Judgment : 1. The plaintiff had instituted this suit for specific performance of Agreement dated 28th January, 1979 against the original defendant nos. 1 to 3 on the ground that original defendant nos. 1 to 3 had by Agreement dated 28th January, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the suit agreement) agreed to sell the property described in para 2 of the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the suit property) for total consideration of Rs.3,81,000/-. During the pendency of the suit, defendant no.1 expired and his heirs were brought on record as defendant nos.1A and 1B. Similarly, defendant no.3 expired and his heir was brought on record as defendant no.3A. 2. On 1st September, 2006 consent terms were arrived at between plaintiff and defendant no.3A and consent decree was passed on 19th June, 2007 between plaintiff and defendant no.3A. The Plaintiff and defendant no.1A and 1B desired to arrive at settlement and file consent terms so as to grant decree in favour of the plaintiff as regards rights of the plaintiff to have specific performance against defendant nos.1A and 1B. Accordingly, consent terms dated 10th January, 2008 were placed on record duly signed by the plaintiff on one hand and defendant nos.1A and 1B on the other and this Court passed consent decree on 15th January, 2008 against defendant nos.1A and 1B as regards prayer for specific performance of the suit agreement in regard to the suit property. This mean, defendant no.1A and 1B after having stepped into the shoes of defendant no.1 and defendant no.3A after having stepped into shoe of defendant no.3, consented for executing the Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff pursuant to the suit agreement. No formal conveyance is executed by defendant no.1A, 1B and 3A in favour of the plaintiff as the decrees were to act as conveyance. The suit remained pending against defendant no.2 as defendant no.2 wanted to contest the suit. 3. It is to be noted that defendant no.2 had taken out Notice of Motion No.3824 of 2008 so as to seek permission to file written statement after condonation of delay in filing in filing the written statement. Said motion was dismissed by speaking order dated 20th January, 2009. Against the said order, defendant no.2 filed appeal, however, he lost therein. As a result of this, defendant no.2 was precluded from filing written statement and the suit proceeded without filing written statement. Said motion was dismissed by speaking order dated 20th January, 2009. Against the said order, defendant no.2 filed appeal, however, he lost therein. As a result of this, defendant no.2 was precluded from filing written statement and the suit proceeded without filing written statement. The plaintiff has approached the Court with a positive case that apart from the three persons against whom he had filed suit, there was one more person who had rights in respect of the suit property and his name was Mr. Shivbali J. Pandey. According to plaintiff, after the death of said Shivbali Pandey, his wife Tulsadevi stepped into the shoes of said Shivbali Pandey and she had entered into consent terms for selling her share to the plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff obtained from said Tulsadevi consent terms dated 1st April, 1986. It is also the case of the plaintiff that on the said document titled as consent terms, defendant no.2 had tendered his signature thereby consenting to have a decree against him in regard to the suit property. This document titled as consent terms has been taken on record and marked as Exh.P-2. It is to be noted that the suit was not filed against Tulsadevi and these consent terms were not taken on record and order in terms of consent terms was not obtained. The plaintiff in the course of trial has heavily relied upon this document to show the existence of the suit agreement, desire on the part of defendant no.2 to consent for a decree and admission of the fact that full consideration was paid to Tulsadevi and defendant no.2. This document was also relied upon to contend that possession of the suit was handed over after this document in the nature of consent terms was signed. Defendant no.2 has challenged this document. Fact remains that this document was not used to secure a consent decree. In the year 2008, plaintiff took out Notice of Motion No.1247 of 2008 praying that on the strength of the aforesaid document Exh.P-2 this Court should pass a decree on the ground that defendant no.2 has tendered his signature on the consent terms and has manifested his intention to consent for a decree. Eventually, plaintiff withdrew said Notice of Motion. The suit was then taken up for hearing on merits. 4. Eventually, plaintiff withdrew said Notice of Motion. The suit was then taken up for hearing on merits. 4. As the suit was to proceed on merits directions were given to enable the parties to proceed for trial. Accordingly, plaintiff filed his evidence affidavit as well as compilation of documents. The Commissioner was appointed to record the evidence. It is to be noted that the documents on which the plaintiff wanted to rely upon were not marked as exhibits and / or for identification before sending the suit for recording of evidence. It is to be noted that defendant no.1 had not filed written statement as such he was not entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witness i.e. plaintiff PW-1 on factual aspect of the matter. This aspect missed the attention of the Commissioner as well as the plaintiff. Defendant no.2 was permitted to cross-examine plaintiff PW-1. After the cross-examination on the part of defendant no.2 was over, plaintiff closed his case. Defendant no.2 did not lead any evidence. The matter was transferred to the Court for hearing of the arguments. 