V.K. Shukla, J.- Present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, questioning the validity of resolution/order dated 08.09.1994 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow, refusing to accord renewal to the permit, and the order passed in appeal dated 15.03.1996 by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, affirming the said resolution on different grounds. 2. Brief background of the case is that petitioner was operator of Pallia-Area route, which lies within jurisdiction of Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow. The petitioner had been holding regular stage carriage permit No.823-SC. After enforcement of New Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, petitioner moved an application for renewal and the same was allowed for the period starting with effect from 10.04.1989 to 09.04.1994; then again application was made on 06.08.1994 for subsequent renewal of his aforesaid permit. Said application was placed before the Regional Transport Authority, but the same was rejected on the ground that the application was barred by time; petitioner was in dues of passenger tax and the vehicle in question was more than 20 years' old. Against the said order, petitioner preferred appeal; appeal was entertained and during pendency of the appeal interim order was passed and thereafter, said appeal in question had been rejected. At the said juncture, present writ petition had been filed. 3. Pleadings inter se parties have been exchanged, and thereafter, present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing and disposal with the consent of the parties. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sameer Kalia, contended with vehemence that in all eventuality, once pre-requisite terms and conditions were fulfilled by the petitioner, then renewal ought to have been accorded and further in view of introduction of Section 217A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, renewal was liable to be considered, as such writ petition deserves to be allowed. 5. Countering the said submissions, learned standing counsel, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner would not get any benefit, whatsoever, on account of introduction of Section 217A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inasmuch as, rights of the petitioner had already lapsed before coming into force of the new Act, and Section 217A of the said Act introduced subsequently, has no application to the facts of the case, as such writ petition deserves to be quashed. 6. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced, factual position which emerges in the present case is that the petitioner had been accorded stage carriage permit No.823-SC under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the period of renewal provided for under the old Act was three years. New Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 01.07.1989. Petitioner's stage carriage permit was renewed in the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority dated 06.12.1989, for the period starting with effect from 10.04.1989 to 09.04.1994. Thereafter, the petitioner again moved an application for renewal on 06.08.1994 for subsequent renewal of his aforesaid permit. Said application was rejected by the Regional Transport Authority on the ground that the application was barred by time, petitioner was in dues of passenger tax and the vehicle in question was more than 20 years' old. Against the said order, petitioner preferred appeal; the appellate authority has taken categorical stand while confirming rejection of renewal application though on different ground that permit of the petitioner had been issued under the provisions of repealed Act, 1939, and therefore, by virtue of clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, same was not renewable after expiry of its term. The Appellate Tribunal has noted this fact that last renewal was done with effect from 10.04.1989, and in such a situation the appellant's permit died its natural death, and it could not be renewed. 7. The issue in respect of permits granted under the repealed Act 1939 and the saving orders passed passed under new Motor Vehicles Act qua permits came to be considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gajraj Singh and others vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, (1997) 1 SCC 650 , and therein clear cut view was taken that in respect of grant of permit under the old Act and new Act, there was lot of distinction and the view was taken that such renewal of permits was not permissible and the permits which had been obtained after 01.07.1989, same were on account of mistake and misconception of law and were to be treated as temporary permit. Relevant paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 46, 50, 61 and 62 of the said judgment are being quoted below: "32. Relevant paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 42, 43, 46, 50, 61 and 62 of the said judgment are being quoted below: "32. It is already seen that the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 217 is to obliterate the Act 4 of 1939 and any corresponding law in force in any State from operation with effect from 1st July, 1989. However, repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired, accrued or incurred. Sub-section (2) enumerates and saves from the obliteration of Act 4 of 1939 and corresponding law by fiction with its non obstante clause. Ex abundenti cautela clauses (a) to (e) elaborate the enumeration of rights. They would apply to specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute. Clause (a) preserves continued operation of any notification, rules, regulations, order or notice issued etc, and any appointment or declaration made etc, under the Repealed Act in force immediately before July 1, 1989. Those enumerated acts or actions shall be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. In other words, Section 217 (2) (a) gives an elongated operation as regards all transactions, which being consistent with the provisions of the Act should be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act. Existence of the corresponding provisions similar to the repealed provisions is a condition precedent. If the operation of the provisions in the Act is inconsistent