Judgment : G. Rajasuria, J. Compendiously and concisely the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of A.No.1505 of 2010 application would run thus: (i) The respondents herein, as plaintiffs(hereinafter referred to as the decree holders for short), have obtained the decree dated 10.11.2002 in C.S.No.435 of 1982 for obtaining delivery of possession of the property described in the schedule of the decree concerned. Whereupon they filed the E.P.No.117 of 2009 for obtafining delivery of possession by citing the judgement debtors as respondents therein. Before the Master when the matter came up, the Master ordered delivery and he subsequently understood from the Amins report that there had been some inconvenience for the Amin to execute the warrant, as other than the judgement debtors some third parties were in the premises. Consequently, the 3rd parties (hereinafter referred to as the obstructors) filed the application No.6758 of 2009 with the following prayer: "to record our objection and treat the applicants as obstructors of the decree." (ii) Counter has been filed resisting the same, by the decree holders. (iii) The learned Master, after hearing both sides, dismissed the application. 2. Being aggrieved by and dis-satisfied with the order of the learned Master this application has been focussed on various grounds, the gist and kernal, the pith and marrow of them would run thus: (a) The Master, without considering the independent right of the obstructors as tenants in the suit property and without even giving an opportunity of marshalling evidence during the enquiry, which the Master was expected to conduct, the he simply dismissed the application by holding as though the obstructors were having no independent right over it. (b) To the knowledge of the decree holders, the obstructors entered into the property as sub-lessees under one Jothi and her husband Renganathan and they were not aware of the pendency of the suit, namely, C.S.N.435 of 1982. (c) The obstructors spent huge amount in modifying the structure of the property and also in maintaining it. (d) The obstructors are doing business in the premises and if they are summarily thrown away it would cause discomfiture and loss of money to them. (e) The obstructors are ready to pay the rent directly to the decree holders and continue in the premises. 3. (d) The obstructors are doing business in the premises and if they are summarily thrown away it would cause discomfiture and loss of money to them. (e) The obstructors are ready to pay the rent directly to the decree holders and continue in the premises. 3. In fact, placing reliance on the above said grounds the learned counsel for the obstructors would further submit that at one point of time during the pendency of the said suit itself, the plaintiffs/decree holders took steps to implead the obstructors herein as parties, virtually recognising them as tenants in the suit property, but subsequently even without serving notice on the obstructors, the former allowed the said application to be dismissed. 4. All these fact, according to the learned counsel, the obstructors came to know only subsequently. Behind the back of the obstructors/judgement debtors, a collusive ex-parte decree was obtained by the decree holders and the obstructors are totally in the dark as to what happened actually in this matter during the pendency of the suit stage including the trial stage. Without giving due opportunity of being heard to the obstructors they cannot be deprived of their valid independent right as tenants in the E.P.Schedule mentioned property and accordingly, the learned counsel prays for setting aside the order of the Master and for remitting the matter back to the Master for conducting a regular trial as contemplated under Order 21 Rule 101 of C.P.C. 5. By way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments as put forth on the side of the obstructors, the learned counsel for the decree holders advanced and set forth his arguments, the gist and kernal, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus: (i) Absolutely there is no whisper in the affidavit that there was collusion between the judgement debtors and the decree holders. (ii) It is a trite proposition of law that the presence or absence of knowledge about the pendency of the litigation is not at all germane for attracting the principle of lis pendens. (iii) Admittedly and indubitably during the pendency of the suit alone the obstructors claimed to have entered into the premises as sub-tenants under Jothi and her husband Renganathan. The fact remains that the property remains as the trust property and to that effect the Court gave its finding. (iii) Admittedly and indubitably during the pendency of the suit alone the obstructors claimed to have entered into the premises as sub-tenants under Jothi and her husband Renganathan. The fact remains that the property remains as the trust property and to that effect the Court gave its finding. (iv) One of the Trustees, namely, deceased Purushotamdas Chandak assuming himself as though he has got the right to lease the trust property, in is capacity as the alleged owner, leased it out in favour of the said Jothi, who allegedly sub-leased it in favour of the obstructors and the Court held that Purushotamdas Chandak himself has no right to lease out the property in favour of Jothi and it was a void one and ultimately whatever alleged right Jothi had to sub-lease, cannot subsist. (v) When Jothi herself had no right over the property, the obstructors claiming right under Jothi during the pendency of the litigation cannot project themselves as obstructors demanding for a regular trial with the meaning of Order 21 Rule 101 of C.P.C. Accordingly the learned counsel prays for the dismissal of the application. 6. The point for consideration is as to whether the learned Master was justified in dismissing the application No.6758 of 2009 in limini, without conducting a regular trial as contemplated under Order 21 Rule 97 and 101 of C.P.C.on the ground that the obstructors had no independent right? 