5. This Court noted the fact that the documents on which plaintiff wanted to rely upon have not been marked as exhibits. With the consent of learned advocates on both sides, the documents were taken up for marking and documents came to be marked as exhibits or for identification. In all, five documents came to be marked as exhibits as Exhs. P-1 to P-5. Exh. P-5 is a typed copy of suit agreement. After this exercise was carried out, it was noticed that in the course of cross-examination of PW-1, certain questions were asked by the learned advocate for the defendant no.2. Objections thereto were raised by learned Counsel for the plaintiff. It was necessary to rule on each objection. That exercise was conducted by this Court and by a detailed order dated 5th August, 2010 various objections were attended to. After the aforesaid exercise was carried out, the matter was taken up for hearing of the arguments. 6. The plaintiff approached this Court stating that the three defendants entered into a suit agreement dated 28th January, 1979 for sale of the suit property though in the prayer clause, the date of the agreement was typed as 15th March, 1980. After the aforesaid exercise was carried out, the matter was taken up for hearing of the arguments. 6. The plaintiff approached this Court stating that the three defendants entered into a suit agreement dated 28th January, 1979 for sale of the suit property though in the prayer clause, the date of the agreement was typed as 15th March, 1980. It is noticed that this typographical mistake was not noticed by the plaintiff till decree came to be passed against defendant no.1A, 1B and defendant no.3A. Plaintiff took out chamber summons and Court passed an order allowing amendment to change the date from 15th March, 1980 to 28th January, 1979. This amendment was granted before recording of evidence commenced. Defendant no.2 did not challenge the order by which aforesaid amendment was granted. Though some arguments were advanced on this aspect of the matter, said argument cannot be accepted on the ground that there is no challenge to the order by which amendment was granted. 7. Defendant no.2 has not filed written statement in the circumstances mentioned aforesaid. Hence, while considering the matter on merits, it was not necessary for the Court to frame formal issues and that is how in the present suit no formal issues have been framed. 8. The plaintiff gave concession to the defendant no.2 and conceded that cross-examination conducted by defendant no.2 can be read at the stage of hearing of the arguments. It appears that this was done by the plaintiff to have the suit decided at an earlier date. Hence, this Court has read the cross-examination conducted by advocate for defendant no.2 while deciding the matter. The documents relied upon by plaintiff have been marked as Exhibits / for identification after hearing learned Counsels on both sides and by passing a speaking order dated 30th April, 2010. 9. The plaintiff claims that original defendant nos.1 to 3 were joint owners in respect of the suit property and they had agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff and were to receive consideration of Rs.3,81,000/-. It is to be noted that defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A consented for a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Each decree was to act as conveyance against respective defendant. It is to be noted that defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A consented for a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Each decree was to act as conveyance against respective defendant. So far as the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant no.2, the Court will have to test the case of the plaintiff with reference to the execution of the suit agreement, payment of consideration to defendant no.2 and readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and other related matters. 10. The original suit agreement is not before the Court. The plaintiff has brought the suit agreement on record by way of secondary evidence. It is the case of the plaintiff that at the time of filing of the suit, he was in possession of the suit agreement in original, however, when the matter came up for recording of evidence, the suit agreement which was handed over to his advocate was not traceable, as it was misplaced and despite making frantic efforts, the original agreement could not be traced. The plaintiff has, therefore, produced a typed copy of the suit agreement as and by way of secondary evidence. To the plaint, a typed copy has been annexed along with other documents. A typed copy of the suit agreement was also filed. Looking to the evidence of PW-1 Virsen plaintiff, the said typed copy annexed to the plaint was marked as Exh.P-5 as the Court was convinced about the testimony of Viren PW-1 as regards the loss of original suit agreement. On account of this, the said document Exh.P-5 has been read by the Court for the purposes of deciding the matter. Arguments were advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that no such agreement was entered into and it was necessary for the plaintiff to produce the original suit agreement. It was also argued that after the plaintiff realized that the original suit agreement is misplaced, he should have applied for amendment of the plaint and placed the said fact on record. I am not inclined to accept this argument advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.2. There is no practice in the Court to lodge original document like suit agreement in Court. The plaintiff was required to annex the true copy of the said