and incompatible, it gets obliterated and the earlier provisions no longer revive or survive. If analogous provision in the Repealed Act does not find place in the Act, the rights accrued or acquired thereunder would not continue under the Act unless fresh rights are acquired under the Act. 33. By operation of clause (b), any certificate of fitness of a motor vehicle or its registration or licence issued or permit granted under the repealed enactments, shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed. 33. By operation of clause (b), any certificate of fitness of a motor vehicle or its registration or licence issued or permit granted under the repealed enactments, shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed. In other words, a permit granted under the Repealed Act 4 of 1939 shall continue to have the same operation under the Act under the same terms and conditions and for the same period, as if the Repealed Act was in operation and as if the Act had not been passed. This is the fiction of law by which, though Act 4 of 1939 was wiped out, its operation gets revived. The intention, thereby, appears to be that the Act breaths life into the dead permits etc, and allows full play to the permits granted under the Repealed Act, even if inconsistent, till their period expired by efflux of time. 34.On expiry of the period of permit granted under Act 4 1939 or corresponding law what would be the consequence is the question. It is true, as contended by Shri Venugopal, that by operation of sub-section (4) of Section 217, read with clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 217, Section 6 of the GC Act steps in and the conjoint operation thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the notification issued, rules or regulations made, orders passed, notice issued, or any appointment or a declaration made, exemption granted or any confiscation made or any penalty or find imposed in or any other thing done or any other action taken under the repealed enactment in force immediately before such commencement shall, as far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, be deemed to have been correspondingly issued, made, granted, done or taken under the Act and their operation thereby gets saved by appropriate clause in Section 6 of the GC Act read with Section 217(2)(a) to (e) of the Act. In other words, proceedings initiated before Act 4 of 1939 was repealed, would be continued and concluded under the Act as if the Act was not enacted. However, four things would emerge from its operation. In other words, proceedings initiated before Act 4 of 1939 was repealed, would be continued and concluded under the Act as if the Act was not enacted. However, four things would emerge from its operation. First, there must exist a corresponding provision under the Act pari materia with the Repealed Act; secondly, that the order or permit granted must exist and be in operation as on July 1, 1989- the day on which the Act had come into force: thirdly, it must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act; and fourthly some positive acts should have been done before July 1, 1989 to further secure any right. All the four conditions should be satisfied as conditions precedent for application of Section 6 of the GC Act by operation of sub-section [4] of Section 217 and then clause [a] of sub-section [2] of Section 217 steps in and starts operation thereof. We are concerned with permits, let it be said that a permit is preceded by an order granting permit by the concerned RTA or STA, as the case may be, under the Repaled Act. The said order stands merged with the grant of permit and gets exhausted. 35. This may be angulated from yet another legal perspective, namely, consequences that would flow from the meaning of the word `renewal' of a permit under Section 81 of the Act. Black`s Law Dictionary defines the word `renewal' at page 1296 thus: "The act of renewing or reviving. A revival or rehabilitation of an expiring subject; that which is made anew or re-established. The substitution of a new right or obligation for another of the same nature. A change of something old to something new. To grant or obtain extension of;" 38. It is settled law that grant of renewal is a fresh grant though it breaths life into the operation of the previous lease or licence granted as per existing appropriate provisions of the Act, rules or orders or acts intra vires or as per the law in operation as on the date of renewal. The right to get renewal of a permit under the Act is not a vested right but a privilege subject to fulfillment of the conditions precedent enumerated under the Act. Under Section 58 of the Repealed Act, renewal of a permit is a preferential right and refusal thereof is an exception. The right to get renewal of a permit under the Act is not a vested right but a privilege subject to fulfillment of the conditions precedent enumerated under the Act. Under Section 58 of the Repealed Act, renewal of a permit is a preferential right and refusal thereof is an exception. But the Act expresses different intention. Sections 66, 70, 71 and 80 prescribe procedure for making application and compliance of the conditions mentioned therein. Existence of the provisions of the Act consistent with the Repealed Act is a pre-condition. Grant of renewal under Section 81 is a discretion given to the authority [STA or RTA] subject to theconditions and the requirement of law. Discretion given by a statute connotes making a choice between competing considerations according to rules of reason and justice and not arbitrary or whim but legal and regular. Sections 70 and 71 read with Section 81 do indicate that grant of permit or renewal thereof is not a matter of right or course. It is subject of rejection for reasons to be recorded in support thereof. Therefore, right to renewal of a permit under Section 81 is not a vested or accrued right but a privilege to get renewal according to law in operation and after compliance with the pre-conditions and abiding the law. 42. There is a distinction between right acquired or accrued, and privilege, hope and expectation to get a right, as rightly pointed out by the High Court in the impugned judgment. A right to apply for renewal and to get a favorable order would not e deemed