JUDGMENT M.K. Chaudhury J - This appeal is preferred by the appellant convict against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 3rd Court. Pachim Medinipur in Sessions Trail No. XLIV /February /2007. 2. The prosecution/respondent's case in short is that one Rumpa Ruidas was married with appellant Pintu Ruidas of village Metaldoba After Marriage appellant Pintu Ruidas along with his parents and other members of family used to inflict torture upon Rumpa. On 16.05.2006 the de facto complainant i.e. Sunil Ruidas, brother of the victim Rumpa got information that his sister have been admitted in the Midnapore Medical College and Hospital in burnt condition. The de fado complainant and his other family member’s came to the village Metaldoba and they came to know that on 15/16th of May, 2006. victim was mercilessly beaten by her husband and inlaws. She was confined in a room and was poured kerosene and she was set on fire. She was thereafter brought to Garhbeta Hospital and therefrom to Bishnupur Hospital. Finally the victim was admitted in Midnapore Sadar Hospital. Accordingly, Goaltore P.S. Case No. 35 of 2006 dated 17.05.2006 was started against the appellant Pintu Ruidas and others under Sections 498-N/326/307/34, I.P.C. During the course of investigation the victim died. Accordingly, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and others under Sections 498-N/ 302/34. I.P.C. Prosecution examined 22 witnesses. 3. The appellant and others were examined under Section 313. Cr.P.C. by the learned trial Court. Thereafter, learned trial Court convicted appellant Pintu Ruidas under Sections 498-A/302. I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 4.000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further period of four months for the offence punishable under Section 302. I.P.C. The appellant was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine" of Rs. 1.000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. Learned Court below acquitted the rest accused persons. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence. the appellant Pintu Rudas has. Therefore, preferred this appeal as appellant This appeal has been contested by the State as respondent. This appeal was admitted by Division Bench of this Court on 14.06.2010. Since none appeared, on behalf of the appellant. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence. the appellant Pintu Rudas has. Therefore, preferred this appeal as appellant This appeal has been contested by the State as respondent. This appeal was admitted by Division Bench of this Court on 14.06.2010. Since none appeared, on behalf of the appellant. Sri Tapan Dutta Gupta was requested to act as State Defence. 5. Now, the points for consideration are whether the judgment and order of conviction are vitiated by illegality, perversity and misconception of facts and law. At the very outset it may be mentioned that this Court is empowered under Section 386 of Cr.P.C. to reappreciate the evidence already recorded consideration of point of facts and law. 6. It has been submitted by advocate for State Defence that the evidences of the prosecution witnesses specially P.W. 5, P.W. 6, P.W. 7. P.W 8, P.W, 9, P.W. 10, PW. 11 and P.W. 12 are not at all sufficient to convict the appellant Pintu Ruidas. Moreover, it is further submitted on behalf of the State Defence that learned trial Court has based the conviction of the appellant on the dying declaration of the deceased Rumpa Ruidas and this dying declaration is full of inconsistencies as there are two dying declarations, one at 5 a.m. and another at 10.30 am. On the other hand it is submitted by learned Advocate for the State that evidences of the prosecution witnesses are sufficient to convict the appellant on the charge under Sections 498-A/302 of I.P.C. We have extensively heard the submissions of both learned advocate for State Defence and learned Public Prosecutor. We have also scrutinized the prosecution witnesses and the dying declaration made by the deceased. At the very outset it is wise scrutinized the evidences of the prosecution witnesses upon which learned trial Court has based the conviction of the appellant Pintu Ruidas. 7. P.W 1-A.S.I. held inquest (Exhibit 1). P.W.2-Autopsy Surgeon held P.M. Examination (Exhibit-4). P.W 3 is ward master. P.W.4 constable who identified the dead body. P.W.I8 started Goaltore P.S. case and filled up formal F.I.R (Exhibit-6). P.W.19 wrote the complaint. P.W.20 held part-investigation and submitted charge-sheet. 