agreement to the plaint and that requirement has been fulfilled by the plaintiff. I am not inclined to accept this argument advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.2. There is no practice in the Court to lodge original document like suit agreement in Court. The plaintiff was required to annex the true copy of the said agreement to the plaint and that requirement has been fulfilled by the plaintiff. If at all the plaintiff wanted to have suit agreement produced on record, it was necessary for him to place it before the Court at the time of recording of evidence. In the present case, plaintiff has approached this Court with a case that original suit agreement was misplaced at the stage of recording of evidence and plaintiff wanted to rely upon it by way of secondary evidence. Hence, there was no question of amending the plaint and bring the fact of loss of original suit agreement on record. It was argued that no such agreement was entered into between plaintiff and three defendants. This argument cannot be accepted because defendant nos. 1A, 1B and 3A after they were brought on record have consented for having a decree against them. It is to be noted that the property agreed to be sold is not a small piece of land. It admeasures 1696 sq.yard equivalent to 1412.07 meters situate at prime location at Mumbai namely village Mogra at Andheri. If original defendant nos. 1 and 3 had not entered into suit agreement, defendant nos.1A, 1B and defendant no.3A would not have consented for decree. In the consent decrees, there is reference to suit agreement dated 28th January, 1979 and decrees are in respect of suit agreement. It was argued by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that when decrees were passed against defendant nos. 1A, 1B and defendant no.3A, the date of the agreement in prayer clause was 15th March, 1979. On facts, this submission is correct, however, decrees do refer to suit agreement. This fact is in any event in favour of plaintiff. It was also not necessary to have separate conveyances in favour of plaintiff as decrees were to act as conveyances. Be that as it may, the decrees respectively against defendant nos.1A, 1B and defendant no.3A do prove the case of plaintiff as regards suit agreement. 11. The plaintiff has given evidence as regards loss of suit agreement. The relevant portion of the evidence is as follows. Be that as it may, the decrees respectively against defendant nos.1A, 1B and defendant no.3A do prove the case of plaintiff as regards suit agreement. 11. The plaintiff has given evidence as regards loss of suit agreement. The relevant portion of the evidence is as follows. “I say that the original agreement has been misplaced and could not be traced despite frantic efforts made by me to locate the same. I tender a duly certified typed copy of the said Agreement. I say that the typed copy of the said Agreement annexed to the plaint was made out from the original Agreement and at the time of filing the above suit I had compared the contents of the typed copy and the said Agreement with the original Agreement. I identify the signatures of the original defendant Nos. 1, and 3 and defendant no. 2 on the said Agreement. I also identify my signature on the said Agreement. I say that the contents of the said Agreement are true and correct.” In order to bring on record suit agreement by way of secondary evidence, the plaintiff was required to comply with requirements as set out in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The case of plaintiff would fall in Section 65(c) of Indian Evidence Act. The evidence of plaintiff clearly makes out that he had lost the suit agreement when the suit reached stage of recording of evidence. The plaintiff has specifically stated that he could not trace the document despite frantic efforts made by him to locate the same. It is pertinent to note that this evidence of the loss of the document by the plaintiff has not been seriously challenged by defendant no.2 in the cross-examination. No doubt, defendant no.2 has asked questions as to why the advocate in whose custody the said document kept has not been examined. In my view, if the plaintiff has stepped into the witness box and has stated that the said document has been lost and it is not traceable despite frantic efforts, it is sufficient to come to the conclusion that plaintiff had lost the document. Plaintiff’s case that he lost the document cannot be disbelieved because he has not examined his advocate. Certain questions were asked as regards getting the copy of the documents from advocate Mr. Vashi who had acted as an advocate for the vendors. Plaintiff’s case that he lost the document cannot be disbelieved because he has not examined his advocate. Certain questions were asked as regards getting the copy of the documents from advocate Mr. Vashi who had acted as an advocate for the vendors. In my view, since advocate Mr. Vashi had acted as an advocate for the vendor, he would not necessarily have the copy of the said original document. Considering the evidence of plaintiff PW-1 as a whole, I hold that plaintiff was justified in giving secondary evidence as regards suit agreement. It is also required to be noted that when plaintiff had secured decree against defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A on the suit agreement, there was no need for the plaintiff to keep the original agreement away from the Court. In fact, the plaintiff had to bring before this Court secondary evidence because the document came to be misplaced. The plaintiff did not secure any additional advantage by keeping the original document away from the Court. In my view, the conduct of the plaintiff in leading secondary evidence cannot be seen with doubt. The evidence placed by the plaintiff PW-1 Virsen, in my view, is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff lost the document and that is how he had no alternative but to bring on record suit agreement by way of secondary evidence. 