to be a right accrued unless some positive acts are done, before repeal of Act 4 of 1939 or corresponding law to secure that right of renewal. In Gujarat Electricity Board vs.Shantilal [ AIR 1969 SC 239 ], this Court had pointed out that before Section 71 of the Electricity Supply Act was amended the appellant had issued a notice under Section 7 thereof, exercising the option to purchase the undertaking. It was held that a right to purchase the electrical undertaking which has accrued to the Electricity Board was saved by Section 6 of the GC Act. 43. It was held that a right to purchase the electrical undertaking which has accrued to the Electricity Board was saved by Section 6 of the GC Act. 43. So, if no action under the Repealed Act was set in motion before July 1, 1989, by a valid application for renewal of a permit, there was no right acquired or accrued to pursue the remedy under the Act. The privilege to obtain renewal of a permit is not an accrued right. Section 58(2) of the Repealed Act gives, as stated super, preferential right to a holder of a permit for renewal thereof. Section 71 of the Act gives preferential right in favour of STU for grant of permit in Chapter V which is not available under the Repealed Act. Therefore, even for grant of a permit or a renewal under Section 72 or 81, the STU is entitled to preferential right over the private citizens. Thereby, the Act manifests intention inconsistent with and incompatible to that in Chapter IV of the Repealed Act. Similarly, even on the approved routes under a scheme framed in Chapter IVA, an exception has been carved out in the scheme with a non obstante clause in favour of STU, which is a self-operatiive law by itself. The rights of the existing operators for renewal thereof under Section 68F(1D) under the repealed Act were saved. But, under the Act, Chapter VI does not speak of renewal of the permits to the private operators, though permits were saved in the scheme itself. In other words, Chapter VI manifested inconsistency in its operation from the law in Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act. Similarly, other provisions are inconsistent with those in Act 4 of 1939 which exist in the Act as are apparent but they are not relevant for our present purpose and hence need no elaboration. Therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (2) would not get attracted, even if it were to apply to grant of permit being a "thing done" as contended by Shri Venugopal. So, any permit issued to operate a stage carriage under the Repealed Act would survive, by virtue of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the Act by fictional operation of law; and this would be on the same conditions and for the same period mentioned under the Repealed Act, as if the Act was not enacted. So, any permit issued to operate a stage carriage under the Repealed Act would survive, by virtue of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the Act by fictional operation of law; and this would be on the same conditions and for the same period mentioned under the Repealed Act, as if the Act was not enacted. Any other view would tantamount to allowing the Repealed Act to remain in operation in perpetuity simultaneously with the operation of the Act. Both cannot co-exist in the same shelter. 46. We, therefore hold that grant of renewal of the stage carriage permit should necessarily be preceded by a grant of a permit to stage carriage under Section 72, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Sections 70 and 71. This should be made before the expiry of the period prescribed in the permit granted under the Repealed Act. Therefore, for stage carriage permits granted under Chapter IV of the Repealed Act, if they stand to expire or expired after 1st July, 1989, without any pending application for renewal having been made under Section 58 as on 1st July, 1989, fresh applications under Section 70 should be filed and after consideration under Section 71, permits be obtained as per law under Section 72. If there is any delay to obtain permits pending consideration, by operation of Section 76, to avoid hiatus in continued operation of providing stage carriage service, section 87 gives power to grant temporary permit without following the procedure laid down in Section 70. In Mithilesh Garg & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (1992) 1 SCC 168 ], this Court had laid down different criteria for grant of inter-region, intra-region and interstate permits under the Act under Section 88 and 80 of the Act which did not find place in the Repealed Act. It was held that such distinction was neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus considered, the argument of arbitrariness, discrimination or avoidable inconvenience to the holders of permits etc, under the Repealed Act and to the travelling public would be hypothetical and without force. 50. It was held that such distinction was neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus considered, the argument of arbitrariness, discrimination or avoidable inconvenience to the holders of permits etc, under the Repealed Act and to the travelling public would be hypothetical and without force. 50. Two views are plausible under the scheme of the Act.The first is that after the expiry of the permit or renewed permit under the Repealed Act, the named private operator saved under the scheme gets denuded of his right of renewal of his permit under the Act, since "permit" defined under Section 2(31) would mean permit granted under the Act, which occasion does not arise as the field, occupied by the exclusive right to operate stage carriages was given to STU. Thereby, he ceases thereafter to have any right to ply stage carriages, though saved under the self operative scheme which continues to be in existence after the Act came into force. The other view is that the rights of the private named operators whose specified permits were saved under the respective schemes, were not expressly taken away under the Act. Being private operators, they would be entitled to avail of the right and remedy given in Chapter v of the Act, with exclusion of other private competitors. Thereby they should apply for and obtain permit afresh under Section 72 and renewal thereafter under Section 81. In