8. P.W.5 Chandi Ruidas is the brother of deceased Rumpa Ruidas. The evidence of this P.W.S reveals that he did not disclose the matter to the I.O. P.W.22 Suresh Chandra Ghosal• is the I.O. of this case. P.W.I8 started Goaltore P.S. case and filled up formal F.I.R (Exhibit-6). P.W.19 wrote the complaint. P.W.20 held part-investigation and submitted charge-sheet. 8. P.W.5 Chandi Ruidas is the brother of deceased Rumpa Ruidas. The evidence of this P.W.S reveals that he did not disclose the matter to the I.O. P.W.22 Suresh Chandra Ghosal• is the I.O. of this case. The cross-examination of I.O. reveals that this P.W. 5 i.e. Chandi Ruidas did not mention that appellant Pintu Ruidas confined the victim in a room and poured kerosene over the body of the victim. His entire evidence reveals that it is a development of the prosecution case. His cross-examination reveals that he did not file any case when his sister reported him about torture by the appellant. He did not tell the I.O. that his sister reported him about such torture. He had no knowledge about the day-to-day affairs of her matrimonial home. 9. P.W.6 Lakshmikanta Ruidas has categorically stated in his cross-examination that he did not see the day-to-day affairs in the matrimonial home of Rumpa. 10. P.W.7 Uttam Ruidas. a co-villager has stated that Rumpa did not tell him anything about the incident. He has stated in his cross-examination that relation between Pintu and his wife was as usual. 11. P.W.8 Aswini Ruidas cannot say about the cause of burning. P.W. 9 also cannot say about the cause of burning. 12. P.W.10 Mukta Ruidas did not see the incident. He has no direct knowledge about the cause of burning. 13. P.W. 11 Kalpana Ruidas is the mother of the victim. She has stated that one Mangala informed her by telephone about the incident. But, from the evidence of I.O. P.W. 22 it appears that this P.W. 1 Kalpana Ruidas did not tell him that on the date of incident. appellant Pintu assaulted the victim and she came to know about the incident from Mangala. She did not stay at the matrimonial home of her daughter. On the contrary, she has stated that appellant Pintu used to behave well only one year with her daughter. 14. P.W.12 Banshi Lohar cannot say why the incident took place. He did not see any misbehaviour by the accused persons upon Rumpa. 15. P.W. 14 Sundari Ruldas has stated that Rumpa was her niece. On the contrary, she has stated that appellant Pintu used to behave well only one year with her daughter. 14. P.W.12 Banshi Lohar cannot say why the incident took place. He did not see any misbehaviour by the accused persons upon Rumpa. 15. P.W. 14 Sundari Ruldas has stated that Rumpa was her niece. She has further stated that Rumpa's matrimonial home is at distance 50 k.m. from her house and she did not stay in the matrimonial home at Rumpa. She has no knowledge regarding the day-to-day affair in the house of Rumpa. Although she has stated that Mangala reported her that Rumpa was burnt by the husband Pintu, but she did not disclose the same to the I.O. 16. So, all these witnesses have made statements which are nothing but subsequent development during the trial. 17. P.W. 15 Basanti De did not tell the I.O. that P.W. 5 Chandi Ruidas and others reported that Rumpa was burnt by her husband. 18. P.W. 16 Mangala Ruidas has not disclosed to the I.O. that Rumpa reported her about the incident in hospital. On the contrary, she disclosed that she did not see the assault upon Rumpa and setting of fire on Rumpa. She did never stay in the matrimonial home of Rumpa. 19. Similarly. P.W. 17 Sankar Ruidas (Sanku) did not tell before I.O. that Mangala reported him that appellant set fire to Rumpa. This witness is the brother of deceased Rumpa. No such statement of this witness to the effect that Rumpa told him that appellant Pintu did not her to survive was ever made to the I.O. All these witnesses are telling in a same fashion telling what is tutored. 