12. In order to bring on record suit agreement, plaintiff has produced typed copy of suit agreement. Such a typed copy by way of secondary evidence would fall within the ambit of Section 63 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act i.e. copies made from or compared with the original. The plaintiff has in his evidence categorically stated that typed copy annexed to the plaint was made out from the original agreement and at the time of filing of suit, he had compared the contents of the typed copy of the agreement with the original suit agreement. The evidence of plaintiff is clear and cogent as to how Exh.P-5 was prepared as a copy compared with original. There is no reason for Court to doubt the veracity of evidence of plaintiff PW-1 as to how he prepared copy of suit agreement Exh.P-5 from original suit agreement. The evidence of plaintiff is clear and cogent as to how Exh.P-5 was prepared as a copy compared with original. There is no reason for Court to doubt the veracity of evidence of plaintiff PW-1 as to how he prepared copy of suit agreement Exh.P-5 from original suit agreement. It is a matter of common practice that when a copy of the agreement like suit agreement is to be annexed to the plaint, it would be typed from the original document and then compared with original document. 13. In view of above discussion, I hold that plaintiff is entitled to lead secondary evidence as regards suit agreement Exh.P-5 and it can be read in evidence. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had relied upon the judgment in the case of Pandu V/s. Bapudas and Ors. AIR 1929, Nagpur, 288 to contend that the plaintiff has not placed sufficient material as regards the loss of the original document and, therefore, the case of the plaintiff that he could give secondary evidence is required to be rejected. Having perused the said judgment and with the aforesaid discussion, I am inclined to observe that plaintiff was justified in giving secondary evidence. In fact, the judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for defendant no.2 as mentioned aforesaid, authorizes the Court to exercise discretion and arrive at conclusion whether secondary evidence could have been given and what is the probative value of it. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid, I hold that the discretion is required to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff. 14. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had relied upon the judgment in the case of Patel Maganbhai Bapujibhai and Ors. Vs. Patel Ishwarbhai Motibhai & Ors. AIR 1984 Gujarat 69. It needs to be mentioned that the facts concerned in the said judgment are totally different from one which are presently before the Court in as much as the document in the said case was written document. In the present case the plaintiff got the copy done with the help of a typing machine and has compared the same. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had relied upon in the case of Om Prakash Berlia and Anr. V/s. Unit Trust of India & Ors. AIR 1983 Bombay 1. After having perused the said judgment, I am inclined to observe that said judgment is not relevant to the facts of this case. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had relied upon in the case of Om Prakash Berlia and Anr. V/s. Unit Trust of India & Ors. AIR 1983 Bombay 1. After having perused the said judgment, I am inclined to observe that said judgment is not relevant to the facts of this case. The said judgment deals with proof of the contents of the documents. By the said judgment, it is observed that merely because the signature on a particular document is proved that would not mean that the contents of the documents have been proved. In the present case, the plaintiff has stepped into witness box. He has stated that Exh.P-5 was compared with the original agreement and he has also identified the signatures of the persons who had executed the document. The plaintiff stepped into the witness box and has testified about execution of the suit agreement and the contents of said document have been duly proved. 15. The learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had relied upon following judgments :- (i) Ashok Dulichand V/s. Madhavlal Dube and Anr. AIR 1975, SC 1748. (ii) Kalyan Singh V/s. Chhoti and Ors. AIR 1990, SC 396. (iii) Poonamchand V/s. Motilal and Ors. AIR 1955 Rajasthan 179 (V.42 C56 Oct.). (iv) Govt. of A.P. and Ors. V/s. Karri Chinna Venkata Reddy & Ors. AIR 1994, SC 591. After having gone through these judgments, I am inclined to observe that they have no application to the facts of the present case. 16. The next point to be considered is as regards the parties to the suit transaction. A perusal of the document at Exh.P-5 read with the case of the plaintiff, it is clear that original defendant nos.1 to 3 represented to plaintiff that they are the owners in respect of the suit property and can sell suit property to plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 to 3 executed the suit agreement. The plaintiff claims that one person by name Shivbali Pandey had also rights in respect of the suit property and after his death, his wife Tulsadevi had agreed to sell her share as heir of said Shivbali Pande. As the suit agreement pertains to plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the transaction between plaintiff and Tulsadevi. As the suit agreement pertains to plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the transaction between plaintiff and Tulsadevi. As mentioned earlier, since defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A have submitted to decree in favour of the plaintiff to that extent the plaintiff’s case that agreement has been entered into by the three defendants is required to be accepted. 