this behalf, it is relevant to note the contention of S/Shri Venugopal and Salve. Their contention is that in the scheme, such named operators whose specified permits were mentioned in the scheme alone were given exclusive rights to ply their stage carriages on the named routes subject to corridor restrictions mentioned in the scheme. Other persons whose permits were nationalised were paid compensation under the Repealed Act or under Section 105 of the Act but the appellants were not paid compensation as their permits were saved. By operation of Section 217 (2) (e) and Section 100 of the Act, even pending schemes should be finalised under the Act within the limitation prescribed therein. Until its finalisation, the existing operators are allowed to ply their vehicles and to obtain temporary permits. This would indicate the legislative intention that the Act did not intend to destroy the rights, saved under the respective schemes, of the named operators in respect of the specified permits. Until its finalisation, the existing operators are allowed to ply their vehicles and to obtain temporary permits. This would indicate the legislative intention that the Act did not intend to destroy the rights, saved under the respective schemes, of the named operators in respect of the specified permits. The contention of Mr. Pramod Swarup for U.P.S.R.T.U. is that after the expiry of the period mentioned in the permits granted to the named operators of the specified permits, they lost their right to renewal of their permits since the right to renewal, similar to Section 68F (1D),does not find place in Chapter VI. The grant of renewal to them, unless modified by the scheme under Section 102 of the Act, is inconsistent and, therefore, the their permits. The exclusive right, thereby, was given to the STU to ply their stage carriages, goods carriages or contract carriages so as to avoid inconvenience and hardship to the travelling public. 61. Accordingly, we hold that the named transport operators whose permits were saved in the relevant scheme shall apply for permits under Section 70 and 71 and obtain permits afresh under Section 72 of the Act before the expiry of the period mentioned in the permit issued either under Section 47 or Section 48 or renewal under Section 58 or Section 68F(1D) of the Repealed Act. No third party/private operators are entitled to apply for permits on the same notified route or part thereof, nor are they entitled to compete with them for grant of permit, since the right of all other private operators to apply for and operate in the approved notified area, route or a part thereof, has been frozen. The right is reserved only in relation to the named operators and that too for specified permit, and none else. Along with the application under Section 70 filed for grant of permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 made by the named holder of a specified permit in an approved scheme, he should enclose an authenticated copy of the approved scheme, the details of the route on which he was plying his stage carriage with corridor restrictions on over lapping routes. The RTA or STA, as the case may be, should verify the original scheme under which the named operator, whose specified permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the stage carriage in the approved scheme with the condition of the corridor restrictions on the notified scheme and if so to what extent. What is the duration of his right saved in the approved scheme? Whether he had plied his stage carriage on complying with the law in force? His right to permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved scheme. The STU also should be heard in that behalf. On consideration of these and all other relevant facts in relation to grant of stage carriage permit or renewal thereof, the appropriate authority may grant or reject; in the later event, for reasons to be recorded in support of the rejection. The authorities should consider their applications in accordance with the law and the prescribed procedure and may grant new permits under Section 72 and later on before the expiry thereof, to renew it in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 80 and 81, that too on compliance with law, until the scheme is duly modified or cancelled in accordance with law. We reiterate that this right is available exclusively to the named private operators and that too in respect of the specified permits and with same restrictions continued in the scheme and none else and no more. 62.Since the appellants had obtained permits by mistake of the law and and misconception of law on the part of the competent authorities applied under Section 81 and had been grated renewal of their respective permits under Section 81 after 1-7-1989, such grant of renewal of permits should be treated to temporary permits under Section 87 of the Act. Therefore, the private operators, be they covered by Ch pater V or VI, should apply for and obtain afresh permits before the expiry of the period mentioned in their respect permits or renewed for consideration under Section 71 and grant under Section 72 of the permits afresh consistently with Section 2 (31) of the Act. Thereafter, before expiry thereof, they shall apply for and the STA/RTA person/authority concerned may grant or refuse renewals of permit for reasons to be recorded under Section 81 of the Act." 8. Thereafter, before expiry thereof, they shall apply for and the STA/RTA person/authority concerned may grant or refuse renewals of permit for reasons to be recorded under Section 81 of the Act." 8. The law on the subject on existing provisions had been thus made clear that the permit holders under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were not at all entitled to apply for renewal of their permit under Section 81 of the Act after 01.07.1989, and the option they had was to apply for fresh permit under Sections 70 and 71 and obtain fresh permit under Section 72 before the expiry of period mentioned in the permit issued either under Section 47 or 48 or renewal under Section 58 or Section 68F(ii) of Repealed Act. 9. Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act No.27 of 2000) is an Act to further amend the 1988 Act, and same received assent of the President on 11.08.2000. It was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, dated 14.08.2000, and therein statement of objects and reasons for amendment are given as to why further amendments in the aforesaid Act became necessary. Therein it was proposed to allow renewal of permits, driving licences and registration certificates granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to be renewed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by inserting new Section 217A. By means of Section 5 of Act No.27 of 2000, new Section 217A has been inserted as follows: "217A. Renewal of permits, driving licences and registration certificates granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.- Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of Section 217 of the enactments referred to in that sub-section, any certificate of fitness or registration of licence or permit issued or granted under the said enactments may be renewed under this Act." 10. A bare perusal of the aforequoted provision would go to show that notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of Section 217 of the enactments referred to in that sub-section, any certificate of fitness or registration of licence or permit issued or granted under the said enactments may be renewed under this Act, i.e., under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (emphasis supplied). A bare perusal of the aforequoted provision would go to show that notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (1) of Section 217 of the enactments referred to in that sub-section, any certificate of fitness or registration of licence or permit issued or granted under the said enactments may be renewed under this Act, i.e., under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (emphasis supplied). Said provision has to be read along with the provisions as contained under Section 217 (2) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides for that any certificate of fitness or registration of licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have the effect after such commencement under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed. Sub-section (2) of Section 217 and Section 217A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, both, open with non-obstante clause "notwithstanding the repeal made by sub-section (1) of Section 217. Object and purpose of introduction of Sub-section (1) of Section 217 is to obliterate Act No. 4 of 1939 and any corresponding law in force in any State from operation w.e.f. 01.07.1989 sub-section (2) of Section 217 enumerates and saves from obliteration of Act No.4 of 1939 and corresponding law by fiction with non substante clause. Clauses (a) to (e) elaborate enumeration of rights irrespective of the repeal. The rights which had been saved under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 217, earlier therein there had been no provision of renewal, in such situation opinion had been formed that renewal application was not maintainable qua permits obtained under 1939 Act. In order to provide, opportunity of renewal, to the cases which are covered under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 217 (2), qua the same Section 217A has been introduced. Said right of applying for renewal has been conferred, notwithstanding the repeal. 11. Renewal has been defined in Blacks law Dictionary 6th Edition as follows:- " The act of renewing or reviving. A revival or rehabilitation of an expiring subject, that which is made a new or re-established. The substitution of new right or obligation of other for same nature. A change of something old to something new. To grant or obtain extension of. Similarly in the Law Lexicon (Ed. 1987) word renewal is defined to mean "a change of something old for something new". The substitution of new right or obligation of other for same nature. A change of something old to something new. To grant or obtain extension of. Similarly in the Law Lexicon (Ed. 1987) word renewal is defined to mean "a change of something old for something new". Renewal in essence is to prevent discontinuance. Once provision of renewal has been introduced and renewal has the effect from the date of such expiry and the period of renewal under old Act was 3 years and under the new Act 5 years, then even though said provision has been introduced on 14.8.2000, it will bring within its fold all applications falling within the parameters of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 217. Section 217A of Motor Vehicles Act gives discretion to consider application for renewal, same gives way for consideration of renewal application. Even if application is moved for renewal, the parameters for grant of renewal would be the same as has been mentioned by Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Girraj Singh (Supra), paragraphs 38,43,46 and as provided for under Sections 70,71,72,80 and 81 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Renewal if accorded, always operates retrospectively, and renewal being privilege, same is governed as per the law in operation as on the date of renewal. Statute has to be read reasonably, and same cannot be read in manner, which may result in absurdity, and here on its plain language, object of introducing Section 217 A is clear, i.e. to confer privilege for applying for renewal. Said provision is in addition to the provision to ensure protection of right or privilege acquired under repealed Act as contained under clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 217 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and has to be accepted as part of the scheme of things provided under new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 said meaning is culled out from the plain language, any other meaning would render the very purpose of introducing scheme of renewal, as redundant and otiose. 12. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance, on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs. Bhajan Kaur and others, (2008) 12 SCC 112 , wherein view has been taken that Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be given retrospective effect, and it has also been made clear that if an enactment confers any right, it does so with prospective effect. Paragraphs 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16 of the judgment are being quoted below: "9 A statute is presumed to be prospective unless held to be retrospective, either expressly or by necessary implication. A substantive law is presumed to be prospective. It is one of the facets of the rule of law. 10. Section 92-A of the 1939 Act created a right and a liability on the owner of the vehicle. It is a statutory liability. Per se it is not a tortuous liability. Where a right is created by an enactment, in absence of a clear provision in the statute, it is not to be applied retrospectively. 14. Reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, in our opinion, is misplaced. Section 217 of the 1988 Act contains the repeal and saving clause. Section 140 of the 1988 Act does not find place in various clauses contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the 1988 Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 217 of the 1988 Act reads, thus: "(4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals." What is, therefore, otherwise saved in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inter alia is the right. It reads as under: "6 Effect of repeal.--Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-- (a) *** (b) *** (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;..." Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, inter alia saves a right accrued and/ or a liability incurred. It does not create a right. When Section 6 applies only an existing right is saved thereby. It does not create a right. When Section 6 applies only an existing right is saved thereby. The existing right of a party has to be determined on the basis of the statute which was applicable and not under the new one. If a new Act confers a right, it does so with prospective effect when it comes into force, unless expressly stated otherwise. 15. Section 140 of the 1988 Act does not contain any procedural provision so as to construe it to have retrospective effect. It cannot enlarge any right. Rights of the parties are to be determined on the basis of the law as it then stood, viz., before the new Act come into force. 16. It is now well-settled that a change in the substantive law, as opposed to adjective law, would not affect the pending litigation unless the legislature has enacted otherwise, either expressly or by necessary implication." 13. Said judgment, is in reference to rights and liabilities of parties, when cause of action for filing claim petition arose. Section 140 of the Act has not been containing any procedural provision, and any change made in the same, by no stretch of imagination, could have enlarged the rights, as rights were to be determined as it then stood, viz., before the new Act came into force. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 will not operate retrospectively, is rightful view, and here question of prospectivety does not arise, as by necessary implication Section 217-A is integral part of the scheme of things provided for under new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under the old Act of 1939, provision of renewal of permit has been there, Section 217A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 merely recognizes the right to apply for renewal, and it has not enlarged any new right/fresh right, in such a situation Section 217A of Motor Vehicle act 1988, will have retrospective operation. 14. In the present case, appeal preferred by petitioner has not at all been decided on merits, rather same was decided on the reasoning that permit died its natural death, same cannot be renewed. 14. In the present case, appeal preferred by petitioner has not at all been decided on merits, rather same was decided on the reasoning that permit died its natural death, same cannot be renewed. Said reasoning is in consonance with the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Gajraj Singh (Supra), and since during the pendency of writ petition, change in law has been introduced, making provision for consideration of application for renewal of permits granted under the old 1939 Act by means of Section 217A of the Act, in such a situation, application moved for renewal, can be considered and decided in accordance with law, as already observed in the preceding part of judgment. In the present case, the period of renewal, which has been subject matter of issue, was for the period with effect from 10.04.1994 to 09.04.1999. In spite of renewal being refused, for the said period, petitioner succeeded in using his permit, based on the interim order dated 08.11.1994 passed by Tribunal, and after dismissal of appeal on 15.03.1996, based on the interim order passed by this Court on 10.04.1996. Without undergoing the adjudicatory process petitioner has already got the requite relief. The validity of said orders, are more academic, and as on date has already outlived its utility. In such a situation, as provision of renewal has been introduced, by means of Section 217A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the period of renewal involved in present writ petition is already over, and petitioner himself in his application dated 19.03.2002, has accepted such situation, and has also stated that application for renewal had been moved in the year 1999 and it has also been stated that application for grant of temporary permit had also been made 0n 06.03.2002 and the said application remains undisposed of. The period for which renewal had been asked for was already over in the year 2004, and no where it has been stated that thereafter any fresh application for renewal has been moved. 15. The period for which renewal had been asked for was already over in the year 2004, and no where it has been stated that thereafter any fresh application for renewal has been moved. 15. In such a situation, present writ petition is disposed of with the observation that in the event of application being moved for renewal of permit, the same be dealt with and considered as per parameters provided by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gajraj Singh (supra), paragraphs 38, 4 3, 46 and as provided for under Sections 70, 71, 72, 80 and 81 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in accordance with law, without being influenced by the orders impugned in the present writ petition. 16. No order as to costs.