20.So, evidences of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses upon which learned trial Court based the conviction are full of subsequent development and do not inspire any confidence to support the prosecution case. These witnesses had no access to the matrimonial home of deceased Rumpa. They either heard from witness Mangala or from Rumpa. But the evidences do not corroborate this aspect of the prosecution case. Learned trial Court moreover relied upon the dying declaration of the deceased. The dying declaration as it appears from record of inpatient marked Exhibit-7 - reveals that at 5 p.m. she made statement before Dr. They either heard from witness Mangala or from Rumpa. But the evidences do not corroborate this aspect of the prosecution case. Learned trial Court moreover relied upon the dying declaration of the deceased. The dying declaration as it appears from record of inpatient marked Exhibit-7 - reveals that at 5 p.m. she made statement before Dr. H. Ghosh and therein she stated that she had some hot conversation with her husband in the evening and following this she burnt herself using kerosene oil. But Dr. H. Ghosh was not examined. But Dr. Debasis Roy. P.W. 21 has stated that Dr. H. Ghosh recorded the dying declaration in his presence. This P.W. 21 has stated that on 16.05.2006 the dying declaration of the patient was recorded in his presence. This P.W. 21 has further stated that subsequent statement was recorded in his presence at 10.30 a.m., It appears at 10.30 a.m. that the victim stated that her husband burnt her by kerosene oil. So, there is apparent inconsistency in the dying declaration of the victim. P.W.21 Dr. Debasis Roy has stated that it is not possible in all circumstances to make normal statement if patient receives burnt injury of 90%. There is no whisper in Exhibit -7 that patient was mentally fit to make such declaration. This P.W. 21 has further stated that patient's condition was rapidly deteriorated after her admission. Therefore there is a great doubt about the veracity or authenticity of dying declaration made by the deceased who sustained 90% burnt injury and whose condition deteriorated rapidly after admission. 21. Therefore. in view of the apparent discrepancy in the two dying declarations it would not be safe to convict the appellant. This principle of law is clearly enunciated in the decision Hiralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 2010 (1) SCC (Cri.) 686. Therefore, neither the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses nor the dying declaration of the deceased prove the prosecution case beyond all reasonable doubts. The appellant/convict is entitled to get the benefit of doubt. In another decision in Ranjit Singh and others v. State of Punjab. 2007 (2) SCC (Cri.) 604 it has been observed that when there is suspicion regarding the dying declaration corroborate is necessary. Relying upon the principle of law we do not find any reliable corroboration whatsoever; from the oral evidences. In another decision in Ranjit Singh and others v. State of Punjab. 2007 (2) SCC (Cri.) 604 it has been observed that when there is suspicion regarding the dying declaration corroborate is necessary. Relying upon the principle of law we do not find any reliable corroboration whatsoever; from the oral evidences. Learned trial Court was not Justified in convicting the appellant on the basis of inconsistent and uncorroborated oral evidence and inconsistent and doubtful dying declaration. 22. Having regard to the bum injury of 90% it is not possible to make normal statement for the deceased either to any person or to the doctor. There must be in- consistency giving birth to doubt and suspicion. 23. In another decision Bijay SantTa and another v. State of West Bengal. 1989 C Cr LR (Cal) 108 similar principle of law has also been elucidated. 24. We have carefully gone through. the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and judgment passed by learned trial Court and we are unable to upheld the conviction of appellant on any count. The evidences clearly disclose omissions. Contradictions improvements of the prosecution witnesses. The claim of the witnesses to have received report from one Mangala is also unbelievable. 25. Considering the evidence on record we are of considered view that judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Court are vitiated by misconception of facts and law and the same suffer from perversity and illegality and cannot sustain in law. we, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Court upon the appellant Pintu Ruidas. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Sections 498-A/302 of I.P.C. 26. 'The' appeal is. Therefore, allowed, The appellant is set at large and be released forthwith from jail if not required in another case. Let a copy of this judgment along with Lower Court record be sent down to the learned trail Court forthwith for necessary action. Talukdar, J .-I agree. Appeal allowed.