17. Now I turn to the facts relating to the transaction in question. The suit agreement would go to show that the plaintiff agreed to purchase the suit property at Rs. 225/- per sq.yard. Keeping in view the area of the suit as 1696 sq.yards, the total consideration of Rs.3,81,000/- was to be paid to the three defendants. A sum of Rs.25,000/-has been paid to defendant nos. 1 to 3. In the suit agreement, there is an acknowledgement of receipt of Rs.25,000/-. At the end of the suit agreement in the receipt clause, proper receipt has been issued by the three defendants as regards receipt of Rs.25,000/- as an earnest money. Hence, the balance consideration would be Rs.3,56,000/-to be paid to all the three defendants. If the balance consideration to be paid to all the three defendants is fixed as Rs.3,56,000/-, share of each defendant turns out to Rs. 1,18,666/-. It is noticed that while obtaining consent decree against defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A, the amount in excess of Rs.1,18,666/-has been paid. This would only mean that at the time when decree came to be passed, defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A respectively demanded additional monies than agreed consideration and plaintiff gave the amount in excess of the agreed consideration and secured consent decrees. This aspect of paying more amount to defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A was treated as unusual by Counsel for defendant no.2 when the balance consideration was not more than Rs.3,56,000/-. Plaintiff paid the consideration in excess of agreed consideration voluntarily and one cannot object to said excess payment. The next question is what is the share of defendant no.2 so far as balance consideration. The balance consideration payable to defendant no.2 would be Rs.1,18,666/- . The question is whether plaintiff has paid this amount to the defendant no.2 prior to stage of recording of evidence. It is worth noting that plaintiff has relied upon two documents executed by defendant no.2. The balance consideration payable to defendant no.2 would be Rs.1,18,666/- . The question is whether plaintiff has paid this amount to the defendant no.2 prior to stage of recording of evidence. It is worth noting that plaintiff has relied upon two documents executed by defendant no.2. They are (i) Power of Attorney dated 5th May, 1988 Exh.P-3 executed by defendant no.2 in favour of the plaintiff (ii) Exh.P-4 is a declaration dated 5th May, 1998 executed by defendant no.2 stating therein the terms of the suit transaction. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff wanted this Court to read these two documents to hold that balance of consideration has been paid to defendant no.2. It has also been the case of the plaintiff that the Tulsadevi and defendant no.2 had signed what may be referred to as consent terms which are on record as Exh.P-2. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff wanted to suggest that reading of Exh.P-2 signed by Tulsadevi as well as defendant no.2 shows that Tulsadevi and defendant no.2 admitted that full consideration has been paid. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff wanted to suggest that clause 4 in the said consent terms clearly indicates the receipt of total consideration of Rs.3,81,150/-. It was suggested by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that nothing is due and payable to defendant no.2. 18. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had contended that documents at Exh.P-3 and P-4 are forged documents and should not be relied upon by the Court. It was even suggested that there is no acknowledgement of consideration in the said documents and, therefore, they should not be relied upon to hold that balance consideration has been paid to defendant no.2. It was also contended by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that particulars of these two documents are not included in the list of documents, on which plaintiff wanted to rely upon at the time of the institution of the suit. I have considered these two documents. These two documents are executed on 15th May, 1988 before a Notary. This will mean that these two documents came in existence after the filing of the suit and, therefore, the plaintiff has not included these documents in the list of documents annexed to the plaint. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had contended that these documents are suspicious and are required to be disbelieved. This will mean that these two documents came in existence after the filing of the suit and, therefore, the plaintiff has not included these documents in the list of documents annexed to the plaint. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had contended that these documents are suspicious and are required to be disbelieved. Unfortunately, there is no cross-examination on these documents and there is no suggestion to say that these documents have been concocted or brought into existence by the plaintiff. It was argued that signature of defendant no.2 is not appearing on each and every page and that these documents are not genuine and the Notary has not been examined. In the cross-examination of plaintiff PW-1, there is no challenge to these documents. The documents have been properly executed before the Notary and, therefore, one need not question the execution of the same and raise a doubt about it. It was not necessary to have signature of defendant no.2 on each and every page of the document. It was not necessary to register these documents as per the provisions of Indian Registration Act as these documents were not required to be compulsorily registered as per the provisions of Indian Registration Act. These two documents were relied upon by the plaintiff for the purposes of proving the fact of execution of a suit agreement by defendant no.2 in favour of the plaintiff. In my view, by relying upon these two documents, the plaintiff has placed before the Court adequate material to show that the suit agreement was entered into by defendant no.2 for sell of the suit property. 19. The declaration executed by defendant no.2 vide Exh.P-4 undoubtedly makes out a case that the three original defendants executed the agreement. Power of Attorney at Exh.P-3 was executed by defendant no.2 to enable the plaintiff to take further steps in the matter as plaintiff was by profession a developer. These two documents appear to have been executed by defendant no.2 in the normal course and no doubt can be raised about it. It is noted that defendant did not file written statement for 24 years and it is only after passing of consent decrees against defendant nos. 1A, 1B and defendant no.3A, the defendant no.2 thought of filing written statement. The defendant no.2 of course could not succeed in said attempt. It is noted that defendant did not file written statement for 24 years and it is only after passing of consent decrees against defendant nos. 1A, 1B and defendant no.3A, the defendant no.2 thought of filing written statement. The defendant no.2 of course could not succeed in said attempt. One would not be able to see these two documents with doubt because till 1988 there was no objection on the part of the defendant no.2 to complete the suit transaction. The relations between the plaintiff and defendant no.2 appeared to be cordial otherwise defendant no.2 would not have gone before the Notary, execute the documents at Exhs. P-3 and Exh. P-4. The custody of these two documents with plaintiff cannot be termed as unnatural. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid, I accept these Exhs.P-3 and P-4 as executed by defendant no.2. 20. The plaintiff has relied upon the document at Exh.P-2 in support of his case that defendant no.2 had consented for a decree along with Tulsadevi. Plain reading of the said document would go to show that the said document appeared to have been brought into existence in April, 1986 though no specific date is put on the said document on which signatures of Tulsadevi and signature of defendant no.2 appear. The document is explained to Tulsadevi on 30th April, 1986 as an endorsement to that effect is found. This would mean that the said document came into existence on or about 30th April, 1986. It is to be noted that though this document came to be executed and styled as consent terms in this suit, the said document was not used for the purposes of obtaining consent decree though according to the plaintiff it was duly signed by defendant no. 2. This document will have to be read to decide whether defendant no.2 had consented for granting a decree in favour of defendant no.2 and whether the full consideration was paid to defendant no.2. It is to be noted that the signature of defendant no.2 is on the reverse of page 3 and on the reverse of page 3 except the signature of defendant no.2, there is no other writing. It is not even authenticated by an advocate for defendant no.2. It is to be noted that the signature of defendant no.2 is on the reverse of page 3 and on the reverse of page 3 except the signature of defendant no.2, there is no other writing. It is not even authenticated by an advocate for defendant no.2. Learned Counsel for defendant no.2 had submitted that the Court should look to this document with suspicion as defendant no.2 would not have signed this document in the manner in which it is shown to have been signed. After having perused the said document Exh.-2 coupled with the evidence of the plaintiff so far as this document at Exh.P-2 is concerned, I am inclined to accept the submission advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that it would be unsafe to rely upon this document to show that defendant no.2 consented for decree in favour of plaintiff. If the parties wanted to enter into consent terms, a proper document in the proper manner could have been executed. If at all, this document was executed by defendant no.2 and it was agreed that decree should be obtained, nothing prevented plaintiff to get defendant no.2 before the Court and obtain the consent decree. Hence, I am inclined to discard this document at Exh.P-2. Consequently, the case of plaintiff that balance of consideration was paid to defendant no.2 cannot be accepted. 21. The plaintiff had relied upon Exh.P-3 and P-4 to claim that balance consideration has been paid. It was sought to be contended that if the balance consideration would have not been paid to the plaintiff, defendant no.2 would not have executed the declaration at Exh.P-4 and the Power of Attorney at Exh.P-3. It is to be noted that in these two documents, there is no mention about payment of balance consideration to defendant no.2. These two documents are silent about the payment of balance consideration to defendant no.2. 