7. The learned counsel for the obstructors cited the decision of this Court reported in 2002(2) CTC 521 – RAJENDRAN GNANAOLIVU VS. SUNDAR GNANAOLIVU AND ANOTHER, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "10. Learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the decision of M.Srinivasan,J., (as he then was) in the case of Annapoorni v. Janaki, 1995(1) L.W.141. The said judgment concentrates only on the power of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He also relied on the decision of S.S.Subramani,J., in the case of Arthur Theodore James (deceased) and 2 others v. Mrs.Hanna Rosaline and 4 others, 1999(1) L.W.222. In the said decision the learned Judge has observed that, "14. The so-called lease in favour of Savarinathan was entered into pending suit for partition and, therefore, he is also bound by the decree. He cannot have a better claim than the so-called lessor. In the said decision the learned Judge has observed that, "14. The so-called lease in favour of Savarinathan was entered into pending suit for partition and, therefore, he is also bound by the decree. He cannot have a better claim than the so-called lessor. I Savarinathan has put up any construction pending litigation, he is bound to remove the same. Merely, because the decree does not provide for removal of the structure, the power of the executing Court and the decree will not become inexecutable. 16. In the case of Shreenath v. Rajesh, 1998 AIR SCW 1619, the Supreme Court has held that the third party in possession of a property claiming independent right as a tenant not a party to the decree for possession of immovable property under execution, could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objections under Order 21, Rule 97." 8. Inviting the attention of this Court to the decision cited supra, in which various Supreme Court decisions are found cited, the learned counsel would develop his argument that once there is an obstruction by a person, whose name is not found in the decree, then he is entitled to a regular hearing within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 97 and 101 of C.P.C. 9. By way of expounding and explaining the said decision cited by the learned counsel for the obstructors, the learned counsel for the decree holders cited the following decision of the Honourable Supreme Court: AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 856 – BRAHMDEO CHAUDHARY V. RISHIKESH PRASAD JAISWAL AND ANOTHER, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "3. Once that report was received by the Executing Court respondent No.1 decree-holder naturally became alive to the fact of such resistance on spot by the appellant, amongst others. Thereafter when he moved the application on 6th May 1991 for issuance of fresh warrant for possession with the help of police force though the application purported to be under Order XXI, Rule 35 it would strictly not fall within that provision as the decree-holder wanted to bypass the obstruction and resistance offered by a stranger to the decree, namely, the appellant who was not claiming any right, title or interest through the judgment-debtor. Whether his claim was right or wrong on merits is a different matter. Whether his claim was right or wrong on merits is a different matter. But once such resistance was offered by him the proper procedure which was required to be followed by respondent No.1 decree-holder was the one contemplated by Order XXI, Rule 97 C.P.C. ... . On the undisputed facts on record it has, therefore, to be held that because of the resistance or obstruction offered by the appellant, amongst others, on 28th April 1991 the application moved by the respondent decree-holder on 6th May 1991 was necessarily to be one falling within the scope and ambit of Order XXI, Rule 97. It is pertinent to note that the resistance and/or obstruction to possession of immovable property as contemplated by Order XXI, Rule 97 CPC could have been offered by any person. The words any person as contemplated by Order XXI, Rule 97 sub-rule (1) are comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming independently and who would, therefore, be total strangers to the decree. It is not in dispute between the parties that no decree for possession has been obtained by respondent No.1 . . . . (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgement-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extent to thirty days". 10. I could call up and recollect the judgement of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (2007) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES 144- USHA SINHA VS. DINA RAM AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: 24. 10. I could call up and recollect the judgement of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (2007) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES 144- USHA SINHA VS. DINA RAM AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: 24. In Silverline Forum (P) Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust3 this Court held that where the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication is confined to a question whether he was a transferee during the pendency of a suit in which the decree was passed. Once the finding is in the affirmative, the executing court must hold that he had no right to resist or obstruct and such person cannot seek protection from the executing court. The Court stated: (SCC pp. 727-28, para 10) “10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions ‘arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99’ shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are ‘relevant to the adjudication of the application’. A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such a transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.” (emphasis supplied) (See also Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh4.) 