respectfully agree with the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court. 21. However, another argument advanced by Mr.Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in respect of the order directing the company to pay an interim relief of Rs.500/= per month to the workers of Plant-I and Rs.400/- to the workers of Plant-III along with salary from 1st June, 2009, it was sharply argued that this portion of the order is totally in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no notice or reasonable opportunity of hearing was given when serious criminal consequence, namely, imprisonment will be the punishment if the order passed u/s 10 (B) against the petitioner company is not complied with. 22. In support of his argument, learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Uma Nath Panday & Ors. - Vs – State of U.P. & Anr. (2009 (2) CTC 663), wherein the Apex Court emphasised in Para-8 of the above said order that adherence to the principles of natural justice is recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining the disputes between the parties or any administrative action involving civil consequence is in issue. 23. No doubt, these principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is known as audi alteram partem rule, which says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle and it must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. 23. No doubt, these principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is known as audi alteram partem rule, which says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle and it must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Therefore, the Apex Court has held that it is essential to put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against any party. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. It is more relevant to have a look at the words of the Apex Court mentioned in para-8, which is extracted hereunder :- “8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. The principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the “Magna Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to “vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the “Magna Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to “vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”. In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works , 1863 (143) ER 414, the principle was thus stated : “Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. “Adam” says God, “where art thou ? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat”. Again the Apex Court, while emphasising the importance of following the principles of natural justice, has further held as follows :- “15. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves Civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression Civil consequences encompasses infraction of nor merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 16. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura, 1855 (2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as universal justice. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen 1877-78 (3) App. Case 614, 623 JC, Sir Robort P.Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy Council, used the phrase the requirements of substantial justice, while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, 1884-85 (10) Appl. Case 229, 240, Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase the substantial requirement of justice. In Vionet .v. Barrett, 1885 (55) LJRD 39, 41, Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as the natural sense of what is right and wrong. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, 1890 (24) QBD 712, Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definiti0on given earlier by him in Vionets case (supra) chose to define natural justice as fundamental justice. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, 1890 (24) QBD 712, Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definiti0on given earlier by him in Vionets case (supra) chose to define natural justice as fundamental justice. In Ridge v. Baldwin, 1963 (1) WB 569, 578, Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with fair-play in action a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J., in Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (2) SCR 621 . In Re R.N. (An Infant) 1967 (2) B617, 530, Lord Parker, C.J., preferred to describe natural justice as a duty to act fairly. In Fairmont Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment, 1976 WLR 1255, Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as a fair crack of the whip while Geoffrey Lane, L.J. in Regina .v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball, 1977 (1) WLR 766, preferred the homely phrase common fairness. 17. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basis elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is nemo judex in causa sua or nemo debet esse judex i propria cause sua as stated in (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114 that is, no man shall be a judge in his own cause. Coke used the form aliquis non debet esse judex in propria cause quia non potest esse judex at part (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party. The form nemo potest esse simul actor et judex, that is, no one can be at once suitor and judge is also at times used. The second rule is audi alteram partem, that is, hear the other side. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form audietur at altera part is used, meaning very much the same thing. The form nemo potest esse simul actor et judex, that is, no one can be at once suitor and judge is also at times used. The second rule is audi alteram partem, that is, hear the other side. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form audietur at altera part is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particulary the audi alteram partem rule, namely, qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquuam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit that is, he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right (See Bosewells case, 1605 (6) Co. Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. ........” Therefore, as ordained by the Apex Court, natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication deeply rooted on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore the purpose of following the principles of natural justice is only for prevention of miscarriage of justice. 24. While keeping in mind the ratio laid down by the Apex Court, though I uphold part of the impugned order passed u/s 10 (B), 10 (3) and 10 (1) (c), 10 (1) (d) and 10 (2) (a) of the ID Act, I am inclined to quash sub-clause (ii) and (iii) of clause (3) of Para 10 of G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009. More importantly, there is no reason or justification as to why the Government has come forward to issue a direction in G.O. No.394 to the company to pay Rs.500/- and Rs.400/- to the respective workers of Plant-I and Plant-III as interim relief along with the salary w.e.f. 1st June, 2009, when they have been paid salary. Therefore, that portion of the order directing to pay an interim relief to the workers, contained in G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009, does not stand to any good sound reason. 25. Therefore, that portion of the order directing to pay an interim relief to the workers, contained in G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009, does not stand to any good sound reason. 25. Therefore, this Court, while partly allowing W.P. Nos.13764 & 13765 of 2009, quash only the portion of the G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009, whereby the petitioner company was directed to pay Rs.500/- and Rs.400/- to the respective workers of Plant-I and Plant-III as interim relief along with the salary w.e.f. 1st June, 2009. In the result, G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009, is upheld on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.777/07, etc., (batch), and the impugned G.O. No.394 dated 26th Sept., 2009, so far as it relates to the direction to pay interim relief to the workers is quashed, as it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. W.P. Nos.15844, 17348 and 17362 of 2009 are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. There shall be no order as to costs.