22. As regards payment of consideration, cross-examination was conducted by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 on two aspects i.e. payment of earnest money and payment of balance consideration. So far as the payment of earnest money, I have already held that sum of Rs.25,000/-was paid at the time of execution of the suit agreement and acknowledgement thereof finds place in the body of the document as well as in the receipt clause. So far as the payment of earnest money, I have already held that sum of Rs.25,000/-was paid at the time of execution of the suit agreement and acknowledgement thereof finds place in the body of the document as well as in the receipt clause. I have, therefore, already rendered a finding that three defendants together did received earnest money of Rs.25,000/-. So far as the balance consideration, I have already held that amount in excess of share of the heirs of original defendant nos. 1 and 3 have been duly paid. Questions were asked to Virsen PW-1 about Virsen obtaining receipt for having paid consideration. PW-1 gave vague answers. He has not come out with the cogent evidence to show that consideration was duly paid. Considering all the documents on record and the evidence of Virsen PW-1, I hold that the plaintiff has failed to show that balance consideration of Rs.1,18,666/- payable to defendant no. 2 has been paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not produced any document to show that balance consideration was paid. Even the oral evidence is not convincing. In the absence of proper documentary evidence the bare word of the plaintiff that balance consideration was paid cannot be accepted and the plaintiff will have to pay to defendant no.2 Rs. 1,18,666/- if he wants conveyance from defendant no.2. 23. So far as question of readiness and willingness is concerned, the plaintiff has made out a case that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff has given evidence as regards his readiness and willingness. Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiff has proved his desire to do everything for the purposes of fulfillment of his obligations towards the suit agreement. 24. It is to be noted that defendants were to produce income tax clearance certificate as well as No Objection Certificate under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. According to plaintiff he had called upon the defendant no.1 to 3 produce these documents however defendant nos. 1 to 3 declined to do so and, therefore, plaintiff had no alternative but to institute the present suit for the specific performance. The plaintiff has also stated that when the defendant nos. According to plaintiff he had called upon the defendant no.1 to 3 produce these documents however defendant nos. 1 to 3 declined to do so and, therefore, plaintiff had no alternative but to institute the present suit for the specific performance. The plaintiff has also stated that when the defendant nos. 1 to 3 were called upon to perform their obligations orally they had declined to comply with the said obligations and that is how the plaintiff had to institute the suit. It was sought to be argued on behalf of defendant no.2 that the terms of agreement required issuance of 15 days notice demanding specific performance of the agreement from the defendants and as the notice was not given, case of the plaintiff should be rejected. Considering the terms of agreement issuance of notice was not a condition precedent. Even otherwise, plaintiff’s case that he had orally called upon original defendants to perform their part of agreement can be accepted. 25. I now deal with certain other objections raised by the learned Counsel for defendant no.2. It was argued by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that the signature of defendant no.2 is absent on the document at Exh.P-5. It is to be noted that plaintiff has given secondary evidence as regards the suit agreement through a document at Exh.P-5 and in such a situation, there would be no question of signature of the plaintiff appearing on the document at Exh.P-5. The argument advanced by learned Counsel for defendant no.2 in that behalf is totally misconceived. When a party wants to bring on record secondary evidence in regard to a document which is lost and when a copy of the same is produced in the normal course, it is impossible to have the signature of the plaintiff. 26. It was argued that the plaintiff did not obtain tax clearance certificate and permission under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. It is to be noted that responsibility to furnish these two documents was not on the plaintiff. It was the responsibility of the defendants. 27. It was argued on behalf of the learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that in the year 1979, the technology to have a xerox copy of the document was in existence and, therefore, it was easily possibly for the plaintiff to produce the xerox copy of the original suit agreement. It was the responsibility of the defendants. 27. It was argued on behalf of the learned Counsel for defendant no.2 that in the year 1979, the technology to have a xerox copy of the document was in existence and, therefore, it was easily possibly for the plaintiff to produce the xerox copy of the original suit agreement. It was submitted that non-production of such a xerox copy should be considered against the interest of the plaintiff. I am not at all impressed by this argument because if the plaintiff has not produced the Xerox copy of the original suit agreement, no adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. It was not mandatory for plaintiff to have xerox copy of original document. Merely because Xerox copy has not been produced, the case of the plaintiff cannot be seen with suspicion. 