25. We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline Forum3. In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the principle that the person purchasing property from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of a decree. We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline Forum3. In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the principle that the person purchasing property from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of a decree. Resistance at the instance of transferee of a judgment-debtor during the pendency of the proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction by a person in his own right and, therefore, is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated. 26. For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the decree-holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment-debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order 21." 11. A mere perusal and poring over of the aforesaid decisions would enable this Court to come to the conclusion that if at all the obstruction is caused by a person, who apparently and axiomatically not in any way concerned with the suit and if his claim is not under the judgement debtor and if his claim is not one derived pendente lite from the judgement debtor, then certainly he would be entitled for a regular trial within the meaning of Order 21 Rules 97 and 101 of C.P.C.; in other words, such obstructors objections should be dealt with like a suit, and such obstructors should not be driven to the extent of filing a regular suit. 12. I would also like to extract hereunder the relevant portions of Order 21 Rule 98(2) of C.P.C. and also Order 21 Rule 102 of C.P.C. "Order 21 Rule 98. Orders after adjudication . . . . 12. I would also like to extract hereunder the relevant portions of Order 21 Rule 98(2) of C.P.C. and also Order 21 Rule 102 of C.P.C. "Order 21 Rule 98. Orders after adjudication . . . . (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgement-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgement-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. Order 21 Rule 102: Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite – Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person." 13. A cumulative reading of those provisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that if a person claims to be a tenant having acquired lease hold right pendente lite from the judgement debtor, figures himself as obstructor, then such a person is not entitled to a regular hearing within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 101 of C.P.C. 14. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 98 would clearly contemplate that if the Court finds that the obstructor acquired some right during the pendency of the suit or Execution Proceedings from the judgement debtor, such a person cannot be treated as a genuine obstructor and his obstruction should be removed. I recollect and call up the maxim Nemo dat quod non habet (If you dont have, you cant give). 15. I recollect and call up the maxim Nemo dat quod non habet (If you dont have, you cant give). 15. The learned counsel for the decree holders is correct in his assertion, by placing reliance on Order 21 Rules 97, 98 and 102 of C.P.C. As per the affidavit of the very obstructors themselves, pendente lite, they allegedly derived lease hold right as sublessees from Jothi and her husband Renganathan, who claimed to be lessors under Purushotamdas Chandak, who himself was held to be having no right to lease out the said property and therefore the obstructors had right of hearing at all before the Court. 16. The learned counsel for the obstructors would contend that only Jothi was a party in the decree and not her husband-Renganathan, for which, the learned counsel for the decree holders would appropriately and appositely point out that it is not the case of the obstructors anywhere that Renganathan had any independent right over the suit property. 17. The mere dismissal for default of the application for impleadment of obstructors even while the suit was pending, would in no way enure to the benefit of obstructors as they could by no stretch of imagination be taken as necessary parties to the suit. 18. A plain reading of the affidavit of the obstructors would evince and evidence, display and demonstrate that they do not dispute that Jothi was the lessee under Purushotamdas Chandak and now it transpired that Purushotamdas Chandak himself had no right to execute the lease in favour of Jothi and in such a case Jothi and Renganathan could not have executed a valid lease in favour of the obstructors and that too, during the pendency of the suit. When such is the clear position, there is no point in setting aside the order of the Master and directing the Master to conduct a regular trial as contemplated under Order 21 Rule 101 of C.P.C. Hence, in this factual matrix, I am of the considered view that no interference with the order of the Master is warranted. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, A.No.1504 of 2010 is also dismissed. 19. The learned counsel for the obstructors made an extempore submission that if one months time is granted, possession of the said property would be handed over to the decree holders. 20. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, A.No.1504 of 2010 is also dismissed. 19. The learned counsel for the obstructors made an extempore submission that if one months time is granted, possession of the said property would be handed over to the decree holders. 20. Hence, recording the same one months time from this date is granted for handing over delivery of possession of the E.P. Scheduled mentioned property to the decree holders by the obstructors. As prayed by the learned counsel for the Decree Holders, he could pay delivery process and batta by 22.4.2010, if no delivery is handed over amicably either by the judgement debtors or the obstructors within 21.4.2010.