28. It was sought to be suggested that the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendants was an unconscionable contract. In support of this judgment in the case Vinayakappa Suryabhanappa Dahenkar V/s. Dulichand Hariram Murarkar AIR 1986 Bombay 193 was relied upon. It is required to be mentioned that except making such suggestion at the stage of arguments, there is no material on record to show as to how the transaction was unconscionable. A contention raised at the stage of argument without any material in support thereof that the transaction is unconscionable cannot be accepted. 29. It was sought to be argued that decree which are passed against defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A relate to agreement dated 15th March, 1980 and now the plaintiff is seeking specific performance in regard to an agreement dated 28th January, 1979 and, therefore, a decree for specific performance should not be passed against defendant no.2. I am not in agreement with this submission. The record clearly goes to show that in the plaint, plaintiff has referred to the suit agreement as agreement dated 28th January, 1979 at number of places, at the same time at one or two places in the body of the plaint and in the prayer clauses the agreement is termed as agreement dated 15th March, 1980. The amendment to show correct date as 28th January, 1979 was done only after decrees came to be passed between the plaintiff and defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A. The amendment to show correct date as 28th January, 1979 was done only after decrees came to be passed between the plaintiff and defendant nos.1A, 1B and 3A. The decree is passed against defendant nos.1A, 1B and defendant no.3A are in regard to suit agreement dated 28th January, 1979. In any event, the Court is required to test the case of the plaintiff qua defendant no.2. 30. It was argued that the suit agreement is not registered and, therefore, it should not be acted upon. This argument cannot be accepted as Indian Registration Act does not require compulsory registration of Agreement to Sale. 31. It was contended before this Court that suit agreement on which plaintiff is placing heavy reliance is not stamped as per the provisions of Bombay Stamp Act. Questions were asked to the plaintiff PW-1 as regards payment of stamp duty on the original document. No doubt, answers given by the plaintiff to that extent do not clearly indicate that the said document was duly typed on appropriate stamp paper. I am of the view that the Court should not dwell more on this aspect particularly when the plaintiff has relied upon copy of the suit agreement and has proved the transaction concerning the suit property by secondary evidence. In any case, at the time of execution of the final conveyance, the plaintiff will have to pay proper stamp duty. The argument advanced by defendant no.2 in that behalf is required to be rejected. 32. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am inclined to observe that the plaintiff has made out case for specific performance of the suit agreement in his favour. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff has failed to show that he has paid to defendant no.2 his share of consideration and, therefore, in order to secure specific performance of the suit agreement qua defendant no.2, the plaintiff will have to pay to defendant no.2 his share of balance consideration namely Rs.1,18,666/-. On payment of this consideration only, the plaintiff would be able to get specific performance from defendant no.2. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I record following findings in the suit. (i) The plaintiff has proved the suit agreement qua defendant no.2. Plaintiff has proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the suit agreement. On payment of this consideration only, the plaintiff would be able to get specific performance from defendant no.2. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I record following findings in the suit. (i) The plaintiff has proved the suit agreement qua defendant no.2. Plaintiff has proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the suit agreement. (ii) Plaintiff has shown that defendant no.2 was given opportunity to perform his part of the agreement, defendant no.2 has failed to perform his part of the agreement and as such the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the suit agreement. (iii) Plaintiff will be entitled to specific performance of agreement dated 28th January, 1979 as between himself and defendant no.2. 34. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid, I pass the following decree. DECREE (a)The Suit is decreed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). (b) Plaintiff shall deposit in this Court a sum of Rs.1,18,866/-on or before 15th October, 2010. Upon deposit of such amount, plaintiff shall inform defendant no.2 and his advocate about such deposit. The Prothonotary and Senior Maser shall invest the amount in Fixed Deposit for a period of six months and renew the same for like period till further orders. (c) After such a deposit has been made, plaintiff will be able to execute the decree against defendant no.2 for specific performance of the agreement dated 28th January, 1979 between plaintiff and defendant no.2. (d) By giving reasonable notice to defendant no.2, plaintiff would call upon defendant no.2 to execute necessary conveyance in his favour. If defendant no.2 fails to execute the conveyance as demanded by the plaintiff, plaintiff would be able to execute the decree of specific performance. After the conveyance is executed in favour of plaintiff, office to pay to defendant no.2 Rs. 1,18,666/-plus interest thereon without security or guarantee. (e) In the facts and circumstances of the case, defendant no.2 will have to be saddled with costs of this suit. Accordingly defendant no.2 to pay to plaintiff costs of this suit.